



Disaster Upon Disaster

Lessons Beyond Yolanda

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

4Ps – *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program*
ACAPS – Assessment Capacities Project
ACF – Active Citizenship Foundation
ACT Alliance – Action of Church Together Alliance
ADB – Asian Development Bank
AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines
AID – areas of intervention and development
AMIHAN – National Federation of Women Farmers
APIS – Annual Poverty Indicators Survey
ARB – agrarian reform beneficiaries
ARMM – Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASSURE – Alliance for Safe and Sustainable Reconstruction
BALSA – *Bayanihan Alay sa Sambayanan*
BAS – Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
BEAM – Biliran Environmental Awareness Movement
BFAR – Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
Bgy. – *barangay* or village
BHS – barangay health station
BISKAFFA – Bislig-Kaboynan Farmers and Fishermen’s Association
CARP – Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
CBLA – Cash for Building Livelihood Assets
CCA – climate change adaptation
CCCM – Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CDRC – Citizens Disaster Response Center
CEO – Chief Executive Officer
CIDG – Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
CLUP – Comprehensive Land Use Plan
CMFR – Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility
CO – capital outlay
COA – Commission on Audit
Comelec – Commission on Elections
COMP – Chamber of Mines of the Philippines
CRRP – Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan
CSR – corporate social responsibility
CTUHR – Center for Trade Union and Human Rights
DA – Department of Agriculture
DAR – Department of Agrarian Reform
DASTA – Designated Areas for Sustainable Tourism Administration
DBM – Department of Budget and Management
DEC – Disasters Emergency Committee
DENR – Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DepEd – Department of Education
DILG – Department of Interior and Local Government
DNA – deoxyribonucleic acid
DND – Department of National Defense
DOE – Department of Energy
DOH – Department of Health
DOST – Department of Science and Technology
DOTC – Department of Transportation and Communication
DPWH – Department of Public Works and Highways
DRR – disaster risk reduction
DRRM – disaster risk reduction and management
DSMC – Defense Situation Monitoring Center
DSWD – Department of Social Welfare and Development
DTM – Displacement Tracking Matrix
EC – electric cooperative
EDC – Energy Development Corporation
ENSO – El Niño-Southern Oscillation
ESSU – Eastern Samar State University

EU – European Union
 EWPH – East-West Seed Philippines
 FAITH – Foreign Aid Transparency Hub
 FAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
 FFF – Federation of Free Farmers
 FGD – focus group discussion
 FRC – Filminer Resources Corp.
 GDP – gross domestic product
 GIZ – German Society for International Cooperation (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*)
 GK – Gawad Kalinga
 GOCC – government-owned and controlled corporation
 GRDP – gross regional domestic product
 GSCF – Global Security Contingency Fund
 GVA – gross value added
 HC – Humanitarian Coalition
 HEI – Higher Education Institutes
 HMC – Hinatuan Mining Corp.
 HUDCC – Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council
 ICS – incidence command system
 ICTSI – International Container Terminal Services Inc.
 ID – identification card
 IDM – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
 IEDA – International Emergency Development Aid
 IFC – International Finance Corporation
 IFI – international financial institutions
 IMR – infant mortality rate
 INGO – international non-government organization
 IOM – International Organization for Migration
 IP – internet protocol
 IPI – International Pharmaceutical Incorporated
 JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency
 JRC – Japan Radio Company
 KADAMAY – *Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap*
 KALAHI-CIDSS – Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services
 KAMP – Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas
 km – kilometer
 KMP – *Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas* (Peasant Movement of the Philippines)
 kph – kilometers per hour
 LCDE – Leyte Center for Development
 LDRRMF – Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund
 LGU – local government unit
 LIDE – Leyte Industrial Development Estate
 LRRP – Local Rehabilitation and Recovery Plans
 MCNA – multi-cluster needs assessment
 MIMAROPA – Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, Palawan (Region IV-B)
 MOOE – maintenance and other operating expenses
 MRE – meals ready to eat
 MT – metric tons
 NAC – Nickel Asia Corporation
 NAPSE – *Nagkakaurosa ng mga Panag-uma han Seguridad han Ekonomiya* (United Farmers for Economic Security)
 NBI – National Bureau of Investigation
 NCR – National Capital Region
 NDF – National Democratic Front
 NDRRMC – National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
 NDZ – no-dwelling zone
 NEA – National Electrification Administration
 NEDA – National Economic and Development Authority
 NFA – National Food Authority
 NGCP – National Grid Corporation of the Philippines
 NGO – non-government organization

NHA – National Housing Authority
 NOAA – Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards
 NPA – New People’s Army
 NPC – National Power Corporation
 OCD – Office of Civil Defense
 OIC – Organization of Islamic Cooperation
 OPARR – Office of the Presidential Assistant on Reconstruction and Recovery
 PA – Philippine Army
 PAF – Philippine Air Force
 PAGASA – Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services
 PAGCOR – Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
 PAMALAKAYA – *Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya ng Pilipinas* (National Federation of Small
 Fisherfolk Organization in the Philippines)
 PASAR – Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp.
 PBSP – Philippine Business for Social Progress
 PCA – Philippine Coconut Authority
 PDAF – Priority Development Assistance Fund
 PDNA – Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
 PDP – Philippine Development Plan
 PDRF – Philippine Disaster Relief Foundation
 PN – Philippine Navy
 PNP – Philippine National Police
 PO – people’s organization
 PPA – Philippine Ports Authority
 PPA – projects, programs and activities
 PPDO – Provincial Planning and Development Office
 PPP – public-private partnership
 PRMO – Provincial Reconstruction Management Office
 PSA – Philippine Statistics Authority
 RA – Republic Act
 QRF – Quick Response Fund
 RAY – Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda
 RHU – rural health unit
 RMP – Rural Missionaries of the Philippines
 ROK – Government of the Republic of Korea
 SAGUPA – *Samahan han Gudti nga Parag-uma Sinirangan Bisayas*
 SAF – Special Action Force
 SARO – Special Allotment Release Order
 SEA-K – Self-Employment Assistance Kaunlaran
 SENTRA – *Sentro ng Repormang Agraryo* (Center for Agrarian Reform)
 SIDECO – Sicogon Development Corp.
 SOS – *Samahang Operasyon Sagip*
 STC – Save the Children
 Tabang-EV – Tabang-Eastern Visayas
 TNAS – Tacloban National Agricultural School
 TRSDG – Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group
 TVI – Technical Vocational Institutes
 U5MR – under 5 mortality rate
 UCT – unconditional cash transfer
 UMA – *Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura* (Agricultural Workers Union)
 UN – United Nations
 UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
 UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
 UN Habitat – United Nations Human Settlements Programme
 UN OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
 UP – University of the Philippines
 USAID – United States Agency for International Development
 WFP – United Nations World Food Programme
 WHO – World Health Organization
 WISM – Women’s International Solidarity Mission

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Introduction




Typhoon Yolanda was a disaster that became an even bigger tragedy because of government neglect and corporate opportunism. Disasters especially of the scale of Typhoon Yolanda (international code Haiyan) and the corresponding responses are complex events and not amenable to simple or easy conclusions. But this is not to say that conclusions cannot be made – only that any conclusions that are made stand on the point of view taken and on the evidence and analysis used to back them up.

This study, most important of all, looked at Typhoon Yolanda and the response from the point of view of the communities and the people most affected. Interacting with survivors and their community organizations has been the empirical anchor and foundation of the research. Their experiences and perspectives were augmented by interviews and data from various stakeholders: local government officials, Filipino and foreign non-government organizations (NGOs), international agencies, and national government agencies. There were also an Eastern Visayas-wide household survey on the typhoon's impact and a nationwide household survey on the perceived response.

Typhoon Yolanda was the fourth strongest typhoon in recorded history with wind speeds of more than 300 kilometers per hour (kph) and storm surges of over four meters.¹ But it was the world's strongest typhoon to ever make landfall with a speed of 152 kph and gusts of up to 376 kph. It was also peculiar in making six landfalls over: Guiuan, Samar; Tolosa, Leyte; Daanbantayan, Cebu; Bantayan Island, Cebu; Concepcion, Iloilo; and Busuanga, Palawan.^{2 3}

The government estimates that the typhoon affected 12,122 barangays, 591 municipalities and 57 cities in 44 provinces of nine regions. The Eastern Visayas region (Region 8) was most affected. (See Map 1) The southern coast of Eastern Samar and the coastal towns of the Leyte Gulf in Eastern and Western Samar and Leyte were devastated by storm surges. The inland areas of Leyte and Eastern and Western Samar, along with parts of the provinces of Cebu, Capiz, Iloilo, Aklan and Palawan, were severely affected by strong winds. There was severe damage even beyond the 100-kilometer (km) storm track.

Map 1. Areas on the path of Typhoon Yolanda



Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)

Yet the government identified only 171 municipalities in 14 provinces of four regions located within the 100-km storm track as priority areas for assistance, according to the National Economic and Development Authority’s (NEDA) Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) strategic plan.⁴

IBON conducted a rapid appraisal one year after the disaster to know the specific socioeconomic needs of the survivors and to assess the government’s response so far. The study focused on five research areas in Eastern Visayas, namely Tanauan and Tacloban City in Leyte, Guiuan in Eastern Samar, Naval in Biliran, and Pinabacdao in Western Samar. Naval and Pinabacdao were outside Typhoon Yolanda’s 100-km track.

Focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with a heterogeneous mix of participants living in temporary shelters, in unsafe zones declared ‘no-build zones’, in permanent shelters, and also some who just moved farther inland away from no-build zones. Participants from Tanauan came from Barangay (Bgy.; village) San Roque, a coastal barangay and reportedly the most devastated among 54 barangays of Tanauan. There were two FGDs

in Tacloban City – one participated in by fisherfolk from Bgy. 52 and by people living in bunkhouses on the property of International Pharmaceutical Incorporated (IPI) and Abucay but who used to live in Bgys. 88, 71 and 37; the other was participated in by farmers of *Nagkakaurosa ng mga Panag-uma han Seguridad han Ekonomiya* (NAPSE) living in their farms in Bgy. 97.

Participants from Guiuan were from the fishing community in Bgy. 6. At the time of the FGD, they were either staying in bunkhouses, in tents put up on the vacant grounds at the back of the Eastern Samar State University (ESSU) or in the declared unsafe zones in Bgy. 6. Participants from Pinabacdao were from farming communities in Bgys. Mambog, Paras-anon, and Nabong. Finally, most of the participants from Naval were farming in Bgys. Caray-caray, Bigaa, Pablo, and Antipolo. The last two are both coastal barangays, while Bgy. Caray-caray is near a major river system and Bgy. Bigaa is a mountain barangay.

These FGDs were augmented with interviews and data from a wide variety of stakeholders from the: Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

(OPARR); Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) including its national LGUs and some city/municipal offices; local government units of Tanauan, Tacloban, Guiuan, Naval, and Pinabacdao, including their mayors; NGOs including Leyte Center for Development (LCDE), Biliran Environment Awareness Movement (BEAM), ACT Alliance, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund (SCF); international organizations International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).

IBON also spent considerable time with various people's organizations: Bislig-Kaboynan Farmers and Fishermen's Association (BISKAFFA), COCO CARE, *Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap* (Kadamay), NAPSE, *Samahan han Gudti nga Parag-uma Sinirangan Bisayas* (SAGUPA), and *Tabang-Eastern Visayas* (Tabang-EV).

The findings affirmed the socioeconomic vulnerability of large populations in central Philippines even before Typhoon Yolanda hit; this was the single biggest circumstance that caused the damage wrought to be so vast. The affected areas had poor, backward, agrarian and extractive economies.

The government response was seen to be slow and grossly inadequate. A year after the typhoon, the Philippine government had yet to deliver the bulk of social services and livelihoods needed for the surviving families to start getting back on their feet. Many families remained displaced, children's schooling was still disrupted, and health services remained fragmentary. Water and sanitation, electricity and transport infrastructure were at low levels to begin with but were even slow in being restored. The damage to agricultural lands and fisheries undermined the most basic sources of livelihoods, relieved only by uncertain and erratic dole-outs.

The government's lack of preparedness was evident upon impact and in the aftermath. Disaster-related budgets were insufficient and misallocated. These were aggravated by institutionalized corruption and patronage politics which delayed or allegedly even denied relief and rehabilitation to survivors. While the participation of military forces in disaster response is accepted, Philippine and foreign military forces were seen as acting beyond merely being responders to having concealed military objectives.

The government response also inappropriately included a private sector-led reconstruction plan called 'Build Back Better'. This pushed the neoliberal notion of

public-private partnerships in disaster response resulting in reconstruction designed for business and profits and deferring to corporations according to their financial clout or political influence. This de-emphasizes state responsibility and its role while exaggerating private sector efficiency and humanitarian intent.

