

FOUR YEARS AFTER TYPHOON YOLANDA UNRECOVERED PAST, UNCERTAIN FUTURE

CAUTION!
ONGOING
CONSTRUCTION

CAUTION!
AREA UNDER CONSTRUCTION
SORRY FOR INCONVENIENCE



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**UNRECOVERED PAST,
UNCERTAIN FUTURE**

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

4Ps	Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program
AAM	Adopt-a-Municipality project
ACC	Australian Civilian Corps
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AGHAM	Advocates of Science and Technology for the People
AID	area(s) of intervention and development
AO	Administrative Order
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AVID	Australian Volunteers for International Development
BALSA	Bayanihan Alay sa Sambayanan
Balwharteco	Balicutro Wharfage and Terminal Corporation
BBB	Build Back Better
BFP	Bureau of Fire Protection
Bgy.	barangay or village
BJMP	Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
BTB	Better than Before Project
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBD	Central Business District
CCT	conditional cash transfer
CEC	Center for Environmental Concerns
CHED	Commission on Higher Education
CLUP	comprehensive land use plan
CMTS	cable modem termination system
COA	Commission on Audit
CPH	Census of Population and Housing
CRRP	Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSA	Core Shelter Assistance
CSO	civil society organization
DA	Department of Agriculture
DAFAC	Disaster Assistance and Family Access Card
DAR	Department of Agrarian Reform
DBM	Department of Budget and Management
DBP	Development Bank of the Philippines
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DepEd	Department of Education
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DND	Department of National Defense

DOF	Department of Finance
DOE	Department of Energy
DOH	Department of Health
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOLE	Department of Labor and Employment
DORELCO	Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc.
DOST	Department of Science and Technology
DOT	Department of Tourism
DOTC	Department of Transportation and Communications
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways
DRR	disaster risk reduction
DRRM	disaster risk reduction and management
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
DZR	Daniel Z. Romualdez Airport
EC	electric cooperatives
ECC	Environmental Compliance Certificate
ECOPOWER Inc	Ecosystems Work for Essential Benefits, Inc.
EIA	environmental impact assessment
EIS	environmental impact statement
ESA	emergency shelter assistance
ESAMELCO	Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative, Inc.
EVRDP	Eastern Visayas Regional Development Plan
EVRGC	Eastern Visayas Regional Government Center
EVRMC	Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FMR	farm-to-market road
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GRDP	gross regional domestic product
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
GVA	gross value added
HEALS	Health Empowerment and Action
HLURB	Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
HOR	House of Representatives
HUDCC	Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
I-BUILD	intensified building up of infrastructure and logistics
I-PLAN	investments in planning at the local and national levels
I-REAP	investments in rural enterprises and agriculture and fisheries productivity
I-SUPPORT	implementation support to PRDP
IATF-Yolanda	Inter-Agency Task Force-Yolanda
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICT	information and communications technology
ID	identification card

IDP	internally displaced person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
iGOVPhil	Integrated Government Philippines Project
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMR	infant mortality rate
INGO	international non-government organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	informal settler families
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KADAMAY	Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
KAPACSA	Kapunungan han mga Parag-uma ha Calbiga han Samar
km	kilometer(s)
KMP	Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines)
KOICA	Korean International Cooperation Agency
KP	Kilusang Pagbabago
kph	kilometer(s) per hour
kWh	kilowatt-hour
LBP	Land Bank of the Philippines
LCDE	Leyte Center for Development, Inc.
LEYECO	Leyte Electric Cooperative
LFS	Labor Force Survey
LGU	local government unit
LWUA	Local Water Utilities Administration
m	meter(s)
MCCT	Modified Conditional Cash Transfer
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MMR	maternal mortality rate
MPA	Marine Protected Area
MSA	Modified Shelter Assistance
MSL	mean sea level
MSWD	Municipal Social Welfare and Development
MT	metric ton
MW	megawatt
NAPC	National Anti-Poverty Commission
NCA	notice(s) of cash allotments
NCIP	National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
NCR	National Capital Region
NDRRM	national disaster risk reduction and management
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NDZ	no dwelling zone
NEA	National Electrification Administration
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NERBAC	National Economic Research and Business Assistance Center

NGCP	National Grid Corporation of the Philippines
NGOs	non-government organizations
NHA	National Housing Authority
NHIP	National Health Insurance Program
NIA	National Irrigation Authority
NORSAMELCO	Northern Samar Electric Cooperative
NTC	National Telecommunications Commission
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
ODA	official development assistance
OFW	overseas Filipino worker
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process
OPARR	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
OWWA	Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
PACAP	Philippine-Australia Community Assistance
PCA	Philippine Coconut Authority
PDP	Philippine Development Plan
PFA	Presidential Financial Assistance
PhilHealth	Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
PNP	Philippine National Police
PPA	Philippine Ports Authority
PPAs	projects, programs and activities
PPP	public-private partnership
PRDP	Philippine Rural Development Project
Project CHARGE	Championing Children's Right in Rehabilitation through Government-Civil-Society-Children Engagement
PSA	Philippine Statistics Authority
PSP	Private Sector Promotion
QRF	Quick Response Funds
RAY	Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda
RCEP	Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership
RMP	Rural Missionaries of the Philippines
RoRo	roll-on, roll-off
RPAB	Regional Project Advisory Board
RROW	Road Right-of-Way
SAAD	Special Area of Agriculture Development
SAGUPA-SB	Samahan han Gudti nga Parag-uma ha Sinirangan Bisayas
SAMELCO	Samar Electric Cooperative
SARO	special allotment release orders
SEPALCO	Sulu Electric Power and Light Philippines, Inc
SICAFSA	Sitio Caminguhan Small Farmers Association
SOLECO	Southern Leyte Electric Cooperative
sq.m.	square meter(s)
STEP Center	Samar Tourism and Entrepreneurship Center
SY	school year
TESDA	Technical Education and Skills Development Authority

TRIP	Three-Year Rolling Infrastructure Plan
TYHP	Typhoon Yolanda Housing Program
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UFMR	under-five mortality rate
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UP-NIGS	University of the Philippines-National Institute of Geological Studies
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WSCAP	Western Samar Coastal Agricultural Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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Introduction

The Philippines is so exposed to natural hazards that millions of families are always at risk of falling into deeper poverty, and the economy can be disrupted in so many ways. The government's preparedness and its capacity to respond was tested in 2013 when Typhoon Yolanda (international code Haiyan) struck the country, especially Eastern Visayas, and in its aftermath. The last four years highlights major issues on the part of the government, which is and should always be the primary responder. Lessons need to be learned in terms of disaster response and according to a comprehensive framework of eradicating poverty and developing the economy.

In 2017, it is clearer than ever that Typhoon Yolanda was a disaster of huge proportions made worse by government neglect and corporate opportunism. This is in no way to discount the enormous outpouring of support and considerable efforts that the disaster triggered. This was fuelled by how news of the supertyphoon, images of the tragedy, and stories of its survivors quickly circulated through the infinite pathways of today's digital planet. The government, local NGOs, international agencies and NGOs, militaries, corporations and business, myriad groups, and countless concerned citizens in the Philippines and around the world mobilized in an unprecedented response.

Yet at the end of the day the hard persevering work of recovery and rehabilitation is the government's task especially, as is inevitable, when the fickleness of digital attention spans kicks in and newer dramas take over. This

research has found that the government still has so much to improve in this regard. The implications in the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda are bad enough, but the repercussions of unresolved government neglect will just become greater when, as is also inevitable, small and big disasters strike the country in the future.

This study focused on 10 research areas in Eastern Visayas, namely Tacloban City (Ridge View and Seaside); Palo, Leyte (Bgy. Baras and Bgy. San Agustin); Calbiga, Western Samar; Ormoc City; Borongan City; Catbalogan City; and Leyte (Tanauan and Calubian). A household survey using a 61-question instrument was also conducted in six research areas covering 1,023 respondents. Stakeholders contacted for interviews and data, published and unpublished, include: Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) including its national and local offices; National Economic and Development Authority Region VIII; Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); local government units of Tacloban City, Ormoc City, Catbalogan City, and Tanauan City, including their mayors; NGOs including Leyte Center for Development (LCDE) and Health Empowerment and Action (HEALS); and people's organizations such as SAGUPA-Eastern Visayas, San Agustin Farmers Association, KAPAKSA, KUSOG, MAGKAUBAN, ESAMELCO, KADAMAY-Federation of Market Vendors, SICAFSA, and People Surge.

The research shows that backlog of response is uneven and overall still immense. Many survivors still have no

homes and livelihoods. The government has to date only been able to deliver partially – and in some cases just fractions – of the targeted housing units, refertilized coconut and intercropped areas, irrigation systems, and livelihood programs. Thousands of classrooms remain unrehabilitated or unbuilt. This is amid huge controversies and allegations of corruption in the construction and distribution of housing units and emergency shelter assistance. There are homes lacking water and power even when there has been resettlement.

The Eastern Visayas region experience is also emblematic of deeper structural problems. Construction projects greatly boosted regional economic growth and seemingly improved its employment situation, albeit largely in informal and temporary work. Yet poverty and landlessness remain acute especially among the region's farmers, fisherfolk, and urban informal sector workers. The agricultural sector remains decimated and below pre-Yolanda levels, while manufacturing, never more than incipient, is even worse off. When the brief construction boom ends, so too will the spurt of growth and employment. The artificial influx of spending power from this and from other financial support will also subside.

The survivors and the region are also little served by the government's privatized, corporate-led and investment-driven rehabilitation plan. Disaster capitalism is in play. The idea of corporate "development sponsors" was launched early on with large private sector interests portrayed

as generously committing to education, health, housing, and livelihood projects as well as other rehabilitation efforts. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the government's regional development plan now conspicuously stresses business-oriented value chain development to exploit the region's agricultural, fishery and labour resources as well as tourism projects. Public resources are mobilized to, in effect, subsidize big business interests in these with infrastructure projects financed from general revenues as well as foreign loans and official development assistance (ODA).

On the other hand, little room is given to small farmers, fisherfolk, and the urban poor. They are dislocated from their communities which are supposedly hazard areas even as tourism resorts and commercial establishments are allowed to replace them. Land use policy is also aligned not with their need for land to till but towards conversion for other non-agricultural uses.

These will not do anything to resolve and address the serious development problems faced by the poor who make up the majority of the population: landlessness, poor education outcomes, high maternal mortality and malnutrition, unsanitary water sources, poor electrification, and lack of irrigation facilities. This chronic poverty and economic backwardness is the result of decades of neoliberal policies that have undermined domestic farming and manufacturing while making social services and public utilities unaffordable and inaccessible.

Many of the typhoon's victims and survivors struggled with poverty even before the typhoon hit. The momentary flurry of attention and flow of support that large disasters tend to prompt, as Typhoon Yolanda did, have evidently not been enough to change that. The greatly inadequate response of the government is a key factor. Four years later, millions of those affected by Yolanda have yet to recover even just what they lost and face an uncertain future.

The study however concludes on an optimistic note. It recognizes how people-centered disaster response and advocacy have been long-standing features of the organized struggles of Filipinos for real change and reforms. This is exemplified by the emergence of People Surge – at one point able to mobilize over 12,000 victims and survivors of Typhoon Yolanda to march in the center of Tacloban City. They join the larger mass movement of different sectors asserting their rights to dignity, justice and sovereignty, and the primacy of people's rights and welfare over corporate profits and narrow private gain.

A vertical photograph on the left side of the page shows a narrow, unpaved alleyway between tall, light-colored concrete buildings. A person with reddish hair, wearing a dark tank top and light shorts, is walking away from the camera down the alley. The ground is uneven and appears to be a mix of dirt and concrete. The lighting suggests it's daytime, with shadows cast on the walls.

CHRONOLOGY OF TRAGEDY

The magnitude of Typhoon Yolanda in 2013 revealed the Philippine government's lack of disaster preparedness and response, ironically for a country that is in the global list of top natural hazard countries. The Philippine government had just put in place the law on national disaster risk reduction management (NDRRM) in 2010, strengthening the role of the local government units (LGUs) in disaster mitigation and preparation, from the provinces and municipalities down to the *barangays* (villages). Five days after Typhoon Yolanda struck in 2013, local and international media observed that it was unclear who was in charge from the government.¹

By law (Local Government Code of 1991), the LGU is the first responder. But the NDRRM law also clearly states that if two or more regions are affected, the national government should immediately intervene. Yolanda affected nine regions covering 12,122 barangays in 44 provinces.² It took the Noynoy Aquino government a week to sort out its response; by then international humanitarian assistance led by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) was already taking the lead in relief and response.

Typhoon Yolanda evoked a quite large response – 57 countries, 29 militaries, all major humanitarian United Nations (UN) agencies, numerous non-government organizations (NGOs), and voluntary organizations. On the part of the Philippine government, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRMC) along with the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) as the designated lead agency to implement the NDRRM law were supposed to have the leading role, especially in bringing together about 44 civilian and military departments and agencies and setting up coordination cells. But the NDRRMC was criticized for being too slow and weak in coordinating these government agencies with the LGUs. Its nature as a stand-alone agency was put in question.^{1 3}

A month after Typhoon Yolanda, the Office of the President decided to take over the operation assigned to the NDRRMC through the creation of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR). Pres. Aquino appointed former senator Panfilo Lacson as head. The OPARR was mandated to be the overall manager in the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts of both government and private sector in the areas hit by the super-typhoon. It was also mandated to put together short-term as well as strategic plans for recovery and rehabilitation – a task that prior to Yolanda was assigned to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).⁴

Still, it was the NEDA that made the preliminary assessment of damage and

1 The NDRRMC is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) and vice-chaired by the Departments of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and Science and Technology (DOST), and the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). Members of the NDRRMC include government departments and institutions, the Philippines Red Cross, civil society representatives, and a representative from the private sector.

losses. The agency took only six weeks to conduct its estimate, which it pegged at US\$12.9 billion. It then published this in the 100-page Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY), and thereat pushed for a private sector-led reconstruction and outlined the guiding principle of “Build Back Better”. The RAY also became the basis for the 2013 supplementary budget and forward projections up to 2016 as well as for external financing.⁵

Meanwhile, the UN OCHA was coordinating relief operations with its established cluster approach. There were 12 clusters, and the Inter-Cluster Coordination Team, which reported to the Humanitarian Country Team, was headed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).⁶ (See Table 1)

The Inter-Cluster Coordination Team and the Humanitarian Country Team in a meeting on 4 July 2014 chaired by the DSWD and co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator decided to shift from relief to rehabilitation and recovery phase. This was four months ahead of the one-year period normally allotted for relief phase. It was a decision apparently due to the progress seen in Yolanda-affected areas. The 12 clusters were transitioned to five rehabilitation and recovery clusters, namely resettlement, social services, infrastructure, livelihood, and support, which OPARR started to lead.⁷

But it was a decision that came ahead of the crafting of a comprehensive rehabilitation plan. On 14 August 2014, the OPARR submitted to the President for approval the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP). It was to be the master plan for post-Yolanda rehabilitation within a three-year period 2014-2016 with the funding requirement of Php170.9 billion, conspicuously too small for the

TABLE 1. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN CLUSTERS IN THE PHILIPPINES

CLUSTER	CLUSTER LEAD
Camp coordination, camp management	DSWD and IOM
Coordination	UN OCHA
Early recovery and livelihoods	UNDP and ILO
Education	UNICEF and Save the Children
Shelter	DSWD and IFRC
Emergency telecommunications	WFP
Food security and agriculture	WFP and FAO
Health	DOH and WHO
Logistics	WFP
Nutrition	UNICEF
Protection	DSWD and UNHCR
Water, sanitation and hygiene	UNICEF

DOH Department of Health
 DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development
 FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
 IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
 ILO International Labour Organization
 IOM International Organization for Migration
 UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
 UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
 UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
 WFP World Food Programme
 WHO World Health Organization

Source: Assessment Capacities Projects Secondary Data Review

Php571 billion worth of estimated damages and losses and Php360.9 billion recovery and reconstruction needs based on RAY and the post-disaster needs assessment done by the OCD. Still, only Php37.4 billion would come from government funds, the rest would have to be raised from private investments.⁸

Pres. Aquino approved and publicly announced the CRRP just a week before the first anniversary of the tragedy. The public launch was a media and promotional event for Build Back Better. This was amid the continued political bickering between the politicians from Pres. Aquino’s Liberal Party and those from the opposition party

who happened to be in Eastern Visayas LGUs, and despite prevailing stories of undistributed assistance and unmet survivors’ needs.

Adding to the tragedy of government’s lack of disaster preparedness and response to the scale of ‘criminal negligence’ was the Aquino government unveiling a privatized, corporate-led and investment-driven rehabilitation plan. The CRRP promotes the concept of “development sponsors” who would commit projects in education, health, housing, and livelihood and/or participate in rehabilitation efforts. The OPARR divided the Yolanda-affected areas into 24 “areas of intervention and

development" (AID) that the "development sponsors" would "adopt". By January 2015, 18 corporations were considered "development sponsors", which committed to rehabilitate their respective AIDs. Other corporations also came in as 'donors' and made their presence felt. Many of these corporations are owned by the country's oligarchs.⁹ (See Annex 1)

Such 'disaster capitalism' was happening while the affected communities were still confused whether or not official response had already transitioned from relief to recovery. There was still a significant delay in the distribution of relief goods and donations, while survivors continued to live in temporary shelters years after Typhoon Yolanda. The more pressing concern now is how this disaster capitalism has aggravated not only the survivors' difficulty in recovery but also their vulnerability to disasters. The so-called rehabilitation projects aggravate the people's diminishing access to resources, livelihoods, public utilities, and social services.

Sen. Lacson filed his resignation from OPARR in December 2014, to take effect in February the following year. Pres. Aquino transferred the powers of the OPARR to the NEDA in April 2015 in Memorandum Order No. 79, which specified the transfer (more aptly, return) of the coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of all disaster-related programs, projects and activities (or PPAs in CRRP language). The NEDA would use the existing clusters on infrastructure, resettlement, social services, livelihood, and support, as well as existing institutional arrangements for monitoring and evaluating the PPAs.¹⁰ But it was unclear who would be left to tend to the demands of the neglected survivors.

Duterte: Another disaster?

Pres. Rodrigo Duterte expressed concern over the delay in the rehabilitation of Yolanda-affected areas during his campaign for the presidency. But it took him another year in

office before he would do something about the issue, and it was only to create another inter-agency task force that would implement and monitor the rehabilitation program.

Administrative Order (AO) No. 5 signed on 8 August 2017 stipulates that Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF)-Yolanda, as the task force is called, shall serve as the central committee of all executive departments and offices, including government-owned and -controlled corporations, which are involved in the different aspects of implementation and monitoring.¹¹

Pres. Duterte appointed his long-time right hand, Cabinet Secretary Leoncio Evasco, to be the chairperson of IATF-Yolanda. Serving as co-chairs are the Presidential Assistant for the Visayas Michael Dino, another long-time friend who served as Duterte's campaign manager, and Presidential Assistant for Special Concerns Norberto Gonzales who served as security adviser and defense secretary under the Arroyo administration.¹²

It is too early to say how the IATF-Yolanda shall fare in bringing justice to the Yolanda victims. But suffice it to say that Pres. Duterte's belated move is part of the ongoing image improvement by the current administration that is heavily criticized for its bloody war on drugs while nothing is happening with the economic crisis and intensifying poverty in the country.² Apart from the IATF-Yolanda, Cabinet Sec. Evasco is also tasked to handle 12 poverty-related agencies, supposedly for simpler and faster services. He is also in charge of leading an assumed grassroots movement, *Kilusang Pagbabago* (Movement for Change), which many believe is simply the mechanism to organize Pres. Duterte's followers.

² Pres. Duterte has vowed to focus as the centerpiece program of his administration on wiping out the country's drug problem by launching a police operation plan called Tokhang. This however targets the drug users, especially the poor, instead of the big-time drug traders. Tokhang has resulted in more than 12,000 drug-related killings of suspected dealers and users by the police and other vigilante groups.

Endnotes

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UNDELIVERED OUTPUTS

The damage that Typhoon Yolanda wreaked was huge, but government response had been minimal in comparison. Today, the remaining five clusters are assigned to deliver whatever immensely reduced targets are left to deliver. Still, four years after, the government, now under a new presidency, is still staggering to deliver its backlog. (See Table 2)

Resettlement, most tragic

The Resettlement Cluster is responsible for PPAs relating to the relocation of affected families living in danger zones to safe area, and for the development of secure, comprehensive, and sustainable settlements. PPAs include among others disaster resilient resettlement houses, multi-purpose covered courts, and school constructions or restorations. The Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) leads the cluster.¹

Members of the cluster are the: National Housing Authority (NHA), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Department of Agriculture (DA),

¹ The HUDCC was previously chaired by Vice-President Leni Robredo from the now opposition Liberal Party. She resigned from HUDCC after Pres. Duterte told her to “desist from attending Cabinet meetings”. She was replaced by Cabinet Secretary Evasco.




TABLE 2. SELECTED REMAINING DELIVERABLES PER CLUSTER, AS OF FIRST QUARTER 2017

DELIVERABLES	TARGET	COMPLETED	ONGOING	NOT YET STARTED
Resettlement				
Housing units constructed	205,128	50,791	71,743	56,870
<i>Under procurement</i>			25,724	
Livelihood				
Coconut area replanted (hectares)	100,000	101,571	21,929	1,991
<i>Under procurement</i>			10,000	
Coconut area fertilized (hectares)	282,000	41,149	4,721	15,280
<i>Under procurement</i>			12,414	
Areas with coconut intercropping (hectares)	282,000	84,298	860	1,255
<i>Under procurement</i>			1,525	
Rice and corn seeds distributed (bags)	148,848	131,091	6,241	7,716
Farm tools distributed	27,372	24,643	-	2,198
<i>Under procurement</i>			531	
Tractors and other machineries	188	150	-	20
<i>Under procurement</i>			9	
Beneficiaries of Tulong Pangkabuhayan sa Ating Disadvantaged / Displaced Workers	47,498	42,157	-	5,504
Beneficiaries of Integrated Livelihood Program	114,923	54,374	-	19,540
Livelihood assistance grant and Cash for Building Livelihood Assets provided (beneficiaries)	360,437	376,363	-	-
Skills and livelihood trainings conducted	48,733	40,022	-	16,158
Department of Trade and Industry starter kits distributed	12,477	4,397	-	8,080
Entrepreneurship trainings conducted	364	301	-	63
Fishing boats repaired / replaced	54,825	53,969	4,927	-
Fishing gear and paraphernalia provided (set)	68,636	79,105	2,546	-
Marine engine replaced	19,534	17,926	1,608	-
Input assistance provided	14,619,276	13,257,270	1,364,533	-
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources facilities rehabilitated / reconstructed	12	10	2	-
Social services				
Emergency Shelter Assistance (families)	1,032,655	1,038,671	42,197	-
Textbooks and learning materials provided (copies)	6,470,478	6,470,478	-	-
Infrastructure				
National roads reconstructed / rehabilitated (kilometers)	105	104	1	-
National bridges reconstructed / rehabilitated (kilometers)	1,853	1,853	-	-
Flood control structures reconstructed / rehabilitated	110	103	7	-
Airport facilities rehabilitated	40	38	-	2
Seaport facilities rehabilitated	56	27	10	8
<i>Under procurement</i>			11	
Newly constructed classrooms	2,313	1,790	207	178
<i>Under procurement</i>			3	
Rehabilitated classrooms	17,335	11,720	1,032	313
State colleges and universities projects completed	719	701	16	2
National / communal irrigation systems restored (structures)	206	111	4	91
Municipal facilities rehabilitated	307	305	2	-
Barangay facilities rehabilitated	3,517	2,546	747	-
<i>Under procurement</i>			224	
Resettlement sites provided with electricity	310	90	-	-
Food warehouses reconstructed	4	1	1	-

Source: National Economic and Development Authority

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Department of Education (DepEd), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), DILG, Department of Health (DOH), DOST, DSWD, OCD, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), Office of the Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process (OPAPP), and the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC).^{1 2}

NHA under fire

The Resettlement Cluster targeted 205,128 housing units for construction by the NHA through the Typhoon Yolanda Housing Program (TYHP), a roadmap of priority interventions in the 171 cities and municipalities affected by the typhoon. The TYHP is under the CRRP and its timeframe was also supposed to end in 2016. The Commission on Audit (COA) report by end 2016 showed that only 42,599 housing units were completed under the program, and only 26.9% of these housing units had been occupied.³ (See Table 3)

The TYHP is the largest program of the NHA; the two other programs are for military personnel and informal settler families. Of the total targeted 382,082 housing units, only 49.8% were completed on end-2016. The delay or non-accomplishment within the three-year period, according to COA, was primarily due to the delay in the releases of funds, particularly for the TYHP, and the lack of sites.⁴

Of the total Php59.8 billion appropriated for TYHP, 73.5% was released under different special allotment release orders (SARO) and only 23.6% was released with notices of cash allotments (NCAs). In short, the funds of Php59.8 billion for TYHP had been obligated, and the Department of Budget Management (DBM) had released Php44 billion, but the NHA has only disbursed Php14.1 billion.⁵ (See Table 4)

The COA cited the lack of basic facilities and access road and the beneficiaries' lack of funds to improve the housing units as among the reasons for low occupancy rate.

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF HOUSING UNITS UNDER NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY HOUSING PROGRAMS, 2014-2016

HOUSING PROJECT	TARGET	COMPLETED		
		TOTAL	OCCUPIED	UNOCCUPIED
AFP / PNP / BJMP / BFP	68,689	62,472	7,143	55,329
ISF	108,265	85,342	57,410	27,932
TYHP	205,128	42,599	11,451	31,148
Total	382,082	190,413	76,004	114,409

AFP - Armed Forces of the Philippines
 BFP - Bureau of Fire Protection
 BJMP - Bureau of Jail Management and Penology

ISF - Informal Settler Families
 PNP - Philippine National Police
 TYHP - Typhoon Yolanda Housing Project

Source: Commission on Audit

TABLE 4. APPROPRIATION FOR HOUSING PROJECTS, 2011-2016 (IN PHP BILLION)

HOUSING PROJECT	FUNDING REQUIREMENTS/ APPROPRIATION	SARO	NCA
TYHP	59.8	44.0	14.1
AFP / PNP / BJMP/ BFP / BUCOR	20.9	20.9	14.8
ISF	32.3	30.5	20.2
Total	112.9	95.4	49.2

Note: Appropriations for TYHP were for 2013-2016.
 AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines
 BFP – Bureau of Fire Protection
 BJMP – Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
 BUCOR – Bureau of Corrections

ISF – Informal Settler Families
 NCA – Notice of Cash Allotment
 PNP – Philippine National Police
 SARO – Special Allotment Release Orders
 TYHP – Typhoon Yolanda Housing Project

Source: Commission on Audit

The built housing units, on the other hand, are ‘substandard’ as revealed by Engr. Camilo Salazar, the authorized subcontractor of the main contractor, J.C. Tayag Builders Inc. This was the subject of inquiry of the Committee on Housing and Urban Development of the House of Representatives (HOR), which also insinuated that the main contractor could be charged with plunder since the amount involved is more than Php50 million and that NHA could be held liable for gross negligence. The Committee also found out that 80% of the projects in Eastern Visayas were cornered by J.C. Tayag Builders, Inc.⁶

Anomalies in shelter assistance

Meanwhile, the DSWD has the mandate through AO No. 17 series of 2010 to provide shelter assistance. There are three types, namely Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA), Core Shelter Assistance (CSA), and Modified Shelter Assistance (MSA).⁷

The ESA is the provision of limited cash or materials to help families with damaged

houses located in safe sites or in areas engineered to be habitable. In 2014 the DSWD through Memorandum Circular No. 24 specified further the eligibility requirements for families to avail of the ESA, including being listed in the official DSWD list through the system of Disaster Assistance and Family Access Card (DAFAC) and being employed with fixed monthly salary below Php15,000, provided they have not received the same assistance from other agencies and are in the DAFAC list.

The amount of Php30,000 is to be given per family or individual beneficiary whose owned house is totally damaged. The amount of Php10,000 is to be given per family or individual beneficiary whose house is partially damaged or whose rented or shared house is partially or totally damaged.⁸

The CSA on the other hand is the provision of environment-friendly, structurally strong units that can withstand 220-kilometer-per-hour (kph) wind velocity, earthquake



up to intensity 4 of the Richter scale, and other similar natural hazards. Eligibility requirements include income below food threshold based on the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) poverty statistics, and possession of a guarantee of ownership or permanent or long-term occupancy on the lot.

Lastly, the MSA provides limited financial and material assistance to augment family resources in building houses in relocation sites for the purpose of modifying structural design in consideration of cultural, economic, religious and political norms of the affected areas and the families.⁹

The DSWD's recovery and rehabilitation efforts in Yolanda-affected areas focused mainly on ESA distribution and the construction of transitional shelters managed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to address the immediate need for housing of displaced families awaiting resettlement. Of the total Php1.2 billion cash donations received by the department, ESA distribution accounted for 46.6%; transitional shelter, 16.2%; and CSA comprised seven percent. The DSWD also received Php131.2 million worth of grants from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to construct 1,559 units of modified shelter, additional funds for IOM transitional shelter, and cash for work for the beneficiaries. (See Table 5)

TABLE 5. MAJOR EXPENSES FROM DONATIONS, AS OF 2016 (IN PHP)

ACTIVITY / PROGRAM	AMOUNT	% OF TOTAL DONATIONS
<i>Shelter construction - 71% of total cash donations</i>		
Emergency Shelter Assistance	543,277,225	46.6
Transitional Shelters (construction managed by IOM)	189,000,000	16.2
Core Shelter Assistance Project	81,862,132	7.0
Leyte Resettlement Site Sustainable Water Supply in partnership with IOM	10,000,000	0.9
Permanent Shelter Assistance (IOM)	3,262,000	0.3
<i>Other support projects - 7.9% of total cash donations</i>		
Construction of boat garage in Guiuan, Eastern Samar	27,000,295	2.3
Cash For Work	24,310,413	2.1
Living Assistance Grants	19,142,545	1.6
Issuance of Civil Registry and Request for Civil Registry Region VIII	8,999,900	0.8
Payment of NFA Rice	6,926,831	0.6
Supplementary Feeding Program	5,665,950	0.5
<i>Administrative and support services - 9.7% of total cash donations</i>		
Purchase of Office Equipment and Support Vehicles for Centers and Institutions and Warehouses	22,002,141	1.9
Support to Operations	90,671,509	7.8

IOM – International Organization for Migration
NFA – National Food Authority

Source: Department of Social Welfare and Development Establishing DSWD's Accountability: A Critical Assessment of the Utilization of Recovery and Rehabilitation Funds for Yolanda Survivors

Due to the extensive damage, the DSWD asked the OPARR for additional ESA funds: Php13.5 billion for totally damaged houses for 449,127 households (each at Php30,000) and Php5.2 billion for partially damaged houses for 417,214 households (each at Php10,000). The DBM released Php20 billion under the RAY plus Php176.2 million under the Quick Response Funds

(QRF) from the national budget, in addition to Php543 million cash donations (reflected in Table 5). (See Table 6)

The DSWD under Sec. Dinky Soliman of the Aquino administration became the subject of mistrust and complaints by the survivors due to delays in relief and rehabilitation efforts despite huge cash donations

TABLE 6. FUND SOURCES FOR EMERGENCY SHELTER ASSISTANCE, (IN PHP)

FUND SOURCE	AMOUNT
Department of Budget Management release	20,010,650,000
Donations	543,277,225
Quick Response Funds	176,202,775
Total	20,730,130,000

Source: Department of Social Welfare and Development Establishing DSWD's Accountability: A Critical Assessment of the Utilization of Recovery and Rehabilitation Funds for Yolanda Survivors

and additional funds received by the department. Upon his assumption of the presidency, Pres. Duterte opened Cabinet positions to nominees of the Philippine Left, and the DSWD was one of the agencies occupied by the Left's nominee, Sec. Judy Taguiwalo. In her first 100 days, Sec. Taguiwalo conducted a study to establish the DSWD's accountability to the survivors and to the funds received in order to identify gaps and come up with an action plan.