The study also noted how many NGOs functioned as charity or service providers. There were large amounts of well-meaning aid centered around big INGOs and their local subcontractors. Needing to be spent immediately and visibly, these resulted in dole-outs or distorted project implementation which undermined accumulated social capital and painstaking community organizing and politicization efforts. These tend to undermine social movements while reinforcing the neoliberal model of civil society as partners of the state and big business in not just disaster response but in governance.

Overall, there is strong reason to conclude that the government response was wanting even in the most affected Eastern Visayas region with the situation even worse in other areas outside the identified 100-km storm track. And very much less has the government even started to address the socioeconomic realities are the root causes of vulnerability not only of the affected regions but also of the entire country.

The study affirms how survivors deserve genuinely pro-people reconstruction. This means a response building on existing community grassroots-based organizations as real development actors and indeed the most important development actors. They are not merely channels for charity or service delivery but are the main players for participation, community solidarity and empowerment. This is a response that strengthens their capacities in a way that reflects and respects their aspirations for development.

The response must also seize the opportunity to advance the vital issues of the greatest significance for the majority marginalized and vulnerable. This is not just reconstructing to the previous situation of inequities with merely minor or superficial improvements but rather challenging socioeconomic and political structures. There must certainly not be any reinforcing or intensifying of these inequities. This means a strategic framework that doesn't just address their current emergency situation but that addresses their long-term needs for land, access to resources, livelihoods, and real control over their lives.

Endnotes

- 1 *Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better*, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), 16 December 2013.
- 2 *Birdtalk Yearend 2013: Deepening Crisis and Disillusionment*, IBON Foundation Inc., 15 January 2014.
- 3 *NDRRMC Update: SitRep No. 89 Effects of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)*, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), 11 January 2014.
- 4 *Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better*, *op. cit.*

Vast damage, minimal response




Typhoon Yolanda caused extensive damage, but government response has been minimal. Even the various official assessments done on government's disaster preparedness and response reveal an incredible lack of official efforts and near-default to private individuals and organizations.

According to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), as of 3 April 2014, the casualties of Typhoon Yolanda are 6,293 reported dead; 28,689 injured; and 1,061 missing.¹ To this day, however, there is still debate on the actual death toll,

since forensics experts, leaders of non-government organizations (NGOs) and even the local government of Eastern Visayas are claiming based on evidences that death toll can reach between 15,000 and 18,000.²

Yolanda's casualties



Internally displaced persons

There are 3,424,593 affected families, according to the NDRRMC, 890,895 families (or 4,095,280 individuals) were displaced and served both inside and outside evacuation centers. Of the displaced, 20,924 families (or 101,527 individuals) were inside 381 evacuation centers while the remaining 869,971 families (or 3,993,753 individuals) were outside.³

The majority of those inside evacuation centers were in Eastern Visayas, mainly Leyte province (71,982 individuals), followed by Samar (15,106 individuals) and Eastern Samar (11,606 individuals). The majority of those outside evacuation centers, around 2,431,952 people, were in all the provinces of Western Visayas (Region 6), but also a large number (1,354,132) in Leyte and Eastern Samar provinces in Eastern Visayas.⁴

A multi-cluster needs assessment (MCNA) was conducted by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) with 20 participating organizations including the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The Camp Coordination and Camp

Management (CCCM) cluster led by the DWSO and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) used the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) tool to monitor internal displacement. The CCCM figures however did not correspond with the NDRRMC figures – 26,523 individuals in 66 displacement sites as against 101,527 individuals in 381 evacuation centers, respectively. Displacement sites include evacuation centers (such as schools and covered courts), transitional settlements (such as tents and bunkhouses and awaiting permanent location), and self-settled or spontaneous settlements.⁵

⁶ There appeared to be huge discrepancy.

According to the CCCM in its 28 April report, there were 66 displacement sites sheltering 26,523 individuals or 5,830 families out of 918,261 displaced families, leaving 912,341 families unserved. Transitional sites made up 71.2% of all types of displacement sites, while 67.4% of displaced families were found to be living in the bunkhouses or transitional sites. The number of evacuation centers decreased from 87 (housing 3,794 families) on 20 December 2013 to only 4 (housing 455 families) by 28 April 2014. The number of tent cities decreased slightly from 17 tent cities housing 1,483 families in December 2013 to 14 tent cities housing 1,422 families as of 28 April 2014. Almost 93% of tent cities are in Tacloban City. Spontaneous settlements decreased from 5 to 1, while bunkhouses increased from 0 to 47 (housing 3,928 families by April).⁷

At the start of the disaster, the majority of the displacement sites (50.5%) and families (61.4%) were located in Tacloban City and more broadly Leyte province. But sites closed faster in Tacloban City and concentration of displacement sites shifted to Guiuan by end-April, although the majority of displaced families remained concentrated in Tacloban City. Displacement sites increased from 6 to 36 displacement sites in Guiuan along with the number of served families from 154 to 1,231 families; decreased in Tacloban City (55 to 24), but the number of families housed increased (3,393 to 3,646); decreased in Ormoc City (4 to 3) although the number of families increased (229 to 769); fell in Cebu City from 16 to 0; and also fell in Roxas City (28 to 3), housing 727 families in December to 184 families in April. The increase in the number of sites in Guiuan was due to the construction of bunkhouses.⁸

By end-October 2014, data from the IOM (as cited by UN OCHA) showed that there were only 24,780 displaced people served in displacement sites – 320 in evacuation centers; 4,760 people in tents; and 19,700 people in transitional sites.⁹ By the 5 November 2014 data of the DSWD, only 19,828 people remained served in displacement sites: 74 people (48 families) in one evacuation center; 2,115 people (423 families) in tents; and 17,639 people (4,310 families) in 253 bunkhouses.¹⁰

There are no statistics on the number of tents and specific locations of sites.

In sum, 26% of the affected families were not living in their own house in April 2014, while only 2.3% of the displaced were served in displacement sites. The larger number of the displaced had remained unserved after a year. The MCNA had monitored over 2,000 people in December 2013 who left their community, a third from the coastal areas. Around 20,000 survivors arrived in the National Capital Region (NCR) through free flights; others were housed by the DSWD in the NCR while unknown number took the inter-island vessels carrying busload of passengers to safer shores.¹¹ To date, the DSWD does not have data on displaced people living with friends and relatives, or whose living situation and whereabouts are unknown.¹²

What has been the condition of the survivors in the evacuation centers, tents or bunkhouses is a different tale altogether. The study led by IOM and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) gives an appraisal of the quality of government assistance provided in the sites. The common problems were lack of water, hygiene and sanitation, cooking facilities and electric power, protection especially of women and children from sexual harassment and molestation, health services, food and nutrition, and education.¹³

Evacuation centers were extremely overcrowded, posing great risks to the elderly, children, women, and infants. The use of schools as evacuation centers, as the practice in the Philippines, disrupted classes. There were also reports of violence and violation against women and minors.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the IOM observed a drop in the ratio of female to male in tent cities, indicating poor condition for women and/or the women's decision to live with host families. Those living in tent cities, especially in hazard prone areas, and in schools as evacuation centers were prioritized for moving into bunkhouses.¹⁵ However, construction of bunkhouses lagged and even figured in anomalies.

The IOM observed a marked decrease in the number of families living in spontaneous sites, which however can only be an indication of transfer to transitional sites and not of rebuilding their homes.¹⁶ On the other hand, there are a total of 205,128 families living in unsafe zones deemed by the government in its hazard mapping. Western Visayas has the most number of families living in unsafe zones at 117,203 followed by Eastern Visayas with 56,140 families.¹⁷ Yet the government has allowed non-government humanitarian actors to build transitional shelters in these unsafe areas.

The search for permanent relocation sites also lagged – the main reason according to the government was the lack of suitable land. The Department of Environment

and Natural Resources (DENR) has so far identified 4,000 hectares of public land in the 14 affected provinces, which can be proclaimed for housing purposes. But the National Housing Authority (NHA) has identified only 80 hectares that can be used for resettlement.¹⁸ It would seem later that the deeper problem is the problematic land tenure system where majority of the victims do not have land titles, whether in previous settlements or as collateral for permanent relocation.

Prostitution

Findings from the Women's International Solidarity Mission (WISM) to Yolanda-affected areas led by GABRIELA Philippines (a nationwide network of grassroots organizations, institutions and programs that advocate for and address women's issues) show an increase in prostitution and human trafficking post-Yolanda.

Based on WISM interviews with survivors and organizations in the Yolanda-affected areas, there are women who have turned to illegal activities such as selling drugs and prostitution in order to survive and support their families. Despite the influx of humanitarian assistance, many people are still struggling and have become desperate in the face of lost livelihoods, lack of shelter, and high costs of basic goods and services.¹⁹

Survivors interviewed shared that in the weeks following the disaster, many of the women who were left widowed with children to feed sold their bodies in exchange for cash and even relief goods. Some of the clients were said to have been staff of foreign NGOs as well as US and Korean troops stationed in the villages.²⁰

Although the level of prostitution for food has gone down one year after Typhoon Yolanda, there are still young girls prostituting themselves to help their families, and for gadgets and tuition. More bars have sprouted in the Tacloban City area where prostitutes will hook up with customers. Meanwhile, there are reports that cheap lodging rooms also in Tacloban City are accommodating the transactions of prostitutes.²¹

Human trafficking has also become a problem after Typhoon Yolanda. According to the DSWD-Eastern Visayas, there are unverified reports that more minors are being trafficked in the entire region after Typhoon Yolanda. As of November 2014, the DSWD office has rescued 50 victims of trafficking in disaster areas such as Tacloban City, Catbalogan City, Marabut, Ormoc City, Baybay, Palo, and Camotes Islands, with most of them being minors. Two of the reported six cases are in Tacloban City.²²

Reports have also emerged in the past year of Yolanda survivors being rescued in raids on prostitution dens. In August 2014, 18 young women from Samar and Leyte were rescued after a raid on two alleged sex joints in Angeles City by members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG). GABRIELA also monitored reports of at

least three alleged prostitution dens raided by police operatives, which exposed the sex trafficking of several women from Yolanda-affected areas.²³

Rising violence against women and children post-Yolanda is also of great concern. More than 100 incidents of violence against

women and children were recorded by the Social Welfare and Development Office in Tacloban City from January to September 2014.²⁴ The DSWD office in Tolosa, Leyte also recorded as many as 10 cases of violence against women in the months right after Typhoon Yolanda struck, although one year later this has now declined to five cases per month.²⁵

Bunkhouse construction anomalies

Accusations of corruption, and substandard and overpriced bunkhouses emerged in early January 2014. The Office of the Presidential Assistant on Reconstruction and Recovery (OPARR) Secretary Panfilo Lacson launched an investigation, and by end-January, said that there were 10 politicians allegedly receiving 30-35% kickbacks from the construction of substandard bunkhouses.²⁶ But despite two separate probes launched by the PNP-CIDG and the Philippine Senate, allegations of corruption were dropped due to lack of



evidence. Secretary Lacson would also not reveal the names of the corrupt politicians.²⁷

There were also allegations that contractors building the bunkhouses were not complying with the required specifications, like using cheaper materials in order to make a bigger profit. There were reports that bunkhouses should have cost only around Php200,000 and not the Php959,360 cost that the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) estimated. The DPWH also claimed that they only hired contractors outside of the disaster-struck region. Yet in one Eastern Samar town, it was found that at least six private contractors hired were local residents that were not engineers or contractors. One of them was an official of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) who did not have the capacity to provide the Php1 million investment required for a single bunkhouse project.²⁸

A report from the CCCM Philippines also attested to the substandard construction of the bunkhouses. The CCCM Bunkhouse Assessment Report raised concerns over bunkhouse conditions ranging from lack of drainage systems and toilets, and some bunkhouse sites being flood-prone due to construction deficiencies such as outward swinging doors and gaps in the wall partitions between units. The report also noted that the space of the bunkhouse unit allotted to one family of five was 50% below sphere standards as set by The Sphere Project.²⁹ The Sphere Project is a voluntary initiative that brings humanitarian agencies together to ensure standards and rights of people affected by disasters.³⁰

International architect Jun Palafox, who has worked with 38 countries in rebuilding disaster-hit areas also confirmed that the various international organizations found the bunkhouses to be substandard and undersized. He stated that bunkhouses in Leyte for example violated building code with living spaces being too cramped and lacking privacy, and that the materials used such as plywood were fire hazards. Palafox also noted that the same materials blown away by Typhoon Yolanda were being used again in building the bunkhouses.³¹

When Typhoon Ruby struck Eastern Visayas in early December 2014, the construction deficiencies of the bunkhouses were further exposed. Strong winds from the typhoon damaged or destroyed several bunkhouses in the region. Roofs were blown away forcing some residents to cover their homes with tarpaulins, while others had to abandon altogether the bunkhouses that were destroyed.³²

Based on Sphere standards, shelter sites are only considered finalized if the shelter-assisted population agree with the relocation site. But there has been little or no consultation with displaced families in choosing location sites and constructing the houses.³³

In Estancia, Iloilo, Yolanda survivors said that the relocation site in Bgy. Gogo is far from their source of livelihood, which is the sea. Also of concern was that the homes of other Yolanda survivors were demolished to make way for the government's relocation project and bunkhouse construction.³⁴

More than 2,000 Yolanda survivors at the Cabaian bunkhouses in Tacloban City are also facing eviction. The bunkhouses in the IPI compound were allowed on a temporary basis. IPI posted an eviction notice in November 2014 stating that the bunkhouse residents must leave by the end of 2014. The 530 families or 2,273 people housed at the site are uncertain of where they will be transferred.³⁵

Damaged houses

The DSWD reported in July 2014 some 1,171,469 damaged houses, which roughly indicates that the homes of around 34% of the displaced people were totally damaged or destroyed.³⁶ Around 78% of all houses within the 100-km radius were affected; 32% of houses in the first 0-25-km distance of the storm path, 15% in the 26-50-km and 2% in 50-km distance were total destroyed.³⁷



In the RAY, the government estimates that the cost of damaged houses would be around Php303.8 billion, of which Php299.8 billion is privately owned and Php4.1 billion is publicly owned. Total losses are estimated to reach Php21.4 billion, of which public losses may reach Php206 million and private losses Php21.2 billion. Public loss assessment includes immediate home material assistance given to affected households and cost of temporary bunkhouses. Private losses include temporary shelters provided

by international relief organizations, residents' losses due to demolition and removal of debris, and landlords' losses due to loss of rental income.³⁸

However, based on the OPARR, as of 30 September 2014, government has only completed 364 housing units, while 3,159 units are ongoing, 11,217 are bid out, and 64,680 are still for bidding.³⁹ The RAY aims

to ensure “adequate, disaster-resilient and affordable resettlement of permanently displaced families” as well as to construct permanent new housing to “higher standards of disaster resilience.”⁴⁰

More than half (53%) of the houses nationwide are made of wood, half-concrete/half-wood, bamboo or nipa, and makeshift materials; 69% in Region 8. Only 1.3% of the houses nationwide have tile or concrete roofing materials while an overwhelming 78% of the housing units have galvanized iron or aluminum for roof.⁴¹ One of the two main problems is housing service is predominantly privatized in the Philippines, with annual budget allocation of only less than one percent, leaving poor families without the capacity to buy materials and rebuild their houses on their own. Another main problem is the economy cannot produce the necessary durable roofing and housing materials and must rely on importation. More severe levels of poverty brought about by displacement, on the other hand, cannot stimulate the economy enough to import more of these housing materials.

In the recently unveiled Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP) by the Aquino government through the OPARR, insecure land tenure is cited as a deterring factor in ‘building back better’ houses, especially since the priority concern of the Aquino government is to secure pre-existing property rights.⁴² According to an Oxfam report, there are some 252,688 families who have insecure tenure and are living in affected coastal barangays within the 50-kilometer buffer of the Typhoon Yolanda track.⁴³ Farmer and fisherfolk communities are unable to avail of the support services and programs provided by government and aid groups for livelihoods and housing, because most of them are landless or have no land tenure security, thus putting into question their property rights for rehabilitation.⁴⁴

On the other hand, there are families who used to have house or land but lost their property titles. Based on the MCNA of the UN OCHA, 45% of people in areas along the eastern coastline of Leyte and across the southern coastline of Samar were living in their own house (Domain 1); 72% in inland areas of Leyte/Samar and along the storm path to Kanaga and Ormoc (Domain 2); and 74% in areas along the typhoon path including Panay Island, northern Cebu, and Coron (Domain 3). More than half of the population in Domain 1 was displaced.⁴⁵ These families, despite having property rights over their land and despite having immediately returned to their land plots to live in ruins, are likewise threatened with landgrabbing by big and wealthy families.

OPARR has admitted that there is a lack of ‘available’ lands for housing units for Yolanda-affected families. As

of its 7 May 2014 post, there are only 26,155 generated lots against a total of 216,966 housing units that are targeted to be built. The remaining 190,811 lots will need another 1,169.8 hectares.⁴⁶ There are also some local government units (LGUs) that have yet to formulate their Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), which is necessary for the LGU to identify suitable relocation areas for Yolanda survivors.⁴⁷

The problem may also rest in politics and the lack of cooperation between national and local governments, according to international organizations such as the UN and Oxfam and even the OPARR chief Panfilo Lacson. For instance, the regional capital, Tacloban City, according to its mayor Alfred Romualdez needs 30 to 40 plus hectares of land to build relocation sites, but lags behind the municipality of Tanauan, which is five times smaller than Tacloban City.⁴⁸ Aquino and Romualdez are two rival clans in Philippine politics. President Aquino blamed Mayor Romualdez’s lack of preparedness for the extent of damage to Tacloban City, while Mayor Romualdez cited red tape and politicking for the national government’s delay in response.⁴⁹



Adding to the problem in permanent resettlement is the ‘no-build-zone’ policy of the Aquino government. The DENR is delineating 40-50 meters from the shoreline as ‘no-build-zone’, covering about 100 kilometers of the coastline of Samar and Leyte, presumably for growing mangroves and beach forests that would protect the areas against storms.⁵⁰ The policy was later changed to ‘no-dwelling-zone’ (NDZ), however, in order to accommodate interested investors in tourism beach resorts.⁵¹ It is estimated that about 200,000 people will be affected by the NDZ policy, facing uncertain futures and prolonged displacement.⁵² Yet the LGUs are almost without solution to the resettlement problem and lacks clarity on the implementation of the policy, which is prolonging displacement.⁵³ The policy has also raised concerns about the loss of livelihood for families who are now prohibited from going back to the coastlines. An estimated 10.8 million people will be displaced by the policy.⁵⁴

THE RESEARCH AREAS

Devastated

Tacloban City suffered the greatest damage to housing and settlements, accounting for 5% of the national total. It continued to have evacuees in bunkhouses and tents a year after the typhoon. Majority of the city's informal settlers occupied the unsafe areas and roughly 34.8% of the totally damaged houses belonged to the urban poor.⁶¹ In Tanauan, about 12,947 households affecting 53,310 people were left homeless.⁶²

There were 32 public buildings designated as evacuation centers in Guiuan, not including those in the island barangays, churches, and private residences that were also designated as evacuation centers. But public buildings were some of the most impacted physical infrastructures in Guiuan; most of them were heavily damaged by the strong winds, rendering them unusable or in need of heavy repair. Thus only three evacuation centers remain usable, the rest were either destroyed or heavily damaged.⁶³

Naval was among the badly hit towns in Biliran. More than 2,000 people were evacuated and served by the local government in three designated evacuation centers. Some evacuation centers were destroyed forcing the evacuees to transfer at the height of the typhoon.⁶⁴ Pinabacdao suffered moderate to heavy damages in infrastructure including its municipal building and barangay halls, public schools, day care centers, chapels, and houses.



SURVIVORS SPEAK

Homeless and restless

The water reached 16 feet high in Tanauan. All the houses and belongings of the participants were washed out to the sea and some of their neighbors died in the tragedy.

All of the participants said that their families evacuated to the evacuation centers and tent cities. Many eventually left the evacuation centers and returned to the site of their original dwellings and put up makeshift houses. Meanwhile, others remained in the tent cities in the school grounds of Tanauan National High School in Bgy. Canramos and in other sites.

Parts of Bgy. San Roque were declared NDZ areas. The LGU allowed the residents to go back to the NDZ areas and gave them Php7,000 cash for housing materials assistance from the international NGO (INGO), Oxfam. However, the LGU made the residents sign an agreement that their temporary shelters would be demolished once the permanent relocation had been built.

The LGU also gave the evacuees in the tent city in the Tanauan National High School Php10,000 cash assistance when the evacuees moved back temporarily to the NDZ areas in Bgy. San Roque while waiting for the completion of the construction of the permanent houses.

Gawad Kalinga (GK) is the NGO partner of the LGU in building permanent shelters. The GK Village in Bgy. Pago is the pilot project. Only 100 housing units, out of the 380 units targeted, have been erected, but almost half are without window жалousies and finishing. There is no tap water and no electricity installed, and the roads are unpaved.

One of the respondents, Mang Ninoy, works everyday to complete 1,800 hours "sweat for equity" just to get a housing unit at the GK Village. The survivors do the work without pay – men and women, old and young alike have to complete the 1,800 hours at the GK Village but without any

assurance however that they would be prioritized to permanently own the units assigned them.

There are more than 400 households in the NDZ of Bgy. San Roque, and only two have been relocated to the GK Village so far. About 40% of the households in the NDZ are still without roofs.

Residents of Bgy. San Roque have no titles to their homelots, because the village is classified government land or public property. Only few people (especially those in the non-NDZ areas) hold land titles. In the GK Village, absence of proof of ownership also makes the residents insecure about their tenure.

In Tacloban City, only structures left were posts, bathrooms and comfort rooms, according to the participants. After the typhoon, they lived in bunkhouses but many eventually went back to the coastal areas where they used to live, and looked for livelihood from fishing.

In Bgy. 88, about 3,000 families became homeless, but only 100 of these families were transferred to the bunkhouses. Some continue to live in bunkhouses in IPI and Abucay and have no idea when and where they will be transferred to permanent shelters. IPI bunkhouses, in addition, are near the foot of a mountain, which is prone to landslides. Meanwhile, there are still tents in Bgy. 88 near the airport.

According to the participants living in Bgy. 52, they have insecure tenure at the NDZ area, which is a public land. They are under constant threat of being demolished and also unsure of their transfer to permanent shelters.

Meanwhile, farmers of NAPSE said that they have rebuilt their houses but not totally to original form. Some of them still have makeshift structures with tarpaulin for roofing, which leaks during heavy rains.

In Guiuan, the participants said they currently live in tents and bunkhouses. Most of the evacuees in the tent cities are from Bgy. 6, Bgy. 7 and Bgy. Hollywood. The women in bunkhouses have restless sleep and wake up feeling uncertain about where to end up next – whether they would ever have their own house or would still be in temporary shelters where their movements are limited, in darkness and without real privacy.

Meanwhile, survivors who are back living in the NDZ areas complain that they always smell the stench of canals near their homes and that their children often get sick. They also dread the possibility of more storm surges and stronger typhoons. They are under constant threat of being displaced by typhoons because of their unstable temporary shelters. There is no electricity and the participants feel unsecured from criminal elements. Lastly, they have no proof of ownership as they live on public lands along coastal areas.

There is no assurance that the internally displaced shall be relocated to permanent shelters. According to the LGU and the DSWD, the shelters being built in Bgy. Cogon for the relocatees are still transitional. The lands will be awarded to the households but only after the evacuees turn in their identification cards (IDs) to the DSWD, according to the Mayor. But the DSWD said that there is actually no assurance that the relocatees would own the units to be assigned to them. The relocatees will also eventually pay for these transitional shelters, and there is no certainty if they will ever transfer to the permanent shelters planned to be built in Bgy. Tagporo.

In Naval, which is outside the 100-km track, none of the participants sought refuge in evacuation centers. They went to their neighbors or relatives' sturdier houses during the height of the typhoon. Their houses were only partially damaged but still need fixing, and whatever the participants can save daily they use it to buy housing materials needed to fix their houses.

Some of the community members received help from the NGO, Philippine Disaster Relief Foundation (PDRF). A number had their houses transferred in their ricefields from the coastal areas in Bgy. Antipolo. But during heavy downpour, their ricefarms would get flooded as irrigation canals overflow.

Likewise in Pinabacdao, which is not part of the prioritized 100-km track, the community did not get any assistance from the government, so they made do with whatever materials they could find to fix their houses. They have no kitchen, walls, ceilings, or floorings. They also did not get any tents from NGOs to serve as temporary shelters.

The provision of temporary shelter and housing repairs or construction, along with other needs, are critical in the first six months of disasters. But six months after Typhoon Yolanda, the UN OCHA estimated that over 2 million people were still without durable shelter and only 42% of the shelter requirements or needs of the displaced persons have been met.^{55 56} A year after Typhoon Yolanda, the UN OCHA estimates that around 95,000 households (475,000 people) are still living in unsafe or inadequate makeshift shelters, making them highly vulnerable as coping mechanisms have diminished and vulnerabilities have increased further.⁵⁷

Landgrabbing

The RAY assured respect for pre-disaster property rights for property owners in affected areas, but this has not prevented big landlords from taking advantage of the disaster to claim their ownership of the land. There is push for commercial interests such as tourism and property development to the detriment of tenants and those who have been living for years in these lands.