The DSWD accomplished the distribution of ESA for 468,528 totally damaged houses and 667,429 partially damaged houses – all amounting Php20.7 million, approximating the exact total of ESA funds. However, the study revealed that, among others:

- 1) ESA distribution started only a year after Yolanda;
- 2) Funds released remained undisbursed for at least five months due to inefficiencies of LGUs;
- 3) A large portion of the funds disbursed remained unliquidated upon Sec. Soliman's turnover to Sec. Taguiwalo;
- 4) The issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 24 created confusion, conflicts

- 5) and complaints among the implementers and beneficiaries, in the process excluding listed beneficiaries;
- 6) Wide discretion was given to barangay officials in the selection of beneficiaries, leading to politicking and exclusion of beneficiaries;
- 7) Beneficiaries were shortchanged or received incomplete amounts; and
- 8) Thousands of survivors are still awaiting their ESA to this day.¹⁰


For CSA distribution, the department targeted 3,112 housing units from the ADB funds, QRF and cash donations. By August 2016, the department had completed only 33% of target or 1,017 housing units and was in the process of completing 160 more, while it had not started 1,935 housing units. Delays were attributed to problems in acquisition of land, insufficient funds for labor or cash for work, competition for supplies, and distance from the town centers or suppliers. Even the ADB-funded 1,559 modified shelter units were barely started, with only 8 units completed, 59 units ongoing, and 1,492 units not yet started by August 2016.¹¹

With regard to transitional shelters, IOM was awarded Php189 million for the construction of 2,480 transitional shelters in Leyte, Eastern



Samar and Western Samar from August 2014 to December 2015. As of September 2016, the IOM has constructed 770 transitional shelters and 640 timber houses or a total of 1,410 units, 57% lower than targeted, and for a cost of Php201 million, 6.35% higher than budgeted. The ADB funded the balance of Php12 million.

Apparently, there was a major change in the number of units and conversion of 1,709 transitional shelters to 640 timber houses without the approval from the DSWD, which resulted in excessive cost yet less number of beneficiaries. The study also found out that the overhead cost of Php82.8 million is 41% of project cost, exceeding the 14% allowable overhead based on DPWH standards. Lastly, the study revealed uneconomical or irregular use of government funds in the upgrading of transitional shelters. Some 133 transitional shelters costing Php19 million were set to be dismantled only nine months from date of transfer, whereas they can last for as long as five years. The DSWD upgraded these to core shelters at a total cost of Php10.1 million.¹²





Livelihood, neglected

The Livelihood Cluster is responsible for the provision of livelihood and emergency employment assistance to the affected families. This includes crop production, industry, trade and services, forestry, fishery, and livestock and poultry. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) heads the cluster.

Members are the: DSWD, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), DA, DAR, DENR, DOST, OCD, HUDCC, NCIP, OPAPP, NAPC, NHA, Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and government financial institutions such as the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).¹³

The Livelihood Cluster targeted 100,000 hectares replanted with coconut trees; 282,000 hectares intercropped with

coconut trees; 109,708 rice and corn seeds distributed (raised to 148,848 in 2016); 27,372 farm tools distributed; 176 tractors and machinery (raised to 188 in 2016); 58,873 fishing boats repaired/replaced; and 81,377 fishing gears (reduced to 68,636 in 2016).^{14 15}

The DSWD targeted 360,437 beneficiaries of livelihood assistance, while the TESDA targeted 48,733 skills and livelihood trainings. The DTI aimed for 364 entrepreneurship trainings and 17,470 starter kits distributed (reduced to 12,477 in 2016).

As of end-2016 and based on available data for the first quarter of 2017, the government has over-achieved the targeted area for coconut replanting, distribution of fishing gear and paraphernalia, and beneficiaries of livelihood assistance. The rest of the targets have achievement rates ranging from 30% (area for coconut

intercropping); 82% (skills and livelihood trainings; to 94% (fishing boats repaired/replaced). (See Table 2)

Meanwhile, the DOLE also showed low achievement rate in its Integrated Livelihood Program, where 114,923 beneficiaries were targeted in 2017, and only 54,374 have so far benefited.

One of the most controversial aspects of the livelihood programs was the delay in the payment of cash-for-work. The initial assessment that IBON conducted in 2016 confirmed for example that the DSWD provided in 2015 cash-for-work to 120 residents in Bgy. 70, Anibong, Tacloban City, but payment only arrived in October 2016.¹⁶

Social services, sorely lacking

The Social Services Cluster is in charge of continuing relief operations to the most vulnerable groups and resuming community services in the affected areas. These services include food, health, education, emergency/transitional shelter, and on shelter assistance. The DSWD heads the cluster.

Members are the: DND, DA, DAR, DepEd, DENR, DOH, OCD, HUDCC, HLURB, NCIP, OPAPP, NAPC, NHA, and the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).¹⁷

The cluster targeted the distribution of ESA and textbooks and learning materials. (Reconstruction or repair of facilities is under the Infrastructure Cluster.) Distribution of 6.5 million textbooks and learning materials was accomplished by the first quarter of 2017. Meanwhile, ESA distribution became the most controversial of the rehabilitation targets of the Aquino administration, as revealed in the DSWD study and COA audit.

The DSWD also targeted to expand the coverage of its conditional cash transfer (CCT) poverty alleviation program to Yolanda-affected areas. In 2014, the allocated CCT fund reached Php44 billion, covering about 847 municipalities nationwide. Through the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan – Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services – National Community-Driven Development Program (Kalahi CIDSS - NCDDP), the DSWD prioritized the 554 municipalities in Yolanda-affected regions with higher allocation from the Php44-billion fund.^{2 18}

The funding would come from the national government (Php9.3 billion), World Bank (US\$479 million), and ADB (US\$372.1 million). The DSWD aimed to use accelerated procedures in the targeted disaster areas to implement the program.¹⁹ The CCT allocation increased to Php65 billion for 2015 plus Php2 billion in supplemental budget for Yolanda victims. The Kalahi-CIDSS-NCDDP will run up to 2019.

The components are: capacity building of local government; community grants to fund social preparation and planning; and project management to fund DSWD operations. The DSWD conducted an evaluation of the implementation so far, and the results are varied. The projects generally suit the needs of the communities, albeit given below 75% satisfaction rating. In terms of timeliness, the communities felt that the response was rather late despite accelerated community empowerment cycle approach. There was also low community participation and low representation of the more marginalized sectors. There were also ambivalent results with regard to resiliency and sustainability and transparency and accountability.²⁰

² Kalahi CIDSS-NCDDP is a poverty alleviation program, which according to its brochure, “aims to ensure that communities in targeted poor and disaster-affected municipalities are empowered to achieve improved access to services and to participate in more inclusive local planning, budgeting, implementation and disaster risk reduction and management.”



Infrastructure, priority over survivors' needs

The Infrastructure Cluster is in charge of rehabilitation programs and projects relating to physical infrastructure, both horizontal and vertical, damaged or destroyed by Typhoon Yolanda. This includes construction, repair and restoration of damaged roads, bridges and other public structures. It is led by the DPWH.

Members of the cluster are the: DA, DAR, DepEd, Department of Energy (DOE), DENR, DTI, DOH, DOST, the previous Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), DILG, OCD, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), CHED, National Irrigation Administration (NIA), and National Electrification Administration (NEA).²¹

The government prioritized infrastructure rehabilitation over other clusters during the first few months after the typhoon. By the first quarter of 2017, the cluster had accomplished half of its targets, while others remained undone. The backlog includes: 2 airport facilities; 29 seaport facilities; 523 new classrooms

for construction; 5,615 classrooms for rehabilitation; 971 barangay offices for rehabilitation; and 73 national/communal irrigation systems for restoration. These back jobs have brought much frustration among the affected communities.

Support, absent

The Support Cluster is supposed to address cross-cutting policy concerns and issues among the different clusters. It is co-chaired by the DBM and the NEDA. Members are the: Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of Finance (DOF), Department of Justice (DOJ), DSWD, Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office (PCDSPO), Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO), Presidential Management Staff (PMS), OES, OCS, OPAPP, COA, DENR, DILG, HLURB, and DPWH. The NEDA however, does not report its targets and progress.

Eastern Visayas: most devastated, most glaring gaps

The government has focused response mainly on Eastern Visayas (Region VIII), rightly so since it was the most devastated

region. But even then, the size of output backlog in the region is inexcusable.

Major obstacles identified by the government were surmountable, if only government prioritized resettling the victims and rebuilding their lives and livelihoods. Instead, infrastructure was prioritized to immediately restore business activities.

As of July 2017, Php32 billion has been released to Region VIII. The DBM reports Php105.4 billion released since 2013 up to March 2017. Yet, major issues, though avoidable, remain.^{22 23}

For resettlement, Php14.4 million has been released as of 28 July 2017, but only Php6 million has been disbursed, to cover only 16,846 of the targeted 56,140 housing units.²⁴ In Tacloban City alone, the LGU admitted that around 6,000 people are still to be resettled.²⁵ Some Php6.7 million has already been disbursed for ESA, but as of 2017 some 705 families with totally damaged houses have not yet received the financial assistance.^{26 27} Two resettlement projects in Balangiga, Easter Samar are also the subject of controversy for substandard quality of the permanent housing units.²⁸

There is a substantial delay in the implementation of the water and power supply projects for the resettlement areas in the region. Of the 86 resettlement sites, only five are serviced with water supply by the LWUA and only 59 are energized by the NEA. Building permanent schools, particularly in Tacloban North, has also been snail-paced.

In terms of livelihood, Php2.6 million has been released, of which Php1.9 million has been disbursed. Coconut replanting and fertilization is so under-achieved, along with the distribution of fishing gear

and paraphernalia. The DA lags behind, accomplishing nothing of its target outputs. The DA and Department of Tourism (DOT) on the other hand started livelihood projects in the resettlement areas only recently due to delays in the release of funds.²⁹ It has also been conspicuous how the LGU has prioritized tourism by infusing livelihood assistance in the tourism department.

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- 29 *Ibid.*



SURVIVING UNSETTLING LIFE

This study focused on 10 research areas in Eastern Visayas, namely Tacloban City (Ridge View and Seaside); Palo, Leyte (Bgy. Baras and Bgy. San Agustin); Calbiga, Western Samar; Ormoc City; Borongan City; Catbalogan City; and Leyte (Tanauan and Calubian). (See Annex 2)

Tacloban City is located in the northeastern part of the island of Leyte. It is considered 'highly urbanized' with 138 barangays, 17 of which are rural barangays. Land area is 20,172 hectares – 47.9% are classified water bodies; 31.3% alienable and disposable; and 20.8% timberland. Natural resources are marine resources, *tikog* grass, *tigbao* grass, and bamboo.¹

Population is estimated to reach 250,268 in 2017, around 58,202 households. Sixty-four percent are in the labor force, with unemployment rate of 3.2% and underemployment at 27.2 percent. Poverty incidence is at 20.2 percent.

The city's development plan identifies its agri-industrial center to be located in the northern portion of Tacloban City, Bgy. Tagpuro, Old Kawayan and New Kawayan. Preferred industries are beverage, food, textile, ceramic, electrical machinery, fabricated metal, non-ferrous metal, and glass factory.²

Ridge View is one of the relocation sites for Typhoon Yolanda survivors. It is located in North Tacloban and is composed of identical housing units. Most of the houses are yet to be finished, however. The place is almost barren and the ground is covered with cement, which makes it scorching especially in the afternoon.³

Seaside is where most of the residents in Ridge View came from. Seaside is an area of informal settlers located near the shipping port and the market. The houses of the residents are made from scavenged scrap materials. The seaside is brimming with debris and waste washed up from the sea, but this does not stop the children from taking baths or playing near the murky waters.⁴

Palo is located in the northeastern part of the province of Leyte. It is composed of 33 barangays, 25 of which are rural. The municipality covers 8,018.58 hectares – 72.2% are agricultural lands; 14.6% forest; the rest are roads, open water spaces, mangroves, and others. The top crop is coconut, followed significantly by rice and corn.⁵

Population in Palo reaches 70,052. It is predominantly young, with 15-64 years old constituting 60% of the total population. The level of unemployment in the municipality of Palo could not be determined after Typhoon Yolanda. It definitely surged, according to the development plan of the municipality, along with the poverty incidence, due to the extent of damage to “almost all social and economic infrastructures in the locality.”^{6,7}

One of the major issues in the municipality is the changing land use pattern after the typhoon. There are at least four sites identified for new permanent housing

and seven sites for temporary relocation areas. There are also directives to relocate structures along the Leyte Gulf, the two rivers, Bangon and Binahaan Rivers, and along the major roads.

The area with steep slopes in the northwest part is for protected forests, but some parts have also been assigned for new permanent housing. A solar farm will also be developed in this area. The southeast part along the coast is a vast mangrove site that is delineated by a major road that is lined up with informal settlements.

In between the roads leading to the towns of Tanauan and Pastrana are the irrigated and irrigable agricultural lands with small patches of residential areas. Devastated coconut farming communities will also be redefined in terms of land use.⁸

Bgy. Baras in Palo, Leyte faces San Pablo Bay. The residents reside in permanent housing shelters made out of wood or cement. Currently, Section Four, the first section of the Tide Embankment Project, is being constructed in Bgy. Baras. Those affected by the project are mostly coconut vendors who self-demolished and fishermen who had huts near the “no dwelling zone” (NDZ).⁹

Bgy. San Agustin is a farming community. Residents live in uniform housing units. The land is mostly flat with mountains seen afar.¹⁰

Samar or Western Samar is bounded on the north by Northern Samar, on the east by Eastern Samar, on the west by Samar Sea, and on the south by Leyte Gulf. It is largely an agricultural province; its major crops are coconut, palay, corn, and banana. It is also the second major fish-producing province in Eastern Visayas.¹¹

Alienable and disposable land accounts for 62.3% of the total land area of the province, and the rest is forestland, 81.9% timberland.¹²

The province has a long coastline in the western side, extending over 300 kilometers from Calbayog City to the southernmost municipality of Marabut.

The province is divided into two congressional districts, with the first district composed of nine municipalities and one city (Calbayog), while the second district is composed of 15 municipalities and one city (Catbalogan), the capital and a newly created city. Majority of the municipalities and the two cities are coastal and only four are in the mainland. The province has a total of 951 barangays, being 409 coastal and 542 inland.¹³

Calbiga belongs to the second district of Samar. It is mainly a farming community, while some residents near the waters work as fishermen. Calbiga is a mountainous area between Maqueda and Villareal Bays.¹⁴

Meanwhile, Catbalogan City is located at the western seacoast of Samar, which faces Silanga Bay. It is bounded on the western side by Maqueda Bay, on the north by the municipalities of Tarangnan and San Jorge, and on the east by Jiabong. The Maharlika Highway traverses the city from the south. Catbalogan City is composed of 57 barangays, 21 of which are located in coastal areas and 15 are in the upland areas. Catbalogan City is mainly a fishing community.¹⁵

Ormoc City is located on the northwestern coastal plain of Leyte Island. Its eastern portion is generally hilly and mountainous, reaching a peak of 1,000 meters above sea level. Its western and southwestern portions are nearly level to undulating

lands that form the Ormoc Valley. Its 464.30-square kilometer land area is mainly agricultural and protected forest. Only 6% of the land area is built-up with the bulk along Ormoc Bay. It has 215,031 inhabitants.

Ormoc City is among the four pilot areas of the Adopt-a-Municipality (AAM) project. The three other municipalities are Palo in Leyte and Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo. AAM was initiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) after Typhoon Yolanda with the objective of modeling a post-disaster framework for resilient recovery planning. The AAM was also a means to segue into comprehensive land use planning at the local level. The AAM is an operationalization of Build Back Better principles.¹⁶

Borongan City is located along the middle coastal part of the province of Eastern Samar. The city center is situated along the northern banks of the Lo-om River and is set back a little distance away from the shoreline of Borongan Bay.¹⁷

The city is bounded on the north by the municipality of San Julian, on the south by the municipality of Maydolong, on the west by the Samar municipalities of Hinabangan, Calbiga, Pinabacdao, and Basey, and on the east by the Pacific Ocean. The city's territory includes the islands of Ando, Monbon, and Divinubo in Borongan Bay. It has approximately 69,297 population.

The main product of Borongan is copra. Also, many families rely on coastal and deep-sea fishing as well as lowland and upland farming for means of livelihood. The city is also grooming itself to be one of the region's top tourist destinations.¹⁸

Bgy. Songco in Borongan City is located at the eastern side of the city, near the

Philippine Sea. It is a coastal community near the "boulevard", which is a tourist attraction of small cemented sheds selling various kinds of street food.¹⁹

Tanauan is a second-class municipality of the province of Leyte. Tanauan is approximately 18 kilometers south of Tacloban City. It is bounded on the north by the municipality of Palo, on the south by the municipality of Tolosa, on the west by the municipalities of Dagami and Tabon-Tabon, and on the east by San Pedro Bay. It is composed of 5 barangays and has approximately 55,021 people.²⁰

Major economic activities are agriculture, livestock raising, fishing, forestry, mining, trade, and tourism. Bgy. Calsadahay is a farming community, consisting of flatlands bordered with mountains.²¹

Lastly, Calubian is a fourth-class municipality of Leyte with 31,228 people. It occupies the eastern portion of the northernmost tip of the mainland of Leyte. It is bounded on the north by the Biliran Strait, on the south by the municipality of San Isidro, on the east by the town of Leyte, and on the west by the Visayan Sea. Its coastline measures 36 kilometers located in a harbor that is port of call of inter-island vessels.²²

Land area is 13,760 hectares of undulating and rolling terrain. Calubian has seven major rivers, namely Gutosan, Gunsorongan, Villanueva, Manga, Railes, Jubay, and Cuwanon Rivers.

Calubian is basically an agricultural town. Of the total land area of 13,760 hectares, 70.7% is agricultural with additional 3,180.26 hectares of grassland is potential for agricultural development. The number one major crop grown is coconut, which is commercially grown covering a total

of 53% of municipality's total land area. Major crops grown are corn, rice, banana, vegetables, and root crops. Corn is the staple food crop of the majority.²³

Bgy. Jubay is located in the northwestern part of Leyte and is facing the Biliran Strait. It is a mountainside farming community with no road networks. The only mode of transportation is by walking or through motorcycles.²⁴

Ridge View: Still not home

Ridge View Park in Bgy. Cabalawan is one of the resettlement sites in Tacloban City.

The families who survived Typhoon Yolanda were resettled in 2016. To this day, however, they are still confused whether or not the housing in Ridge View is for free. Pres. Duterte apparently assured the residents that the houses would be given to them for free, but local government officials including the NHA have come to collect money for the dwelling units.

Substandard housing

The residents have also complained that the houses are substandard. After the earthquake that hit the Visayas in 2017, the residents observed that their housing units had cracks. According to them, the walls were made from Hardiflex and could not withstand the quake. The workers of the contractor, CSE Builders, revealed to the residents that the walls are hollow and only sand was put inside.

The roof leaks after heavy rains. The whole house sounds like water is coming out of the floors and walls when rain pours or when the ground shakes. Moreover, the housing units in Ridge View, unlike in other resettlement sites such as Northhills,

Greendale, and Guadalupe, do not have floor tiles.

After a year of occupancy, their comfort rooms are already clogged. Some units do not have toilets, or have misaligned pipes. The septic tanks are left open.

Lack in basic amenities

Water is available in the housing units, but tap water is not potable. The residents have to buy drinking water for Php30 per jug (5 gallons). Sometimes tap water turns brown and causes their clothes to turn yellow.

Water tanks from the NGO, Oxfam, which purify water from lakes, are available. Purified water costs Php2 per jug to pay for the salary of the personnel who maintains the water tanks.

Electricity is not available in the housing units. There are electric posts in Ridge View, but there is no electricity. The residents had to approach a private electricity provider and had to pay Php1,600 for the meter and Php300 every month for their electricity usage.

In terms of mobility, roads to and from Ridge View are substandard. The DepEd was about to build a school in the area, but the NHA engineer did not allow the trucks to enter because the roads do not have such carrying capacity. The roads are also dangerous at night since they are not lighted. Residents pay Php15 fare for a jeepney ride and another Php7 for pedicab (foot-powered bicycle with side cart) to get to downtown.

Scant livelihood

The relocatees have no access to stable livelihoods. Their being displaced from

being near downtown has caused their incomes to dwindle. Some lost their regular jobs in the city, while others have to pay for higher transportation fares to get to the city.

Some of them had to borrow from loan sharks for their start-up of vending in the market, but even that could not be sustained due to harsh competition. Many of the residents sink in debts for their daily sustenance.

When the Ridge View residents were living near downtown, they could save a bit and invest for small trade. But transferring to Ridge View has reversed their plight. Now, they are borrowing from usurious lenders just to get by.

Some of the residents did cash-for-work with Php260 per day, which lasted for a month. Some availed of the cash-for-work of the NGO Tzu Chi Foundation for Php500 per day, which lasted for three months. But not everyone could get cash-for-work, since selection was narrow.

Neglected social services

Social services are also scant in the resettlement site. The Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC) does not give medicines to the residents, and when the hospital does, the medicines are already expired. The hospital also accepts only 30 patients per day and refuses patients once the limit is reached. The doctor visits every week.

Common illnesses in the area are asthma, flu, and hypertension. Children get asthma due to the dust and heat from construction going on at Ridge View.

On the other hand, the school has no adequate ventilation and comfort rooms.



According to one parent, the children need to go home to urinate or defecate.

Since the school has makeshift classrooms, the children go home around 3 p.m. since the unbearable heat is no longer conducive to learning.

The residents of Ridge View transferred from the danger areas, the NDZs, to the bunkhouses, then to the resettlement site. Comparing their situation then and now, they feel that they were better off in the bunkhouses since they had electricity then and that they still do not feel safe or out of danger in Ridge View.

In the middle of nowhere in Palo

Bgy. San Agustin is a landlocked village of Palo, Leyte. Electricity is available in almost every house, but electricity bills have shot up even before the typhoon. It was around the time of Pres. Gloria Arroyo when the

geothermal plant in Bgy. San Agustin was privatized. Today, those who have no money to pay for their bills get their electric lines cut.

Transportation used by the residents is the *habal-habal* (single-rider motorcycle) costing around Php25 per trip. Road construction is always ongoing in Bgy. San Agustin, and telephone signals are intermittent.

Schistosomiasis is the common illness. The DOH distributes medicines to treat schistosomiasis. The village has one elementary school, the San Agustin Elementary School, but high school students have to go to Anahaway and Palo.

During Typhoon Yolanda, the residents immediately needed food and water. But it took the LGU one week to provide assistance. The government was absent during the relief efforts, and it was mostly the NGOs which helped the residents of Bgy. San Agustin.

Harder life for Calbiga upland farmers

Bgy. Binangaran in Calbiga, Samar is an upland farming community. Typhoon Yolanda caused lower demand for farmers' products such as banana, cassava, copra, and rice. Pests also damaged most of the crops, since farmers were not able to avail of the insecticides being given out by the LGU. Typhoon Ruby in 2014 affected the farmers more than Typhoon Yolanda did.

Before Typhoon Yolanda, the farmers harvested 100 or more cans of rice, but now they only get around 20 cans. The farmers did not receive cash-for-work, and emergency shelter assistance (ESA) was given one year after Typhoon Yolanda.

The DSWD gave livelihood cash assistance as well as loans but only to a chosen few. The upland farmers had to go loan sharks to get capital for their crops.

Although their houses were not damaged much (with stores of some residents being wiped out or kitchens crushed by trees), the community is yet to recover from the effects of the typhoons.

Bereft of social services

With or without disaster, however, the residents continue to struggle for continuous access to water and electricity. Water sometimes does not reach the uplands of Calbiga, while electricity supply interruptions are common, especially during typhoons, sometimes even lasting for months.

Roads are yet to be constructed or fixed for the farmers to transport their crops efficiently to Calbiga. Moreover, it takes four hours to walk from Cambuyog where motorcycles can run.

Common illnesses in the area are colds, flu, and diarrhea. After Typhoon Yolanda and even after Typhoon Ruby, chikungunya became prevalent in Calbiga.

The barangay health center does not have adequate medicines. If residents are not beneficiaries of the poverty alleviation program, *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* (4Ps), they will not receive any medicine. The barangay health center also does not take in childbirths, and pregnant women sometimes give birth inside the ambulance. The ambulance drivers on the other hand charge residents Php500 for fuel and food. The barangay health center also closes at around 1 p.m.

After Typhoon Yolanda, the Singlatan Elementary School in Calbiga was washed out and the school supplies were damaged. The parents had a hard time replacing these since they did not have enough money. The school has had irregular classes since then.

No government help for livelihood

The farmers did not receive as much help as they needed, since Calbiga was not declared being in a state of calamity. Only NGOs helped them.

The government distributed canned goods. The farmers needed tools and seeds for farming, which has yet to be fully addressed. The only tools they have left after Typhoon Yolanda are their bolos and carabaos.

Some NGOs gave them tools although not adequate for their farms. One example are the plows appropriated for rice fields but not for upland farming. The NGO Leyte Center for Development, Inc. (LCDE) had a consultation with the farmers of Calbiga regarding the distribution of five lambs. The farmers refused the lambs since these are hard to maintain. But the NGO distributed these anyway since it had already bought the animals.

Rehabilitating for business

Construction of farm-to-market roads in Calbiga is a common occurrence. If fixed, these roads will be beneficial for the farmers in transporting crops and produce, although fares should be manageable as well. Farm-to-market roads, however, will be connected to Lulugayan Falls for tourism and will facilitate easier access to the mining areas in Calbiga as well as the hydroelectric project.

Mining for copper and gold has already started in Bgy. Balakay, and the land has been contaminated by mining. The government also plans to build hydroelectric power plant and put up water turbines to harness power from Lulugayan Falls. This early, however, hydroelectric power appears to be benefiting the private sector rather than the communities.

Farmers' travails in Ormoc

After Typhoon Yolanda, the residents of Salvacion, Ormoc had no capital to plant rice. Their houses were destroyed and remained so even years after Yolanda. Even their calamansi plants were destroyed. They have been practicing the habit of eating only one meal a day.

The government should have immediately addressed the issue of farming equipment, but the residents did not receive any assistance from the government after Typhoon Yolanda. Although the DA had projects, these were not enough.

Government assistance if any was heavily politicized. Only those who were friends with the LGU received assistance. One example is the farming equipment given to the community facilitated by the barangay secretary. It was distributed only to those who were close to the barangay secretary.

The residents received the petition of the people's organization, People's Surge, for Php5,000 from the Presidential Financial Assistance Fund. Apart from that, however, only few of the residents had cash-for-work – only those close to the coordinator were chosen to do cash-for-work for Php260 per day for 15 days.

Water is accessible from the water district, Ormoc City Waterworks and Sewage Administration (ORWASA), but

the residents have to filter the water as sometimes it has dirt or smells of chlorine. Electricity on the other hand was restored four months after the typhoon and is still intermittent today. For cooking, the residents use butane or wood.

Transportation has been difficult. Right after Typhoon Yolanda, fare increased up to Php100 for one tricycle trip, although it went back to Php 7 after sometime.

There have been no reconstruction efforts in the area – only the covered court is being fixed.

The community has a health center, but health services are not fully operational except during elections. Schooling was disrupted for several months due to the disaster.

NGOs mostly helped the community, instead of the local government. The LGU helped only a chosen few. The DSWD, on the other hand, was slow in response and relief-giving.

The community is organized under Magkauban, a farmers' organization. Members help each other with farm work and share seeds among themselves. They are also raising pigs and share offsprings among one another.

Wrong priorities in Borongan

Typhoon Yolanda did not directly hit Borongan. In fact, Typhoon Ruby was even more destructive. Yet, the community had less income after Typhoon Yolanda.

Some of the houses in Borongan were destroyed, but the DSWD had to determine if they were partially or totally damaged, and some are yet to receive cash assistance

for the identified damage. Like in other cases, the recipients were only a select few.

Cash-for-work was also given to only a select few. One has to be friends with the barangay captain in order to get cash-for-work.

Some NGOs coordinated with the DSWD to facilitate their cash-for-work programs. But for some, it would have been better if the money were given directly to the people affected by Typhoon Yolanda instead of channeling it to the DSWD.

Mayor Maria Fe Abunda did not declare Borongan in a state of calamity even though the city was affected by the typhoon. Thus assistance after Typhoon Yolanda was slow.

The LGU did not prioritize livelihood projects. Mayor Abunda instead prioritized the beautification of the boulevard, which for many residents looks like a comfort room.

The boulevard was declared an NDZ before, but residents noticed that it was being reconstructed to accommodate new small business owners. The Mayor was suspended in fact for overspending for the beautification project.

Fishermen who lost their boats on the other hand were assisted by NGOs and even by some Chinese vessels. The LGU gave fishing equipment and paraphernalia to those who are living in fields.

Workers at the Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative were forced to work overtime without pay to restore power. Even if they were disaster victims themselves, they could not avail of emergency leaves. Still, the government did not extend any assistance to the workers' sector.

No relief, no services

Some residents approached the DSWD, but they were reprimanded and told to go to their respective barangay officials.

After the typhoon, prices of basic goods increased – rice price rose up to Php60 per kilo. Yet there was enough supply in the capitol but it was only left to rot.

Water sources are wells, water pumps, and piped connections from the water district. Electricity had to be restored with the help of electric cooperatives from Tacloban, Bicol, Camarines Sur, and even Davao.