One case of landgrabbing is on Sicogon Island in northern Iloilo. Around 6,000 families whose homes were damaged or destroyed by Typhoon Yolanda were unable to rebuild on property claimed by the Sicogon Development Corp. (SIDECO). The 72-hectare strip of public land where residents of two barangays used to live is being claimed as a part of SIDECO's 809-hectare property. The company guards reportedly blocked boats carrying relief goods to the island and told them to return to the mainland. SIDECO blocked the Yolanda survivors' attempts at rebuilding and threatened them that their settlements would be demolished. The company stopped humanitarian groups from providing residents with building materials.⁵⁸

SIDECO is planning to turn Sicogon Island into a tourism destination in partnership with Ayala Corporation. Ayala Corporation happens to be a major development sponsor under the Yolanda rehabilitation and reconstruction program.

The company also dangled a carrot to the residents. The company through the NGO that it formed offered survivors Php150,000 in cash if they would leave voluntarily, or a house in a resettlement site in the mainland and some pocket money. Some families accepted the offer, while others decided to stay put. In the end, the community and SIDECO compromised on a specified patch of land within the island where the residents will build their homes and engage in farming and fishery activities.⁵⁹

The disaster was also used by landowners to evict tenants. In Eastern Samar, a staff of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office was privy to a landowner's attempt to ease

Affected vulnerable workers



out the tenants of a landholding that has been applied for land conversion under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The destruction of crops, the inability of tenants to plant coconut trees because of the landowners'

prohibition, and the inability of tenants or leaseholders to pay rent have been used by landowners to claim that the conditions for the tenancy do not exist anymore.⁶⁰ The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) came up with Administrative Order No. 2 series of 2014, which prohibits the ejection of tenants or dispossession as a result of non-payment of lease due to a calamity, except where dispossession is authorized by an appropriate body or court in a judgment that is final and executory. The administrative order however does not cover tenants of farms planted to rice and other temporary crops.

Lost livelihoods

The immediate impact of Typhoon Yolanda on the affected population was the stoppage of production activities and the overall loss of employment and incomes. An estimated 6 million workers from 9 regions have been directly affected, of which 2.3 million or 40% are female workers and 1.2 million or 20% are youth workers aged 15 to 24.⁶⁵

Based on end-November 2013 estimates by the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), a consortium of three INGOs, the total number of those affected by damage to the services sector was over 2.8 million, of whom 56% were workers in vulnerable employment defined as the sum of own-account workers and unpaid family workers. Meanwhile, over 910,000 workers in the industry sector were affected, of whom 17% were in vulnerable employment. About 1.85 million workers in agriculture were affected, of whom an overwhelming 68% were in vulnerable employment.⁶⁶

In sum, of the total affected vulnerable workers (2.6 million), 55.8% or 1.5 million were from the agriculture sector, 42.7% or 1.1 million from the services sector, and the remaining 1.5% or 40,000 from industry. Of the vulnerable, 42% were women.⁶⁷

On average, incomes in all affected employment sectors have been cut in half, which can reach up to 70% for

farming and fishing families whose key assets had been damaged by the storm.⁶⁸ Preliminary estimates indicate that the monthly income loss among those in vulnerable employment amounts to Php9.6 billion. Monthly income loss of the 2.8 million waged workers employed in private establishments in both agriculture and non-agriculture sectors is estimated at Php16.6 billion.⁶⁹

Overall, there has been significant damage to livelihoods in Typhoon-devastated areas. This has led to limited income sources being further diminished, as well as households losing one or more of their food sources.⁷⁰ The loss of livelihoods is mainly attributed to damage to infrastructure, lack of market access, and disrupted cash flow.⁷¹

Many retail stores run by small vendors who supplied Tacloban City and its barangays with fresh food and dry goods were severely damaged. Besides physical damage and looting, the stores are reportedly dealing with a lack of capital and customers. Some shops have resumed operations but are reportedly selling either looted goods or items like cigarettes and light drinks recovered from the debris. Oxfam also reported that many tricycle and pedicab drivers in Tacloban City either lost their vehicles or needed repairs.⁷²

Despite the vastness of livelihood losses, the Aquino government has so far only accommodated 363,627 families to participate in its Cash for Building Livelihood Assets (CBLA) projects; CBLA for boat construction to 9,519 families and CBLA for farmland clearing, land preparation and planting to 233 families.⁷³ As of 19 June 2014, government agencies have provided 89,834 individuals while humanitarian agencies have provided 93,428 individuals with cash for work or emergency employment.⁷⁴

The OPARR reports after a year to have provided the following:

- 9,149 farmers with farm tools
- 32,081 fisherfolk with repaired bancas
- 44,870 fisherfolk with fishing gears
- 4,507 seaweed farmers with propagules and implements
- 2,482 farmers with seeds

The government also reports having provided livelihood assistance grants to 1,908 families, trainings to 21,843 individuals, and 15,409 micro and small-scale enterprises.⁷⁵ The UN OCHA on the other hand has assessed that in terms of early recovery and livelihood needs, 73% remains unmet.⁷⁶

Damage to agriculture and fisheries

In December 2013, 29% of farming households said that their livelihoods were completely destroyed, according

to the MCNA. Full recovery of agricultural households was also estimated to take six to eight months.⁷⁷

The NDRRMC reported the following damages to agriculture as of April 2014:

- Crops (rice, corn, other crops) Php 9,491,493,471.47
- Livestock 2,890,306,123.20
- Fisheries 5,996,896,091.39
- Irrigation facilities 231,000,000.00
- Other agricultural infrastructure 1,652,423,030.00⁷⁸

Around 600,000 hectares of agricultural lands were affected by the typhoon. There was a loss of 1.1 million metric tons (MT) of crops, 80% of which was in Eastern Visayas. The principal crops badly affected in Western Visayas, Central Visayas and Eastern Visayas are palay (16% of crop), corn (4%), and coconut (73%).⁷⁹

Coconut was the most heavily damaged, covering an area of 441,517 hectares, of which 161,400 hectares were totally damaged.⁸⁰ An estimated 44 million coconut trees were damaged or destroyed, thus affecting around 1 million coconut farmers, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).⁸¹

The harvesting of the main season rice crop (accounting for 55% of annual production) was well advanced at the onset of Typhoon Yolanda. At the same time, the planting of the secondary season crop in mostly irrigated areas was beginning. But main season palay and corn losses have been reported in Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, MIMAROPA, Bicol, and Central Visayas. As much as 80% of damaged rice fields and 70% of the value of rice and corn losses were in Eastern Visayas.⁸²

There were also damages in livestock reported though to a lesser extent compared to agriculture and fisheries. Around 31% of households reported livestock losses, mainly of poultry. There was also a lower degree of damage to farm equipment, agricultural land and post-harvest facilities, and factories. Other losses reported include fishing vessels, irrigation systems, and rural infrastructure.⁸³

Total future loss in agricultural production is estimated at Php30.8 billion, which includes loss of foregone production, work animals and farm implements, reduction of available labor, among others. Losses due to foregone production of coconut and mango will be significant due to re-establishment of plantation production (usually 6 to 9 years for new coconut). Lower fish catches will likely result because of the typhoon's impact on boats, wharves, equipment, and to reefs and coastal mangrove forests.⁸⁴

There was significant damage to the fishing sector as well. Around 74% of fishing communities indicated

that their main source of income was severely affected. The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) estimates that the typhoon affected 146,748 fisherfolk and 21 out of 72 of the country's fishing provinces. Department of Agriculture (DA) data shows that 14,500 fisherfolk households were affected in Eastern Visayas.⁸⁵

It is estimated that 21,000 fisherfolk families lost fishing capacity because of damaged or lost boats. Fisherfolk houses which are mostly constructed of light materials were also destroyed either by the storm surge or being in the direct path of the typhoon.⁸⁶

Other damages incurred were the loss of fishing gears and aquaculture such as seaweed farms and fish cages. Fishponds and oyster farms as well as accompanying structures such as dikes, sluice gates and water pumps were also damaged. Sea-based fish pens or fish corals were also destroyed.⁸⁷

The supplies of fish in affected regions have decreased by 30 percent. There has also been a significant decline in sales and delayed replenishment of fish stocks. Other structures important to the fishing industry have also been affected such as processing and cold storage facilities, as well as jetties and landing ports.⁸⁸

The fiberglass boats donated by private and government agencies are not ideal for deep-sea fishing since they are small and can be easily damaged by strong waves.⁸⁹ Although there were many boats and fishing gears donated, fish catch is still small in Tacloban City due to debris and damage to the coral reefs where fish live and breed.⁹⁰

In sum, damaged agriculture covers 600,000 hectares, of which 161,400 hectares of coconut farms are totally damaged, yet the government has replanted only 16,375 hectares of damaged coconut lands with new coconut seedlings and has intercropped with cash crops some 38,205 hectares of coconut areas.⁹¹

The OPARR recently reports to have provided the following:

- 87,063 bags of rice seeds
- 18,810 bags of corn seeds
- 3,624 kilograms of assorted vegetable seeds
- 90,103 pieces of planting materials
- 17 4WD tractors
- 30 hand tractors
- 9,579 sets of farm tools
- 87,910 bags of Urea fertilizer
- 2,201 heads of livestock
- 13,909 marine engines
- 40 fish cages⁹²

SURVIVORS SPEAK

Begging for work

In Tanauan, prior to Typhoon Yolanda, the community was mostly engaged in fishing and fish vending. After the typhoon, many went back to fishing and fish vending, but the stalls at the public market had remained non-operational. Many had become ambulant food and vegetable vendors, clothes washers especially the women, or pedicab drivers. Even office employees, such as a young mother who used to work for a computer company, lost their jobs.

The BFAR distributed boats to the survivors on loan basis. Meanwhile, the INGO, Tzu Chi Foundation, distributed unconditional cash transfer (UCT) of Php8,000 to Php15,000, which the fisherfolk used to buy materials to build boats while borrowing money to buy boat engines.

The participants said they do not earn as much as they did before. Fishermen net an average of Php120 per day for about 8-10 hours at sea, while pedicab drivers net Php100 on good days. There are more pedicab drivers now compared before. Meanwhile, about 80% of residents of Bgy. San Roque still depend on relief.

In the permanent relocation in Bgy. Pago, fishermen have to shell out Php24 fare to Bgy. San Roque, which is the main fishing area of Tanauan. The average Php120 income per day is reduced further to only Php96. For 62-year old Mang Ninoy, he helps in pulling boats ashore in exchange for some fish and crabs which he sells to his neighbors in Bgy. Pago. At times, he can only manage to take home Php40, just enough to buy a kilo of rice.

Some of the women used to earn income from making *pawid* for walls of houses. They sourced the raw materials from the mangroves that were destroyed by the typhoon. Now, they do laundry to earn a living; those who have regular customers for washing clothes earn about Php900 a week or Php3,600 a month.

There was "cash for work" from the government's poverty program, Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), from Oxfam, and from the Mormons (Church of the Latter Day Saints) for its members. Cash for work under the 4Ps involves clearing the public market and weeding for two weeks. The work schedule is from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m. and from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m. for Php260 per day for both men and women. But the payment comes only after one month. The women would lose about Php900 a week from doing laundry or Php3,600 a month if they had to work for delayed payment from cash for work under 4Ps.

Oxfam on the other hand provides cash for work for construction of houses. The people of Bgy. San Roque should work for the construction of their own house and help in the building of another four houses as part of *bayanihan* (a Filipino term for cooperative labor or labor pool). Each group is composed of 10 people – five men and five women. The payment is Php260 per day for 12 days, and like in the 4Ps, the payment is also delayed and received only after more than a month.

Cash for work under the Mormons involves three persons who are paid Php5,000 per week for one house. Payment is due within the day of each work.

There is also the “sweat for equity” for permanent shelter at the GK Village where each individual has to earn 1,500 hours of work to be able to avail of a unit. Men or women, including the old, do the same work such as carrying and passing of hollow blocks, mixing gravel, sand and cement, fetching water, etc. The participants lamented that they had to work without pay instead of earning for their everyday needs. They also shouldered their own transportation and food while working for sweat for equity. Yet, some survivors were given their units first even if their points were incomplete because they were close to the GK leaders.

In Tacloban City, all of the participants lost their livelihoods. Most of them were fishermen or tricycle drivers but lost their boats and tricycles including multicabs.

The BFAR and other INGOs provided some of them with boats but without fishing gear. Some fishermen simply joined fishing trips as extra hand. Yet, there is much debris from houses, including cars, refrigerators, plastic, garbage, iron sheets, etc. in the ocean. Instead of fish, fishermen fish out debris, yet the government has not done any cleanup of the coastal areas.

The tricycle drivers on the other hand borrow tricycles from others who still have their units. The women, on the other hand, have lost their businesses (selling clothes and coconut wine) and do not have the capital to start again.

Fishing remains to be the main source of livelihood among the communities living in the coastal areas. The only difference now is that living is harder and more expensive and the fish catch is lower. Those living in the bunkhouses depend on relief and the people have no source of income. They are prohibited from raising farm animals.

There was cash for work provided by Oxfam for making canals at Php260 per day, but the payment was given seven to 10 days later. Payment for cash for work from

the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was given two to three weeks later. Cash for work from the DSWD was also given two weeks delayed. In Bgy. 88, relatives of barangay officials were prioritized for cash for work. Meanwhile, Tzu Chi Foundation’s payment for its cash for work at Php500 a day was given right away.

Farming remains the primary source of livelihood for NAPSE members. Yet, they also engage now in construction work including boat making to supplement income. They earn an average of Php250 to Php350 per day from construction work.

According to the farmers, their land is less productive and has not yet recovered from the devastation by the typhoon. After Typhoon Yolanda, food crops especially palay were infested with worms. The rainwater was dirty and debris included clutters of wood, leaves, mud, etc. They had a hard time clearing their farms.

After clearing their farms, some of the farmers planted right away, while others could not plant as they lost their savings. But planting did not yield as plentiful harvest as before. They had no income (losing 100% of their income) and had no support from the DA such as seeds subsidy or capital, nor from the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) for the recovery of their coconut trees.

In Guiuan, most of the participants engage in fishing, some are pedicab or tricycle drivers, while a number used to work for the INGO, IOM. Others engage in construction and many are unemployed. Some mothers gather shells for making into necklaces to add to the household’s income.

There are fewer fish to catch especially after Typhoon Yolanda, according to the participants. They said that prices of food and basic commodities soared after the disaster.

The residents earn Php250 per day for boat construction. The fishermen would net Php400 for fishing that normally takes three nights out at sea. Pedicab drivers earn at most Php200 a day compared to Php300 before, because there are more pedicab drivers now than before. The lowest pedicab drivers earn in a day is Php80 to Php100. The participants said that the income is almost the same, but because of high prices of food and basic commodities, life is harder and they are poorer than ever.

According to the participants, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) gave out Php40,000 per family, but this did not reach the survivors. At the tent city, the UNICEF provided UCT for three months for Php4,400 a month. There was also calamity assistance for 4Ps members and non-members.

Other INGOs provided cash for work, such as IOM, World Food Programme (WFP), People in Need, and Oxfam. The survivors were paid Php250 for 15 days. The INGO, Plan, promised cash for work for three months, and the participants agreed to receive payment on a monthly basis, but it took almost a year before Plan paid the survivors for their work.

In Naval, income level is the same for the participants, but prices of basic food and necessities keep increasing almost everyday. Oil price hikes also occur every month. For a province that relies on fishing trips, this has impact on income.

The main source of income is fishing. But since boats were destroyed, farming and farm work became the primary source of income. Still for those that were provided with new boats, fish catch has been small compared to pre-Yolanda days.


Meanwhile, the coconut farmers have not yet recovered. Many who were farmers and fishermen before now work as dishwashers or food servers, do construction work, or migrate to Manila to find work.

There was cash for work, but availment was “color coded” or based on political affiliations. None of the participants was able to avail of the cash for work program of the government.

In Pinabacdao, most of the participants now have to borrow seed capital from loan sharks. They borrow Php50,000 – Php30,000 to Php40,000 is spent for producing rice. The cost of production is high, and since many of them do not have farm tools, rent for these adds to production costs. Rent for a tractor, which used to be Php80, is now Php200. Farmgate prices of palay however remain low at Php8-10 per kilo.

Had not the residents picketed the municipal office of the DSWD, they would not have known that there was Php14 million allotted for Pinabacdao. The DSWD was forced to implement 15 days, 8 hours a day cash for work (such as gardening and cleaning) for Php260 a day starting only on 25 July 2014. The survivors got their payment only on 23 September 2014. Not everyone though was given the chance to avail of cash for work.

Coconut trees



Support so far given to farmers is temporary and does not adequately address the sustainable livelihood needs of farmers. For instance, only 1.95 million of the 14 million totally damaged coconut trees have been cleared.⁹³ If the land is not cleared, the farmers are unable to replant or intercrop, and there is concern

that the trees will rot and lead to pest infestation.⁹⁴ Since it takes six to eight years for a coconut tree to reach maturity, coconut farmers need an alternative source of income in the meantime.

But Eastern Samar Congressman Ben Evardone said that only 50% of the coconut seedlings distributed by the DA were used by the farmers, because the rest was of poor quality. Also, the coconut seedlings to be distributed were just left on the streets; farmers from interior villages were not able to avail of them. According to Evardone, DA employees advised the farmers to plant coconut seedlings 100 meters from the highways where national government officials and the media could see them. Likewise, those provided with livestock are those living along the highway. On the other hand, chainsaw operators who were asked to fell damaged trees are still not reimbursed for their expenses. Evardone criticized the national government for lack of coherent plan in terms of marketing vegetables planted by typhoon survivors and for distribution of substandard fishing boats.⁹⁵


Disruption to education

The total estimate of damage to the education sector is Php21.7 billion, of which Php11.4 billion is damage to public basic education school infrastructure. There are around 5,898 fully damaged classrooms and 14,508 partially damaged classrooms in 2,905 public elementary schools and 470 public secondary schools. The total cost of damage of classrooms, which includes items like school furniture, computers and learning materials, is roughly Php2.7 billion.⁹⁶

Official Department of Education (DepEd) data from early December indicated that 18 out of 57 school divisions in the regions of Mimaropa (4-B), Western Visayas (6), Central Visayas (7), and Eastern Visayas (8) were reported to have the greatest level of damage. This includes 3,770 public schools, 1,318,654 affected students, and 41,014 teachers, the majority women.⁹⁷

School attendance was greatly affected after Typhoon Yolanda. The attendance of schools in the eastern areas hit by the typhoon is lower because of damage or continued use of the schools as evacuation centers.⁹⁸ The education of half a million students in Eastern Visayas alone was disrupted.⁹⁹ Also, a high percentage of upper secondary students (age 16-17 years old) had to either work to help their families or quit school altogether due to lack of money.¹⁰⁰

State of classrooms



According to RAY, total damage to Higher Education Institutes (HEI) and Technical Vocational Institutes (TVI) was roughly Php5.4 billion. Damage to HEI was Php4.8 billion, and damage to TVI was Php551.8 million. Of the HEI damage, 72% was in the public sector, while 18% was in the private sector. Meanwhile, of the TVI damage, 15% was public and 85% was private.¹⁰¹

The total estimated losses in education sector, which include items such as foregone revenues, alternative learning spaces and urgent school repairs, are roughly Php2.2 billion, of which nearly 60% is in the public sector. Of this, there are losses worth Php617 million in basic education, Php1.4 billion in higher education, and Php219 million in technical-vocational education.¹⁰²

Despite having inventoried 20,406 fully and partially damaged classrooms, the Aquino government has so far only constructed 101 classrooms (1,095 are ongoing) and rehabilitated 833 classrooms (2,467 ongoing).¹⁰³

Based on DepEd Region 8 office records, more than 11,000 public school classrooms in the provinces of Eastern Samar, Samar and Leyte, and Tacloban and Ormoc Cities were damaged or destroyed. This is equivalent to more than 70% of public school classrooms in Eastern Visayas. Of these, 2,157 were totally destroyed, and of these, 1,080 were rebuilt by INGOs and 759 by the government with funds from the gaming corporation, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The number of partially damaged classrooms

is 9,010, of which, 5,511 were repaired by INGOs and 1,500 by DepEd via its quick repair program. As of 31 October, there were remaining 1,999 classrooms in need of repair.¹⁰⁴


Estimating that the average classroom population is 45 students, this means an estimated 89,955 students are learning in makeshift classrooms such as tents.¹⁰⁵ The students experience various discomforts in the makeshift classrooms. Tents become heated and bother the students on hot days. Some of the tents are damaged and leak when it rains, wetting the students and teaching materials. With continuous rains, classes have to be cancelled, while heavy rainfall can also cause the tents and tarpaulins to be disarranged. There are also health risks in these conditions, with children getting sick or even catching pneumonia.^{106 107}

The UN OCHA concludes as of June 2014 that there are still 40% unmet education requirements, while four schools are still being used as evacuation centers in Tacloban City, housing 497 families. Thirty daycare centers in Tacloban City have not reopened due to unavailability of daycare workers' salaries, affecting 600 children.¹⁰⁸

Damaged health facilities

Damage to infrastructure and equipment in public and private health facilities was assessed in regions deemed to be the most affected. A partial damage report covers 296 barangay health stations (BHS), 97 rural health units (RHU), 38 hospitals, and one Center for Health Development in Region 8. Total damage to public health facilities is estimated at Php1.2 billion, of which infrastructure costs Php863.7 million and equipment costs Php307 million. Total damage to private health facilities is around Php2 billion, of which infrastructure costs Php858.6 million and equipment and medicines cost Php1.1 billion.¹⁰⁹

State of health facilities in Eastern Visayas



Total loss to health and nutrition sector, according to RAY, is Php2.4 billion, of which the public sector accounts for 79%, and private, 11 percent. Losses cover demolition and rubble removal, deployment of medical teams, treatment of injuries, psychosocial and mental health support, temporary consultation services for the displaced, outbreak surveillance, health promotion, prevention and control of diseases, augmentation of health workforce, and revenue loss.¹¹⁰

According to Julie Hall, World Health Organization (WHO) country representative, around 800,000 survivors of Typhoon Yolanda would need immediate medical help for depression and other mental disorders. Of these, 80,000 or one in 10 would need medication for depression.¹¹¹

Unfortunately, among the community services that have to be restored, the Aquino government has been slowest on health services. No BHS has been completed out of 257 ongoing projects. Only one RHU has been completed and not one of the three targeted LGU hospitals has been

finished. The targeted single Department of Health (DOH) facility is still ongoing.¹¹² Other community services such as garbage collection and disposal, drainage and sewage have also remained largely non-functional, especially in more isolated barangays.¹¹³

Accessibility of health facilities and services has been wanting even before Yolanda. The number of health workers in proportion to population has always been dismal as well as the number and proximity of health facilities to the communities. While there may be a BHS in the village, chances are there are no health personnel for consultation and there is no medicine supply. In Guiuan, the health center is far from the tent city at ESSU and the bunkhouses. Tanauan does not have its own hospital, and people have to travel to Palo.

Lack of food sources

The typhoon has also affected market systems in affected areas. Though some markets have recovered to conditions prior to the typhoon, other markets are

SURVIVORS SPEAK

Worse hunger sets in

All participants attested that they received food donations at the onset of the disaster, which however had dwindled since then.

In Tanauan, the participants said they have difficulty accessing nutritious food after Typhoon Yolanda, because their meager income cannot afford the increasing prices of basic food needs such as rice, vegetables and fruits as well as meat products. They cope by maintaining small vegetable plots for their own consumption, with seeds coming from NGOs.

In Tacloban City, the women in the bunkhouses usually eat noodles from the food relief packs from the DSWD. They also barter relief goods for other foodstuff like rice or vegetables from Pinabacdao.

The NAPSE farmers have no extra money to buy fruits and vegetables. They used to have abundant fruits and vegetables in their farms, such as bananas, mangoes, guavas, avocado, santol, durian, jackfruit and marang, but Typhoon Yolanda has destroyed all these. Most of their fruit trees were uprooted including many of their coconut trees. They also had abundant production of okra and bitter melon before the typhoon. Whatever fruits remained in the fruit trees that withstood Typhoon

Yolanda eventually rot. According to the farmers, rice is very expensive – Php2,000 per *cavan* (equivalent to 50 kilos). While waiting for their next harvest, the farmers have to buy rice and can afford to cook rice only once a day.

In Guiuan, the participants usually eat canned fish and vegetables with rice. They seldom eat fruits anymore, and there is no more meat in their diet. They also eat rice only once a day, and have sweet potatoes (*kamote*) for lunch and dinner. At times, they only have one meal or only rice and sweet potato without viand.

They also related that the food reliefs provided them were expired, but they had no choice but to eat them. Now that they do not have food reliefs anymore, they have to spend Php20 from their meager incomes to go to the public market.

In Naval, the participants live on leafy vegetables that they mix with the broth of dried fish. They have stopped their diet of meat, which they used to have once a week. There are no more fruits in their daily meals.

Rice is very expensive – the lowest price per kilo is Php43. Rice from the National Food Authority (NFA) is Php32 per kilo, but it smells rotten. Meat is now currently sold at Php200 to Php220 per kilo. There is also less fish to catch, and fish has become more expensive.

having more difficulty. For example, the Guiuan market is only functioning at 30% of pre-typhoon levels. Overall access to vegetables, food and meat has decreased and such items are also not included in relief distribution.¹¹⁴

Damages to transportation have also affected market supply. For example, the destruction of Tacloban port in Eastern Samar has led to increased costs of transportation and basic commodities. There is difficulty for some local markets and traders to return to normal after considerable losses, because of limited or no access to credit, warehousing, and storage or transport capacity.¹¹⁵

Prices of food and other commodities skyrocketed after the typhoon, even if there was low demand. There was heavy damage to vegetable cultures and local producers lost crops. There was low consumption of green vegetables due to high prices and lack of local green vegetable traders. There was also limited dietary diversity among the affected population due to low or zero purchasing power.¹¹⁶

The nutrition of babies is also compromised, as nursing mothers cannot eat sufficiently. The mothers complain that if there is ever any assistance or support for nutrition it is mostly for the children and none for the nursing mothers.