Tricycle is the main mode of transportation. Telephone signals are sometimes problematic and messages are delayed, and Internet access is difficult.

On a positive note, school is regular. There is a barangay health center in the area, but only those close to the barangay captain is given medicine. Sometimes, the barangay health worker would even get angry with the people who are asking for medicine. Common illnesses are flu, colds, and diarrhea.

Urban perceptions, no different

IBON also conducted a household survey, covering six research areas on 1-10 September 2017 and using 61-question instrument. (See Annex 3) While a total of 1,000 respondents were targeted, the survey outcome resulted in 1,023 respondents. (See Table 7)

Precarious livelihood

Since the survey was conducted in largely urbanized areas, most of the respondents are workers/laborers (26.1%) and housewives/husbands (24.4%). Farmers

and fisherfolk comprise 3.3% and 10.7%, respectively. Around 12% are businessmen/women, 8% are employees, 3% are students, and 2% are professionals. Significantly, 7% are unemployed; most of them have been unemployed for more than a year already.

When asked about their family's livelihood after four years since the typhoon, 61.6% said that it remained the same, 19.6% said it got worse, and 17.1% said it got better. Others did not answer.

Some 37% of the respondents said that their family's current primary source of livelihood is rendered labor, followed by 19.4% who said that they have their own businesses. Despite lower percentage

livelihood, accounting for 3.3%, while 4.5% did not answer.

Eighty-three percent (83%) of the respondents said that this was the same source of livelihood for their family before Typhoon Yolanda hit, while 16% said otherwise. Among the 162 respondents who said that their families had different sources of income before Yolanda, 28% said that it used to be rendered labor, followed by 23% who said they used to rely primarily on employment. Families who were into fishing before Yolanda comprise 9.3%, farming 6.2%, and those who previously had their own businesses account for 10.5 percent. Others were reliant on their pension, overseas

TABLE 7. RESPONDENTS' DISTRIBUTION

PROVINCE	MUNICIPALITY / CITY	TARGET RESPONDENTS	TURNOUT
Eastern Samar	Borongan City	105	109
Leyte	Ormoc City	296	300
	Palo	97	107
	Tacloban City	313	318
Western Samar	Calbiga	38	38
	Catbalogan City	151	151
Total		1,000	1,023

Source: September 2017 IBON Eastern Visayas Survey on Yolanda

in sectoral distribution, 17% of the respondents rely on agriculture – 11.4% on fishing and 5.6% on farming. Around 14.5% rely on employment in both the government and the private sector. The rest have various sources such as professional work, overseas employment, pension, support from relatives, informal credit, government assistance, and NGO volunteer work. There are also those who said that they do not have any source of

employment, and volunteer work in church. Significantly, 14% did not answer, while nearly 7% said they did not have any source of livelihood even before Yolanda came.

Of the total number of respondents, 74% said they do not have other sources of livelihood, while some 19% said they have. Among the 198 respondents who said that their families have other sources of income,

nearly half are engaged in rendered labor. Some 16% said they also have their own businesses, while 14% have other family members employed in the government and the private sector. Roughly 11% are also in agriculture (6.1% farming, 4.5% fishing). Other sources of income mentioned are pension, informal credit, overseas work, family support, and cooperatives.

Given that most respondents said that they have their respective sources of livelihood, 54% expressed that their family's income is not enough for their needs. On the other hand, 43% said that it is enough, while less than 1% said they do not know and around 2% did not answer.

Staying put

Not considering the quality or engineering of their houses, 73% of the respondents said that they are living in their own houses, while some 7% expressed that they do live in their own houses but with various owners of the lots – either rented, as provided by the government, among others. There are some who live with their relatives (8%) and who are renting (7.2%). Some 1.5% said that they are still in relocation areas, while 3% did not answer.

Almost 87% of the respondents said that they have been living where they are now for more than three years already. The rest of the respondents comprise the rest of the 12% as follows: more than two years, 7.1%; more than a year, 3%; more than six months, 1.2%; and only 1-6 months 1.1 percent.

Eighty-three percent (83%) of the respondents said that they have lived there before Yolanda came. Of the 148 respondents who said that they did not live there before Yolanda came, 35.8% said that their families did not go back to where

they used to live because their houses were destroyed and had not been reconstructed, and 24% said that they did not have any interest in going back. Other significant reasons given by the respondents were: their areas were declared as “no build/dwelling zones” (10.1%); there are no livelihood opportunities (9.5%); there are no schools (5.4%); and their lots have been claimed by others (4.7%).

Incomplete services and utilities

Despite being in the cities, social services are still not 100% available for the residents. Most respondents said that the following are available or accessible where they live: water for domestic use (85.9%); clean, safe drinking water (85.3%); toilet (85.3%); electricity (82.5%); and communication services (82.1%). And despite priority being given to infrastructure, only half of the respondents said that transportation is available or accessible.

Among health facilities, public health centers are identified by 82.3% of the respondents as available or accessible where they live, followed distantly by public hospitals, identified by 19.6% of the respondents. Other health facilities are private hospitals (8.7%), public lying-in clinics (6.9%), private health clinics (3.7%), private lying-in clinics (2.2%), and community-based practices or herbal medicine practitioners (0.3%). There are 3.6% of the respondents who said that there are no health facilities at all in their areas.

Sixty-two percent (62%) of the respondents said that their child/children are able to go to school. Nearly 35% said that this concern does not apply to them, because they do not have school-age children. Of the 20 respondents who said that their

children are not able to go school, 80% said that this is because there are no schools in the area, while 60% said that they couldn't shoulder the expenses. Other reasons given are they were too busy working (15%) and that the school is far from home (5%). Twenty percent (20%) did not answer.

Unaddressed needs

Some 46% of the respondents said that there are services and/or structures in their areas that still need to be addressed up to now, while 42% said otherwise. Those who said they do not know account for 9%, while those who did not answer nearly four percent.

Among the 466 respondents who said there are still concerns that need to be addressed, 22% said that they still need cash/financial assistance and 18.5% still need housing (on top of this specifically ESA 9.9%, construction materials 2.8%). Other major concerns identified are transportation infrastructure (roads 16.3%, bridges 9%, public transportation (0.6%), livelihood (12.4%), utilities (water 10.7%, electricity 8.6%), and vital components for farming (irrigation facilities 4.3%, land 0.2%). In addition to these are social services such as evacuation centers and resettlement areas (8.2%), schools (4.5%), health facilities such as hospitals (2.6%), and other public facilities (barangay hall and gym 3%, public market 3%).

Reconstruction for whom?

Asked if respondents are aware of reconstruction projects being implemented, 52% said that there is none, while only 27% said that there are such projects. Nearly 20% said that they do not know and 1% did not answer.

Among the 273 respondents who said that there are reconstruction projects implemented, 54.6% answered various infrastructure projects, 54.9% various social services, and 41.8% various livelihood projects.

Infrastructure. Of the 149 respondents who identified various infrastructure projects, most identified roads, public utilities and services, sports facilities, LGU establishments, and bridges as the projects implemented. (See Table 8)

Generally, the respective LGUs in the respondents' areas and national government agencies were identified as the main implementer of most infrastructure projects enumerated, except for waiting sheds, commercial establishments, and churches. For these, private and religious institutions were identified as project implementers.

Some NGOs, INGOs, and donor organizations were also identified as main implementors of some projects. To mention a few, Plan International was mentioned putting up streetlights and public utilities and public services, as well as the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

While LGUs and government agencies were mainly mentioned, respondents identified a few more NGOs, international NGOs (INGOs) and donor organizations as project partners. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was mentioned a couple of times with the construction of roads and bridges, while Tzu Chi Foundation was mentioned with the construction of roads and public markets. Some project partners were simply identified as NGOs and private individuals/companies.

TABLE 8. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS IDENTIFYING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Total number of respondents with Infrastructure	149	100
Roads	57	38.3
Bridges	15	10.1
Pathway	2	1.3
Waiting shed	1	0.7
Evacuation center	4	2.7
Commercial establishment	2	1.3
Public utilities (electricity, water),public service (drainage)	37	24.8
Streetlight	7	4.7
LGU establishments, i.e. municipal/ city hall, barangay hall	15	10.1
Public market	3	2.0
Breakwater, riprap	2	1.3
Tide embankment	4	2.7
Church	4	2.7
Sports facilities	27	18.1
CCTV	2	1.3
Public plaza	1	0.7
Transportation terminal	2	1.3
Barangay outpost	1	0.7

Source: September 2017 IBON Eastern Visayas Survey on Yolanda

Of the 149 respondents, more than half (52.3%) said that a public consultation was done, while 34.2% said that there was none. Some 9% said that they did not know and 4% did not answer.

Of the 78 respondents who said that there was a public consultation, 60% said that they were able to attend while 38.5% said that they were not able to attend. An

overwhelming majority of the 78 said that they agreed with the implementation of the projects.

Of the 149 respondents, 55% said that there is no chance that the project/s they identified will displace them, while some 25.5% said that there is a chance of displacement. Some 7% said that they don't know while 12% did not answer. Of

the 38 respondents who believe that they will be displaced, 53% said that they were not offered any relocation of residence.

Also of the 149 respondents, 26% said that the project/s they identified will affect their livelihood, and 74% of these respondents said that they were not offered any form of aid or compensation for their livelihood.

Asked if they were offered any form of aid by the implementer of the project they identified, 75% of the 149 respondents said that they did not receive any offer, while 14% said they did. Some 6% said they do not know if there were any offers of aid, while nearly 5% did not answer. Among the 21 respondents who said that there was aid offered, 38% identified livelihood projects, 24% medical assistance, 19% educational assistance, 14% food relief or assistance, 9.5% each for case assistance and utilities (water, electricity), and 5% housing materials. Some 10% did not answer.

Social services. From the 150 respondents who answered various social services projects, housing, education and health related projects were enumerated. While LGUs and government agencies were still mainly mentioned as main implementer of these projects, many NGOs, INGOs and donor organizations were also identified. Among the most mentioned were Plan International, Oxfam, Save the Children, Tzu Chi Foundation, Red Cross, Gawad Kalinga, USAID, Habitat for Humanity, and various formations under the UN umbrella. Some of these are similarly mentioned as partners in implementing the projects, together with some local foundations of the mainstream media, e.g. ABS-CBN Foundation and GMA Foundation. (See Table 9)

Of the 150 respondents, 45.3% said that they were able to receive the social services they identified, while 26.7% said they did

not. Only 2% said they do not know, but overwhelmingly 26% did not answer.

Of the 150 respondents, 40% said that there were no requisites for them to be able to avail of the said social services. Twenty-five percent (25%) said that there were, while 8% did not know if there were. A similarly large portion did not answer (27%).

Of the 38 respondents who said that there were requisites, most answered with valid identification cards (IDs, 21.1%), Certificate of Live Birth (13.2%), and their respective DSWD Green Card (10.5%). Other requisites mentioned were barangay-issued certificates of residence and indigency, biodata, marriage contract, family picture, and valid PhilHealth membership. It is noteworthy that favored access was still observed in availing these social services. On the other hand, there were more respondents who did not mention what these were, accounting for 34% of the 38 respondents. More than half of the 38 respondents were able to provide these requisites, while about 29% were not able to produce them. Some 16% did not answer.

Of the 150 respondents, more than half said that they did not encounter any problem in receiving the social services, while 11% said that they did. Thirty-two percent (32%) did not answer this question. Among the 16 respondents who said that there were problems, most expressed their difficulty in acquiring the necessary documents and having to pay for them. There was also observed favoritism. Other difficulties mentioned were instruction was difficult to comprehend, not being included in the shortlist of beneficiaries, having no government connection to enjoy priority, tedious processes, among others.

Livelihood. Of the 114 respondents who answered various livelihood projects,

most identified cash for work programs as well as livelihood training and assistance programs. Some also identified food for work and microfinance programs. (See Table 10)

Most respondents identified their respective LGUs as well as the DSWD, DOLE, TESDA, and DTI as the main implementers of the livelihood-related projects. On the other hand, some NGOs, INGOs and donor organizations were also mentioned, among which are Tzu Chi Foundation, Plan International, USAID, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Oxfam. These same organizations were also identified partners of LGUs and government agencies in implementation, including IOM and World Vision.

Of the 114 respondents, 62.3% said that they were included in the livelihood program that they have identified, while 27.2% said that they were not. Some 10% did not answer. More than half of the 114 respondents said that there were no requisites to be included in the said livelihood programs, while 21% said that there were. Those who did not know if there were requisites comprise 8.8% and those who did not answer almost 15 percent. Among the 24 respondents who said that there were requisites, most said that these were valid IDs (29.2%), community tax certificate (25%), barangay-issued certificates of clearance (12.5%), residency (12.5%), and indigency (4.2%). Some of the other requisites mentioned were biodata, selection of just one person per household, and rendered

TABLE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS IDENTIFYING SOCIAL SERVICES PROJECTS

	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Total number of respondents with Social services	150	100
Health center	6	4.0
Lying-in clinic	2	1.3
Medical missions	49	32.7
Housing	73	48.7
Relief goods	4	2.7
School	32	21.3
DSWD Green Card	1	0.7
Housing materials	3	2.0
Emergency Shelter Assistance	21	14.0
Financial assistance	10	6.7
Hospitals	4	2.7
Scholarship program	3	2.0
Playground	2	1.3

Source: September 2017 IBON Eastern Visayas Survey on Yolanda

TABLE 10. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS IDENTIFYING LIVELIHOOD

	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Total number of respondents with Livelihood	114	100.0
Cash for work	87	76.3
Food for work	1	0.9
Livelihood training	10	8.8
Microfinance program	1	0.9
Livelihood program	11	9.6
Construction work (solar farm)	1	0.9
Livelihood assistance	11	9.6

Source: September 2017 IBON Eastern Visayas Survey on Yolanda

labor during the cleaning of Tacloban. Of these 24 respondents, 79% were able to provide the requisites, while only 8% said otherwise. Some 12% did not answer.

Of the 114 respondents, 64% said that there were no problems encountered in joining the livelihood programs, while 19% said that there were. Nearly 17% did not answer. Of the 22 respondents who said that there were problems, almost half observed that favoritism was rampant (45.5%). Some of the other problems cited are the following: salary was distributed late, the barangay got a portion from the salary from cash for work program, denial of employment because the spouse is a government employee, tedious processing for accommodation in the list, discrimination among pregnant and senior citizen applicants, among others.

Low awareness of other economic and business projects

Only 11% of the 1,023 respondents said that there are other economic projects or

businesses implemented in their community. Those who do not know if there are other economic projects account for 23% and some 3% did not answer. Nevertheless, it appears that the LGUs have been actively promoting these projects as beneficial to their constituents, as affirmed by the survey results.

Of the 111 respondents who said that there are other economic and business projects, most mentioned commercial establishments (44%), while others mentioned agribusinesses (7%), microfinance programs (7%), projects on disaster risk and reduction management (6%), among others. (See Table 11)

Half of the 49 respondents who answered commercial establishments identified mall developers and private companies as main implementers of these projects, some even particularly saying “Chinese businessmen”. Surprisingly, there were also some respondents who answered “LGU” here. They also said that these are mainly for job generation and local income generation, while also mentioning for the businesses’

interests, to provide retail outlets, for rest and recreation, and for tax generation.

Almost half of the respondents said that they were not consulted about these commercial establishments, and there are more of those who said that they do not know if a public consultation was held (27%). Nevertheless, 88% believed that these projects are beneficial for them. Among the 43 respondents who said that the projects are beneficial, most see these as opportunity for employment or livelihood, and some said that these

this, and they think that it is beneficial for them because of the livelihood opportunities and availability of cheaper products.

There are eight respondents who answered microfinance programs, most of which are by NGOs like World Vision, Hope Foundation, and donor organizations like UNDP and USAID. These are seen by most as employment opportunities. There were public consultations beforehand, and these programs have aided them in livelihood, capital and housing opportunities.

TABLE 11. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS IDENTIFYING OTHER ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS PROJECTS

	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
Total number of respondents	111	100.0
Agribusiness	8	7.2
Ecotourism	2	1.8
Commercial establishments	49	44.1
Microfinance programs	8	7.2
Cooperative	3	2.7
DRRM	7	6.3
Bigasang Bayan	2	1.8

Source: September 2017 IBON Eastern Visayas Survey on Yolanda

provide better access to retail goods, access to cheaper goods, and income and tax generation.

Among the eight respondents who answered agribusiness, most said that the government (LGU and DOLE) is implementing these while also mentioning the NGO, World Vision. They are mainly for the purpose of job creation according to the respondents, but also for local income generation and distribution of production inputs. Most were aware that a public consultation was held for

Seven respondents identified disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) projects, almost all saying that the LGU has been implementing them. Three respondents who answered cooperatives said that these are implemented by the government (LGUs and the DSWD), and are for job creation purposes. There were public consultations held, and they see these as beneficial for the survivors in terms of livelihood opportunities, income generation, and personal credit.


There were only two respondents that answered ecotourism projects. Both did not

know the implementer, though they said that these projects are for rest and recreation. They said that a public consultation was held, and they think it is beneficial for them because it will serve as tourist destination.

Lastly, there were also two respondents who answered "Bigasang Bayan", a form of availing rice supply that they can pay for later. This was implemented by their LGU and both said that it was beneficial for them.

Endnotes

- 1 Republic of the Philippines Municipality of Tacloban, Leyte Tacloban City Planning and Development Office. *Comprehensive Development Plan 2017-2022*, pp. 1-2.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 3 Affected residents of Bgy. Cabalawan, Tacloban Ridgeview. Focus group discussion. 26 Aug. 2017.
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 Republic of the Philippines Municipality of Palo Leyte. "VOLUME I: The Comprehensive Land Use Plan." *PART 3: Disaster and Climate Risk Sensitive Development and Land Use Plan for Palo, Leyte, ASEAN Adopt-A-Municipality for Resilient Recovery Planning Project* pp. 5, 50, 72. 2015.
- 6 "Population of Region VIII – Eastern Visayas (Based on the 2015 Census of Population)." *Philippine Statistics Authority*, 2 June 2016. Accessed 1 Jun. 2017.
- 7 VOLUME I: The Comprehensive Land Use Plan *op. cit.*, p. 10.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 9 Affected residents of Bgy. Baras, Palo, Leyte. Focus group discussion. 28 Aug. 2017.
- 10 Affected residents of Bgy. San Agustin, Palo, Leyte. Focus group discussion. 29 Aug. 2017.
- 11 Samar. Invest Philippines, p. 1.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- 14 Affected residents of Calbiga, Samar. Focus group discussion. 1 Sept. 2017.
- 15 *Catbalogan Ecological Profile* p. 6. 2017.
- 16 VOLUME I: The Comprehensive Land Use Plan., *op. cit.*
- 17 "Borongan." *Wikipedia*. Accessed 3 Aug. 2017.
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 Affected residents of Borongan, Samar. Focus group discussion. 4 Sept. 2017.
- 20 "Tanauan, Leyte." *Wikipedia*. 3 Aug. 2017.
- 21 Affected residents of Bgy. Calsadahay, Tanauan, Leyte. Focus group discussion. 8 Sept. 2017.
- 22 *Calubian Site*. Dignos, Gus. Accessed 10 Aug. 2017.
- 23 *Ibid.*
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NEOLIBERAL OUTCOMES

The RAY uses an outcome-driven approach to the recovery and rehabilitation process. The attainment of the measurable outputs, as identified in the RAY Implementation for Results, is supposed to produce the desired outcomes. An outcome-driven approach also means that the technical, institutional, managerial, and budgetary resources are combined to produce the intended outcomes at sufficient levels.

The four main recovery and rehabilitation outcomes are for: livelihood and business development, housing and resettlement, social services, and infrastructure. The NEDA has focused monitoring outcomes mainly on the most affected region, Eastern Visayas.

These desired outcomes however are assessed in accordance with the goals of the Philippine Development Plan (PDP), the package of neoliberal economic policies implemented by the Philippine government. In short, the Philippine government is actually looking for a market-driven approach to recovery and measures success accordingly. Still, even with such erroneous framework, monitoring yields poorer outcomes.

Livelihood and business development *Moderating unemployment figures*

According to RAY, the private sector had lost 90% in assets and incomes after Yolanda. Businesses that were affected included the business enterprises, self-employed and family businesses, micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, and larger corporations that employ many residents of Eastern Visayas.¹

The RAY Implementation for Results has identified outcome indicators for livelihood and business development specifically for the livelihood, agriculture, industry, trade and services, and financial sector (See List 1). Indicators pertain to the recovery of employment, economic activity and access to credit to pre-Yolanda levels. The RAY Implementation for Results believes that achieving the outcomes is an opportunity for Eastern Visayas to catch up with the rest of the country in terms of “development outcomes”.²

In the years after Typhoon Yolanda, the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) had moderated its national unemployment figures by excluding Region VIII from its quarterly labor force surveys (LFS). Annual estimates for 2014 used the average estimates of the April, July and October rounds, all of which did not cover the province of Leyte; the January round, the quarter right after the disaster, was not included in the annual estimates because the whole of Eastern Visayas was excluded. For 2015, the annual estimates did not include Leyte because the January and April rounds still did not cover Leyte. Figures thus did not reflect the impact of the disaster on employment.³

PSA data shows that unemployment rate in Eastern Visayas averaged at 5.1% in 2013-2017. The figure is lower than the national average of 6.3 percent. Annual average

LIST 1. OUTCOME INDICATORS FOR LIVELIHOOD AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT

Livelihood	Restoration of employment level beyond pre-typhoon levels that meet or exceed national PDP targets, especially for women.
Agriculture	Restoration of agricultural production beyond pre-typhoon levels that meet or exceed national PDP targets.
Industry, trade, and services	Restoration of all enterprises in the trade, industry, and services beyond pre-typhoon levels that meet or exceed national PDP targets.
Financial sector	Enhancement of liquidity in the banking sector for banks and MFIs to extend credit at affordable interest rates and favorable terms in a risky environment.

Source: National Economic and Development Authority Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Implementation for Results

TABLE 12. LABOR FORCE INDICATORS, PHILIPPINES AND EASTERN VISAYAS, 2013-2017 (POPULATION IN THOUSANDS; RATES IN %)

REGION AND INDICATOR	2013	2014 ^a	2015 ^b	2016	2017 ^c
Philippines					
Total population 15 years old and over	64,173	64,033	64,936	68,311	69,728
Labor force	41,023	41,379	41,343	43,361	42,455
Employed	38,118	38,651	38,741	40,998	39,929
Underemployed	7,371	7,118	7,180	7,513	6,469
Unemployed	2,905	2,728	2,602	2,363	2,526
Not in the labor force	23,150	22,654	23,593	24,950	27,273
Participation rate	63.9	64.6	63.7	63.5	60.9
Employment rate	92.9	93.4	93.7	94.6	94.1
Underemployment rate	19.3	18.4	18.5	18.3	16.2
Unemployment rate	7.1	6.6	6.3	5.4	5.9
Eastern Visayas					
Total population 15 years old and over	2,997	1,709	1,701	3,006	3,078
Labor force	1,935	1,109	1,069	1,874	1,857
Employed	1,832	1,045	1,011	1,790	1,771
Underemployed	460	326	321	535	408
Unemployed	103	64	58	84	87
Not in the labor force	1,062	600	632	1,132	1,221
Participation rate	64.6	64.9	62.8	62.3	60.3
Employment rate	94.7	94.2	94.6	95.5	95.3
Underemployment rate	25.1	31.2	31.7	29.9	23.1
Unemployment rate	5.3	5.8	5.4	4.5	4.7

Notes:

1. Figures for 2013-2015 are 2000 Census of Population and Housing (CPH)-based estimates, while 2016-2017 figures are 2010 CPH-based estimates. Also, the 2003 Master Sample Design was used for 2013-2015 covering approximately 50,000 households, while the 2013 Master Sample Design was used for 2016-2017 covering approximately 44,000 households.
2. The quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS) did not cover the Eastern Visayas Region in January 2014 and the province of Leyte from April 2014 to April 2015. Leyte was included again beginning July 2015.

^a annual data for 2014 is the average of April, July and October rounds

^b annual data for 2015 excludes Leyte

^c annual data for 2017 based only on January, April and July rounds

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority 2013-2017 Labor Force Surveys

underemployment rate meanwhile was higher in the region than the national average, at 28.2 percent. The underemployment figure got worse after the typhoon and could not be recovered to pre-disaster level until 2017 (although 2017 figures are preliminary). (See Table 12)

Sinking agriculture


Agriculture in Eastern Visayas, the region's main source of livelihood, continually contracted in the years following the typhoon, except in 2016 when the sector registered a production increase, although still not enough to recover pre-disaster levels. (See Table 13) The decrease in the gross value added (GVA) in agriculture in 2014 and 2015 was compounded by another typhoon, named Ruby, which continuously destroyed the crops in the region.

The declines in agricultural GVA in 2013-2015 made the region fail to meet the national growth targets. Even the supposed recovery in 2016 was 38% short of the national growth target for agriculture. (See Chart 1)

The annual average production volume of palay from 2012-2016 in Eastern Visayas was 975,583 metric tons (MT). Palay production went down by 0.5% in 2013, 0.7% in 2014, 2.7% in 2015, and 0.1% in 2016. Eastern Visayas also failed to reach the targeted annual production volume of at least one million MT. (See Table 14)

Leyte has been the top producer of palay in the region, which accounted for half of the total production volume of the region from 2012 to 2016. However, Leyte has been consistently experiencing a drop in the volume of palay production, with 521,115 MT in 2012 down to 473,580 MT in 2016.

CHART 1. GROSS VALUE ADDED IN AGRICULTURE, HUNTING AND FORESTRY, GROWTH RATE, EASTERN VISAYAS ACTUAL VIS-A-VIS NATIONAL TARGET, 2013-2016 (AT CONSTANT 2000 PRICES; IN %)



Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Gross Regional Domestic Product

TABLE 13. GROSS VALUE ADDED IN AGRICULTURE, HUNTING AND FORESTRY, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2013-2016 (AT CONSTANT 2000 PRICES; IN PHP THOUSAND)

INDUSTRY SECTOR	2013	2014	2015	2016
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry	23,569,735	20,934,062	20,177,427	20,552,012

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Gross Regional Domestic Product

The declines were due to the impact of typhoons Crising, Gorio, Yolanda and Ruby, and the infestation of pests and crop diseases in 2013. Moreover, Typhoon Yolanda damaged numerous irrigation facilities. In 2015, although palay production slightly increased in the first half of the year, the dry spell in the middle of the year dampened the annual production growth. Other reasons for the declining volume of palay production were inadequate irrigation support, climate change, and low technology adoption.⁴

The volume of corn production in Eastern Visayas from 2012 to 2016 was an annual average of 87,514 MT. It increased in 2013 by 2.3%, dipped by 1.3% in 2014, increased again in 2015 by 3.4%, and finally dropped 10.5% in 2016. Overall regional corn production has not been recovered to pre-Yolanda levels. Declines were aggravated by rat infestation and drought, for instance in 2014.⁵

With regard to coconut production, Eastern Visayas was the top producer, next to Davao, from 1997 to 2011. But the region slipped to third in 2012, fourth in 2013, and sixth in 2014 and 2015. Despite this drop, coconut comprises around 40% of its crop production.⁶

The average volume of production of coconut from 2012 to 2016 was 1,365,100

MT. Typhoon Yolanda reportedly destroyed 33 million coconut trees, half of which were totally damaged, sending the region to a production slump from 2013 to 2016. Typhoon Ruby destroyed another 200,000 coconut trees by the end of 2014.⁷

The highest percentage reduction was reported in the provinces of Eastern Samar and Leyte. As of 2015, the number of bearing coconut trees was around 34.5 million, the lowest recorded number in decades.⁸

From 2012 and 2016, the region's volume of coconut production dwindled by 39.4%, tantamount to a production gap of around 700,000 MT. This was due to lower coconut yields, as areas allotted for coconuts were reduced by around 23 percent. Among provinces in Eastern Visayas, Leyte had the worst coconut production decline at the end of 2016 compared to 2012.⁹

Meanwhile, abaca annual harvest has been threatened by massive infestation of bunchy top and mosaic diseases on abaca plantations. Around 10,000 hectares of abaca farms in Leyte had been infested, which caused low fiber output and the displacement of abaca farm workers in the region. In 2012, the condition of the abaca sector worsened due to low foreign demand from the Japanese market for abaca fiber used for Japanese currency bills.¹⁰

TABLE 14. VOLUME OF PRODUCTION OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL CROPS, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2012-2016, (IN METRIC TONS)

CROP	REGION / PROVINCE	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Palay	Eastern Visayas	994,972	989,794	982,596	955,709	954,844
	Biliran	66,543	66,309	66,343	66,567	67,881
	Eastern Samar	59,413	63,225	63,605	62,388	61,902
	Leyte	521,115	502,746	502,146	489,405	473,580
	Northern Samar	111,206	116,713	117,965	117,240	111,086
	Southern Leyte	96,166	94,871	92,572	92,581	91,088
	Western Samar	140,529	145,930	139,965	127,528	149,307
	Corn	Eastern Visayas	87,333	89,327	88,162	91,145
Corn	Biliran	745	729	748	747	752
	Eastern Samar	593	571	609	640	456
	Leyte	55,392	58,175	58,601	62,238	53,955
	Northern Samar	14,352	14,800	15,351	15,204	14,922
	Southern Leyte	7,118	5,809	5,631	5,149	4,205
	Western Samar	9,133	9,243	7,222	7,167	7,313
	Coconut	Eastern Visayas	1,771,459	1,623,585	1,191,923	1,165,867
Coconut	Biliran	58,990	61,416	51,051	51,104	51,221
	Eastern Samar	274,851	265,987	189,661	158,234	156,959
	Leyte	676,021	526,558	194,050	201,123	206,702
	Northern Samar	345,208	355,708	366,401	362,524	269,928
	Western Samar	292,607	286,045	262,955	266,424	260,420
	Southern Leyte	123,779	127,869	127,804	126,455	127,435
	Abaca	Eastern Visayas	19,190	16,597	12,849	12,752
Abaca	Biliran	98	81	69	122	131
	Eastern Samar	401	369	291	122	79
	Leyte	6,606	4,832	1,482	1,531	1,616

TABLE 14. CONTINUATION

CROP	REGION / PROVINCE	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	Northern Samar	7,329	7,433	7,579	7,550	7,241
	Western Samar	1,382	1,381	1,270	1,318	1,313
	Southern Leyte	3,372	2,498	2,155	2,106	2,110
Sugarcane	Eastern Visayas	395,843	318,296	348,642	179,362	333,411
	Biliran	-	-	-	-	-
	Eastern Samar	2	2	1	0	0
	Leyte	395,811	318,265	348,613	179,362	333,411
	Northern Samar	-	-	-	-	-
	Western Samar	29	28	27	27	28
	Southern Leyte	0	0	0	0	0
Banana	Eastern Visayas	280,439	259,095	216,991	227,223	226,602
	Biliran	16,243	13,918	10,970	11,020	11,133
	Eastern Samar	5,708	5,413	4,494	3,103	3,093
	Leyte	51,456	46,359	20,859	23,602	26,943
	Northern Samar	20,645	22,001	22,734	22,542	18,567
	Western Samar	116,236	103,486	94,127	103,705	103,270
	Southern Leyte	70,148	67,915	63,806	63,249	63,594
Pineapple	Eastern Visayas	7,456	7,485	6,706	7,185	8,014
	Biliran	382	359	333	340	344
	Eastern Samar	592	578	541	529	540
	Leyte	1,990	2,028	1,441	1,810	2,867
	Northern Samar	28	37	39	39	38
	Western Samar	4,236	4,248	4,130	4,248	4,003
	Southern Leyte	225	232	221	216	220

"0" - less than one metric ton

"-" - zero

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority CountrySTAT Philippines (<http://countrystat.psa.gov.ph/>)

Abaca production targets at regional and provincial levels have not been met over the years. From 2012 to 2015, the region's annual average share of abaca in national production shrank to 25% from the previous average of 40 percent.¹¹

Sugarcane production in the region declined from 2013, except in 2014 when output increased by 9.5% and in 2016 by 85.9 percent. The largest production volume decline was in 2015 when the region experienced a 48.6% drop (169,280 MT decrease).