In Pinabacdao, all the participants' food crops were wiped out, including various crops as sources of income. Almost all of them can no longer eat three times a day. They eat twice or once a day. Cassava, which used to be for snacks, is now for main meals.

They cannot even buy bananas. There are some who still have their banana trees standing and this is their only fruit right now. The kids no longer drink milk, just the three-in-one instant coffee in the morning or the water from boiled rice in the evening.

Even the rice they kept for their own consumption and the palay for the next planting season was sold. Rice these days is expensive – from Php65 to Php70 per *ganta* (Filipino dry measure equivalent to 2.25 kilos) before, it is now Php125 per *ganta*.

The farmers from Pinabacdao travel to Tacloban City to barter their remaining rootcrops, fruits and vegetables for rice as well as for other necessities such as soap, toothpaste, and salt from the relief packs of evacuees in Tacloban City.

Meanwhile, there has been limited food assistance primarily in areas located in the Western Visayas and Eastern Visayas regions with La Paz, Buruaen, Santa Fe, Pastrana, and Tabontabon, which are particularly in need. Poorer families, especially women, are doing various coping strategies and/or limiting food intake.

The poor are also not informed of relief programs, while various organizations are not coordinating on their cash-based interventions. These are creating stress and uncertainty among the people and causing prices to increase further.¹¹⁷



Inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene

Estimated total damage to water, sanitation and hygiene is Php3 billion, 86% of this was due to damage of private connections in partially or totally destroyed houses. Damages were mainly in above-ground structures and equipment, water sources, reservoirs, and transmission pipelines.¹¹⁸ The OPARR targets to rehabilitate 76 facilities for water districts, but no progress has been reported yet.¹¹⁹

According to Save the Children, the common problem of the bunkhouses in Tacloban City is overflowing septic tanks. Camp managers do not have the resources to siphon the tanks and have resorted to merely sealing off the overflowing septic tank until they can acquire help.¹²⁰ The displacements sites surpass the recommended ratio of 20 persons per toilet, according to the IOM. There are also increased drainage problems from 19 to 29 percent. This is expected to worsen with the oncoming rainy season.¹²¹

Lack of electricity

Some generators have been provided in displacement sites, but the fuel is not enough to keep them running through the night. In some cases, the cables provided are not long enough to reach areas that are some distance from the generators.¹²²

Damage to the electricity sector is estimated at Php6.8 billion – Php5.2 billion in distribution subsector and Php1.6 billion in generation and transmission

subsectors. Distribution facilities operated by the electricity cooperatives (ECs) incurred almost 76% of the total damages, mainly the supply of electricity to residential consumers and public buildings. Out of 33 ECs affected, 12 were completely damaged and 21 partially damaged. Four ECs in Leyte incurred the most damage, accounting for 52% of total damages.¹²³

The National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) reported Php1.5 billion in damages to 248 transmission towers, 376 poles, and seven substations. Unified Leyte geothermal power plant complex, which supplies one-third of Visayas' electricity, reported substantial damage. The Energy Development Corporation (EDC) reported a downtime of 12 months before plants can return to full capacity.¹²⁴

SURVIVORS SPEAK

No public utilities

Water and electricity are not yet available for everyone in Tanauan. For the permanent shelters at the GK Village in Bgy. Pago, for instance, there is no tap water yet in each unit. The relocatees have to buy mineral water from across the street outside the GK Village. The only available source of water is the water pump, which the relocatees use for sanitation purposes. The Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) provided water within the village using water bladder, but the residents complain that the water supply is irregular and it is yellow and rusty.

The situation is worse for the residents in the NDZ as their access to the only remaining water for drinking and sanitation near the community has been fenced off by the LGU. They have to go far to fetch water for their daily needs. The public faucet, which used to be the community source of water and was destroyed by piles of debris, was never restored by the LGU since the area had been declared NDZ. Likewise, there is no electricity in the NDZ of Bgy. San Roque.

In Tacloban City, the relocatees in the bunkhouses have water and electricity supply. There is also provision for sanitation—four households share a bathroom and a comfort room. Food is cooked using firewood or charcoal for all the participants in the NDZ area and in the bunkhouses. The women said they have a common kitchen and cooking area in the bunkhouses. But this is Tacloban City, although water and electricity are cut off in the NDZ area of Bgy. 52.

The NAPSE farmers meanwhile said there is water from the NGO, Samaritan Purse, but for use only by the city

Meanwhile, the National Power Corporation (NPC) reported minor damage of Php7.3 million to off-grid facilities and Php117.2 million due to their Power Barge 103 being “ripped from its mooring site” and “forcefully rammed onto the shore” along the Estancia coastline.¹²⁵

Losses in private sector are estimated to be about five times those of the public sector at Php8.7 billion, with 88% to the distribution subsector. The high estimated losses are mainly attributed to loss of income for the 33 ECs. The remaining Php1 billion is due to Unified Leyte revenue loss.¹²⁶

The Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that 6,638 villages lost power service because of Typhoon Yolanda. DOE Secretary Jericho Petilla promised that electricity in all areas would be restored by December 2013, but this

government's employees in the vicinity of the barangay. They get their supply of drinking water from the delivery of the municipal water district. Some of them have their own deep wells and wash their clothes in the river nearby. Not everyone however has electricity and they cook their food using firewood and charcoal.

In Guiuan, the participants buy their supply of drinking water. But for sanitation, they use the jetmatic pump at the tent city and bunkhouse areas. In the NDZ, water supply is irregular and far from their community as the water supply nearby is not being repaired by the LGU.

There is a generator set for electricity provided by an NGO in the tent city and bunkhouses, but each household has to contribute Php10 per night for the gasoline or Php30 for 5 days. Electricity is supplied between 6 p.m. to 9 p.m.

There is a designated cooking area in the bunkhouses and tent city. They use firewood or charcoal for cooking. The evacuees however opt to cook near their tents and bunkhouses especially when it rains. Meanwhile in the NDZ, the people use “jumpers” to have their supply of electricity. Firewood or charcoal is also used for cooking.

The participants in Pinabacdao said that the water is not fit for drinking. People buy drinking water from Calbiga (one jug for Php15), and those who cannot afford to buy source their water from deep wells or from rainwater. Water supply is a business of the Mayor of Calbiga. Water supply in Pinabacdao is only for washing clothes and dishes. Most of the population do not have sanitary toilets and they defecate in the open fields. Half of the communities do not have their own source of electricity. Some resort to illegal connections.

was not accomplished. As of 16 March 2014, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) reported that 90% of households (or 1,368,573) already have connections, while 157,100 households have yet to be connected.¹²⁷

The government has not updated the status of electrification since March 2014. The latest report released by the government was on 24 March 2015 saying that power supply has been restored in 155 out of 196 barangays in the affected municipalities of Palo, Babatngon, and Tacloban City. In Tacloban City, the DOE reported 85% electrification. However, the actual number of households without connection including those which used to be in relocation areas but have since returned to the site of their previous houses has yet to be reported. Moreover, according to the government target of the government based on the 'build back better' framework, households with electricity should already be at 86.2% of the total number of households by 2015 from 72.1% before Typhoon Yolanda.¹²⁸ It can be recalled that in the areas affected by Typhoon Pablo (Bopha) in 2013, the DOE failed to electrify affected areas even after one year and two months.¹²⁹

Damage to transportation

Damage to ports is estimated at Php515.6 million. Loss is at Php24.3 million. Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) ports were reported to be partially damaged and operational, while municipal ports, which are lighter structures, were severely damaged and non-operational.¹³⁰

Meanwhile, damage to airports is estimated at Php5.7 billion. Considerable damage was wrought on Tacloban City airport, which was inundated by the storm surge, and other airports including Ormoc City, Kalibo International, Busuanga, Guiuan, and Roxas, which were within the storm's path.¹³¹

The OPARR targets to rehabilitate 43 ports facilities and 27 airport facilities.¹³² According to the Department



State of infrastructures

	Target for rehabilitation	Completed
National roads	116.3 km	5.8 km
Bridges	34	3
Flood control structures	99	0
Municipal halls	112	34
Municipal civic centers	117	34
Municipal markets	112	29
Ports	43	14
Airports	27	3

of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), 14 ports and 3 airports have been fully rehabilitated. Rehabilitation is still ongoing for the Ormoc and Guiuan airports. The DOTC and PPA report that 44 port rehabilitation projects are either ongoing or in the pipeline. There is also one remaining project for Poro Port as well as 14 upcoming projects of the Philippine Coast Guard in Cebu.¹³³

Damage to infrastructure

According to the NDRRMC, damage to infrastructure costs:

- Roads, bridges and other structures Php15,746,727,686.11
- Flood control 230,393,000.00
- Health Facilities 1,272,434,800.00
- Schools 2,309,823,650.00¹³⁴

According to RAY, total damage cost can reach Php4.3 billion; Php952.7 million on national roads and bridges and Php1.2 billion on local roads. In general, according to RAY, blocked roadways and delayed relief operations were mainly due to debris and down utility poles and lines. There were also "some storm surge- or rain-triggered earth movement/washouts" reported. About 15% of road sections and eight bridges were affected. Regarding flood control structures, the DPWH conducted a technical assessment in six regions and found Php307.5 million in damages to public flood

structure facilities, the majority of which were in Eastern Visayas worth Php145 million. The DPWH assessed Php1.8 billion in damages to central government facilities not covered by LGU assessments.¹³⁵

The OPARR reports slow progress even in infrastructure. Out of the target 116.3-kilometer national roads for rehabilitation, only 5.8 kilometers are completed while 22.6 kilometers are still undergoing rehabilitation. Out

of the target 34 national bridges for repair, only 3 are completed while 15 are ongoing. As of 30 October 2014, the OPARR reports having completed 2 out of a target of 99 flood control structures; 34 out of 112 municipal halls; 34 out 117 municipal civic centers; and 29 out of 112 municipal public markets.¹³⁶ Yet, the Aquino government has overemphasized the damage to infrastructure over the damage to agriculture in order to prioritize investment for this lucrative sector.

Endnotes

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‘Criminal negligence’

Analyzing budget allocation for disaster alone shows that the Aquino government is ill prepared for the country's disaster vulnerabilities. Scientific studies of what happened during Typhoon Yolanda would even show that the Aquino government was not only ill prepared but probably guilty of ‘criminal negligence’ that communities and people's organizations are accusing the government of. The Aquino government has faltered in all phases of response – from disaster preparedness, search and rescue, relief, rehabilitation, to reconstruction, including accounting of relief goods and funds.

Discretionary disaster budget

Republic Act (RA) 10121 or “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010” was passed on 27 May 2010 during the Arroyo administration in reaction to the disastrous aftermath of Typhoon Pepeng in 2009. The law emphasizes and prioritizes disaster preparedness and mitigation in the Philippines.¹

The law also defines the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) as having “the primary mission of administering a

comprehensive national civil defense and disaster risk reduction and management program by providing leadership in the continuous development of strategic and systematic approaches as well as measures to reduce the vulnerabilities and risks to hazards and manage the consequences of disasters.”²

In terms of funding, the law states the following:³

Sec. 21 Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF), previously known as the Local Calamity Fund. Not less than 5% of estimated local government revenues should be earmarked for the LDRRMF for disaster risk management activities. Thirty percent (30%) of the LDRRMF should be allocated to the Quick Response Fund (QRF).

Sec. 22 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (also known as Calamity Fund). Specific amount of the fund and the recipients (agencies and/or LGUs) is dependent on the approval of the President based on recommendations of the NDRRMF. Thirty percent (30%) of the NDRRM Fund should be allocated to the QRF.

Sec. 23 Funding of the OCD – “As lead agency to carry out the provisions of this Act, the OCD shall be allocated a budget of one billion pesos revolving fund starting from the effectivity of this Act.”

Despite the OCD’s significant role in disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) as defined in RA 10121, the Aquino government allocated only Php100 million operations budget and the QRF percentage of the Calamity Fund, not the Php1 billion revolving fund as stipulated by law. Rigoberto Tiglao, a former Arroyo official, said that the limited budget may have had implications on the OCD meeting and implementing its full responsibilities as the lead agency in DRRM. He added that Aquino claimed that the LGUs are supposed to be in charge of disaster preparedness and relief operations, but it is the OCD’s main responsibility to ensure that LGUs have local DRRM plans and that those plans are effective.⁴

In 2011, President Aquino even vetoed the 2011 national budget, saying that the Php5 billion Calamity Fund should be used by the NDRRMC for “actual calamities”, not for “preparation of relocation sites/facilities and training personnel engaged in direct disaster”. This was just after Typhoon Sendong that resulted in the deaths of hundreds and left thousands homeless in Cagayan De Oro.⁵

Meanwhile, Commission on Audit (COA) findings show that funds allocated for calamities did not prioritize disaster preparedness and mitigation, and that calamity funds at the LGU level were also not utilized for such.⁶ Included in the national government’s approved budget for fiscal year 2013, which amounted to Php7.5 billion, was broken down as follows:

- Php2.6 billion maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE) for “Aid relief and rehabilitation services to communities/areas affected by calamities, including training of personnel, and other pre-disaster activities”
- Php800 million (MOOE) and Php4.1 billion capital outlay (CO) or Php4.8 billion total for “Repair and reconstruction of permanent structure including expenditures for pre-disaster operations, rehabilitation and other related activities”.⁷

The disbursement process has been centralized to the President, making the disaster budget discretionary in reality. Government agencies, government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), etc. submit requests and proposals to the NDRRMC through the OCD. The NDRRMC then submits its recommendations and proposals to the Office of the President. The President then, at his own discretion, orders the Department of Budget Management (DBM) to dispense the funds.⁸

In 2013, the biggest portion of Calamity Fund releases went to the DSWD (46.5% or Php3.5 billion) and DPWH (40% or Php3 billion). The DOH received 6.7% or Php500 million, while Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) 6.3% or Php467.7 million. Since after 2009, there had been no Calamity Fund releases to the DILG, which is responsible for disaster preparedness and is responsible for close coordination with LGUs, which are at the frontline in terms of disasters. The release of Calamity Fund in 2013 indicates that the national government has given more priority to disaster response, recovery and rehabilitation as opposed to disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness.⁹

Aquino increased the Calamity Fund (renamed NDRRM Fund) from the usual Php7.5 billion to Php13 billion in 2014. Thirty percent (30%) of the amount was allocated as QRF for the offices of the department secretaries of social welfare, national defense, education, agriculture, health, and transportation and communications. Aquino also created a rehabilitation and reconstruction program with a budget of Php20 billion for all recent calamities, again to be released to the departments concerned upon the approval of the President. Finally, he channeled Php80 billion toward reconstruction projects from the so-called Unprogrammed Fund, which again is disbursed at the sole discretion of the President.¹⁰

The Aquino administration has further increased the DPWH budget because of the privatization program of the Aquino government, the public-private partnership (PPP). In particular, flood control increased by 165% from Php11.3 billion in 2011 to Php30 billion in 2014, reflecting Aquino’s plan to clear waterways of settlers, which has excited construction corporations. Meanwhile, the budget for the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services (PAGASA), the main agency for understanding hazards, increased by 36% from Php828 million in 2011 to Php1.1 billion in 2014, reflecting too the purchase of new devices, although around 83% of PAGASA’s projects from 2011-2013 were foreign-assisted.¹¹ (See Table 1)

Aquino has retained and even increased presidential discretionary funds, which aggravates the lack of transparency and reinforces systemic corruption. The 2013 Calamity Fund for instance was reportedly already spent before Typhoon Yolanda struck, but victims of Typhoon Pablo in 2012 have not yet received full relief and recovery. The bigger problem with this budget system (akin to a pork barrel system) is that decision-making powers over what could be programmed beforehand like disasters if only the Aquino government had scientific planning are now ever more centralized in the President.

Aquino’s budget does not only manifest the lack of

Table 1. Top 10 agencies with the largest releases, As of 7 Nov 2014 (in billion Php)

Top 10 Agencies	Projects	Amount
1. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Augmentation of the DSWD Quick Response Fund for General Fund Assistance - Central Office: National Project Monitoring Office - General Food Distribution/Supplemental Feeding Program 	6.1
2. Department of Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of school seats in newly constructed classrooms - Repair and rehabilitation of classrooms 	5.0
3. Department of Interior and Local Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Municipal halls, public markets, civic centers/evacuation centers, police stations, fire prevention and suppression activities, supervision, security and control over district, city, and municipal, and other rehabilitation activities 	4.5
4. National Electrification Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rehabilitation of damaged distribution facilities of electric cooperatives affected by Typhoon Yolanda 	3.9
5. Department of Public Works and Highways	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Various infrastructure projects - Repair/maintenance of roadside structures and government buildings - Rehabilitation/construction of affected flood control structures 	3.1
6. Philippine Coconut Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coconut Tree Disposal and Utilization - Coconut Fertilization 	2.9
7. Department of Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of banca and other fishing paraphernalia for affected fishermen - Government facilities - Assistance to affected farmers (irrigation)/ aquaculture 	2.8
8. National Housing Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Assistance to families in “no-build” zones - Implementation of the FY2013 Emergency Housing Assistance for calamity victims programs - Construction of additional permanent housing of Yolanda victims in Regions IV-4B, V, VI, VII, and VIII 	2.4
9. Department of Transportation and Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sea lift and relief operations - Redevelopment/reconstruction of Tacloban Airport 	2.2
10. Department of Finance/ Bureau of Treasury	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To cover the requirements of Credit Support Fund to provide assistance to victims 	2.0

Source: Department of Budget and Management

orientation towards DRRM specifically having disaster preparedness. It is also clearly marked with patronage and continues with the system that facilitates PPP projects of big local and foreign corporations and the commissioning politicians. Adding all the above-mentioned amounts to allocations for hazard monitoring, flood control and forest management totals Php158.4 billion. It appears that the Aquino government has allotted 7% of the Php2.3-trillion budget for 2014 to addressing disasters, which however is 69% for rehabilitation and a larger percentage including pre-disaster structures (approximately 88%) is for the lucrative infrastructure and construction sector.¹²

Lack of preparedness

Preparations, such as ensuring traditional communication devices, mass evacuation considering the topography of the regions, and real evacuation centers like structures of strong materials and are elevated, were not done. The natural hazard, which is not new for the Philippines, much less for Eastern Visayas, has thus resulted in an unnecessarily huge disaster.

A day before the typhoon, the Manila Observatory warned that massive evacuation of those within 8 to 16 kilometers from the shoreline may be required, but the Aquino government did not carry out such

Evacuation upon Typhoon Yolanda's approach



evacuation. The government of Vietnam on the contrary evacuated 600,000 people at least two days before Typhoon Haiyan reached Vietnam's shores, while the population of Tacloban City is only around 200,000. National government was absent for more than 48 hours after the typhoon struck, and when chaos erupted due to lack of food and water, the Aquino government sent armed troops to go after 'looters'.

After five days, the Aquino government had not yet transported emergency supplies as it failed to mobilize shipping vessels for the purpose, considering the close proximity of the Visayan islands. No search and rescue operations and food and relief distribution were being done, and the corpses were not being collected. The Aquino government also failed to transport en masse survivors, especially those from areas rendered uninhabitable by the disaster, to provide basic needs including temporary shelter and livelihood.¹³

An assessment of early warning efforts in Leyte published by German Cooperation, German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the European Commission in May 2014 shows that the Aquino government lacked risk knowledge and communication of warnings in preparation for the storm. The official storm surge hazard map underestimated the inundation area of the storm surge. The actual area was larger and close to the inundation area shown in the official hazard map. The map only indicates water heights of 1-4 meters. Although the legend of the map shows surge heights up to 12 meters, they are not displayed on the map. As PAGASA forecasted a 7-meter height of expected storm surge, it was not possible to relate the map to the predicted surge.¹⁴

There is sufficient information available concerning the vulnerabilities of buildings to high wind speeds and to storm surge as it is similar to a tsunami. But those in charge of risk management were partly unaware of the hazard and vulnerability information and/or did not use the information appropriately. The OCD/LGUs apparently did not properly check the safety of the locations of evacuation centers with respect to high storm surges or the check was performed and did not result in appropriate actions. Some evacuation centers were located in storm surge areas.¹⁵

In terms of early detection, the German study assesses that the forecast of the storm path and strength by many agencies, including PAGASA, was very accurate days before the storm made landfall. The Japan Radio Company (JRC) warned of a storm surge on 6 November 2013, while PAGASA did this one day later at 12:00h. PAGASA's forecast of the height of the storm surge was too high, while the forecasts made by the JRC and the Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards (NOAH) project by the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) were closer to the actual height of the storm surge recorded in Tacloban City. PAGASA overestimated the amount of rain and the danger of landslides, while the rain and water level sensors of NOAH failed with the breakdown of the mobile network system and thus could not produce data when needed. GIZ-supported sensors also mostly failed due to antenna damages.¹⁶



The German study summarizes the communication of warnings. The warnings from the government and media came days before the typhoon made landfall and therefore there was enough time for preparations and evacuations before 7 November. Government offices asked residents near the coast repeatedly to evacuate and used force in a few cases. PAGASA/NDRRMC failed to emphasize the seriousness of the storm surge but stressed a rain

warning. Warning by many institutions, including the OCD and the LGUs, was apparently not serious enough to make people understand that their lives are in jeopardy if they stay on and do not evacuate. Many did not understand the term "storm surge" and it was also not well known from past media reports. Accounts of residents suggest that a large part of the population in storm surge areas did not evacuate and the high death rate at the coast also suggests that many citizens did not leave the danger zone.¹⁷

The death toll in Guiuan in Eastern Samar where the first landfall occurred at full force was low compared to Leyte, most likely because of the location of the settlements. They were situated at the Western side of the peninsula where a chain of hills protected them from the full force of Westerly winds. Furthermore, the wind at the town of Guiuan was off shore, reducing the danger of a storm surge. The death toll at the Eastern coast of Leyte was high because wind speed was still near peak and no hills provided protection for

the residents. From Tolosa to Tacloban City, the wind was on-shore producing a substantial storm surge in a densely populated area.¹⁸

The German study shows that the average death rate (number of death versus population) of the inland LGUs is 0.090 while it is 1.788 for the coastal LGUs. It concludes that the main killer was strong waves from the storm surge (drowning, collapsing buildings and other structures, as well as floating debris) and to a much lesser extent river floods, flash floods or landslides, and powerful winds (collapsing buildings and other structures/trees, as well as flying debris). The study concludes that if those who died in the storm surge were evacuated to safer areas, a death rate similar to the inland LGUs would have applied to them. More effective evacuations could have saved many lives.¹⁹

Missing search and rescue?

Based on disaster management guidelines, the deployment of search and rescue and emergency teams should take place immediately, with the local government usually first to arrive prior to international agencies and rescue units. There is a question of when search and rescue for Yolanda survivors actually started. A government timeline and a transcript of defense secretary Voltaire Gazmin accounting of national government action for Typhoon Yolanda does not indicate when search and rescue started. But both indicate that the first priorities were clearing of airports and establishing communications.^{20 21}

As indicated by the timelines, the first few days were concentrated on bringing in relief goods and personnel for medical and security purposes. Though supposedly people were deployed and distribution hubs were set up, it is not clear how much was distributed or how many people were reached and serviced.²²

But according to reports from international news agencies (such as Anderson Cooper of CNN), five days after the typhoon struck there was still no search and rescue or organized recovery and relief by the Philippine government. There was a delay in handling and taking care of the corpses that were still out in the open, thus posing a health risk.²³

UN humanitarian chief Valerie Amos said that six days after Typhoon Yolanda hit, some places were still not reached.²⁴ In the current early recovery phase of the response, millions of people still required urgent assistance.²⁵ It was the survivors themselves who shared food and water with their neighbors and cared for the injured.²⁶ Amos also said that many survivors spent days without food

and clean water, some drinking from polluted wells and standing water. Six days after the storm, there were still areas that had not yet received any aid or relief.²⁷

According to a professor of the University of the Philippines (UP) in Tacloban City, help from the government came only after a week, and only the areas near the main roads and highways were reached. For example, in a barangay in Giporlos, Eastern Samar, help came only after three weeks. Survivors in the islands of Guiuan, Eastern Samar went without food for four days. All the boats were destroyed leaving them stranded and without access to disaster relief and assistance. As a result, children became malnourished and some died due to lack of medical attention.²⁸

Because of delayed relief efforts, some Yolanda survivors resorted to desperate measures in order to feed themselves and their families. One barangay councilor recounted having to raid the homes of the dead in order to find food for his four children. Others ransacked local stores and businesses for food items, and even a Red Cross convoy carrying food and water was looted by a mob.²⁹

Days after the typhoon hit, members of search, rescue and retrieval teams placed bodies in mass graves, with some stacked haphazardly in bags, their tags in some cases lost or muddied in the rain. Local officials were desperate to get corpses off the streets, as the stench accumulated and bodies began to decay in the sun.