The impact of Typhoon Yolanda on the sugarcane industry in Kananga and Ormoc City caused financial constraints that prompted sugarcane farmers to abandon their fields. The farmers explored the age-old method of ratooning (relying on the sugarcane stubbles for new sprouts) to save on cost. Only 10% of the total sugarcane areas were replanted with sugarcane, while the rest were planted with ratoons.¹²

The region is also having difficulty recovering its banana production. Typhoons Yolanda and Ruby caused great reduction in banana production, prompting processing

corporations, the SC Global Coco Products for instance, to stop production of banana chips.¹³

The production of pineapples meanwhile increased to 8,014 MT from the pre-Yolanda year. Despite the low harvest per hectare, pineapple production grew by to 11.5% due to additional hectares planted.

Lost manufacturing

The gross regional domestic product (GRDP), a measure of the value of local production of goods and services, is being pushed by the industry sector. From 2013 to 2016, all industry subsectors, except manufacturing, experienced growth. (See Table 15)

Mining and quarrying declined in 2013 but bounced back in the succeeding years, growing by 25.6% in 2014, 16.8% in 2015, and 3.2% in 2016. Construction registered phenomenal increases – 27.4% in 2014, 12.3% in 2015, and 44.5% in 2016, which may be surmised as the effect of reconstruction as well as government spending in the run-up to the 2016 presidential elections.

TABLE 15. GROSS VALUE ADDED IN INDUSTRY, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2013-2016 (AT CONSTANT 2000 PRICES; IN PHP THOUSAND)

INDUSTRY SECTOR	2013	2014	2015	2016
Mining and Quarrying	216,021	271,428	317,044	327,124
Manufacturing	32,497,248	27,283,301	26,476,216	31,675,952
Construction	11,243,588	14,328,381	16,093,918	23,256,282
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply	18,550,125	18,547,630	20,526,390	20,967,054

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Gross Regional Domestic Product

Electricity, gas, and water subsector declined 6.5% in 2013, which continued until 2014. It grew by 10.7% in 2015 and minimally by 2.1% in 2016.

However, the manufacturing subsector, which comprises the biggest share in industry, has not recovered its growth pattern since Yolanda. It had a growth rate of 33.5% before Yolanda, but following the onslaught of the typhoon, the manufacturing subsector declined by 16% in 2014, which continued until 2015 with a 3% dip in its GVA. It grew by 19.6% in 2016, but it was not enough to recover pre-Yolanda levels.

Housing and resettlement

The housing damages brought about by the typhoon had significantly added to the national housing gap, which was estimated at 3.7 million housing units in 2010, and projected to grow to 5.6 million units by 2016.¹⁴

According to the RAY Implementation Results, houses in Yolanda-affected communities were predominantly “non-engineered” types, which were composed of makeshift dwellings, semi-permanent homes, and vernacular houses. Around 40% of the houses located along coastal areas were non-permanent homes as well. Most of these houses according to RAY were owner-built and only less than one percent were publicly owned housing projects.

The RAY Implementation for Results has identified outcome indicators based on the PDP. (See List 2)

LIST 2. OUTCOME INDICATORS FOR HOUSING AND RESETTLEMENT

Housing	Giving of accessible and affordable disaster-resilient housing to Yolanda-affected families
Resettlement	Resettlement and housing in safer areas to families in “no dwelling zones”

Source: National Economic and Development Authority Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Implementation for Results

Big failure in housing

The NEDA in Region VIII has identified a housing need or target of 56,140 permanent houses to be built in Yolanda stricken areas in the region. (See Table 16) But as of the second quarter of 2017, only 16,846 housing units or 30% of target have been completed and 11,957 housing units or 21.3% are in various stages of completion. NEDA-Region VIII attributed this failure to unavailable lots, land acquisition issues, and procurement problems.¹⁵

Awarding and occupancy rate is also quite low, at 44.3% of the total completed and for-completion 28,803 housing units. The delays in transfers according to NEDA-Region VIII were primarily due to unavailable power and water supply in the sites.¹⁶

Still not resettled

There are 86 relocation sites in Easter Visayas for families living in NDZs. The LWUA has been tasked to implement water supply projects in the sites, while the NEA is to provide electricity. (See Table 17)

As of the second quarter of 2017, bidding for the long- and medium-term water supply projects in 20 resettlement sites is still ongoing. For the 66 other resettlement sites, only five sites in Guiuan, Eastern Samar and Tanuan, Leyte have been completed. The water supply project in Babatngon, Leyte is still ongoing and

**TABLE 16. YOLANDA PERMANENT HOUSING PROGRAM
PROGRESS REPORT**

LOCATION	HOUSING NEED/ TARGET	TOTAL NO. OF HOUSING UNITS BID-OUT/ AWARDED	STATUS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT			AWARDED (INCLUSIVE OF OCCUPIED UNITS)
			VARIOUS STAGES	COMPLETED	TOTAL	
Tacloban City	14,433	14,433	2,124	10,531	12,655	11,021
Leyte	16,199	12,190	4,830	3,936	8,766	1,335
Southern Leyte	130	-	-	-	-	-
Biliran	8,905	6,698	2,142	617	2,759	-
Eastern Samar	7,573	4,149	1,550	745	2,295	407
Samar	8,900	7,373	1,311	1,017	2,328	-

Sources: National Economic and Development Authority-Region VIII and Commission on Audit

**TABLE 17. SUMMARY STATUS IN YOLANDA RESETTLEMENT AREAS,
EASTERN VISAYAS, AS OF 2ND QUARTER 2017**

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	PROGRAM/ PROJECT	TARGET	COMPLETED	PERCENT ACCOMPLISHMENT (IN %)	STATUS
Local Water Utilities Administration	Medium and long-term water supply projects	20 resettlement sites	-	-	Ongoing
	Water supply projects for other National Housing Authority- resettlement sites	66 resettlement sites	5	7.6	Ongoing
National Electrification Administration	Electrification of Yolanda resettlement projects	86 resettlement sites	59	68.6	Ongoing

Source: National Economic and Development Authority-Region VIII

the remaining water supply projects in 58 resettlement sites have not yet been started.¹⁷

Meanwhile, the NEA has completed projects for 59 of the 86 resettlement sites, but only 12 of the 59 have been energized including the housing units in the areas. Forty-seven sites have dx lines (tapping points) energized while awaiting permission from the NHA developer to electrify the housing units. Twenty-one of the identified resettlement sites have ongoing construction of dx lines, while six sites are for Electric Cooperatives (ECs) survey.¹⁸

NEDA-Region VIII admits that the Resettlement Cluster has had major issues and concerns that have impeded the smooth and fast implementation of the Yolanda rehabilitation programs in the region. These include delays in the construction of the permanent resettlement units, both in and out of North Tacloban. Additionally, the use of substandard quality of the permanent housing units, such as in Balangiga, Eastern Samar, was reported during the 1 September 2017 HOR public hearing.¹⁹

Moreover, there are delays in the implementation of the water and electricity supply projects in the relocation sites as reported by LWUA and NEA. There are also concerns on additional housing units being requested by LGUs and on livelihood programs for those in the resettlement sites.

Social services

Eastern Visayas has been consistently behind the national targets for poverty, education, and health in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). According to the RAY, significant assistance was provided

to restore social services immediately after Typhoon Yolanda to provide efficient social services to the most vulnerable groups.

Outcome indicators for education, health, and social protection have been identified, which are to be consistent with the PDP targets of universal coverage in education and health. (See List 3)

Output indicators for education and health are composed of physical and service delivery-related indicators, while for social protection are in terms of grants disbursed to Yolanda-affected communities.

Declining education

As of May 2017, the DepEd has completed 1,790 new classrooms out of the 2,313 target in Region VIII. (See Table 18) Some 388 of the new classrooms are still under procurement, while the status of the remaining 135 new classrooms is still unknown. Of the 17,335 classrooms for rehabilitation, 11,720 are completed, while 1,345 are still under procurement and the status of the 4,270 classrooms for rehabilitation is still unknown.²⁰

The DepEd has encountered problems in the building of educational facilities in Eastern Visayas due to the delays in the NHA housing of Yolanda-affected families. DepEd Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Director Roni Co stated that the issue with the construction of schools and classrooms in Region VIII is connected with the problem of NHA in building relocation sites. He argued that DepEd could only build schools once families have settled in their respective relocation sites.²¹ One example is the problem with the establishment of permanent schools in the North Tacloban Resettlement areas since the number of occupants is increasing in the sites.²²

LIST 3. OUTCOME INDICATORS FOR SOCIAL SERVICES

Education	Building of disaster-resilient educational facilities both in the public and private sector
	Restoration of net enrolment and cohort survival in pre-school and basic education at pre-disaster levels
Health	Building of disaster-resilient health facilities both in the public and private sector
	Enrolment in the National Health Insurance Program to cover families affected by natural calamities
	Decline of maternal, infant, and under-five mortality rates; malnutrition of children under five; malaria and tuberculosis mortality rates back to at least pre-disaster levels
	Restoration of access to affordable essential drugs
Social Protection	Expansion of conditional cash transfer program coverage to disaster-affected areas
	Increase of employment and livelihood via social programs (i.e. cash for work)

Latest data from DepEd Tacloban City Division shows the need for around 688 permanent classrooms in the North Tacloban Resettlement sites for the period 2016-2018. While the DepED has already downloaded Php68 million worth of funds from the DPWH Tacloban City District Engineering Office for the construction of 45 permanent classrooms in Ridge View Park (part of its 2016 priority), construction by DPWH is yet to start.²³

DepEd-Region VIII data shows that 2,029 classrooms for elementary and 1,246 for secondary schools are still needed in Eastern Visayas for school year (SY) 2015-2016. (See Table 19)

Net enrolment rate (percentage of enrolled pupils of school age population) in public and private elementary schools in the region declined by three percentage points from 2013 and 2015. (See Table 20) This however is consistent with the trends in the National Capital Region (NCR) and the whole country.

Source: National Economic and Development Authority Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Implementation for Results

TABLE 18. SUMMARY OF SCHOOLS REBUILT AND REHABILITATED, EASTERN VISAYAS, AS OF MAY 2017

	TARGET NO. OF SCHOOLS	UNDER PROCUREMENT	COMPLETED	ACCOMPLISHMENT (IN %)
New Classrooms	2,313	388	1,790	77.4
Rehabilitated Classrooms	17,335	1,345	11,720	67.6

Source: National Economic and Development Authority-Region VIII

TABLE 19. CLASSROOM REQUIREMENT BY DIVISION, EASTERN VISAYAS, SCHOOL YEAR 2015-2016

DIVISION	ELEMENTARY CLASSROOM		SECONDARY CLASSROOM	
	STOCKS	NEEDS	STOCKS	NEEDS
Leyte	7,402	586	1,967	349
Southern Leyte	1,777	219	352	94
Biliran	1,048	85	326	103
Samar	3,131	597	807	202
Eastern Samar	2,566	172	812	63
Northern Samar	3,942	281	1,242	190
Tacloban City	768	31	321	72
Ormoc City	805	-	360	7
Maasin City	618	10	142	22
Calbayog City	1,070	-	279	76
Baybay City	442	10	166	27
Catbalogan City	479	21	148	35
Borongon City	382	17	134	6
Total	24,430	2,029	7,056	1,246

Source: Department of Education-Region VIII

In public and private secondary schools, net enrolment rate in Eastern Visayas increased by 5.2 percentage points from 2013 to 2015, although there was a noticeable decline of 1.8 percentage points in 2014. The trends were similar to the NCR and the whole country. Still, figures showed an overall trend of low net enrolment rate in secondary education. (See Table 21)

The cohort survival rate is the percentage of enrollees at the beginning grade or year in a school year that reached the final grade level whether elementary or secondary. The cohort survival rate in public and private elementary schools for

school year (SY) 2012-2013 was 75.4% in Eastern Visayas, which increased to 82.3% in SY 2013-2014. (See Table 22)

Meanwhile, the cohort survival rate in public and private secondary schools increased from 73.9% in SY 2012-2013 to 78% in SY 2013-2014. (See Table 23)

Education statistics in a nutshell shows that in the region almost 9 out of 10 school age population enroll in elementary schools, but only 7 will finish basic schooling. Five of these graduates will enter secondary school, but only 4 will finish the course.

TABLE 20. NET ENROLMENT RATE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION AND EASTERN VISAYAS, 2013-2015 (IN %)

AREA	2013			2014			2015		
	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE
Philippines	93.8	93.0	94.7	92.6	91.8	93.4	91.1	90.2	92.0
National Capital Region	92.5	91.3	93.9	89.7	88.3	91.2	88.1	86.5	89.9
Eastern Visayas	92.6	92.2	93.0	91.7	91.3	92.1	89.6	89.0	90.2

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2016

TABLE 21. NET ENROLMENT RATE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION AND EASTERN VISAYAS, 2013-2015 (IN %)

AREA	2013			2014			2015		
	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE
Philippines	64.9	60.0	70.1	63.2	58.4	68.3	68.2	63.6	73.0
National Capital Region	76.5	73.9	79.1	72.4	69.6	75.2	75.5	73.0	78.1
Eastern Visayas	61.0	54.5	68.0	59.2	53.2	65.8	66.2	59.3	71.6

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2016

TABLE 22. COHORT SURVIVAL RATE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION AND EASTERN VISAYAS, SCHOOL YEARS 2012-2013 TO 2013-2014

AREA	2012-2013			2013-2014		
	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE
Philippines	74.2	70.5	78.4	80.6	77.7	83.9
National Capital Region	82.3	79.3	85.6	81.1	79.1	83.3
Eastern Visayas	75.4	71.1	80.4	82.3	78.5	86.7

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2016

TABLE 23. COHORT SURVIVAL RATE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION AND EASTERN VISAYAS, SCHOOL YEARS 2012-2013 TO 2013-2014

AREA	2012-2013			2013-2014		
	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE
Philippines	78.2	73.5	83.0	80.6	76.2	85.1
National Capital Region	81.3	76.4	86.3	82.1	78.6	85.7
Eastern Visayas	73.9	69.3	78.5	78.0	73.1	82.9

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2016

TABLE 24. NUMBER OF HOSPITALS, PHILIPPINES AND EASTERN VISAYAS, 2013-2015

AREA	2012			2013			2014			2015		
	TYPE		TOTAL									
	PRIVATE	PUBLIC		PRIVATE	PUBLIC		PRIVATE	PUBLIC		PRIVATE	PUBLIC	
Philippines	1,095	730	1,825	912	542	1,454	770	452	1,222	772	423	1,195
Eastern Visayas	28	449	77	20	22	42	20	22	42	21	22	43

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2016

TABLE 25. PHILHEALTH MEMBERS AND DEPENDENTS, PHILIPPINES AND EASTERN VISAYAS REGION, 2016

AREA	MEMBERS	DEPENDENTS	TOTAL
Philippines	41,231,849	52,169,012	93,400,861
Eastern Visayas	1,663,715	2,527,170	4,190,885

Source: Philippine Health Insurance Corporation PhilHealth 2016 Annual Report

Deteriorating health outcomes

In 2012, Eastern Visayas had 77 hospitals, 28 of which were private while 49 were public hospitals. In 2013, the number of hospitals in the region plummeted to 42, which was composed of 20 private hospitals and 22 public hospitals. The same

number of hospitals was reported in 2014. In 2015, only one private hospital was added to the number. (See Table 24)

As of 2016, there are almost 1.7 million members of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) or PhilHealth in Eastern Visayas, with 2.5 million dependents. (See

Table 25) According to the PhilHealth's annual report, a total of 55,474 families from Eastern Visayas who were casualties of Typhoon Yolanda were enrolled to receive extended insurance coverage under the Fortuitous Event Program as a component of the PhilHealth for the billing period of January to December 2014. But the figure is just a drop in the bucket if compared with the number of affected families.

Infant mortality rate (IMR) in Eastern Visayas was at 6.9 per 1,000 live births in 2015, while maternal mortality ratio (MMR) was higher than the national figure at 98.9. (See Table 26) IMR in 2013 was higher at 11 and MMR was also higher at 109.7.

Under-five mortality rate (UFMR) in Eastern Visayas follows the national trend of substantially decreasing from 2008

and 2013. (See Table 27) Data in 2015 places the UFMR in Eastern Visayas at 9.5, compared with 64 in 2008 and 32 in 2013. The figure is also lower than the national rate of 10.9 per 1,000 livebirths.

Yet, malnutrition data in the region reveals that in 2015, 29.5% of children under five years old were underweight, an increase from 2011 and 2013 figures. (See Chart 2) The Philippine rate of underweight children under five was at 21.5% in 2015.

Stunting comprised 41.7% of children under five in Eastern Visayas in 2015, again an increase from the 2013 figure of 36.6% and higher than the 33.4% national figure. Meanwhile, wasting or thinness in the region among children less than five was at 8.4% in 2015, higher than previous years under review. The percentage of children under five being overweight, on the other hand, decreased over time.

TABLE 26. INFANT AND MATERNAL MORTALITY RATES, PHILIPPINES AND EASTERN VISAYAS, 2015

AREA	INFANT DEATHS		MATERNAL DEATHS	
	TOTAL	INFANT MORTALITY RATE	TOTAL	MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE
Philippines	14,736	7.9	1,371	73.7
Eastern Visayas	610	6.9	88	98.9

Note:
 Infant Mortality Rate - Infant Deaths / Livebirths x 1,000
 Maternal Mortality Ratio - Maternal Deaths / Livebirths x 100,000

Source: Department of Health Field Health Service Information System 2015 Annual Report

TABLE 27. UNDER-FIVE MORTALITY RATE, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2015

	2008	2013	2015
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	64.0	32.0	9.5

Sources: Department of Health Field Health Service Information System 2015 Annual Report and Philippine Statistics Authority Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2016

The DOH reported 227 cases of tuberculosis in 2015 – 141 of which were relapsed cases, 37 failures of treatment, and 49 patients returning after defaulting. Southern Leyte accounted for the highest numbers of all case classifications.²⁴

Short social protection

Despite higher budget for CCT for Eastern Visayas, the increase in the coverage of beneficiaries in the region has not been commensurate. The Modified Conditional Cash Transfer (MCCT) included those affected by Typhoon Yolanda and expanded children from 0-14 to 0-18 years old. Most household beneficiaries or 92% of 274,1043 were in the subsistence level. Data shows, however, that the success rate


of distribution has not been 100% even two years after Typhoon Yolanda. (See Table 28)

Cash for work in exchange for disaster relief operations was provided to 34,948 households worth more than Php21 million.²⁵ But the delay in the payment has been reportedly horrendous.

Infrastructure

Most of the infrastructure rehabilitation efforts are through the respective government agencies under RAY. The only exception is in electricity, water, and sanitation where the local and private cooperatives and enterprises are responsible for the distribution.

CHART 2. PREVALENCE OF MALNOURISHMENT AMONG CHILDREN LESS THAN FIVE YEARS OLD, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2011, 2013 AND 2015 (IN %)



Source: Food and Nutrition Research Institute-Department of Science and Technology 2016 Regional Dissemination Forum

The outcome indicators for infrastructure were taken from the PDP's key indicators in order to ensure the recovery of Yolanda-affected areas to pre-disaster levels. (See List 4)

Over-achieving roads and bridges

One of the outcome indicators in the roads and bridges subsector is the increased length of paved roads. The DPWH has reported that Eastern Visayas has 203 roads with a total road length of 2,537.2 kilometers (km), 38.9% is in good condition, 36.6% in fair condition, and 11.8% in poor condition. Around 123.9 km or 4.9% of the road is in bad condition. The remainder, 197.1 km or 7.8% of the road length is yet to be assessed. Seventy-three

percent (73%) of the total road length for all conditions is concrete. (See Table 29)

As of July 2017, the DPWH has completed reconstructing the target of 107.6 km of national roads. NEDA data reveals that the DPWH went beyond the earlier target by finishing 110.78 km of national roads.²⁶

On the other hand, Eastern Visayas has a total number of 873 bridges – 47.9% of the bridges in the region are in good condition, 40.8% in fair condition, 10.9 % in poor condition, and 0.5% in bad condition. Seventy-nine percent (79%) of the bridges are concrete. (See Table 30)

NEDA data from July 2017 shows that the DPWH has completed the target of 1,852

TABLE 28. LEVELS OF WELL-BEING OF PANTAWID FAMILYA HOUSEHOLD BENEFICIARIES BY PROVINCE, EASTERN VISAYAS, DECEMBER 2015

PROVINCE	NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITIES AND CITIES COVERED	2015 SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (SWDI) BASELINE ADMINISTRATION					PERFORMANCE (IN %)
		TARGET HOUSEHOLDS TO BE ADMINISTERED WITH SWDI TOOL*	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	TOTAL	
Leyte	40 municipalities, 3 cities	107,586	1,796	91,278	6,174	99,248	92.2
Southern Leyte	18 municipalities, 1 city	19,350	452	16,166	1,203	17,821	92.1
Biliran	8 municipalities	7,263	163	5,969	443	6,575	90.5
Samar	24 municipalities, 2 cities	58,508	2,385	47,027	1,824	51,236	87.6
Eastern Samar	22 municipalities, 1 city	30,923	1,345	26,199	499	28,043	90.7
Northern Samar	24 municipalities	46,184	1,092	39,181	2,380	42,053	91.1
Total	136 municipalities, 7 cities	274,103	7,233	225,820	12,523	245,576	

* - active Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) households as of December 2014

Source: Department of Social Welfare and Development-Region VIII

km for national bridges and went beyond the target length of national bridges by constructing a total of 1,937.81 km of national bridges.

Focusing on flood control

The Geohazard Survey and Assessment updated the comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) of LGUs, identified resettlement areas for disaster-prone communities, and identified the provision of early warning systems.

Geohazard maps in the region were updated after the typhoon. Identified landslide and flood-prone areas significantly rose from eight in 2011 to 168 in 2015. NEDA data shows that a total of 107 flood control structures have been built in the region out of the target of 110 structures.²⁷ (See Map 1)

More flights but fewer passengers and cargo

Eastern Visayas has 10 airports as of 2015. Only eight are operational, and out of the eight operational airports, only the airports in Tacloban, Calbayog and Catarman are operating commercial flights. The Daniel Z. Romualdez (DZR) Airport in Tacloban is classified as Principal Class I, while the airports in Ormoc, Calbayog and Catarman are considered Principal Class II. Airports in Guiuan, Maasin, Borongan, Hilongos, Catbalogan and Biliran are classified as community airports.²⁸

LIST 4. OUTCOME INDICATORS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

Roads and bridges	Increase in the length of paved roads (in percentage)
	Increase in the length of permanent bridges along national arterial roads (in percentage)
Flood Control	Decrease of areas vulnerable to flooding (in hectares)
Airports	Increase in cargo throughput (metric tons per annum)
	Increase in number of passengers
	Increase in number of aircraft movements
Ports	Increase in cargo throughput (metric tons per annum)
	Increase in number of passengers
	Increase in number of vessels
Telecommunications	Increase in municipalities covered by cellular mobile telephone system (in percentage)
Electricity	Increase in number of households with electric power supply (in percentage)
Water supply	Increase in households with level III connection (in percentage)
	Number of waterless areas eliminated as part of Millennium Development Goals
Sanitation	Increase of population with access to basic sanitation (percent population)
	Increase in households covered by septage management systems (percent of households)
Irrigation	Improvement of cropping intensity (ratio of the net area sown vs total cropped land)
Government buildings	Increase of government services to households

Source: National Economic and Development Authority Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Implementation for Results

TABLE 29. STATUS OF ROADS, EASTERN VISAYAS, AS OF 2016 (IN KILOMETERS)

SURFACE TYPE	CONDITION					TOTAL
	GOOD	FAIR	POOR	BAD	NO ASSESSMENT	
Concrete	673.7	759.9	201.8	82.9	139.1	1,857.3
Asphalt	314.1	167.3	82.9	36.2	36.8	637.3
Gravel	-	1.3	15.2	4.9	15.2	36.5
Earth	-	-	-	-	6.1	6.1
Total	987.8	928.4	300.0	123.9	197.1	2,537.2

Source: Department of Public Works and Highways Road and Bridge Inventory

TABLE 30. STATUS OF BRIDGES, EASTERN VISAYAS, AS OF 2016

SURFACE TYPE	CONDITION				TOTAL
	GOOD	FAIR	POOR	BAD	
Concrete	332	279	76	3	690
Steel	84	77	19	1	181
Bailey	2	-	-	-	2
Timber	-	-	-	-	-
Total	418	356	95	4	873

Source: Department of Public Works and Highways Road and Bridge Inventory

The target numbers of domestic passengers and cargo as of 2015 are still not met, since airports like DZR Airport are heavily damaged by the typhoon. The entire region experienced a decrease in the number of passengers in 2013-2014 while airports were undergoing repair.²⁹

The number of domestic passengers dropped from 1.25 million in 2012 to 1.14 million in 2015. The weight of domestic cargo traffic also dropped from 7.6 MT in 2012 to 6.3 MT in 2015. Yet, domestic flights increased from 17,000 in 2012 to almost 31,000 in 2015. (See Table 31)


More vessels, less cargo

Region VIII has 29 major ports and ferry terminals. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) manages 22 of these, while the LGUs and private companies manage four ports.³⁰

In 2015, the total cargo reached 5.1 MT compared to 5.4 MT in 2012. (See Table 32) The NEDA attributes the decline to damaged ports and ferries.

The total number of passengers reached 6.7 million in 2015, which was a 26%

MAP 1. HYDROMETEOROLOGIC HAZARD MAP, EASTERN VISAYAS PROJECTS



Source: National Economic and Development Authority-Region VIII Eastern Visayas Regional Development Plan 2017-2022

increase from 5.3 million in 2012. The highest number of passengers was recorded at Balicuatro Wharfage and Terminal Corporation (Balwharteco) Ferry Terminal in Allen, Northern Samar. While there was a drop of passengers in 2013, it was recovered in 2014 since the DZR Airport remained damaged.

The number of vessels also increased from 25,000 in 2012 up to 30,000 in 2015.

Telecommunications business

The expansion of business by private cellular telephone providers has led to more cell sites in Eastern Visayas. In 2011, there were 404 cell sites in the region, which increased to 446 in 2015. (See Table 33)

Based on the data from National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)-Region VIII, the municipality of Sto. Niño, Samar is yet to have a cellular site due to its isolation as an island municipality. Moreover, of the 4,390 barangays in Eastern Visayas, 59% have access to cable modem termination system (CMTS).³¹

Living in the dark

NEA 2016 data shows that 89.5% of 887,200 households in Eastern Visayas have access to electricity in their homes. (See Table 34) All of the barangays in the region have electricity, but out of the 811 *sitios* (a barangay or village is made up of sitios or sites) in Eastern Visayas, only 405 or half have electricity.³²

Although Eastern Visayas is the largest producer of geothermal energy in the Philippines and exports cheap power to other regions, the region is still experiencing high cost of electricity. In 2016, the region had the second highest power rates in the country, with Php6.31 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) on the average compared with Luzon island with an average of Php5.49 per kWh and Mindanao with Php5.20 kWh. Households in Eastern Visayas are charged for the generation (56% of rate), transmission (12%), distribution (17%), and system losses in generation and transmission (6%).³³

TABLE 31. AIR TRANSPORT STATISTICS, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2012-2015

INDICATOR/UNIT	BASELINE	ACTUAL		
	2012	2013	2014	2015
Number of Domestic Passenger Traffic (in thousands)	1,256	1	928	1,145
Weight of Domestic Cargo Traffic (in metric tons)	8	8	6	6
Number of Domestic Flights (in thousands)	17	35	21	31

Source: Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines

TABLE 32. WATER TRANSPORT STATISTICS, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2012-2015

INDICATOR/UNIT	BASELINE	ACTUAL		
	2012	2013	2014	2015
Cargo throughput (in million metric tons)	5.398	5.931	4.86	5.146
Number of Passengers (in millions)	5.339	5.118	5.657	6.728
Number of vessels (in thousands)	25.307	25.02	28.613	30.352

Source: Philippine Ports Authority

TABLE 33. NUMBER OF CELLULAR SITES BY PROVINCE, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2015

NETWORK PROVIDER	PROVINCE						TOTAL
	LEYTE	SOUTHERN LEYTE	BILIRAN	SAMAR	EASTERN SAMAR	NORTHERN SAMAR	
Smart	80	23	8	33	26	26	196
Globe	77	31	9	34	27	22	200
Digital	27	10	-	13	-	-	50
Total	184	64	17	80	53	48	446

Source: National Telecommunications Commission-Region VIII

TABLE 34. NUMBER OF POTENTIAL VIS-À-VIS ACTUAL ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS OF HOUSEHOLDS, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2012-2016

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Potential	816,000	824,500	857,400	874,100	887,200
Actual	660,946	688,885	693,326	749,693	794,386
Actual as percentage of total	81.0	83.6	80.9	85.8	89.5

Source: National Electrification Administration

TABLE 35. HOUSEHOLDS WITH ACCESS TO SAFE WATER SUPPLY, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2015

AREA	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS WITH ACCESS TO IMPROVED SAFE WATER SUPPLY		TYPE OF SOURCE					
				LEVEL 1		LEVEL 2		LEVEL 3	
				NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%
Biliran	37,389	37,290	99.7	1,920	5.2	14,953	40.1	20,417	54.8
Eastern Samar	104,169	103,271	99.1	50,177	49.6	31,367	30.4	21,727	21.0
Northern Leyte	236,425	220,830	93.4	68,185	30.9	71,559	32.4	81,086	36.7
Northern Samar	120,341	88,043	73.2	33,654	39.2	42,013	47.7	12,376	14.1
Southern Leyte	74,885	70,136	93.7	6,944	9.9	28,767	31.0	34,425	49.1
Western Samar	114,094	95,654	83.8	33,317	34.8	35,220	36.8	27,117	28.4
Calbayog City	36,878	29,987	81.3	11,820	39.4	9,457	31.5	8,710	29.1
Maasin City	18,501	18,382	99.4	4,022	21.9	5,542	30.2	8,818	48.0
Ormoc City	48,190	47,343	98.2	4,854	10.3	11,375	24.0	31,114	65.7
Tacloban City	41,090	38,018	95.5	4,010	10.6	20,928	55.1	13,080	34.4
Eastern Visayas	831,962	748,954	90.0	218,903	29.2	271,181	36.2	258,870	34.6

Source: Department of Health Field Health Service Information System 2015 Annual Report

Inefficient water supply systems

The number of households with access to safe water supply in Region VIII was at 90% of the 831,962 households in 2015. (See Table 35) However, the dominant type of water source is Level 2, or piped water with a communal water point (e.g. borewell, spring system) serving an average of 4-6 households within a 25-meter distance. It comprises 36.2% of the households in Eastern Visayas.

Level 1, or stand-alone water points (e.g. handpumps, shallow wells, rainwater collectors) serving an average of 15 households within a 250-meter distance, accounts for 29.2% of households. Level 3, or piped water supply with a private water point (e.g. house connection) based on a daily water demand of more than 100 liters per person, accounts for 34.6% of the total households in the region.

TABLE 36. HOUSEHOLDS WITH SANITARY TOILET, SATISFACTORY DISPOSAL OF SOLID WASTE AND COMPLETE BASIC SANITATION FACILITIES, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2015

AREA	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	SANITARY TOILET		COMPLETE BASIC SANITATION FACILITIES		SATISFACTORY DISPOSAL OF SOLID WASTE	
		NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%	NUMBER	%
Biliran	37,389	29,438	78.7	17,429	46.6	17,350	46.4
Eastern Samar	104,169	82,799	79.5	69,479	66.7	66,933	64.3
Northern Leyte	236,425	206,220	87.2	175,702	74.3	196,609	83.2
Northern Samar	120,341	74,279	61.7	37,461	31.1	66,594	55.3
Southern Leyte	74,885	68,445	91.4	34,162	45.6	33,267	44.4
Western Samar	114,094	65,709	57.6	12,496	11.0	12,148	10.7
Calabayog City	36,878	19,832	53.8	14,821	40.2	16,027	43.5
Maasin City	18,501	15,880	85.8	7,622	41.2	13,540	73.2
Ormoc City	48,190	37,943	78.7	31,954	66.3	39,180	81.3
Tacloban City	41,090	31,366	76.3	33,023	80.4	31,366	76.3
Eastern Visayas	831,962	631,911	76.0	434,149	52.2	493,014	59.3

Source: Department of Health Field Health Service Information System 2015 Annual Report

TABLE 37. IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT, EASTERN VISAYAS, AS OF 2016 (IN HECTARES)

IRRIGATION OFFICES	POTENTIAL IRRIGABLE AREA		AREAS DEVELOPED		AREAS DEVELOPED	
	AREA (IN HECTARES)	%	AREA (IN HECTARES)	%		
Biliran	4,114	4.5	4,104	99.8	10	0.2
Northern Leyte	55,379	60.2	40,586	73.3	14,793	26.7
Southern Leyte	6,902	7.5	6,882	99.7	20	0.3
Eastern Samar	6,646	7.2	6,631	99.8	15	0.2
Northern Samar	10,860	11.8	7,192	66.2	3,668	33.8
Western Samar	8,082	8.8	6,530	80.8	1,552	19.2
Eastern Visayas	91,983	100.0	71,925	78.2	20,058	21.8

Source: National Irrigation Administration

Northern Samar has the lowest number of households with access to water supply at 73.2 percent. Additionally, only 14.1% of households in the province have access to Level 3 or individual water connections.

Worsening sanitation situation

In 2015, out of the 831,962 households in Eastern Visayas, only 76% had sanitary toilets. (See Table 36)

Aside from sanitary toilets, 2015 data shows that only 52.2% of the households in the region had complete basic sanitation facilities such as lavatory, urinals, bathrooms, kitchen sinks, and other sanitation facilities. In 2014, about 56.5% had complete basic sanitation facilities, thus a decrease of 7.6% from 2014 to 2015.

Furthermore, only 59.3% of households had satisfactory disposal of solid waste in 2015, a slight increase from 48.8% in 2014.

Moreover, the sewage system in Eastern Visayas is also nowhere in place in any city or municipality, which worsens the pollution of water bodies and groundwater resources.³⁴

Neglected irrigation

Data from the NIA as of 2016 puts the potential irrigable area in Eastern Visayas at 91,983 hectares. (See Table 37) But only 78.2% is irrigated. Communal irrigation systems are dominant, at 38,347 hectares. National irrigation systems have 24,827 hectares of service area, while there are 5,916 hectares serviced by private irrigation systems and 2,835 hectares serviced by government-assisted systems.³⁵

Endnotes

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- 10 Eastern Visayas Regional Development plan 2017-2022, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
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- 12 Eastern Visayas Regional Development plan 2017-2022, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
- 13 *Ibid.* p. 82.
- 14 *Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: IMPLEMENTATION FOR RESULTS*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
- 15 *Yolanda Progress Report as of 2nd Quarter 2017: EASATERN VISAYAS*. National Economic and Development Authority, 2017, pp. 5-6.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p.6
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
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- 20 Talabong, Rambo. "How the Duterte Administration Is Fast-Tracking Yolanda Recovery." *Rappler*, 25 Jun. 2017, www.rappler.com/nation/173802-yolanda-recovery-fast-tracked-duterte. Accessed 25 Aug. 2017.
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- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 238.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 237.
- 31 *Ibid.*, pp.246-247.
- 32 2016 Annual Report. National Electrification Administration, 2016, p. 44.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 244.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 241.
- 35 "2016 Status of Irrigation Development." *National Irrigation Authority*, 2017, www.nia.gov.ph/sites/default/files/pdf_reader/2016_status-of-irrigation-development.pdf. Accessed 25 Aug. 2017.



NEOLIBERAL REFORMS: INCREASING VULNERABILITY

The country's high disaster vulnerability is the function of chronic poverty and economic backwardness as exacerbated by government's implementation of neoliberal policies. Over time, these policies have emphasized on the extraction of natural resources by big local and foreign investors, full economic liberalization to foreign products and capital, privatization of even public utilities and social services as well as disaster response, and reduction of government responsibilities. These are being implemented even as governance problems have remained – patronage politics, systemic corruption, and subservience to foreign powers. In short, neoliberalism has aggravated the Philippines' deeply rooted economic problems thus weakening its adaptive capacity.¹

Ironically, however, it is the same neoliberal policies and desired outcomes that the Philippine government aims for the Yolanda-affected regions, particularly Eastern Visayas. Neoliberalism has overly focused on infrastructure development – a way of facilitating and pump priming private business in a devastated region in order to recover its 'marketability'. Instead of prioritizing agriculture and the restoration of natural resources, on

which majority of the population depends for livelihood, the national and local governments have only made sure that the region is attractive for business. Even the delivery of social services and public utilities has been placed under private provisioning. The only direct State delivery that is happening is the distribution of conditional cash transfers, but that is just a smokescreen to the overall government neglect not only of victims but also of the entire working population.

An economy of contradictions

The economy of Eastern Visayas registered its highest growth rate in 2016 – from 4.5% growth in GRDP in 2013; 2.3% decline in 2014; back to growth with 4.6% in 2015 then to 12.4% in 2016. The NEDA Region VIII attributed this to “flourishing economic activities on the back of high domestic demand.”² (See Table 38)

A closer look, however, reveals that the regional economy exhibits the same growth pattern of the national economy, which is shallow and unsustainable. The regional economic growth was attributed to the 44.5% growth in public and private construction. This was due to the intensified implementation of construction projects such as road widening and flood control projects, among others, on top of the remaining post-Yolanda reconstruction projects. Private construction, precipitated by investments such as the opening of hotels, malls and other establishments, also contributed to growth. Election spending further bolstered growth in 2016.

Manufacturing rebounded with a 19.6% growth from a 16% contraction in 2014 and 3% in 2015. Operations of establishments in the region’s economic zones apparently resumed after some disruptions due to the typhoon. The 8.6% growth in the

services sector was pushed by 11% growth in financial transactions as well as the 6.3% growth in government spending in construction.³ All these growth trends, however, are typical of election years.

Meanwhile, agriculture bounced back by 2.4% in 2016 from a 12.6% contraction in 2014. This was pushed mainly by poultry and fishery production, the more viable destinations of private investments and foreign loans than crop production. Agricultural GVA remained lower than pre-Yolanda nonetheless.⁴

Gross capital formation in agriculture had the lowest share of 6%, also the lowest among regions in the Visayas. Seventy-four percent of investment went to construction.⁵

Region VIII, as the rest of the country, relies on export earnings. However, after the destruction of Typhoon Yolanda, export earnings consistently dropped, slipping to US\$313.3 million in 2015. The top exports of Region VIII are minerals including copper, cathodes and section of cathodes, fertilizers, coconut and copra, and refined oil or cochin. China is the top trading partner.⁶


The NEDA-Region VIII lauds this growth to have resulted in a per capita GRDP of Php37,261 at constant prices, the highest in the last seven years, which also grew the fastest year-on-year across regions.⁷ Poverty, however, has remained acute at 38.7% of the population (30.7% of families) in 2015, albeit reportedly reduced already. (See Chart 3) Farmers and fisherfolk remain the poorest sectors in Eastern Visayas. The annual per capita poverty threshold in 2015 was at Php21,304, which means that Php8,877 per month is required to meet the basic food and non-food requirements of an average household.⁸

TABLE 38. GROSS REGIONAL DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2013-2016 (AT CONSTANT 2000 PRICES; IN PHP THOUSAND)

INDUSTRY SECTOR	2013	2014	2015	2016
I. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing	30,124,558	26,314,710	25,385,477	25,983,383
a. Agriculture, Hunting & Forestry	23,552,209	20,934,062	20,177,427	20,552,012
b. Fishing	6,572,348	5,380,648	5,208,050	5,431,371
II. Industry	62,317,166	60,430,739	63,413,567	76,226,411
a. Mining & Quarrying	216,021	271,428	317,044	327,124
b. Manufacturing	32,497,248	27,283,301	26,476,216	31,675,952
c. Construction	11,243,588	14,328,381	16,093,918	23,256,282
d. Electricity, Gas, & Water Supply	18,360,308	18,547,630	20,526,390	20,967,054
III. Service	57,416,426	59,731,340	64,425,641	69,938,795
a. Transportation, Storage, & Communication	13,837,994	14,709,210	16,318,729	17,825,028
b. Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles, Personal and Household Goods	8,064,193	7,836,826	8,398,732	8,853,461
c. Financial Intermediation	6,291,134	6,746,381	7,332,853	8,146,672
d. Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities	7,778,442	8,106,590	8,200,341	8,702,766
e. Public Administration & Defense; Compulsory Social Security	8,374,185	8,839,881	9,040,548	9,606,247
f. Other Services	13,070,478	13,492,452	15,134,438	16,804,620
Gross Regional Domestic Product	149,858,149	146,476,790	153,224,685	172,148,589

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Gross Regional Domestic Product

CHART 3. POVERTY INCIDENCE AMONG POPULATION AND FAMILIES, EASTERN VISAYAS, 2006-2015 (IN %)



Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Official Poverty Statistics

Unemployment and underemployment situation in the region has been precarious, even if the national statistics office tried to moderate it by excluding the region from national estimates and Leyte from regional estimates. In particular, underemployment rate is higher in Eastern Visayas than in the whole country. According to the NEDA, while investments have given rise to new businesses being built in the region, this has only made more low-quality jobs.⁹ There is also more informal work than before, which can only be interpreted in general as jobs scarcity.

In 2015, the services sector employed 44.2% of the labor force; agriculture, 43.7 percent. The industry sector, in particular construction, recorded the biggest economic contribution, but it only

employed only 12% of the labor force.¹⁰ Still, a conservative estimate places 53% of the farmers in the region being landless.

Unboxing neoliberalism

The government at the end of 2017 shall unveil the Eastern Visayas Regional Development Plan (EVRDP) 2017-2022 aligned with the country's long-term vision, AmBisyon Natin 2040, (Our Ambition 2040) of a "strongly rooted, comfortable, and secure life".¹¹ The said ambitious vision is the showcase of the PDP 2017-2022.

The key priority sectors are agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism.¹² These, however, will be developed along the overall neoliberal thrust of "value chain development", i.e. producing agricultural



and manufacturing products as viable exports or investment earners directed towards the global economy. They are also to be developed to promote the country as destination of tourism investment.

The local governments in Region VIII are preparing industry roadmaps in order to open up the region to investments in agribusiness and fishery areas. They are also in the process of developing economic zones and strengthening micro, small and medium enterprises, in tune with the neoliberal policies of multilateral trading regimes, such as those of the ASEAN, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the new Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership (RCEP).¹³

The PDP along with the EVRDP, however, are centered on the Duterte administration's massive infrastructure program Build, Build, Build, dubbed as the Golden Age of Infrastructure. This covers the administration's Three-Year Rolling Infrastructure Plan (TRIP) 2018-2020, which lists a total of 4,895 projects worth Php3.6 trillion. They include 1,313 infrastructure projects in the five poorest regions of

the Philippines (i.e. Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or ARMM, Eastern Visayas, Northern Mindanao, Caraga, and Soccskargen) worth Php157.4 billion. In particular, Eastern Visayas has 147 projects amounting to Php19.8 billion. (See Table 39) (See Annex 4)

Cost allocation for the projects of Eastern Visayas is small, however, if the project lineup is to be considered. The cable-stayed long span bridges alone, which will link Leyte to Mindanao and Samar islands and to Luzon, would cost at least Php193.6 billion –Php101.4 billion for Leyte-Surigao Link Bridge Project and Php92.2 billion for Luzon-Samar Bridge Project.¹⁴ Build, Build, Build is foreseen to be bankrolled through public-private partnerships (PPPs), official development assistance (ODA) loans, and other funding schemes.¹⁵

Build, Build, Build is not hinged on recovering domestic agriculture and domestic manufacturing, rather on pump priming the economy for private and foreign investment in value chain development. It is also designed to make infrastructure development itself

an attractive and lucrative destination of foreign private investments, ODA, foreign loans, and even bureaucrat capital.

The World Bank cashes in on agriculture

Official employment figures show that almost half of the region's population depends on agriculture for livelihood. These estimates are often considered conservative since 307,000 jobs were lost in agriculture from 2013-2014, which means that the higher services sector employment is mostly composed of displaced peasants transferring to informal work. An estimated five out of 10 farmers in the region are landless, which presents the deeper dimension of the problem.

But the Philippine government is not focused on developing agriculture as means of increasing farmers' adaptive capacity and resilience or recovering their lives after the disaster. Instead, the Duterte administration is continuing the implementation of the World Bank's Philippine Rural Development Project (PRDP), a six-year loan of the World Bank to the country amounting to US\$501.2 million, 18% of the World Bank's current total Philippine portfolio of US\$2.8 billion. The PRDP is actually the single largest loan approved by the World Bank for the

TABLE 39. THREE-YEAR ROLLING INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN 2018-2020 BY LOCATION AND FUNDING SOURCE

	NUMBER OF PROJECTS	COST (IN PHP BILLION)
<i>By location</i>		
Region specific	4,498	936
National Capital Region	293	180
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	955	51
Eastern Visayas	147	20
Northern Mindanao	117	50
Caraga	66	29
Soccskasargen	28	8
Other regions	2,892	598
Inter-regional	158	1,848
Nationwide	239	824
<i>By funding source</i>		
Locally-funded	3,334	-
Official development assistance-funded	70	-
Public-private partnership	33	-
Other modes	1,341	-
To be determined	117	-
Total	4,895	3,608

Source: "Php157.4-B infra projects to roll out in poorest PH regions," National Economic and Development Authority, 2 May 2017 (<http://www.neda.gov.ph/2017/05/02/php157-4-b-infra-projects-to-roll-out-in-poorest-ph-regions>)

agricultural sector in the history of its lending in the country.¹⁶

The PRDP aims to increase rural incomes and enhance farm and fishery productivity in targeted areas by supporting smallholders and fishers to increase their

marketable surpluses and their access to markets. It is designed to establish the government platform for a modern, climate-smart and market-oriented agri-fishery sector.¹⁷

The World Bank has far-reaching interests in agriculture, which are detailed in its Agricultural Action Plan. Although now defunct, having expired in 2015, the Action Plan remains, according to the World Bank, the framework when it comes to dealing with agricultural projects. The PRDP is attuned to the Action Plan on opening up and integrating domestic markets into global value chains; promoting an index-based climate risk insurance; and prioritizing PPPs in agriculture as a major platform of agricultural investments.¹⁸

The PRDP has four components, which are offered as well in Eastern Visayas: agricultural and fisheries modernization investments in planning at the local and national levels (I-PLAN); intensified building up of infrastructure and logistics (I-BUILD); investments in rural enterprises and agriculture and fisheries productivity (I-REAP); and implementation support to PRDP (I-SUPPORT).¹⁹

The PRDP combines the LGUs and the private sector in a partnership. It is proposal-based, i.e. the stakeholders, usually farmers and fisherfolk's cooperatives, submit a proposal for the approval of the PRDP implementation structure. The Regional Project Advisory Board (RPAB) provides guidance, reviews and approves subprojects for funding under the PRDP.²⁰

Eastern Visayas got the bulk of PRDP loans in the Visayas at the end of 2016. Of 105 I-REAP subprojects, 47 are in Eastern Visayas – 43 were already approved and

three are on the pipeline. Total funding amounts to Php81 million. Most of the subprojects proposed are microenterprises focused on production and trading of certain commodities such as *ube* (yam), vegetables, native chicken, duck, and swine.²¹

The RPAB also endorsed for approval the Northern Samar Coco Geonet Processing and Trading Enterprise, and the Banana Production and Trading Enterprise in Samar.

The former, which is a proposal mainly for trading geonets, shall require a total investment of Php8.7 million. The amount will primarily be used for infrastructure facility, transport vehicles, and machinery. The proponent has already established a warehouse facility in San Jose, Northern Samar, which serves as the central buying and decorticating station. Four multipurpose livelihood enterprise sheds in strategic areas shall also be set up.²²

The latter requires a bigger amount of Php14.1 million, since the proponent still has to put up its own trading center in Bgy. Madalunot, Pinabacdao, Samar and strengthen its production base by developing 175 hectares. The proposed subproject will initially cover the municipalities of Marabut, Basey, Sta. Rita, Talalora, Villareal, Daram, and Pinabacdao.²³

For I-BUILD, on the other hand, the Rehabilitation and Improvement of Bgy. San Roque-Bgy. Bahay Farm-to-Market Road (FMR) is touted to be the biggest PRDP-funded infrastructure subproject in the region, and perhaps in the entire country. It will link the municipalities of Liloan and San Ricardo in Southern Leyte, with a total length of 19.4 km costing Php232 million.²⁴

The subproject is seen to boost not only agriculture trade but also tourism potentials. In the words of DA-Region VIII Director U-Nichols Manalo, "This road subproject will surely boost the locality's agriculture and tourism potentials. Its location is ideal. By the roadside, you will see scenic views that lie along coastlines. Its fishery resource remains abundant. On the other side of the road is a verdant expanse suited for crop and livestock production. This place has a lot to offer."²⁵

Another I-BUILD showcase subproject is the Rehabilitation and Improvement of Bgy. Mahayahay-Bgy. Manalog FMR in St. Bernard, Southern Leyte. It has total length of 16.6 km and costs Php182.7 million. It will link the municipalities of St. Bernard and Hinunangan, the province's top rice producing areas. Other crops produced are coconut, banana, abaca, root crops, and vegetables.

Region VIII is also the recipient of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) of the World Bank, a program to assist in the protection of the environment through environmentally sound and sustainable economic development. The PRDP is funded from the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its GEF.²⁶ For Region VIII, the GEF aims to protect coastal and marine resource base in targeted priority areas by preserving biodiversity and promoting fisheries resource management. It is allocated US\$7 million.²⁷


The GEF covers Guiuan coast comprising the Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) of the municipalities of Guiuan, Mercedes Salcedo, Quinapondan, and Lawaan.²⁸ The subproject aims to rehabilitate fish sanctuaries in the MPAs. Examples of

subprojects are the Rehabilitation of Can-Usod and Bolusao Fish Sanctuaries in Bgys. Betaog and Bolusao in Lawaan, and the Rehabilitation of Manapag Reef Fish Sanctuary in Guiuan.²⁹

Proposals for microenterprise development in the GEF sites may also be submitted. Examples of approved proposals are the Fishing and Trading Enterprise costing Php1.4 million, and the Mangrove Crab Production and Trading at Quinapondan amounting to Php1 million.³⁰

It is premature to assess at this point how the PRDP and its subprojects would benefit large sections of the communities involved, particularly the farmers and fisherfolk households. It is enough to say, however, that the PRDP caters to a limited number of beneficiaries, since most of the subproject proponents are relatively better off to begin with than the ordinary farmers, fishers, and survivors of Typhoon Yolanda. These are large cooperatives, whether preexisting or organized for the purpose of capturing the loans from the PRDP, which already have the capacity to shell out counterpart funds even prior to project approval. In Mindanao, for instance, where half of the PRDP funding has been infused, the project proponents (a.k.a. beneficiaries) must have equity equivalent to 25% of the total subproject cost in the case of livelihood subprojects and 10% of total subproject cost in the case of infrastructure subprojects.³¹

An assessment of PRDP in Mindanao that expired in 2015 is conclusive of the limited benefits, if not contrary effects, of the World Bank project. The study shows that there was an increase in household income of the direct beneficiaries, but mainly driven by non-farm income. Due to its value chain development approach, the project focused more on marketable




crops, thereby undermining its avowed objective of improving food security. The farmers ended up paying more user fees for the irrigation and other infrastructure projects.³²

The study also shows that climate-smart agriculture pushes for crop insurance, which on the other hand emphasizes effective irrigation system and functional drainage system as one of the farm eligibility requirements. The threats of climate change and other weather disturbances such as the El Niño drought phenomenon and super-typhoons are also incorporated in the risk insurance. But it is actually in the form of lending with 10% interest and the farmers' land as collateral. If the farmer fails to pay, the NIA 'confiscates' the land, takes charge of production, and works on the land until the loan is paid. Meanwhile, the farmer renders labor on his or her own land.³³

Meanwhile, the machines bought by the project proponent or cooperative were kept with the president of the irrigators' association and rented by the beneficiaries. They were renting for lower cost than what they used to pay private renters indeed, but the subproject did not end borrowing in general.

Livelihood was not improved, since farmers' income was enough only to roll their debts. Income increments were minimal and only went back to food expenses and not to pay for other household expenses such as education. Farmer-beneficiaries thus have continued to borrow for production and everyday expenses and to work for other tenants, and they still do not own the land.³⁴



The PRDP in Eastern Visayas could be evaluated in terms of its objectives of raising farm incomes by 5%; incomes of the beneficiaries of enterprise development by 30%; values of marketed outputs by 7%; and the number of farmers and fishers accessing the DA services by 20 percent. But the more relevant question should focus on whether or not the PRDP has helped increase the adaptive capacity of the farmers and fisherfolk after the disaster.

In particular, has the PRDP addressed the more basic problem of landlessness, which has rendered the farming population more vulnerable to the vagaries of both the weather and the market? In many cases in the country, the simple redistribution of land to small farmers is more favorable and beneficial than large investments, pre and post-disaster. And this has never been more truthful in Easter Visayas than today. But it is in this regard that the PRDP is bound to fail, as in other regions, since it promotes market-oriented land reform with the objective of allowing smallholder farmers to use land as loan collateral for the subprojects. It does open the gates for the farmers to cede the land to investors instead of strengthening their control and production decisions.

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DECONSTRUCTING BUILD BACK BETTER

The Philippine government's quick move towards the corporate-led and investment-driven reconstruction approach, Build Back Better, falls neatly as one of the examples of disaster capitalism. The NEDA has indeed used Typhoon Yolanda to facilitate private investments in profitable ventures, while the victims are still traumatized by the disaster.

While the nature of capital in vulnerable social circumstances such as natural hazards and wars has always been opportunistic, the Philippine government's long-standing adherence to neoliberalism has also made disaster capitalism effortless on the part of the State and private players. The Philippine government has been preconditioned for the primary role of the private sector and its unhampered profiteering in all aspects of life, including tragedies.

On the other hand, the State has not only used the disaster to sell off its pieces to the private sector but also to introduce additional and more permanent neoliberal reforms that facilitate further profit-seeking activities and wealth concentration by the economic oligarchs. This is evident in how the Philippine government has also used Typhoon Yolanda to rush the acceptance of its most objectionable neoliberal agenda.

Permanent feature

The emergence of the term 'disaster capitalism' although not unexpected is still an appalling reality. Naomi Klein clearly defined it in his book, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, as the "orchestrated raid on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities."¹

Klein used the two most destructive disasters in history to illustrate the concept. One was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which affected 11 countries with almost 250,000 casualties and left 2.5 million people homeless. The Sri Lankan government showcased the rehabilitation of the Arugam Bay into a bustling tourism area as Build Back Better. After the disaster, the Sri Lankan government declared the coastlines as "buffer zones", disallowing the local folk, the previous occupants, from going back to their houses while allowing hotels and resorts to stay on and expand.

The other was Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, United States in 2005, which displaced thousands of people. The federal government contracted out response and recovery to private providers. But the private companies were able to obtain public relief funds at any rate without being accountable for spending. Banks offered interest-based loans to the victims, while insurance companies refused to pay for damages yet continued collecting payments even if homes were no longer liveable. Recovery was eventually left up to local volunteers, churches, and non-profit charities.²

In *Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith*, Vincanne Adams concludes: "In the end, they were able to profit from human

tragedy, turning sorrows into opportunities for capital investment in what Naomi Klein calls a form of disaster capitalism."³

In both cases, disasters are the new markets, comprised of profoundly vulnerable disaster-affected communities, which become a source of immense corporate profits. Shifting emergency management responsibilities from government to the private sector has also changed the nature of the victims from being citizens to being customers.⁴

In the case of the Philippines, the more than three decades of neoliberal policies has not only made the country lose its adaptive capacity to natural hazards but has also made economic planning including rehabilitation from disasters prone to such opportunism and abuses by corporations, the elite, foreign governments and organizations, and corrupt politicians. The country has been prepared more for privatized response, and the government is relegated to the role of facilitating reforms to create business opportunities and wider markets, while the citizens are still "reeling from shock". According to Naomi Klein, the government in such instance even moves quickly to make the reforms permanent.

A further study conducted to examine whether or not disaster capitalism manifested post-Yolanda points out particularities in the Philippines that differentiate the country from the aforementioned cases. One is the permanent Philippine crisis, which makes disasters more of a continuation of devastated lives rather than "shock" for the already ill-prepared, vulnerable populace. Government response has itself been merely a continuation of neoliberal policies that have in the first place made people's lives more miserable.⁵



The second particularity is patronage politics, which is much entrenched by the long-standing domination of Philippine politics and government by the landed and trading elite. The government is run like a personal business and on behalf of the interests of economic oligarchs and cronies. Such bureaucrat capitalism, manifesting in large-scale corruption and plunder, is a unique feature of disaster capitalism in the country.⁶

In Leyte, for instance, only a few families like the Romualdez, Loreto-Petilla and Cari clans control the province's political and economic resources. The clout of such political dynasties shapes disaster capitalism into a different character where patronage politics 'interferes' with 'market efficiency' and profiteering only by businesses in order to ensure that the patrimonial oligarchic state gets its share of the loot.

The third particularity is the capacity of the Filipino people's movement to militantly respond to disaster capitalism with organizing and mobilizations as well

as people-oriented recovery efforts.⁷ This vigilance and high level of organization, which is one of the main subjects of this study, has continually restrained the full-blown operations of neoliberalism, disaster capitalism, and patronage politics.

Push for more neoliberal reforms

The Australian Volunteers for International Development (AVID) program partnered with the DILG to produce a Build Back Better (BBB) Operations Manual for LGUs. The Operations Manual is also meant to be used for future natural calamities.⁸

The Operations Manual illustrates the client instead of citizen orientation of rehabilitation as well as the private sector process of implementation instead of responsible governance. The government steps aside in BBB.

The core principles are:

1. Consultation. Communities directly affected by the disaster are consulted.

2. Information. All the available information such as hazard maps, ecological data, soil information, and flood areas are gathered to help improve the ability of the decision makers in achieving BBB.
3. Social inclusion. BBB is for the whole community regardless of age, gender, and whether formal or informal residents.
4. Local economic recovery. The LGUs must create opportunities for small entrepreneurs of the affected community to flourish.
5. Resilient infrastructure. Create sturdy and functional structures designed and constructed to serve the needs of the affected community.
6. Building resilient communities. Through an understanding of BBB, communities can have increased collective strength and resilience to face future calamities.
7. Local empowerment. Local residents and governments must be knowledgeable in disaster risk management to make informed decisions when a natural disaster occurs.⁹

Underlying the core principles, however, is the “user pays” principle where any user of infrastructure, technical assistance or even training will have to pay a user fee. This is to recoup private investments in reconstruction. Meanwhile, the principles of consultation, inclusion and empowerment are merely rhetoric, since in operationalization they depart from the essence of people-oriented and community-based rehabilitation.

BBB uses the Project Management approach, which has practically stripped government of responsibilities, as it is a linear process that is typical of corporatized systems. It has five stages, each with specific outcomes. The stages are project initiation, planning and design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and closing. In fact, it is the linear process that negates the principles of consultation, inclusion and empowerment, since the community comes in, if at all, only at the initiation stage where needs are to be assessed. The swiftness of the government coming up with the RAY in December 2013 only showed that consultation for needs assessment did not happen as it was stated.

The BBB Operations Manual paved the way for the Aquino administration and the succeeding Duterte administration to push for the full implementation of neoliberal policies, which government had been endeavoring. These include the unhampered PPP in infrastructure development, PPP in schools and hospitals, PPP in agriculture, clearing of identified hazard areas in favor of other structures, and land use policy that gives the LGUs free hand in reclassifying agricultural lands to other uses.

With BBB principles, the DPWH has come up with its Structural Resiliency Program, which aims to upgrade standards in the design and construction of public school, hospitals, and other government structures. The DPWH and the DepEd have also published the Simplified Construction Handbook for School Buildings, which is to help technical professionals ensure Build Back Better principles and provide an easy reference for checking, monitoring, and overseeing the construction and repair of school buildings.¹⁰

The DENR, DILG, DPWH, and DOST have signed a joint memo circular on adoption of hazard zone classification and guidelines. The Secretaries of these respective government agencies are to regulate activities in so-called hazard-prone areas and to provide guidelines and mechanism in the development of areas identified as NDZ. Then, the LGUs shall implement post-disaster infrastructure as guided by the DILG and the Build Back Better Operations Manual.¹¹

Lastly, with the BBB Operations Manual, the HLURB has approved the CLUP Guidebook for LGUs ostensibly for proper planning of land use integral to recovery and reconstruction efforts.¹²

The issue of land use policy in the Philippines is a controversial one. Three administrations including the current one have been pushing for it, yet the Philippine Congress is yet to pass a National Land Use Act. It is problematic especially for the landlord-dominated Congress, since it could put a cap on how much land could be owned by the landlords, even if the neoliberal thrust is to secure their property rights. It is also problematic especially for an agrarian economy, since the neoliberal inclination in land use is more on land as a financial and investment asset rather than as agricultural land.

The functions of land reclassification and conversion were devolved to the LGUs through the 1991 Local Government Code. This gave the LGUs free hand, and power

over the DAR and the interests of agrarian reform beneficiaries, farmers and fisherfolk, to convert agricultural lands to real estate uses. There have always been complaints filed by farmers with the DAR regarding this, but the CLUP Guidebook has expedited the process of reclassification and conversion in the name of recovery and reconstruction efforts.

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
DISASTER CAPITALISM, PHILIPPINE-STYLE

This study focused on 'rehabilitation' projects, which illustrate the opportunism of the government and private sector in the region to gain from the need to rebuild the lives of the people in Region VIII. They also elucidate the running conclusion that what has been wrong with government's rehabilitation Build Back Better is the absence of genuine consultation with the people, rather the priority is given to evaluation of business opportunities. The benefits gained by the public officials have also been evident.

Tide Embankment Project

The JICA conducted the feasibility study for the Tide Embankment Project. The DPWH has since then included in its budget the cost of Civil Works and Road Right of Way (RROW) acquisition. The JICA produced the hazard map, and the government decided to go on with the project. (See Map 2)

The Tide Embankment Project aims "to protect the Yolanda-affected areas in Tacloban-Palo-Tanauan from future similar calamities/storm surges; to prioritize on the protection of urban areas; and to prevent casualties and minimize the number of affected people."¹



**MAP 2. LEYTE TIDE
EMBANKMENT PROJECT**

Source: Department of Public Works and Highways Region 8

The project will run from Bgy. Diit in Tacloban City, the shorelines of Palo, and end in Bgy. Ambao in Tanauan with total length of 27.3 km of steel and concrete sea wall. It will be divided into six sections – Sections 1 to 3 in Tacloban (12.3 km), Section 4 in Tacloban-Palo (7.8 km); Section 5 in Palo-Tanauan (4.1 km); and Section 6 in Tanauan (3.1 km). It is targeted to be finished in five years' time.

The overall design of the tide embankment has a top elevation at mean sea level (MSL)+4.0 meters (m) in Section 3 and MSL+3.5m in Section 4, based on simulated storm surge deviation or MSL+3.8m and MSL+3.2m, respectively.²

The Tide Embankment Project follows a simple alignment design. The wall must be set at a height of 4m, must be 30m away from the shoreline, avoids large facilities, avoids abrupt changes of alignment, and must be 20m from the centerline of the existing road.

Total project cost is about Php7.9 billion for Civil Works and RROW acquisition, which will be broken down into six years. In 2015, the target 278,420 square meters (sq.m.) was acquired for Php110,000 and civil works amounted to Php270,000 for a total of Php380,000. In 2016, the target of 286,000 sq.m. was acquired for Php114,000 and 4.5 km of civil works for Php1.8 million.

The project is envisioned to be beneficial for Eastern Visayas in terms of economic contribution since it will provide protection to around 30,8000 houses and buildings within the urban areas of 27.3 sq.km. Economic benefits are valued at Php6.4 billion, with economic internal rate of return of 35 percent. Estimated economic benefits do not include the value of personal properties of each household,

value of equipment / facilities in the buildings, and the value of goods of business establishments.³

Raising natural hazard

The Center for Environmental Concerns (CEC) raised concerns that the project would be compromising the natural ecosystems of Tacloban-Palo-Tanauan. The project threatens to clear almost 100 hectares of mangroves in the target areas, since areal distribution and ecosystem functions are poorly characterized. There shall be constraints on sediment and water flows and landward migration.⁴

The project is classified as non-Environmentally Critical Project, and this raises questions regarding the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process. The environmental impact statement (EIS) is poorly written and disorganized, yet the DENR granted an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the project.⁵

The people's organization, Advocates of Science and Technology for the People (AGHAM), cites a study by the University of the Philippines-National Institute of Geological Sciences (UP-NIGS) showing that coastal erosion in La Union, province in Northern Luzon, was aggravated by artificial structures. Another incident cited is in Pampanga, province of Central Luzon where extreme flooding affected around 350 barangays after a hundred meters of the tail dike broke.⁶

AGHAM projects that the Tide Embankment Project can worsen flooding since it can block the natural water course of inland floods to the sea.

SOCIAL WELFARE OFFICE ENDORSES

The Municipal Social Welfare and Development (MSWD) Office of Palo claims that there are livelihood programs in the municipality. It has the Cash-Based Livelihood Assistance, which is basically cash-for-work.

Livelihood projects from the LGU include veggie noodles production in San Fernando, buko (coconut) and cassava pie making in Bgy. Arado, complementary food production in Bgy. Pawing, casava chips production in Bgy. Tacuranga and buko vendors of Bgy. Candahug, which is a barangay severely affected by Typhoon Yolanda. There is also mat weaving and embroidery in Bgy. Baras and mushroom production in Bgy. San Joaquin.

Daycare centers were rebuilt with the help of NGOs such as UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children, and Child Fund. Housing projects were done under the NHA and there is also an ongoing project of UN Habitat for Humanity.

The MSWD Office claims that families to be affected by the Tide Embankment Project have been relocated to the Tzu Chi housing project. Some 74 families in Bgy. Cogon will be transferred to Bgy. Castilla. However, many residents do not want to be relocated as their livelihoods as fisherfolk and the schooling of their children will be affected. The fisherfolk can still fish in the NDZ, according to the MSWD Office, but they cannot live there.

The MSWD Office promotes that the Tide Embankment Project will provide protection to the people from possible storm surge in the future. Additionally, the project will serve as a tourist spot, since there are mangroves in the area and there will be a bike lane.



Increasing displacement

Some structures are being exempted from being classified NDZ, such as the Oriental Hotel in Palo, yet dwellings near the hotel and even small beach resorts are being demolished.⁷ The Planning and Development Office in Palo explains that Oriental Hotel pays taxes to the LGU. Also, the DOT has funds for the development of MacArthur area as tourism spot, the LGU reasons, which is separate from the project.⁸

The CEC also warns that there is unjust displacement of communities – 10,000 households from 46 barangays will be affected by the whole project. Yet, coastal residents are still waiting for relocation sites after four years of the typhoon. The project proponent and LGUs have not had informed public consultations with the communities that will be displaced and have not offered alternatives to livelihood such as fishing.⁹

BGY. BARAS: TWICE WRETCHED?

After Typhoon Yolanda, around 1,000 residents of Bgy. Baras in Palo, Leyte were relocated to various housing projects, such as GMA, Gawad Kalinga, and Tzu Chi Foundation in Bgy. San Jose. Residents who lived near the creek, which was declared NDZ, were also relocated. Those who stayed on endeavored to recover from the disaster through their own efforts and without government help.

The residents of Bgy. Baras have always wondered whatever happened to the billions of funds donated and allegedly allotted for Yolanda survivors. They received smaller amount of cash assistance than what was intended for them, and even this was delayed. The residents also observed that the government did not prioritize the upliftment of their livelihood.

The residents complained that the DSWD miscategorized the degree of damage to their houses and the corresponding cash assistance. They said their status should have been categorized as totally damaged instead of partially damaged, especially since they live in a coastal barangay.

Yet, the DSWD gave cash equivalent to assistance for one individual intended for a 3-member family. The agency, through its poverty alleviation program, also gave away pigs to beneficiaries. But some residents complained that they did not have knowledge in livestock raising, while others said that the pigs were not appropriate assistance for them. The DOLE also lent capital for retail storeowners. The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) also distributed cash assistance to the affected families of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).

NGOs Oxfam and Tzu Chi Foundation offered cash-for-work. The residents cleared debris on roads for a day in exchange of Php260, but the work lasted for only 15 days. It was done on rotation, so everyone in the community could earn some income.

Conspicuously, Bgy. Baras did not receive livelihood programs and assistance from

the LGU, unlike other barangays. The NGO, CONCERN, helped by distributing pedicabs to pedicab drivers and boats to fishermen.

The residents themselves repaired their damaged houses and barangay hall. The NGO, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), gave away nails for the reconstruction efforts and had several housing projects in the area. Americare, an INGO, is also helping in the building of a new health center. The reconstruction of the school of Bgy. Baras, the San Jose Elementary School, with around 250 students is a partnership between the Korean Embassy and the JICA. The DepEd has declared the area where the school stands as NDZ thus is not rehabilitating it.

Not only prices of commodities increased after the disaster, the residents noted. Fares shot up from Php13 to Php15 per trip. Even labor cost became expensive, e.g. a carpenter charges Php500, which used to be Php300 per day, while smiths ask for Php750 from previously Php500 per day.

Not consulted, not heard

The Tide Embankment Project paid only Php150 to coconut tree owners who would be affected, while the actual cost is between Php750 and Php1,000. Residents have raised serious concerns about the project, but the city hall has gone on with it anyway. For one, the height of the wall being constructed, according to the barangay councilor, is not enough to protect the residents from a 1-foot high wave. The size of the canal is also too small; it will take days for the flood to go back to the sea.

In the early months of 2015, the DPWH, DSWD, and the LGU consulted with the people. The residents did not approve the construction and requested for another round of consultations, but the government and contractors never returned. Eventually the residents learned that a meeting was held in the office of the Mayor of Palo with barangay captains attending, except the barangay captain of Bgy. Baras. The next thing the residents knew was the project was already being implemented.

The Sky City Mega Project

The Sky City Mega Project is an ambitious 440- hectare project by the LGU atop the City of Catbalogan. Mayor Stephanie Tan-Uy has taken an active role in its promotion and has launched publicity blitz.

The project is envisioned to be the new place of the LGU, education and training center, the city hospital, other medical centers, a retirement home, an information and communications technology (ICT) hub, a multi-purpose complex for sports and events, hotels and multi-functional areas, business centers, regional offices, and mall zones.¹⁰

Mayor Tan-Uy explains that the idea of the Sky City Mega Project was brought about by the need to decongest the present city proper of Catbalogan and the need for a new business district that is allegedly disaster resilient and calamity proof.

According to the LGU, Catbalogan became the center of commerce and trade after the onslaught of Typhoon Yolanda. There has been a rise in the expression of interest of investors to establish their businesses in the area.

THE FIGHT OF THE SEAWALL DWELLERS IN TACLOBAN

Most of the residents in the seawall NDZ in Tacloban City are engaged in informal work, before and after the typhoon.

Not everyone was given the opportunity to do cash-for-work, and while some were, they are yet to receive payment for their services. Also, only those in the safe zones were given ESA; the seawall dwellers had to rely on their meager incomes.

The city hall is asking the seawall dwellers to move to relocation sites in Northern Tacloban, such as New Hope, Ridge View, and Guadalupe. But the relocation sites are far from the seawall dwellers' livelihood sources.

In the NDZ, water is bought for Php3 per container. Water and electricity lines were affected by Typhoon Yolanda but were restored a month after. The NGO World Vision also gave solar powered street lamps to the community.


Mayor Romualdez told the survivors that everyone was affected by the typhoon and that survivors should fend for themselves. The LGU

of Tacloban City excluded the seawall dwellers from assistance, thus they had to depend on the national government for relief. What they got from the national government was spoiled rice and canned goods. The DSWD also did not help them. It was the NGO Tzu Chi Foundation that gave assistance.

Clearing people

The seawall dwellers were not consulted regarding the Tide Embankment Project. Since the LGU does not regard them anyway, being informal settlers as they are, it has not asked the seawall people if they wanted to be relocated for the project. The LGU just keeps on telling them to go to the relocation sites, promising houses and livelihood for them.

The Tide Embankment Project will displace the seawall people. For them, the safety being promised by the project is questionable, since the embankment will only be 4-5m high. For the seawall dwellers, the Tide Embankment Project is only for the tourists and businesses and not for the poor. Only the residents are being relocated while business establishments such as the Astrodome and McDonald's are not being moved. The seawall dwellers are actively fighting the project.



IRONIES IN TANAUAN

Tanauan Mayor Tecson Pua reports that the LGU made permanent housing projects for those affected by the declaration of NDZ to minimize dislocation. In February 2014, the first model house was made and presented to then Pres. Aquino. There were around 1,093 beneficiaries of the housing projects from NDZ, riverbanks, and landslide prone areas, according to Mayor Pua.

The mayor further reports that barangay halls, evacuation centers, the public market, and road networks have all been fixed. Tanauan previously had 19 barangays without road networks.

Livelihood intervention projects, such as agriculture-based programs, were done after Typhoon Yolanda. The mayor believes that high-value farming is better than traditional farming since farmers get higher income. Seeds used in high-value farming are also typhoon resilient, according to the mayor.

The Build Back Better framework has also reduced the poverty incidence from 30% in 2010 to 20% in 2015. The mayor attributes this to Tanauan becoming a destination for investments. Mayor Pua emphasizes that the role of the government is to create the right environment for investors. There is already a commercial subdivision for members of the government housing program, Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) or more commonly known as Pag-IBIG.

For genuine development to come, Mayor Pua said that leadership must come first and there should be community participation. As for the Tide Embankment Project that will affect the municipality, the mayor believes that only people not from Tanauan are against the project. The people in Tanauan saw how the typhoon destroyed the municipality and they cannot agree more to the project, the mayor said.

Still, Mayor Pua emphasizes that the Tide Embankment Project will become a tourist destination and that more hotels will sprout because of the project.

Farmers speak

Typhoon Yolanda destroyed the farmers' coconut trees and banana plants. Some farmers were even wounded during the typhoon. They have not recovered their livelihood since then.

There was cash-for-work in Sitio Caminguhan, Bgy. Calsadahay. Residents also received ESA. NGOs like Oxfam gave Php10,000 cash assistance, while Tzu Chi Foundation gave rice to the residents of Sitio Caminguhan.

The houses of the farmers were devastated, and those who previously lived in wooden houses live now in nipa huts.

Water sources are wells, which were not affected by Typhoon Yolanda. Electricity was restored after six months. The residents use wood to cook.

Roads were also devastated during the typhoon, and it took weeks for vehicles to be able to enter Sitio Caminguhan.

The schools were damaged, and it took one year for INGOs to fix them. The UNICEF made a tent school for the community.

The DA gave coconut seeds, which however were already sick and died upon planting. The agency also gave vegetable seeds but mostly for consumption. The farmers however were not able to fully utilize the seeds given by the DA, since they did not own any land.

Residents affirm that the common rehabilitation projects in Tanauan are road construction projects and some housing projects in Pago and Sacme. Yet, residents observe that certain officials were able to build their own houses and businesses after the typhoon, notably and MSWD officer who allegedly built a mansion and Mayor Tecson Pua who apparently built his fishpond.

The following have been the walk-in investors who are interested in setting up in Catbalogan for the past two years:¹¹

- San Miguel Corporation is planning to build a four-hectare regional depot.
- SM Prime Holdings will build a mall, similar to SM Aura in Taguig City, and the LGU offices will be part of the mall.
- Robinson's, Metro Gaisano, and Grand Gaisano are planning to build malls, each has a required area of four hectares.
- Puregold is planning a one-hectare grocery store.
- Prince is interested in building a one-hectare warehouse mall.
- The LKY Group, owners of Oriental Hotel, will build a two-hectare mall/hotel/terminal.
- SM Savemore plans to build a one-hectare grocery shopping mall.
- The Regional Science High School is interested in building a four-hectare school in the commercial area.
- Popular fastfood chains such as McDonald's, Mang Inasal, Bo's Café, Greenwich, and Jollibee are interested in building a four-hectare food portal in the area.
- Camilla Homes is also planning on using 15 hectares of land for housing projects.
- 2GO wants a one-hectare logistics site.

Additionally, the LGU has invited investors who will develop electricity and water connections for the Sky City Mega Project, since the existing water and electric lines cannot go uphill where the project will be built. Meanwhile, the Korean company, Odin Energy, will utilize wind and solar power, so that even if there would be power outage, the Sky City would still have power.¹²

The project is estimated to cost Php4 billion. PPP is the mode in order to achieve the Sky City Mega Project.

The Samar Tourism and Entrepreneurship Center (STEP Center), conceived in the National Economic Research and Business Assistance Center (NERBAC) workshop in 2010 led by the DTI, came up with the City Tourism Code and City Investment Code. Along with the Phase 2 of the Private Sector Promotion (PSP) of the German Society for International Cooperation (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* or GIZ, formerly German Organisation for Technical Cooperation, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* or GTZ), these codes legally allowed investors to flood the area leading to the Sky City Mega Project.¹³

The main obstacles to the project, however, are the landlords. The planned location is not government land and is owned by various landlords. The heavy promotion by the LGU has upped real estate values, and landowners have taken advantage of the appreciation. The LGU has thus momentarily stopped its mega promotion and has allowed the investors to deal directly with the landowners.

For example, a landowner is selling his land for Php1,500 per sq.m., but SM Prime Holdings will buy it for only Php100-200 per sq.m.¹⁴

Meanwhile, Tacloban Verdi Corporation will acquire 15 hectares and allot five hectares to be used as the government center. Another real estate finance corporation involved is Sun Trust, which is a subsidiary of the Sun Trust Sky City. Another is Golden Triumph, a South Korean company that is buying lots from interested landowners.¹⁵

Backlog in relocation

The city hall, however, has backlog in providing shelters for people in the NDZ. Catbalogan has 25 coastal barangay, but the LGU still has no relocation sites for areas declared as NDZ. Examples are Pier 1 and Pier 2 where houses were destroyed and people were moved to bunkhouses but were not given any relocation site.

The city hall is planning to start the Step Northern Facility housing project where people from NDZ areas will be relocated. Funds for which will be sourced from the LGU budget and the DPWH. So far, out of 2,500 families screened as beneficiaries, only 1,000 have passed.

The LGU is also planning to have partnership with Pag-IBIG fund for a number of housing projects.

Market rehabilitation not for vendors

Another ironic issue faced by the people in Catbalogan is the rehabilitation, more aptly, modernization, of the public market by Mayor Stephanie Tan-Uy, which is projected to marginalize the vendors themselves. Vendors from the Federation of Market Vendors under the urban poor network, *Kadamay* or *Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap*, have filed a case against the LGU, which on the other argues that the vendors will not be displaced since they will only be temporarily relocated at the Pier. Once the market is "rehabilitated", the city hall promises to put the vendors back in the market.

The Mayor's office also rebuts by saying that most of those who signed the vendors' petition were those without proper business permits, hinting that once

the market modernization is finished, these vendors cannot do 'illegal' things anymore.

But the vendors attest that their federation was precisely established by 200 stall owners to protest the project, which is projected to affect 585 market vendors.

The final design chosen by the Mayor's office for the project was the one done by Primark, which includes a mall, parking lot, and many open spaces. Primark is owned by Mayor Stephanie Tan-Uy.

According to the vendors, the implementation of the project has allowed Primark to collect rental fees from the vendors. Ticket costs Php20 per day for sidewalk vendors and Php40 per for regular stall owners.

Residents as clients

Residents of Catbalogan City were among the recipients of rotten food packs. The DSWD provided ESA but not everyone received the assistance.

The two so-called rehabilitation projects, Sky City Mega Project and market modernization will gravely affect the farmers, vendors, and residents. Some farmers have already sold their lands for Sky City Mega Project but have not yet received full payment.

People from Pres. Duterte's *Kilusang Pagbabago* (KP) meanwhile took money from the market vendors, claiming that the organization would help them in their campaign against the market modernization project. But the KP people did not show up afterwards. It was the people's organization, People Surge which helped the vendors as well as the farmers in Catbalogan.

Solar Farm Project

Sulu Electric Power and Light Philippines, Inc (SEPALCO) was established in January 2014 to act as the 'special purpose vehicle' for the Solar Farm Project in Bgy. Castilla, Palo, Leyte. Palo is the hometown of former DOE Secretary Jericho Petilla. The municipal mayor of Palo is Sec. Petilla's mother, Mayor Metin Petilla.¹⁶

The Solar Farm Project is worth US\$90 million. It aims to produce 50 megawatts (MW) of power that will be transmitted to the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) for Php8.69 per kilowatt-hour (kWh). An estimated Php80,000 per month shall be paid to the NGCP for transmission.¹⁷

The solar farm shall operate 10-12 hours a day, since it is sun-dependent, Mondays to Fridays.

Construction started in July 2014 under Melicom Construction. Meanwhile, the solar panels were bought from Taiwan and Germany for about Php6,000 each.¹⁸

The major partners for the project are Grand Solar of Spain, which made the design for the solar farm, and SAS Sunrise as a major investor. But the plant director refuses to name other private investors for the project.¹⁹

¹ If the SEPALCO Solar Farm produces 50 MW, then it can be sold for Php8.69 per kWh (based on the Feed-in Tariff rate of the Energy Regulatory Commission). 50,000 kWh (1 MW = 1,000 kWh) x Php8.69 = Php 434,500 in a day. When computed in a month, SEPALCO can earn Php13,035,000. Furthermore, SEPALCO has a 25-year operational contract with the government.

The land needed for the project measures about 106 hectares in Bgy. Castilla. It is a flat agricultural woodland (tree crops) with about 200 owners. It is around three kilometers away from the 69-kilovolt NGCP transmission line.

The documents of land ownership in Bgy. Castilla are composed of Free Patents and Tax Declarations. Allegedly, there are no agrarian reform beneficiaries, so the conversion from agricultural to industrial use will be easier and simpler, according to the project's briefer.²⁰

Brokers were sent out to buy land or deal with those who complained. Land was bought for Php 50 per sq.m. The plant director said that the negotiations were "bloody" – land acquisition alone cost US\$300 million.

A tripartite agreement between SEPALCO, the local government of Palo, and the DENR Region 8 office regarding technical assistance and land acquisition support for SEPALCO was done in May 2014.²¹

The plant director said that consultations for the project were done. Bgy. Castilla immediately endorsed the project, according to the plant director. He added that since the project is a solar farm and is environment friendly, it easily passed the consultation with various departments and LGUs.

The Planning and Development Office of Palo also explains that consultations with their office have stopped, but SEPALCO is

paying taxes anyway and the municipality of Palo has had an increase in revenue because of the project.

SEPALCO also employed some 1,500 workers during the construction of the solar farm who were paid Php550 per day. The whole barangay will be covered by solar power, according to the barangay captain, but a decision is yet to be made by SEPALCO.

Unattended priorities

Bgy. Castilla it seems has been endowed with other reconstruction projects from the LGU. Governor Dominic Petilla is building a covered court. The barangay is also building a three-storey health center. There is also a plan to construct a drainage system that has a budget of around Php100,000. Workers to be employed for the projects, however, are still planting rice, according to the barangay captain.²²

Yet, in terms of housing projects, the Habitat for Humanity is the one providing 395 housing projects for families from Samar, Bohol, and even Ormoc who have settled in the barangay. Bgy. Castilla does not have access to a public hospital. The next public hospital is in Pawing, which is too far from the barangay. The municipality of Palo has two ambulances for 33 barangays.

Farming is the major source of livelihood, yet farms in Bgy. Castilla lack irrigation facilities. Otherwise, the people work for construction projects, especially of Habitat for Humanity. The poor, according to the barangay captain, have just enough to eat.

NGOism

The Philippines has a large civil society community – composed of about 250,000-500,000 civil society organizations (CSOs); 15,000-68,000 NGOs; and 3,000-5,000 development NGOs.²³

The proliferation of civil society engagements, particularly the big role of NGOs and INGOs in governance, has been one of the main features of neoliberalism in the country. It dates back during the Filipino people's struggle against the Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s/1980s and has flourished in the 'democratic space' post-Martial Law in the late-1980s. It has been institutionalized as part of neoliberal governance since the 1990s, with NGOs participating in the drafting of key neoliberal policies, attending government's forums and conferences, and being consulted for PDP.²⁴

CSOs have subsequently entered the bureaucracy itself. Under the former Aquino administration, the DSWD, DBM and DILG have expanded CSO initiatives. CSO representatives have also been appointed to high government positions. The Aquino administration had facilitated further CSO thinking into government, tapped wide CSO networks, and accommodated NGO participation in government's mechanisms, including disaster response.

NGO response to Typhoon Yolanda has been remarkable, at one point even larger than government's. The NGOs also tend to linger a bit longer and their

mechanisms are more sustainable. They also cover a wide range of programs. (See Annexes 5 and 6)

Their role, however, has been utilized by government and international organizations such as the UN and World Bank systems to legitimize neoliberal policies of privatization and deregulation. NGOs have become a support to government's default and push for private-sector-led disaster response. Some big NGOs have also become themselves the conduit of

excess private and commercial capital to be 'invested' in social infrastructures, thereby legitimizing the encroachment of private sector into the public sphere, specifically the delivery of public utilities and social services. Their measures of outputs and outcomes have also been interventionist in community affairs and plans. In some instances, big NGOs have also been instrumental in the facilitation of military actions in the communities and tolerant to corruption, if not being involved themselves.

Endnotes

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ORGANIZED RESPONSE¹

The rise of the mass organization, People Surge, right after the tragedy has been phenomenal – more than 12,000 victims and survivors marching to the center of Tacloban City to demand compensation and justice for what they called government’s ‘criminal negligence’. Prior to Yolanda, however, people-centered disaster response and advocacy was already part of a vibrant people’s movement in a disaster-prone country such as the Philippines. Typhoon Yolanda simply underscored the strength of Filipino people’s organizations.

Since then, such response especially in the regions affected has become more and more organized, composed of communities doing direct action not only to recover their lives but more importantly to make themselves genuinely prepared and adaptive to natural as well as man-made disasters.

Their critique of government’s Build Back Better has also been pointed and serves as their own ‘seawall’ protection from the onslaught of neoliberal policies. It has not been enough however to simply pile up criticisms against the government then go on surviving their daily travails, including even the government. Increasingly, communities have translated their sharp analysis of their situation into actions that are meant to change their context.

This study is a work in progress in documenting the system of people-oriented responses, which may not be uniform in all cases, but shall bear common features.

Analyzing their situation

Leaders interviewed by IBON were unanimous in pointing out that the government should have focused on the rehabilitation of agriculture, instead of prioritizing infrastructure that has not facilitated the farmers’ production and trade anyway.

Instead of providing alternative livelihood programs in agriculture, the government pushed its long-time agricultural modernization program. Secretary-General

¹ This section is culled from the interviews with the leaders of people’s organizations.

Nestor Lebico of the Samahan han Gudti nga Parag-uma ha Sinirangan Bisayas or Association of Small Farmers in Eastern Visayas (SAGUPA-SB; sagupa means fight in Filipino) gives as an example the hybrid coconut variety from the PCA, which will yield coconuts faster but at the expense of shorter life span. A normal coconut bears fruit for a hundred years, but a hybrid coconut will only bear fruit for three years.

The government is encouraging the planting of high value crops such as jackfruit and cacao. It is also planning to implement a Special Area of Agriculture Development (SAAD) where bamboo plantations will be developed. The SAAD has funding of Php25 million, but it remains a plan. However, SAGUPA claims that these crops do not enhance food security. Cacao plantations for instance serve exports production and are not for local consumption.

Also, in planting cassava, loan sharks lend around Php8,000 to farmers but will buy the farmers' produce for only Php3 per kilo. Loan sharks control production since


they are the ones who deliver and process the cassava.

As aforementioned, the INGO Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) facilitated the planting of cassava and pineapples to be processed as feeds by B-Meg, a subsidiary of San Miguel Corporation, in the Third District of Calubian and in Carigara.

For the farmers' leaders, the development of the farming sector must be prioritized. But the new technologies and new varieties of seeds are too costly for the farmers who are yet to receive assistance after Typhoon Yolanda. They also point out that the farm-to-market roads being constructed by DAR and DSWD in Las Navas in Northern Samar, for instance, would only benefit merchants.

In the final analysis, the leaders reiterate that the firm basis of improving the community's adaptive capacity is the implementation of a genuine land reform. Farmers need to control the land they are tilling to make sound economic decisions. Land distribution to farmers also enhances collective efforts in deciding in farming, what products to plant, and for whom. By prioritizing the rights of tillers, government could have improved the farm economy, thereby making farmers prepared for natural hazards.

This is also true for fisherfolk. Their access to fishing grounds has been hampered by the neoliberal policy of privatizing the commons through licensing and issuance of permits to rich owners of fishing vessels, fish cages, fish pens, and fish corrals. Municipal governments have also allowed, through various exemptions, commercial fishing vessels to enter municipal waters and directly compete with small fisherfolk. The government has also not prioritized



the provision of boats and fishing gear to poor fishers in order for them to improve their lot. Instead, LGUs have focused on modernizing fish ports and seaports, eventually for the benefit of big fishing vessels. The fisherfolk were among the first and directly affected by the devastation of Typhoon Yolanda, but government has been harsh in declaring their source of livelihood as NDZ.

The leaders conclude that prior to the typhoon, the direct producers – those dependent on natural resources – have already been marginalized from economic resources as well as political participation. This situation is the most visible impact of neoliberalism on their situation. Still, they note that in order to implement the neoliberal policies more ‘smoothly’, farms and rural areas in Eastern Visayas have been heavily militarized, and military harassments of peasants including the fisherfolk are everyday occurrence.

The leaders forward this analysis as fundamental in DRRM. Without it, they see government’s efforts as simply palliative, if not pushing for more neoliberal reforms.

Awareness raising and organizing

It is noteworthy that mass organizations prior to Typhoon Yolanda have already ingrained in their programs education activities of their basic situation, issues, campaigns, doable solutions, and long-term struggles. Even those organizations that were set up only after the typhoon started with psychosocial education activities to gather their bearings to be able to understand deeply their situation. Awareness raising also includes lectures on practical methods that may help remedy their hazard-prone production systems. The

mass organizations have facilitated the help of genuine NGOs especially in teaching the science of climate, biodiversity-based ecological agriculture, food self-sufficiency, among others.

One of the education courses developed through time is on disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. With the help of NGOs such as LCDE, mass organizations learn of techniques on disaster preparedness, risk reduction, or making their communities resilient. They take lessons on setting up early warning systems, formation of disaster teams, first aid, search and rescue, and preventive health practices.

Knowledge, calls and positions are also being shared by the people’s organizations to a broader audience through public forums and media conferences. Media education and liaison work has become an integral part of awareness raising programs in the regions, especially since the dominant media and social media have not worked in favor of victims and survivors particularly during the Aquino government’s time. Through its ‘yellow army’ in dominant media, the Aquino administration burnished its image, which was most challenged during Typhoon Yolanda. People’s organizations have since then set up their alternative media to broadcast what is really happening on the ground.

Organizing, on the other hand, is a lifelong commitment among the communities. Mass organizations are grouped according to sectors (e.g. SAGUPA-SB under the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas or KMP, or Peasant Movement of the Philippines), issues (e.g. human rights, mining, health), or disaster response (e.g. Bayanihan Alay

sa Sambayanan or BALSAs, People Surge). Likewise the people's organizations and NGOs are grouped according to the services they render, e.g. agricultural extension services, schools, health missions, reconstruction, among others. The lifeblood of organizing, however, according to the interviewed leaders is discipline in administrative and financial management, meetings, communications, and reporting and evaluation. The leaders point out that they are very much accountable to the membership, while the members also have the responsibility to communicate opinions and suggestions to the leadership. In short, the brand of discipline among these mass organizations bears the features of genuine democracy.

Direct services

Rebuilding houses was one of the first direct services that organized communities provided each other after the typhoon. In the tradition of labor pool or exchanged labor, victims and survivors built houses for one another, for free and using indigenous materials. In a lot of cases, however, friendly NGOs have provided the materials for free or as part of their service programs, while overseeing that the most needy would be prioritized. NGO reconstruction is even sturdier and of good quality more than the government's shelter assistance.

The organizations then focused on the distribution of production necessities, such as seeds, carabaos, livestock for raising, fishery products for culture, boats, farm and fishing tools, and machinery. There were instances of inappropriate livelihood means that were distributed because these were the only available aid from NGOs or people's organizations, but the

recipients made do with the resources. But overall, what has been crucial in the distribution of livelihood resources is that the local people's organizations are part of broader national networks of organizations, including faith-based organizations as well as advocates and concerned citizens, which have served as the 'first responders' to disasters. For instance, coffee seeds given by farmers in Northern Luzon revived the production of farmers in Eastern Visayas right after the typhoon. National Capital Region (NCR)-based support groups for Eastern Visayas also helped in packaging and marketing the coffee products in the NCR.

Health organizations are conducting health and psychosocial missions, nutrition and feeding programs, and trainings on prevention, maintenance, traditional healing practices, community health, water and sanitation, nutrition, and how to establish community health committees. The missions also include the conduct of community health diagnosis that serves as guide for the work of the community health committees. Exposure programs of NCR-based academics – teachers and students – are also launching alternative learning systems for pupils who have been displaced or whose schooling has been disrupted by the typhoon. Apart from direct services by some NGOs of rebuilding damaged schools, teachers and students are conducting classroom-type instruction on basic education. Lastly, members of mass organizations are also helping in building for the communities sanitation facilities, water sources, roads and pathways, and even solar panels with the help of scientists' organizations and NGOs.

Direct action

Manifestations and rallies have marked the Filipino people's colorful social movement. The march of People Surge upon its inception is an example of large mobilization and spontaneous expression of the Filipino people's activism.

The Filipino has always been regarded as humorous even in difficult circumstances and resilient and capable to move on from traumatic experiences. But the large support gathered by People Surge in making the government accountable for the huge number of casualties is proof that these impressions do not necessarily capture the real character of the Filipino, i.e. having been organized for a long time, he/she does not take serious issues sitting down.

The people's organizations have active mass campaigns and programs of lobbying and dialogs with LGUs and the national government. Through dialogs, they have also confronted the military for its operations against the people, particularly

forcible evacuations of 'informal settlers' and other fishing and farming communities. These active mass campaign and lobbying programs provide the impetus for equally active demonstrations, especially as push comes to shove, so to speak.

These rallies have also extended into long marches, dubbed Lakbayan (Journey) from the provinces to the NCR, straight to Malacanang Palace, the seat of national government. Led by People Surge and the broad multisectoral organization, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan, New Patriotic Alliance), the organizations demanded compensation from the Aquino government. The next Duterte administration granted the Presidential Financial Assistance (PFA) program, giving each beneficiary, Php5,000. To date, based



on People Surge's accounting, out of 61,919 targeted beneficiaries, the DSWD has distributed the financial assistance to 41,163 beneficiaries.¹ The continued inefficiency of the DSWD is a secondary point. The main point is the FPA would not have been an additional relief to the victims and survivors had the People Surge and all allied organizations not pressured the government.

There are sections of the general public, however, who accuse the mass organizations of overdoing rallies instead of coming up with practical solutions. These are usually the 'yellow army' of the past administration or the 'keyboard army' (trolls in social media) of the Duterte administration, whose main goal is to ruin people's criticisms against and resistance to current dispensation. Unknown to many, however, the people's organizations consider the assertion of their rights to produce as their primary form of direct action.

The farmers' political assertion of genuine land reform is composed of a direct action called 'bungkalan' (cultivation) on unoccupied and idle lands in the Visayas and elsewhere in the country. Bungkalan has been launched in Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, Negros and Panay islands, the whole of Mindanao island, and Eastern Visayas, targeting not only idle lands of big landowners but also contested lands. Violence has inevitably erupted in these bungakalan activities, especially since large landholdings are guarded by the landlords' private armies and the local police. This is case of human rights violations against the farmers, however, since they have cultivated the lands and made them productive.

Unknown to many and also shunned by the DA is the fact that the farmers regard

the use of organic farming and food processing methods as their weapon against the dictates of the government and the agribusiness corporations, which have promoted 'agriculture modernization' through the use of hybrid seeds, inorganic chemical inputs, and imported machinery. Biodiversity-based ecological agriculture and sustainable farming methods are part of the farmers' assertion of their right to produce, i.e. they have the right to have control over their production systems and free from the dictates and monopoly of agribusiness that promotes only commercial profits at the expense of health, environment, and people's sovereignty.

Surging forward

The NEDA-Region VIII considers the 'improving' poverty situation and 'phenomenal' growth of the regional economy exactly the success of the government's rehabilitation program in the region. The office also believes that AO No. 5 of Pres. Duterte will be the guide in completing rehabilitation, confident that another three years is a "reasonable" time.²

The DBM announced in 2015 that the government had already released Php93.9 billion of the total Php150 billion requirements for Yolanda rehabilitation. Then budget secretary Butch Abad announced that an additional Php46 billion was allocated for 2016 – Php18.9 billion of which was Special Purpose Funds meant for the Build Back Better and part of the NDRRM Fund, while Php27.3 was lodged in agency budgets of NHA for housing, LWUA for water supply, and NEA for electricity supply.³ By the first quarter of 2017, the NEDA-Region VIII reported that a huge portion, amounting to Php12 billion, of the Special Portion Funds remained untouched.⁴

It is a different matter if the Php93.9 billion released has actually been disbursed, and if indeed, why rehabilitation has still been slow and wanting. As if adding insult to injury, the defense secretary Delfin Lorenzana announced on mid-2017 that Php5 billion out of the Php7.5 billion allegedly saved from the budget for Yolanda rehabilitation would be diverted for the rehabilitation of Marawi City.² This announcement has given the wrong impression that the job in Eastern Visayas has been done, while thousands of survivors still languish in substandard shelters and living conditions.

Yet, this early, it is noticeable how the same private sector-led reconstruction and inefficient implementation would be employed in Marawi City. The Marawi local government has identified 6,300 internally displaced persons (IDPs) needing temporary shelters and 2,700 IDPs requiring permanent housing. Yet, the HUDCC is targeting awarding only 600-700 temporary shelters to IDPs by the end of 2017.⁵

This turn of events only proves that the struggle of Yolanda victims and survivors is not at all isolated from the struggles of different sectors who are victimized by disaster capitalism and government opportunism to push for neoliberal reforms. But what is not anticipated by the government along with the corporations that are already cashing in on the rehabilitation of Marawi City is that due

2 The Marawi crisis was a five-month long siege in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur in Mindanao, which started on 23 May 2017. Government troops hunted down the Maute group, allegedly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It became the longest urban battle in Philippine modern history, and without firm basis, Pres. Duterte was quick to declare Martial Law in the entire island of Mindanao. Even before government troops could capture Isnilon Hapilon, the leader of the Maute group, the ADB, World Bank, and corporations have already expressed interest in the rehabilitation of the city. After government troops had allegedly killed Isnilon Hapilon, the Duterte government formed right away the Task Force Bangon Marawi (rise up, Marawi), reminiscent of Build Back Better principles, to begin the rehabilitation of Marawi City.

to the strength and genuine resilience of people's organizations, the shift to Marawi rehabilitation and subsequent diversion of Yolanda funds only widens the alliance of people's organizations. This early, with the help of church organizations such as the Rural Missionaries of the Philippines (RMP), Muslim NGOs, and the alliance of indigenous and Moro peoples, SANDUGO (One Blood), a new organization of IDPs has emerged, the Tindeg Ranao (Rise Up Ranao). Together with the allied organizations under People Surge and the other victims of disaster capitalism, they shall rise up and surge forward to demand back their dignity, justice, and sovereignty. This is a raging storm against a government that has continued to prioritize corporate profits and private gains over people's rights and welfare.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1. List of private sector donations for victims of Typhoon Yolanda

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
3M	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Disaster relief support split equally between American Red Cross and CARE
Aboitiz Group	Dec 2013	Php140 million	Northern Cebu	School building rehabilitation of 1,308 facilities identified by DepEd
Aboitiz Foundation	Nov 13, 2013	Php500,000	Leyte	Food supplies for food packs for 1,000 families, received by the DILG
	2014	Unspecified	Eastern Samar; 4th District, Cebu	Development sponsor
SN Aboitiz Power President & CEO Manny Rubio	Nov 2013	Php15 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Aboitiz Power	Dec 2013	Unspecified	4th District, Leyte	Assisted Leyte Electric Cooperative in restoring power in Leyte
Abbott	Nov 2013	US\$900,000	Unspecified	US\$450,000 worth of grants and healthcare products; US\$350,000 worth of grants to CARE, Direct Relief and the Philippine Red Cross through the American Red Cross; US\$100,000 worth of antibiotics, oral dehydration solutions and nutritionals to longstanding partners Direct Relief and AmeriCares
Abbie and the Abbie Foundation	Unspecified	US\$350,000	Unspecified	Medications donated to humanitarian relief partners
Accenture	Unspecified	US\$2 million	Unspecified	Cash and pro-bono contributions for disaster relief and reconstruction efforts
Aeon	Unspecified	¥10 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Air 21	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Tacloban City	"Volunteered two of its Cessna aircraft (including fuel and air time) to serve as a medevac unit and air transport for passengers to and from Tacloban Delivered donations to Tacloban Harris telecommunications equipment designed to boost radio, mobile, and internet carrier signals throughout the area, but also solar panels for vital charging stations and portable hand-cranked radios
Air Asia Zest	2014	Unspecified	Unspecified	Free flights for volunteers
Air Products	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross International Relief Fund
Alaska Structures	Unspecified	US\$2 million	Tacloban City	480 bed shelter system
Allied Waste Services	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Unspecified

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
Allstate	Unspecified	US\$150,000	Unspecified	Donation through Philanthropic response and American Red Cross
American Express	Unspecified	US\$250,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, International Rescue Committee, Save the Children and UNICEF-USA
Amgen Foundation	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
American Way (AmWay)	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Andrew Tan	2013	Php50 million	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross, ABS-CBN Foundation and UNICEF Children's Fund
Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation (ANZ Bank)	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross
AON	Unspecified	US\$500,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross
Apex Mining	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
Apple	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Part of iTunes purchases go to Typhoon Yolanda relief operations
Aramark	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross Typhoon Relief
Archer Daniel Midland Company	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Asiaticus	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
Assurant Foundation	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Astoria Federal Savings	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Atro Mining	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
AT&T	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through AmeriCares
Axa Foundation	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross Disaster Responder Program and CARE
Atlas Consolidated Mining Corporation	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Relief goods
Ayala / Ayala Foundation	Nov 2013	Php10 million	Unspecified	Donation through DSWD
	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Boxes of drinking water and offered free text messages
	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Iloilo	Sent out medical teams using aircraft from Ayala Aviation
	2014	Unspecified	5th District, Leyte; Eastern Samar; 1st, 2nd and 3rd Districts, Negros Occidental	Development Sponsor
	Nov 2014	Unspecified	Old Sagay Elementary School, Sagay City, Negros Occidental	33 classrooms
	Sept 2015	Unspecified	Cawayan Elementary School, Carles, Iloilo	

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
	Mar 2015	Php96 million	Sagay and Cadiz, Negros Occidental; Tacloban City and Javier, Leyte; Estancia and Carles, Iloilo; parts of Samar	School Buildings in Sagay were officially turned over to DepEd and LGU in November 2015
	Mar 2015		Combined 300 has. farmlands in Negros Occidental, Leyte and Iloilo	Sustainable Livelihood (seeds and fertilizer, sari-sari stores, pedicabs and fishingboats for selected families)
	Mar 2015	Php107 million	Northern Iloilo and Aklan	Unspecified
	Nov 6, 2015	Unspecified	Carles Central School, Carles, Iloilo; Cano-an Elementary School, Estancia, Iloilo	16 classrooms, restrooms, emergency alarm system
	Unspecified	Unspecified	Northern Iloilo Polytechnic State College	Building of new classrooms
Ayala Land	2014	Unspecified	5th District, Iloilo	Development Sponsor
	2015	Unspecified	Iloilo	Offered learning and mentoring sessions
Globe Telecom	2014	Unspecified	Aklan; Eastern Samar	Development Sponsor
B2Gold	2013	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Bank of America	Unspecified	US\$250,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Bank of Guam	Unspecified	US\$10,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
BASF SE	Unspecified	€300,000	Unspecified	Donation through WFP and UNICEF
Bayer	Unspecified	Php38 million and Php5.8 million	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Bechtel	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Bell	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
Broken Hill Proprietary Company Billiton (BHP Billiton)	Unspecified	US\$500,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross Typhoon Haiyan Appeal
Bloomberg Cultural Foundation Inc.	2014	Unspecified	Tacloban 1, Leyte	Development Sponsor
Biogen Idec	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross International Response Fund
BNY Mellon	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
British Petroleum Foundation	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross
Bridgestone Corporation	2013	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Singapore Red Cross Society

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
C&C Alpha Group	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Donation through Sagip Kamapilya
Campbell Soup Company	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross Typhoon Haiyan Appeal
Canpotex Limited	2013	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
Capital One	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Donation through three undisclosed organizations in the Philippines
Cargill	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation in support of WFP's procurement and distribution of high energy biscuits
Carlson	Unspecified	US\$10,000	Unspecified	Donation through International Rescue Committee Typhoon Haiyan Fund
Carnival Corporation & Miami Heat	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Donation with participation of Micky Arison (Chairman of Carnival Corp & plc.)
Chevron	Unspecified	US\$1.5 million	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
Citi Foundation	2013	More than US\$1 million	Unspecified	Pledged value as a disaster relief grant to the American Red Cross Pacific Typhoon Fund; Citi's commissions from sales and trading in the ASEAN region will go to the Phillipine Red Cross
The Clorox Company	Unspecified	US\$150,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross
The Coca-Cola Company	Unspecified	US\$2.5 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
The Collette Foundation	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through Plan International
Covidien	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross and Direct Relief
Costa Crociere Group	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation to Filipino crew members
CSC & CSC Charitable Foundation	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
CTBC Financial Holding	Unspecified	NT\$10 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
CVS Caremark	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Daimler AG	Unspecified	€500,000	Unspecified	Donation through German Red Cross
Deluxe Corporation Foundation	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Deutsche Bank	2013	€1.3 million	Unspecified	Donations made by Deutsche Bank clients and employees in unspecified regions
DHL	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	On-the-ground airport logistics
Dominion Bank	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
Dow Corning Corporation	Unspecified	US\$20,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross
The Dow Chemical Company	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Cash, materials, equipment for immediate response, and medium to long-term recovery, rehabilitation

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
DynCorp International	Unspecified	US\$10,000	Unspecified	Donation through US-Philippines Society
E. & J. Gallo Winery	2013	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donated to the Philippine Typhoon Relief Fund to assist rescue and relief teams
Eisai Co., Ltd.	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Emergency supplies
Eli Lilly & Company	Unspecified	US\$150,000	Unspecified	Donation through Direct Relief International and World Vision
EMD Millipore	Unspecified	US\$10,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
EMC	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Give2Asia
Engineering Equipment Inc.	2014	NA	4th District, Leyte	Development Sponsor
Epson	Unspecified	Php2 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Eton Corporation	Unspecified	US\$140,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Federal Express	Unspecified	US\$10 million	Unspecified	Water purification systems, medical and hygiene supplies
First Hawaiian Bank	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross and FilCom Center
FMC Corporation	Unspecified	US\$75,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Forester	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
Ford Motor Company & The Ford Motor Company Fund	Unspecified	US\$300,000	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross
Freeport McMoran	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
Frontpoint Security	Unspecified	US\$2,500	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.	Unspecified	¥10 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
GE Foundation	Unspecified	US\$750,000	Unspecified	Donation of US\$250,000 each to AmeriCares, Red Cross and UNICEF
General Mills Foundation	Unspecified	US\$150,000	Unspecified	Donation through Phillipine Red Cross and CARE
Glencore Xstrata	2013	US\$2 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Google	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Data gathering support about (missing) people affected by disaster
Groupon	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross, Save the Children, Polish Humanitarian Action, World Vision and WFP
GlaxoSmithKline	Unspecified	£15,000	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross
Hanjin - Subic	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	Donation of four truckloads of rice
Harbor Star Services Inc.	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Tacloban City	Lended 300-footer Barge Lynx for free to the Philippine Coast Guard for relief operations
The Hartford	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
H.B. Fuller Company	Unspecified	US\$10,000	Unspecified	Donation through Give2Asia

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
Health Net Foundation Inc.	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
H-E-B	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Henry Schein, Inc.	Unspecified	US\$150,000	Unspecified	Donation of health care supplies to AmeriCares, Direct Relief, Heart to Heart International and MedShare
Hilton Worldwide	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Hinatuan Mining Corp.	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
Holland America Line & Seabourn Cruise Line	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through Holland America Line Foundation
Honda Motor Company, Ltd.	Unspecified	Php5 million	Unspecified	Relief and recovery efforts
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited	Unspecified	US\$300,000	Unspecified	Donation through Hong Kong Red Cross
The Horizon Foundation for New Jersey	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
HSBC Holdings PLC	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Hudson's Bay Company	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross and American Red Cross
Hyundai Heavy Industries Group	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Donation through Korean Red Cross
INOVA	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Project HOPE
Ikea Foundation	Nov 2013	€2 million	Unspecified	Donation through UNICEF
Industrial Alliance & Financial Services Inc.	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
INJAP Foundation	2014	Unspecified	Tacloban 1 and 1st District, Leyte	Development Sponsor
International Container Terminal Services Inc.	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Tacloban City	Rebuilding of Tacloban Port
	2014	Unspecified	Tacloban 1, Leyte	Development Sponsor
Intex Mining Corp	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
Investor Trust	Unspecified	Php450,000	Unspecified	Donation through World Vision
Island Insurance Foundation	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through FilCom Center
Jamba Juice	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
J.C. Bamford Excavators Limited	Unspecified	£300,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Jefferies	Unspecified	US\$250,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
JG Summit Holdings	2014	Unspecified	4th District, Iloilo	Development Sponsor
	Jun 2014	Unspecified	2nd District, Samar	
Cebu Pacific, Inc.	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	Free airlifting of supplies and relief goods
JPMorgan Chase Foundation	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Donated to World Vision and Habitat for Humanity
Japan International Cooperation Agency	Apr 2015	Unspecified	Tolosa, Leyte	Tolosa Multi-Purpose Livelihood Building

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
	Apr 2015	Unspecified	Guiuan, Samar	Submersible fish cages
	Apr 2015	Unspecified	Leyte	Oyster racks and marine bio-toxin equipment
	Apr 2015	Unspecified	Balangiga National Agricultural School, Balangiga, Eastern Samar	Rehabilitation of classrooms
	Apr 2015	Unspecified	Samar	Pre-fabricated day care center
	May 2015	Unspecified	Sta. Rita and Basey, Samar	1,360 farmer beneficiaries
	2015	¥317 million	Four provinces in Eastern Visayas	Akbay Program supported by the Japanese Government and implemented by the DA through the PCAF and LGUs
Jollibee Foods Corporation	2013	Php30 million	Unspecified	Jollibee employees in relief packing operations of DSWD, and in kind donations for 20,000 survivors
Kaiser Permanente	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross for the benefit of the Philippine Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, Mercy Corps, Relief International and Team Rubicon
Kellogg's Corporation	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through CARE
KEMET Corporation	Unspecified	Php2 million	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Kohl's Department Store	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
The Kyocera Group	Unspecified	¥10 million	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross
Lafarge Philippines	Unspecified	€1 million	Unspecified	Relief supplies, logistical and affordable housing services and cash donations
LG	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross
Lifeway	Unspecified	US\$20,000	Unspecified	Donation through WFP
Lumber Liquidators	Unspecified	Unspecified	Visayas	Provide tents and lifesaving aid
Lopez Group of Companies	Jul 7, 2015 (MOA signing with DepEd)	Php86 million from Sagip Kapamilya	Ormoc City, Palo and Isabel, Leyte	"Leyte School Rebuilding projects (includes livelihood and skills training modules with support from the Kananga EDC Institute of Technology, EDC's technical-vocational school) Phase 1: 14 new classrooms, repaired 10 other classrooms in 4 pilot schools"
			Leyte	Phase 2: 48 new classrooms in 18 school sites
		Php159.3 million from First Gen, First Balfour, First Philec and Rockwell Land Corporation	Carigara, Capoocan, Barugo, Jaro, Pastrana, Burauen, Babatngon, Kananga and Ormoc City, Leyte; Sulat, Eastern Samar; Dumarao, Capiz; Aklan	Phase 3: construction of 56 classrooms in 24 school sites

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
	2014-2015	Php165.4 million	Unspecified	Turned over 127 classrooms in 42 school sites
	2014-2015	Php14.1 million	Unspecified	Educational Soft Programs (Programa Genio)
	2014-2015	Php172.1 million	San Jose, Dulag, Leyte Marabut, Samar Bgy. Osmena, Marabut, Samar Basey, Samar Brgy. Saob, Basey, Samar Basey, Samar	Farm growing organic leafy vegetables and herbs Restaurant and organic farm Fish processing facility (gourmet bottled sardines) Restaurant, spa and barber shop Weaving and beach resort management ecotourism Motorcycles donated by Honda that were converted to habal-habal
	2016	Unspecified	Sohoton Caves and Natural Bridge, Samar; Kapuroan Group of Islands, Marabut, Samar; Sohoton Wespal Tourism Center; Mangrove Ecotour; Dao River Bahay Kawilan, Leyte; San Jose Skimboarding Camp; Sabang Daguitan Surf Camp Basey and Marabut, Samar; 18th Century Lighthouse, Bantigue, Cabugao Diutay and Gigantes Islands, Carles, Iloilo	Ecotourism projects, e.g. Mangrove Ecotour (firefly watching and floating restaurant) Assitance in the development
Energy Development Corp.	Unspecified	Unspecified	Tacloban 1 & 2, 4th District, Leyte	Development Sponsor
Lucio Tan	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Tacloban City and Ormoc City	Use of 2 King Air personal jets to deliver medicine and other relief goods
Asia Brewery Inc.	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Tacloban City and Ormoc City	Donation of 500,000 6-liter bottles of water
Major League Baseball	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross and US Fund for UNICEF
Manulife Finanacial	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
Macy's Inc.	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Marriott International	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross Typhoon Haiyan Appeal
Marubeni Corporation	Unspecified	¥15 million	Unspecified	Unspecified

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
Marsh & McLennan Companies	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation local charities
Mastercard	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross and WFP
Maybank	Unspecified	RM1 million	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross
Maynilad Water Services, Inc.	Unspecified	Php1 million	Unspecified	Donation through PLDT-Smart Foundation
McDonald's Corporation	Unspecified	US\$300,000	Unspecified	Donation through International Federation of Red Cross
Medtronic	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross and Typhoon Appeal
Merck, Co.	Unspecified	US\$300,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross, Save the Children, and International Rescue
Metrobank Group	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
GT Foundation	Aug 2014	Php6 million	Mercedes and Guiuan, Eastern Samar; Palo, Leyte	Health stations with birthing facilities in partnership with Plan International (Plan commits Php1.6 million for management)
Metrobank Foundation Inc.	Jan 11, 2014	Php50 million	Tacloban City	Hygiene and self-care items for teachers
	Apr 17, 2014	¥10 million (approx. Php4.3 million)	Palo, Leyte	Construction of 1 storey, 4 classroom building with toilet and furniture
	Unspecified	Php10 million	Balangiga, Eastern Samar and Bantayan Island and Daanbantayan, Cebu; target areas include Iloilo and Leyte	111 fishing boats distributed NGO partners Yellow Boat of Hope Foundation, Bantayan Back to Sea Project, Negrense Volunteers for Change and TOPSOLDIERS (alumni organization of Metrobank Foundation Outstanding Philippine Soldiers)
	Jul 22, 2014	Unspecified	Lawaan, Eastern Samar	50 motor boats
	Jun 1, 2014	NA	Tacloban 1 and Palo, Leyte; Eastern Samar	Development Sponsor
Microsoft Corporation	Unspecified	US\$500,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corp.	Unspecified	Php1 million	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross
Mitsui OSK Lines	Unspecified	US\$30,000	Leyte Island	Donation through Magsaysay MOL Marine
Momentum Aviation Group	Unspecified	US\$500,000	Unspecified	Support relief efforts
MoneyGram	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Doctors Without Borders
Monsanto Company	Unspecified	US\$400,000	Unspecified	Recover and rebuilding efforts for farmers
Moody's Corporation	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Motorola Solution, Inc.	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
MTS Allstream	Unspecified	US\$20,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
MVP Group of Companies	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Clearing operations, and free text messages and calls
	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Tacloban City	Restoration of Tacloban's Water System
	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Aklan, Capiz and Iloilo	power restoration team
One Meralco Foundation with PLDT-Smart Foundation	Dec 2015	Unspecified	Palo, Leyte	Multi-Purpose Center
Philex Mining Corporation	2013	Php35 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
PLDT-Smart Foundation Inc.	2014	Unspecified	First and Second Districts, Capiz; Tacloban 1 & 2, Leyte; Eastern Samar; 2nd District, Samar	Development Sponsor
Tulong Kapatid	Nov 2013	Php31 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Natural News	Unspecified	US\$10,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
National Basketball Association	Unspecified	US\$250,000	Unspecified	Donation through US Fund for UNICEF
Nestlé Philippines	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	300,000 packs/pieces ready-to-eat and ready-to-drink products
New Vision Renewable Energy	Unspecified	Unspecified	Cebu	1,000 Portable Solar Power Pack & Light Systems
Nickel Asia Corporation	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Medical service and supplies, generator sets
	2014	NA	Guian/Salcedo, Eastern Samar; Palo, Leyte	Development Sponsor
Nissan Motor Co.	Unspecified	¥20 million	Unspecified	Donation through Japan Platform and vehicles for support
Norfolk Southern Foundation	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Northern Trust	Unspecified	US\$150,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Northrop Grumman Corporation	Unspecified	US\$150,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross' Annual Disaster Giving Program
NU Skin	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
NVDIA Foundation	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Oceana Gold Philippines Inc.	2013	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Donation through UNICEF
OMRON	Unspecified	¥10 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Panasonic Group	Unspecified	¥5 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Panda Restaurant Group	Unspecified	US\$645,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross and Tzu Chi Foundation

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
Pentad Corporation	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Catholic Relief Services
Pentair	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Delivery of portable water systems
Pepco Holdings Inc.	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Pepsi Co.	Nov 2013	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Donated to American Red Cross, Give2Asia, Habitat for Humanity-International and Save the Children
Phinma Group	2014	Unspecified	5th District, Iloilo	Development Sponsor
Pfizer Foundation	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross International, Response Fund and Give2Asia
Peregrine Development International	2014	Unspecified	Leyte (rest of 1st district)	Development Sponsor
Phillip Morris Fortune Tobacco & San Miguel	Unspecified	Php100 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Philippine Airlines	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Visayas	Free airlifting of critical supplies and relief goods, medical and aid workers
	2015	Unspecified	Tacloban City	Cash assistance to the Missionary Sisters of Charity, and computer sets to St. Raphael Parish Church
Princess Cruises & Princess Cruises Community Foundation	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross and International Medical Corps.
Procter & Gamble	Unspecified	US\$1.6 million (in products); US\$300,000 (in cash)	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross, World Vision, and Philippine Red Cross
Procter & Gamble Distributing (Phils.), Inc.	Unspecified	Php67 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Prudential Financial, Inc.	Unspecified	US\$250,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
PVH Corporation	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Donation through Save the Children and Philippine Red Cross
PLDT-Smart Foundation Inc. and the BDO Foundation Inc.	2015	Unspecified	Sibalom, Antique	Unspecified
QBE Insurance	Unspecified	US\$250,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
QVC, Inc.	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation American Red Cross
Rezidor Hotel Group	Unspecified	€10,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross
Rite Aid	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Rodgers Communication, Inc.	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
Ross Stores, Inc.	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Royal Bank of Canada	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
Royal Caribbean Cruises	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Samsung Group	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Unspecified

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
San Miguel Corp.	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Free fuel for military relief operations through Petron Corp.
	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	Deployed trucks; converted its Mandaue Brewery as hub for relief ops
The Santander Group	Unspecified	US\$335,000	Unspecified	Health and medical aid
Sempre Energy	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross-National Headquarters
Singtel	Unspecified	Php1.7 million	Unspecified	nda
Sketchers USA, Inc.	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	200,000 pairs of new shoes for children
SM Group of Companies/ SM Foundation	2016	Php300 million	Bogo City, Cebu; Iloilo City; Ormoc and Tacloban Cities, Leyte	Construction of housing units through SM Cares (under SM Foundation)
	Nov 2013	Php100 million	Tacloban and Ormoc Cities; Leyte; Samar; Cebu; Iloilo; Capiz; Bicol Region	Rebuilding of damaged homes, community centers, schools, and churches, and for relief supplies
Fast Retailing Co.,Ltd. (Uniqlo)	Unspecified	Php6.5 million	Unspecified	US\$1 million cash, US\$1 million worth of t-shirts and innerwear to SM Foundation, US\$4.5 million donated to UNICEF
Sobeys Inc.	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation Canadian Red Cross
Sony Corporation	Unspecified	¥15 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Sprint Foundation	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation American Red Cross Philippines Typhoon Appeal Fund
SSI	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Starbucks Foundation	Unspecified	US\$350,000	Unspecified	Donation of US\$250,000 through American Red Cross Typhoon Appeal, US\$150,000 through Mercy Corps
State Street Foundation	Unspecified	US\$500,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Sumitomo Metal Mining Co., Ltd.	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	Donation through the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan
Sun Life Financial - Philippines Foundation Inc.	Jan 2014	Php250,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
	Jan 6-Mar 31, 2014	NA	Cardona, Rizal; Palawan; Oriental Mindoro; Occidental Mindoro; Albay; Catanduanes; Masbate; Camarines Sur; Aklan; Antique; Capiz; Iloilo; Cebu; Bohol; Negros Oriental; Siquijor; Biliran; Leyte; Southern Leyte; Northern Samar; Western Samar; Dinagat Islands; Surigao del Sur; Surigao del Norte	Zero-interest rate on all policy advances availed by affected residents for said duration

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
	May 2014 Jul 2014	Php15.6 million Php80 million	Unspecified Unspecified	Unspecified Construction of classrooms facilitated by Children's Hour Philippines Inc.
SunTrust	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Philippine Red Cross
Sutter Health	Unspecified	US\$200,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross International Disaster Relief Fund and International Medical Corps.
Syngenta	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through International Committee of the Red Cross
Taked Pharmaceutical Company Ltd.	Unspecified	¥10 million	Unspecified	Donation through Japan Platform
Target Corporation	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Save the Children
TBI	Unspecified	US\$1,000	Unspecified	Donation through Bermuda Red Cross
Telstra	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Unspecified
Telus	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross and TELUS International Philippines Community Board
Texas Instruments	2013	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross; will match employee and retiree contributions up to \$100,000 made through Nov 30, 2013
TD Bank	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross
Thrivent Financial for Lutherans	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Donation to match donations by members
Tim Hortons	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Time Warner Cable	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	Provided free calls to their home phone and business service customers; free viewing of the Filipino Channel from Nov 8-30, 2013
Top Rank	Unspecified	Php1 million	Unspecified	Donation for rehabilitation of devastated areas
Toyota	Nov 2013 May 2017	Php10 million Unspecified	Unspecified Police Regional Office 8	Donation through Toyota Motors Corporation, Toyota Motor Philippines and Toyota Financial Services Philippines Donated to DOE through Japan's Non-Project Grant Aid as part of DOE's campaign to promote energy efficiency and clean air across the country
Travel Underwriters	Unspecified	US\$11,216	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross Typhoon Haiyan Fund
Truck Bun Philippines	Nov 12-14, 2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Donation of all profits during said duration
Tupperware Brands Corporation	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Water-tight products for storage of personal belongings, food and supplies; monetary donation through American Red Cross
Tsuneishi Heavy industries (Cebu), Inc.	2014	Php5 million	Bogo and San Remigio, Cebu	Donation through Aboitiz Foundation for restoration of educational facilities in Cebu

Corporation / Private sector	Date	Value	Area	Description
TVI Resource Development Philippines	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
Tyson Foods, Inc.	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through WFP
United Airlines Foundation	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Partnering with AmeriCares, American Red Cross, Operation USA; will match donations of up to said value from United customers and employees
United Health Foundation	Unspecified	US\$750,000	Unspecified	\$250,000 to Project HOPE; match employee contributions up to \$ 250,000
United Technologies	Unspecified	US\$250,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
United Parcel Service (UPS)	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Unspecified
Vale Exploration	2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified
The Valero Energy Corporation	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Viscal Development Corporation	2014	Unspecified	Third and Fifth Districts, Cebu; Eastern Samar	Development Sponsor
Waka Waka Solar Lamps & Chargers	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	14,500 solar lamps & chargers
Walgreens	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross
Walmart	Unspecified	US\$1 million	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross and Save the Children
Walt Disney Company	Unspecified	US\$500,000	Unspecified	Donation through Red Cross and Save the Children
Wells Fargo & Company	Unspecified	US\$250,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross and International Medical Corps.
Western Union	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Save the Children
Windsor Family Credit Union	Unspecified	US\$50,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
WISE Company	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Canadian Red Cross
W.W. Grainger Inc.	Unspecified	US\$25,000	Unspecified	Donation through American Red Cross International Disaster Relief Fund
Xoom Corporation	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Contribute money transfer fees for all donations until Nov 30, 2013 through Philippine Red Cross
Xylem Watermark & Merch Corp.	Unspecified	US\$100,000	Unspecified	Donation through Mercy Corps
Yabu	Nov 2013	Unspecified	Unspecified	Donation of profits incurred on Nov 13, 2013
Yum! Brands	Unspecified	US\$1.5 million	Unspecified	Donation through WFP

Sources: Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery, US Chamber of Commerce Foundation Typhon Haiyan - Corporate Aid Tracker (<https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/corporate-citizenship-center/typhoon-haiyan-corporate-aid-tracker>), and various publications monitored by IBON

NOTES:

Akbay Program	Agrikultura Kaagapay ng Bayang Pinoy Program	First Philec	First Philippine Electric Corporation
BDO	Banko de Oro	FPH	First Philippine Holdings
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere	HOPE	Health Opportunities for People Everywhere
CEO	Chief Executive Officer	HSBC	Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
CFC-ANCOP	Couples for Christ - Answering the Cry of the Poor	LG	Lucky Goldstar
DA	Department of Agriculture	LGU	Local Government Unit
DepEd	Department of Education	MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
DILG	Department of Interior and Local Government	MOL	Mitsui OSK Lines
DOE	Department of Energy	MVP	Manny V. Pangilinan
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development	NGO	non-government organization
EDC	Energy Development Corporation	NT\$	New Taiwan Dollar
FilCom Center	Filipino Community Center	PCAF	Philippine Council for Agriculture and Fisheries
		PLDT	Philippine Long Distance Telephone
		RM	Malaysian Ringgit
		UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
		WFP	World Food Programme

Annex 2. Profile of Interviewees

Key Informants

Name	Office/ Organization Represented	Date	Position
Local Non-Government Organizations			
Minet Aguisanda	Leyte Center for Development	26 August 2017	Executive Director
Local Government Units			
Ermenia Coritana	Barangay Baras, Palo, Leyte	28 August 2017	Barangay Captain
Roberto Dagami Sr.	Barangay Castilla, Palo, Leyte	30 August 2017	Barangay Captain
Lina Balderas	Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office, Palo, Leyte	30 August 2017	Municipal Social Welfare Development Coordinator
Engr. Armand Cabaltera	Municipal Planning and Development Office, Palo, Leyte	30 August 2017	Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
Engr. Noel Nadera	DPWH Region 8, Tide Embankment Project	31 August 2017	Engineer II
Dennis Cosmod	Youth Development Office	6 September 2017	Youth Development Coordinator
Honeylou Mora	DSWD Region 8	7 September 2017	Project Development Officer 2
Engr. Manuel Serdan	City Planning and Development Office, Tacloban	7 September 2017	City Planning and Development Office Coordinator
Pel Tecson	Tanauan, Leyte	8 September 2017	Municipal Mayor
Bonifacio Uy	NEDA Region 8	11 September 2017	Regional Director
People's Organizations			
Nestor Lebico, Sr.	SAGUPA Eastern Visayas	30 August 2017	Secretary General
Ariel Dizon	San Agustin Farmer's Association	30 August 2017	President
Analyndacdac	KAPAKSA	1 September 2017	President
Nestor de Pas Ronda	KUSOG	2 September 2017	President
Alicia Pacheco	MAGKAUBAN	3 September 2017	President
Pedro Quirante	ESAMELCO	4 September 2017	President

Name	Office/ Organization Represented	Date	Position
Bartolome Bellena	KADAMAY- Federation of Market Vendors	6 September 2017	President
Opyang	SICAFSA	8 September 2017	Vice- President
Marissa Cabaljao	People's Surge	8 September 2017	Secretary General

Participants in focus group discussions

Date	Location	Sex	Range of Age	Sources of Livelihood	Barangay
26 August 2017	Ridgeview, Tacloban City	Female - 10; Male - 1	22-67	Informal Employment (Massesuse, Sari-sari store, and food vending)	Bgy. 97 Cabalawan
28 August 2017	Baras, Palo, Leyte	Female - 5; Male - 3	40-66	Baranggay Kagawad, Janitress, School Principal	Bgy. Baras
29 August 2017	San Agustin, Palo, Leyte	Female - 6; Male - 4	15-72	Farming ; Informal Employment (Sari-sari store, Laborer)	Bgy. San Agustin
1 September 2017	Calbiga, Samar	Female - 7; Male - 3	28-57	Farming	Bgy. Binangaran, Bgy. Sinalangtan, Bgy. Polangi
2 September 2017	Tacloban City	Female - 7; Male - 5	37-76	Carpenter, Informal Employment (Sari-sari store, Laborer)	Bgy. 37 (NDZ)
3 September 2017	Ormoc City	Female - 8; Male - 1	32- 68	Farming, Baranggay Health Worker, Natasia Dealer (?)	Bgy. Salvacion
4 September 2017	Boronggan City	Female - 0; Male - 9	37-72	Formal Employment, Fishing	Bgy. Songco, Bgy. Bato, Bgy. Dacul, Bgy. Lorrente, Bgy. Maypangdan, Bgy. Sta Fe
6 September 2017	Catbalogan City	Female - 6 ; Male - 1	21-64	Market Stall Vendor	Bgy. 12 , Bgy. 2, Bgy. Sindapanan, Bgy. 11, Bgy. Guindapunan, Bgy. 10
8 September 2017	Tanauan, Leyte	Female - 2; Male - 7	41-67	Farming, Laborer	Bgy. Calsadahay
9 September 2017	Calubian, Leyte	Female - 4; Male - 5	28-64	Farming	Bgy. Jubay, Bgy. Catoogan

Annex 3. Survey Instrument

Reference No.: _____

SURVEY ON YOLANDA-HIT AREAS AFTER FOUR YEARS September 2017

Enumerator: _____
Date: _____
Time Started: _____
Time Ended: _____

Barangay: _____
Municipality/City: _____
Province: _____

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Sex: Female Male

Age: 18-21 22-35 36-56 57 and above

How many are you in the family? 1 2 3 4 5 or more

How many are age 15 years old and below? 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more

What sector/profession do you belong to?

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Worker | <input type="checkbox"/> Professional | <input type="checkbox"/> Less than one year unemployed |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farmer | <input type="checkbox"/> Businessman/woman | <input type="checkbox"/> More than one year unemployed |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fisherfolk | <input type="checkbox"/> Student | <input type="checkbox"/> Others – Please specify
_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employee | <input type="checkbox"/> Housewife/husband | |

YOLANDA SURVIVORS AFTER FOUR YEARS

1. Did you experience Typhoon Yolanda in November 2013?

- Yes No

2. How is your family's livelihood four (4) years after Typhoon Yolanda?

- Better Worse
 Same Don't know

3. What is your family's current primary source of livelihood?

- | | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farming | <input type="checkbox"/> Labor | <input type="checkbox"/> Employment-government |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fishing | <input type="checkbox"/> Own business | <input type="checkbox"/> Employment-private sector |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others – Please specify _____ | | |

4. Was this your family's source of livelihood before Typhoon Yolanda came?

- Yes No

[If the answer is "No", proceed to #5. If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #6.]

5. What is your family's former primary source of livelihood?

- Farming Employment-government

- Fishing
- Labor
- Others – Please specify _____
- Employment-private sector
- Own business

6. Does your family currently have other sources of income?

- Yes
- None

[If the answer is “Yes”, proceed to #7. If the answer is “None”, proceed to #8.]

7. What is this/are these? (You may have more than one [1] answer.)

- Farming
- Fishing
- Labor
- Others – Please specify _____
- Employment-government
- Employment-private sector
- Own business

8. Is your family income enough for your family’s needs?

- Yes
- No
- Don’t know

9. Where does your family currently live?

- Own house
- Lives with relative/s or friend/s
- Renting
- At the permanent shelter (relocation)
- At the temporary shelter (relocation)
- Others – Please specify _____

10. How long has your family been staying where you live now?

- 1-6 months
- More than 6 months
- More than 1 year
- More than 2 years
- More than 3 years

11. Did your family live here before Typhoon Yolanda?

- Yes
- No

[If the answer is “No”, proceed to #12. If the answer is “Yes”, proceed to #13.]

12. Why didn’t your family go back where you used to live? (You may have more than one [1] answer.)

- No interest in going back there
- The house was devastated
- The house has not been reconstructed the area
- Somebody else is claiming our land
- Was able to return but got evicted because somebody else has claimed our land
- The area has already been declared as “No build/dwelling zone”
- Others – Please specify _____
- There are no health facilities in the area
- There are no schools in the area
- There are no livelihood opportunities in the area

13. Are the following available or accessible where you live?

	Yes	None	Don't know
13.1. Clean, safe drinking water			
13.2. Water for domestic use			
13.3. Toilet			
13.4. Electricity			
13.5. Transportation			
13.6. Communication			

14. What is/are the available or accessible health facilities where you live? (You may have more than one [1] answer.)

- Public health center Private health center/clinic Don't know
 Public lying-in clinic Private lying-in clinic None
 Public hospital Private hospital Others – Please specify _____

15. Are you able to consult regarding your health concerns and/or have yourself treated if sick?

- Yes No

16. Are the children able to go to school?

- Yes No

[If the answer is “No”, proceed to #17. If the answer is “Yes”, proceed to #18.]

17. Why not? (You may have more than one [1] answer.)

- Far from home
 There are no schools in the area
 Cannot shoulder education expenses
 Others – Please specify _____

18. Are there services and/or structures in your area that still need to be addressed since after Typhoon Yolanda?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is “Yes”, proceed to #19. If the answer is “None” or “Don't know”, proceed to #20.]

19. What is this/are these? (You may have more than one [1] answer.)

- Roads Barangay hall, gym
 Bldges School
 Irrigation Hospitals and/or other health facilities
 Market Evacuation center/s, Resettlement area/s
 Electricity facilities Don't know
 Water utility facilities Others – Please specify _____

20. Are there any reconstruction projects implemented after Typhoon Yolanda?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Oo", proceed to #21-25. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #54.]

21. What is this/are these project/s?	22. Main implementor (implementing agency, LGU, company, NGO/INGO)	23. If main implementor is government or LGU, is there a private sector or NGO/INGO partner?	If "Yes" with #23	25. What is the purpose of the project as far as you know?
			24. What is the private sector or NGO/INGO partner?	
Infrastructure				
1.				
2.				
3.				
Social services				
1.				
2.				
3.				
Livelihood				
1.				
2.				
3.				

- 1 – Yes
2 – None
3 – Don't know

If there is at least one answer with Infrastructure, proceed to #s 26-34.

If there is at least one answer with Social services, proceed to #s 35-40.

If there is at least one answer with Livelihood, proceed to #s 41-46.

If there is land use conversion (LUC) answered with Infrastructure and/or Livelihood, proceed to #s 47-53.

Infrastructure

26. Was there a public consultation in your community about this project?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #27-28. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #29.]

27. Were you able to attend the said public consultation?

- Yes No

28. Did you agree with the implementation of this project that was consulted with your community?

- Yes No No decision

29. Is/Was there a chance that you were/will be displaced from your residence because of the project?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #30. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #31.]

30. Were you offered a relocation of residence?

- Yes None Don't know

31. Is/Was there a chance that your livelihood got/will be adversely affected because of the said project?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #32. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #33.]

32. Were you offered any form of aid or compensation for your livelihood?

- Yes None Don't know

33. Were you offered any form of aid by the implementor of this project?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #34. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #35.]

34. What was this/were these?

- Medical assistance Livelihood programs, projects
 Educational assistance Others – Please specify
-

Social services

35. Did you receive this/these said social service/s?

- Yes None Don't know

36. Was/Were there any requisite/s for you to receive this/these said social service/s?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #37-38. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #39.]

37. What was this/were these? _____

38. Were you able to provide this/these?

- Yes No

39. Was/Were there any problem/s encountered in receiving this/these said social service/s?

- Yes None

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #40. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #41.]

40. What was this/were these? _____

Livelihood

41. Were you included in the said livelihood program?

- Yes No

42. Was/Were there any requisite/s for you to be included in the said livelihood program?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #43-44. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #45.]

43. What was this/were these? _____

44. Were you able to provide this/these?

- Yes No

45. Was/Were there any problem/s encountered for you to be included in the said livelihood program?

- Yes None

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #46. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #47.]

46. What was this/were these? _____

LUC

47. Is there a case of land o crop use conversion in your area?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #48-49. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #52.]

48. From what use or crop is it going to be converted and into what use or crop?

_____ → _____

49. Was there a public consultation in your community about this?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to 50-51. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to 52.]

50. Were you able to attend the said public consultation?

- Yes No

51. Do you agree with the implementation of this project that was consulted with your community?

- Yes No No decision

52. Is/Was there a chance that your livelihood got/will be adversely affected because of the said project?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the answer is "Yes", proceed to #53. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", proceed to #54.]

53. Were you offered any form of aid or compensation for your livelihood?

- Yes None Don't know

54. Are there other economic projects or businesses implemented in the devastated community?

- Yes None Don't know

[If the anser is "Yes", proceed to #55-60. If the answer is "None" or "Don't know", the survey ends here.]

55. What is this/are these project/s?	56. Main implementor (implementing agency, LGU, company, NGO/INGO)	57. As far as you know, what is the project for?	58. Was a public consultation about this project held?	59. In your opinion, is this beneficial for the Yolanda survivors?	60. How?
<input type="checkbox"/> Agribusiness					
<input type="checkbox"/> Tourism					
<input type="checkbox"/> Ecotourism projects					
<input type="checkbox"/> Commercial establishments like malls					
<input type="checkbox"/> Others – please specify _____					
<input type="checkbox"/> None					

1 – Job creation
2 – Tax generation
3 – Local income generation

1 – Yes
2 – None
3 – Don't know

1 – Yes
2 – No
3 – Don't know

Annex 4. Major programs, projects and activities

Transport

- Conduct/preparation of the feasibility study/detailed engineering for the Leyte-Samar railway to connect the Luzon and Mindanao railways
- Conduct/preparation of the feasibility study/detailed engineering for the 2nd Leyte-Samar bridge
- Construction of a 2nd Leyte-Samar Bridge connecting Babatngon, Leyte and Sta. Rita, Samar
- Construction of bridges to connect Pacific towns in Northern Samar and connect Northern Samar to Eastern Samar
- Completion of the Samar Pacific Coastal Road (i.e., Simora (Laoang)-Palapag-Mapanas-Gamay-Lapinig-Arteche-San Policarpo Road)
- Construction/completion of roads leading to identified Tourism

Development Areas

- Construction/completion of roads leading to identified economic/production zones (e.g. Leyte Ecological Industrial Zone, North Tacloban economic zone, agribusiness and fishery areas)
- Construction of Jaro-Ormoc Road
- Construction of farm-to-market roads (FMRs) in Northern Samar
 - o Coroconog-Lubog FMR in San Roque and Mondragon
 - o Malagihana-Malibago FMR in San Roque
 - o Lubog-Lawaan-Ginagdaan FMR in San Roque
- Improvement of barangay roads
- Construction of disaster and climate change-resilient roads
- Completion of the road connecting

isolated/interior towns/municipalities in Samar Island

- Construction of concrete-paved roads in conflict-affected areas
- Completion of road construction of concrete-paved roads
- Construction of circumferential roads
 - o San Vicente, Northern Samar circumferential road
 - o Homonhon Island circumferential road
 - o Batag Island, Laoang, Northern Samar circumferential road
- Improvement/upgrading of various secondary roads
- Widening of roads/bridges along major roads in urban centers and thoroughfares
- Construction of bypass and diversion roads in urban/town centers
 - o Construction of Borongan bypass road
 - o Construction of by-pass road leading to San Juanico Bridge-Tacloban CBD
 - o Construction of geometric improvements, such as signalized intersections and road barriers
- Construction of road lanes for non-motorized transport (e.g. bicycle and pedestrian lanes) in appropriate areas
- Construction of access roads to daycare centers and schools in far-flung barangays
- Improvement of Borongan airport
 - o Construction of runway extension
 - o Expansion and widening of access road

o Construction of perimeter fence

- Conduct of feasibility studies for the construction of inter-island link bridges in San Ricardo-Lipata connecting Leyte to Mindanao and from Matnog, Sorsogon to Allen, Northern Samar, and from Maasin City to Ubay, Bohol
- Construction of roll-on, roll-off (RoRo) port facility in CBD Tacloban and Tacloban North resettlement area
- Construction of RoRo ports in Homonhon Island and Guiuan, Eastern Samar, and Limasawa Island and Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte
- Installation of marine navigational aids along San Juanico Strait and other areas critical to night time navigation
- Construction of a new regional seaport/base port
- Rehabilitation/Modernization of the Tacloban Airport and/or construction of a new modern and disaster-resilient regional airport
- Upgrading of other airports in the region, including provision of airport facilities/equipment (e.g. nighttime navigational aids) to make them commercial flights-ready

Water

- Construction of seawall/dike/ tide embankment for storm surge and meteotsunamis protection of danger areas (e.g. Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan)
- Construction of reclamation projects in Baybay and Tacloban City

- Construction of Binahaan Flood control (Tanauan, Palo, Leyte, etc.)
 - Construction of various flood control projects
 - Installation of flood control facilities
 - Formulation of a master drainage plan for flood-prone areas
 - Flood and river control program
 - Shoreline protection program
 - Soil erosion prevention program (vetiver grass, etc.)
 - Construction of drainage canals and flood protection structures
 - Anti-flooding measures at the V&G Subdivision, Tacloban City
 - Construction of irrigation projects and systems, including small reservoir irrigation projects and systems
 - Construction and manning of hydrometeorology stations
 - Development of a water supply system, water transmission system, water distribution system, and water storage system for the Tacloban North resettlement area
 - Provision of water supply for resettlement area
- Information and communications technology (ICT)
- Upgrading of existing ICT Infrastructures
 - Infrastructure support services leading to eco-tourism areas
- Installation of internet services in tourist destinations
 - Integrated Government Philippines (iGovPhil) Project for Palo Government Center
 - Tech4ED Project
 - People's Konek Project
 - Digital PH Program
 - One Expert Project
 - Investment promotion to investors on ICT infrastructure facilities and services at the declared special economic zone (EVRGC)
 - Construction of Ethanol Plant and Infrastructure support to Ormoc/Kananga Sugar Mills
- Power and Energy
- Sitio Electrification Program
 - Household Electrification Program
 - National Renewable Energy Program
 - Photo Voltaic Mainstreaming Program
 - Community Electrification Program
 - Energy Conservation Program
 - Construction of Biliran Geothermal Power Project
 - Establishment of climate-proof energy infrastructure and facilities
 - Conduct of feasibility study on Limasawa Island Electrification
 - Construction of Amanhuray-Amandaraga mini-hydro power plant

- Construction of Calbiga (5 megawatt (MW)-Samar Electric Cooperative (SAMELCO) II)
- Construction of Las Navas Hydro (5MW-Northern Samar Electric Cooperative (NORSAMELCO))
- Construction of Bugtong Mini-Hydro (1MW-SAMELCO I)
- Construction of Paranas Hydro Plant (5MW-SAMELCO II)
- Construction of Lawaan Hydro Plant (1MW-Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative (ESAMELCO))
- Construction of San Miguel Solar Plant (300kW-Leyte Electric Cooperative (LEYECO) III)
- Construction of Dagami Hydro Plant (3MW-DORELCO & LEYECO III)
- Construction of Javier Mini-Hydro (1MW-DORELCO)
- Construction of St. Bernard Mini-Hydro (600kW- Southern Leyte Electric Cooperative (SOLECO))
- Development and construction of more renewable sources of power supply (i.e., solar, wind, marine, bio energy)
- Construction of Olot River Dam in Can-avid, Northern Samar for hydropower/irrigation/water supply
- Advocacy campaign to involve local government units in the enforcement of anti-pilferage campaign
- Completion of the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Complex
- Construction of subregional hospital in Catbalogan City
- Construction/Rehabilitation/Expansion/upgrading of health facilities including barangay health stations, rural health units, hospitals, DTRRCs and mental health centers
- Procurement of equipment and facilities for health centers (including transportation services)
- Upgrading of existing jail/prison facilities to conform to standards
- Construction of school buildings with classrooms (to include K-12 program)
- Construction/Rehabilitation of various school buildings to include public-private partnership-funded projects
- Construction of various resilient evacuation centers
 - o Construction of drug treatment and rehabilitation centers in 7 cities, Dulag, Leyte & 2 capital towns
- Construction of disaster risk reduction and management centers (storage, motorpool, operation centers)
- Housing and resettlement program
- Establishment of Light Industrial Park

Source: National Economic and Development Authority-Region VIII Eastern Visayas Regional Development Plan 2017-2022

Social Infrastructure

Annex 5. List of other development partners in Yolanda Corridor

Development partner	Program / Project / Activity
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)	Community small grants to restore livelihood through Philippine-Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP)
	Resilience and preparedness trainings
	Deployment of six Australian Civilian Corps (ACC)
International Labour Organization (ILO)	Emergency employment and recovery of sustainable livelihood
	ILO Response framework "Philippines Super Typhoon Haiyan: Rebuilding Sustainable Livelihood": Emergency and recovery support to restart livelihoods
Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)	Rehabilitation-upgrading project of Felipe Abrigo Memorial Hospital
	Waste management, vocational training and cash for work
	Rebuilding of Visayas State University-Tolosa Campus
	Northern Iloilo Comprehensive Fishery Rehabilitation and Development
Swish Humanitarian Aid	Rehabilitation of schools
United Arab Emirates (UAE)	Rehabilitation and construction of Western and Eastern Samar schools
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Disaster resilient infrastructure; livelihoods; resettlement support; disaster risk reduction (DRR) mainstreaming; support to Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
United Nations Habitat (UN Habitat)	Resiliency and safety in urban informal settlements in Visayas
	Post-Yolanda support for safer homes and settlements
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Free mobile birth registration
	Assessment and profiling of affected populations in 20 priority municipalities
	Project monitoring
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Support to Department of Education
	UNDP Waste Management
	Rehabilitation and Recovery work in WASH, ECCD centers, child protection systems
	Support for unconditional cash transfers of \$100 per month for 6 months to 5,801 families
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	Tacloban City Hospital Birthing Facility Construction
	Livelihood projects
	Yolanda reconstruction and rehabilitation assistance
World Health Organization (WHO)	Yolanda recovery and rehabilitation programs, support to Department of Health
Care Canada / Government of Canada	Long-term reconstruction program (Rebuilding through micro-insurance, sustainable economic growth, and typhoon Yolanda reconstruction assistance)

Note: This list does not reflect the total number of non-government organizations (NGOs) and private sector actors and their respective programs, projects, and activities for typhoon Yolanda rehabilitation and recovery. Blank spaces indicate that there is no data from the organization at the time of reporting, which is as of 1st Quarter 2017.

Source: National Economic and Development Authority

Annex 6. Summary of ongoing directly-implemented projects by development partners in Region VIII

Development partner	Project	Sector	Grant (in Php)	Expected completion	Remarks
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	ADB-Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction: Emergency Assistance and Early Recovery for Poor Municipalities Affected by Typhoon Yolanda	Cross-sector	Php428,051,364	2017	Updates as of June 2017
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)	Typhoon Haiyan Reconstruction Assistance in the Philippines	Livelihood	Php219,222,000	2021	Updates as of April 2017
Cord Aid	Capacity building for integrated resilience strengthening L&A "Resilient Livelihoods, Resilient Communities Project"	Livelihood	Php2,500,000	Dec 31, 2017	Consists of various livelihood projects for 6,500 beneficiaries
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	Anibong Resettlement	Resettlement	US\$13,445,780	Oct 2018	Ongoing construction of the resettlement project for 2,665 beneficiaries
					Total grant for Yolanda reconstruction assistance in the region amounted to around US\$46,025,277
Ecosystems Work for Essential Benefits, Inc. (ECOPOWER Inc)	Improved Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction in Eastern Samar	DRR	-	Aug 2018	The project is targeting 15 Yolanda-affected barangays in Eastern Samar
Food for the Hungry Philippines, Inc.	Climate Change Facilities in the Philippines – Improving the resilience of rural communities against consequences of Climate Change in Samar	Cross- Sector	-	Dec 2018	-
	Western Samar Coastal Agricultural Programme (WSCAP)	Cross-sector	Php852,893	Nov 2020	
	Better than Before (BTB) Project	Cross-sector	-	Dec 2017	

Source: National Economic and Development Authority-Region VIII

Development partner	Project	Sector	Grant (in Php)	Expected completion	Remarks
Good Neighbors International	Five-year Rehabilitation and Recovery Community Development Plan	Cross-sector	-	2019	Project includes sponsorship and community development programs for identified beneficiaries
International Organization on Migration (IOM)	Construction of Evacuation Center	Infrastructure	-	Aug 2017	Of the two evacuation centers for construction, one has been completed, while the other one (in Borongan) is still ongoing and is due for completion by August 2017
National Council of Churches in the Philippines – ACT Alliance	Shelter Construction	Resettlement	-	-	Remaining projects for completion are both located in Brgy. Ferreras, Marabut, Samar
	Construction of Evacuation Center	Infrastructure	-	-	
Oxfam	Women Economic Empowerment and Care	Livelihood	-	Dec 2019	Project involved the provision of sustainable livelihood for 12,000 beneficiaries in Eastern Samar
Save the Children	Furthering Youth Employment in the Philippines	Livelihood	Php3,600,000	Apr 2021	Total grant for ongoing projects amounted to around Php729.7 million
	Skills Training for Valuable Employment of Youth	Livelihood	Php1,200,000	Sept 2017	
	Championing Children's Right in Rehabilitation through Government-Civil-Society-Children Engagement (Project CHARGE)	Social Services	Php10,000,000	Dec 2019	
	Child Led Information and Knowledge Sharing for School Safety	Social Services	Php27,500,000	Jun 2018	
	Strengthening Child Centered disaster risk reduction (DRR)	Social Services (DRR)	Php4,000,000	Dec 2018	
	Alert, Ready Community	Social Services (DRR)	Php50,000,000	Sept 2017	

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