Many of the dead bodies found were also not being reported anymore and the survivors just buried their dead. The survivors themselves also retrieved dead bodies because search, rescue and retrieval teams were not immediately present. Bodies immersed in the water, which were not immediately retrieved, fell apart. There were also many remains buried in the mud, but people did not report these anymore.³⁰ There were allegations from local officials and politicians that the authorities intentionally suppressed the true scale of the storm, for political reasons.³¹

The search for dead bodies and their proper burial continued months after Typhoon Yolanda. In Tacloban City, residents still found an average of five bodies a day three months after the disaster.³² The mayor's office estimated that hundreds of bodies have not been discovered and retrieved despite efforts by government employees and aid agencies to clear debris and collect the dead.³³

Thousands of cadavers were also buried in mass graves and usually in single plots. It was pointed out by international humanitarian organizations that the

use of such mass graves runs counter to international post-disaster protocol, due to concerns that this might be traumatic for survivors or lead to legal problems if relatives would be unable to identify remains later.³⁴

Identification of cadavers was also problematic because the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was not able to provide immediate sample collection and DNA testing. The NBI team leader for disaster victims identification said that victim identification could take as long as three years, assuming the other neighboring hard-hit towns of Tanauan and Palo are also included. In his experience, he said, only about 60% of the dead are typically identified.³⁵

What happened to relief efforts?

Governments from around the world have responded with generous support for the humanitarian relief efforts and early recovery initiatives. More than 60 countries, together with multilateral organizations, including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Union (EU), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), United Nations (UN), and the World Bank have provided financial, material, and logistical support. By 12 December 2013, foreign aid totaling more than Php23 billion had been pledged, of which approximately Php600 million was then received.³⁶

of December 2014 amounts to Php73.3 billion, of which, Php45.1 billion is cash and Php28.2 billion is non-cash. Of the total amount, Php17.2 billion has been received.³⁹ The DSWD also reported having received donations amounting to US\$877.8 thousand in its dollar account and Php54.4 million in its peso account.⁴⁰

However, the government has not presented in the FAITH website an accounting of how these amounts were spent. It merely listed down the agencies that received these donations but did not disclose where the agencies put the money and the corresponding output. There is no single agency that tracks all the money that has poured in for Typhoon Yolanda according to a report by the COA released in September 2014. Unaccounted-for aid includes those coursed through NGOs, private companies, and LGUs.


In December 2013, the Aquino government had provided about Php2.6 billion worth of relief assistance to families in the affected regions, according to RAY. A total of 35,417 personnel; 1,351 vehicles; 118 sea craft; 163 aircraft; and 28,361 other assets from national, local and foreign agencies, responders, and volunteer organizations had been deployed to various areas to support relief and medical operations.⁴¹

An accounting by COA, however, shows that the Department of National Defense (DND) received 24% of the QRF budget in 2013 of Php3.7 billion, or a total of Php352.5 million. But only 1.9% or Php6.7 million was used to fund relief goods distributed to Yolanda survivors. The DND transferred Php294 million to its major bureaus and services – for the acquisition of equipment for the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Philippine Army (PA) and Philippine Navy (PN); petroleum, oil and lubricant for the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); training for PAF, PA and PN; and construction, repairs and improvement for PA, AFP-Finance Center and OCD.⁴²

The DND also used the QRF for the installation, testing and commissioning of Internet Protocol (IP) radios, switch and transceivers for Defense Situation Monitoring Center (DSMC), but this did not benefit community or victims of calamity. Improvement and repairs done to PA facilities were not disaster-related. Although a big amount of the QRF was spent on disaster-related projects, these were not finished within the year, and therefore were not used for the benefit of calamity victims.⁴³

Meanwhile, only 17% of the OCD's QRF in 2013 or Php121.2 million went to Yolanda-related projects but not directly to calamity victims. Instead the so-called QRF went to: cash advances for operational

Foreign Aid



Local and international organizations and citizens from the Philippines and many other countries have been involved in the immediate response to Typhoon Yolanda, providing assistance in cash and in kind.³⁷

As of October 2014, donors' commitments, contributions and pledges amount to US\$844.7 million. Of which, US\$468.1 million is for the Aquino government's projects listed in its so-called Response Plan.³⁸ Based on the monitoring of the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAITH) of the Aquino government, total foreign aid pledged as

VIEWES FROM LGUS

Prepared but not prepared

The Governor of Leyte, Dominico Petilla, said they met with the provincial disaster risk reduction management council and decided to cancel classes two days before the typhoon; have preemptive evacuation the day before; release food packs and preposition medical supplies; and have plan for road clearing.

In four days, roads were already passable, according to the Governor. Mayors reported to the provincial government and the province distributed goods to each LGU. The province had meetings with the NDRRMC daily. National government assistance came on the sixth day.

The LGU of Tacloban City had DRRM plan in place before Typhoon Yolanda. Three days before the typhoon, the LGU was already evacuating residents that the LGU thought would be hit by the typhoon. The expected landfall was the afternoon of 8 November. The Mayor convened the disaster risk reduction (DRR) council 36 hours before the expected landfall and gave directives and prepared a contingency plan. The LGU applied the incidence command system or ICS where the Mayor was assigned the incident commander. The LGU also planned a meeting with DILG Secretary Mar Roxas and other national government representatives at 8 a.m. of 8 November. Unfortunately, the typhoon made landfall early morning.

By 7:30 a.m., water was already rising and flooding the entire city. By 10:30 a.m., the rain had ended and the floodwater had gone back to the sea. The Mayor was in his residence in San Jose. Only those in the city hall and other buildings were able to respond.

The C130 plane carrying President Aquino arrived on 10 November. The LGU expected a compassionate briefing from the President, but the officials were scolded instead. The next thing they knew the Tacloban City Police Director had been relieved of his duties. Response had been slow during the first two weeks of the aftermath of the disaster. Even the LGU workforce looked for their families.

The LGU implemented the cluster approach, the first phase being emergency mode and relief. It was Tindog Tacloban that led the overall cluster management, identifying the most immediate needs that must be addressed. The cluster identified health, water and sanitation, shelter, security, among others.

On the barangay level, however, the Captain of Bgy. 52 recalled that in the first days of Typhoon Yolanda,

there was no assistance from the LGU nor the national government. There was looting. The DSWD came only on the fourth day and gave out relief packs of water, rice of six kilos per family, noodles, sardines, and corned beef good for four days. The city hall, according to the Captain, did not have vehicles and took a while before it responded. Only NGOs provided immediate relief in the first two weeks after the typhoon. There was nothing from the national government.

The LGU of Tanauan was prepared before the typhoon, including having food packs and medicines ready for relief. Food packs were distributed the night before the typhoon and medical supply was secured at the regional hospital. But many of the relief goods were washed away and the regional hospital was damaged. The town hall was converted into a hospital yet the medical supply ran out. Relief resumed two days later. Meanwhile, the national government was able to respond only after six days.

The LGU of Pinabacdao made preemptive evacuation. It also prepared food packs (rice, noodles, meat loaf) and trucks to clear the roads. According to Dr. Mario Quijano, Municipal Mayor of Pinabacdao, the LGU was not formally informed that the town was not part of the so-called Yolanda Corridor (or the 100-km track). The town was waiting for government assistance but nothing came. It was only in April 2014 that the LGU learned that Pinabacdao was not part of the Yolanda Corridor thus not included in the priority of national government for relief and assistance. The Mayor said he personally made an investigation and an appeal to the OCD and NDRRMC, to DSWD Secretary Dinky Soliman and Secretary Roxas. Based on the results of his investigation, Mayor Quijano said the NDRRMC and OCD used an old map in determining the radius of impact but did not do ground validation.

It was only in June 2014 that Pinabacdao was finally acknowledged as within the radius of impact and should be given assistance. Marabut was the only municipality in Western Samar initially identified as heavily affected.

Both in Naval and Guiuan, the LGUs were also prepared in terms of convening their DRR councils, assigning evacuation centers, and readying relief packs. Their respective Mayors prepared teams to distribute food, medicines, and clear the roads. In Guiuan, there were 200 Army soldiers deployed but only to provide security, as there had been perceived threats from the Communist insurgents who were busy providing relief to the communities.

PO TALK

Inadequate preparations

The people's organizations (POs) observed the government's lack of preparedness and inadequate response. There was no warning that Typhoon Yolanda would be a super-typhoon. The POs recall that there were even storm chasers (people who go after tornadoes) who arrived in Tacloban City before the expected landfall of Typhoon Yolanda.

In Tacloban City, people from the LGU made the rounds but they did not tell the people what preparations should be done. Upon Typhoon Yolanda's landfall, barangay officials were even still rounding up people in danger areas. Still, the evacuees were positioned in shelters near the coasts, such as the Tacloban Astrodome. The LGU was even posing for pictures to show how the government was preparing for the typhoon. There were uniformed rescuers in pumpboats stationed in the airport in San Jose at the coastal area, but these were among those who perished.

The PO, Tabang Eastern Visayas, went to the Tacloban City hall at three o'clock in the afternoon but there was nobody there who was supposed to be in charge of disaster response. There were no food packs anywhere, according to Tabang, nobody manning the information office, no radio. Relief came almost a week later from the Tacloban LGU followed by the LGUs from mainland Luzon. But the rice distributed by the LGU was wet. Food packs of two kilos of rice, noodles, canned foods from the national government on the other hand arrived only a week later. The first sign of the national government about two days after the typhoon was the deployment

of the military and police due to the reported looting of stores in the aftermath of the storm. Two big warships arrived carrying soldiers instead of food.

Eleven months later, many provinces have not yet been reached by the government through the DSWD. In fact, had not the PO, People Surge, staged a protest, the DSWD would have stopped all relief operations in December 2013.

In Tanauan, the LGUs did not explain to the people the nature of a storm surge even as they made efforts to warn the people of the impending strong typhoon and made rounds in the barangays up to the last minute to evacuate people.

After the typhoon, the people were disoriented. In Bgy. Sta Cruz, the barangay adjacent to Bgy. San Roque, it took the government a long time before finally providing relief assistance to the people. It was the NGOs that provided relief of food packs and water.

In Bgy. Cabuynan, the second barangay that had the most damages to properties and the most number of dead and homeless, relief packs of food from the DSWD came only five days later. The DSWD provided 15 sacks of rice for 932 families. This was however the first and last assistance extended by the agency to the barangay.

The president of BISKAFFA (Bislig-Kaboynan Farmers and Fishermen's Association) who is also the Captain of Bgy. Cabuynan said the Tanauan LGU just kept on asking for their reports and resolutions for action but no help came until September 2014. The Php20,000 voucher for shelter assistance from the municipal office of the DSWD came only in the first week of September 2014.

requirements of the NDRRM Operation Center and Region VIII Operation Center; fund transfer to AFP for petroleum, oil and lubricant reserve for disaster operations; and various groceries/medicines for daily subsistence of duty personnel at Region VII Command Center and Operation Center.⁴⁴

The COA report also noted that Php1.6 billion from five agencies namely DSWD, DPWH, NDRRMC, DILG and DOH were unused. The DSWD, which has been criticized for slowness in relief operations and for allowing relief goods in warehouses to rot, has the biggest unused amount at Php782 million. According to the COA, it is a concern that while the law has amply provided needed resources, the national agencies in charge of various aspects of disaster and calamity response did not utilize available calamity funds.⁴⁵

It was also pointed out in the COA report that not only were funds unused but the DSWD was found to have not distributed the relief goods that are already with them as well. The wasted relief goods included family food packs worth Php2.8 million, 19,172 canned goods, 81 packs of noodles and 21 sacks of rice, in addition to the 76,300 assorted canned goods. Another Php58 million worth of supplies were not properly stored and may have become already unfit for human consumption.⁴⁶

On 7 November 2014, around Typhoon Yolanda's first anniversary, the DBM announced that the Aquino government had already released Php52 billion since 2013 as government's relief and rehabilitation efforts. The amount came from the 2012 Calamity Fund, 2013 Calamity Fund and the national budget, 2013 supplemental appropriation (from the unused pork barrel of Congressmen, the Priority Development

Yolanda damage and rehabilitation costs

Estimated damage and losses: Php 571.0 billion
Recovery and reconstruction needs: Php 360.9 billion
Approved funding for major rehabilitation projects: Php 170.9 billion
From government funds: Php 30.7 billion



SURVIVORS SPEAK

No sign of rehab

In Tanauan, the BFAR distributed pumpboats even to those who have never fished before. The farmers in Tacloban City on the other hand had not received any of the assistance promised by the DA. After the coffee and noodles distributed by the DSWD, the farmers had not received any relief anymore. On the contrary, the LGU is bulldozing their lands to build permanent shelter relocation. Part of the 10 hectares that the LGU bought from the landlord, Dr. Enriquez, Jr., in August 2014 is NAPSE's communal farm.

Participants from Guiuan have not witnessed clear rehabilitation from the LGU, except for the slow-moving permanent shelters construction. Meanwhile, the BFAR gave motors for boats, but the fishermen complained that the motors provided are of low quality – Jangdong from China compared to their previous Hyundai engine from Korea. They also complained that the boats are for three persons only and only one gram of nails were provided. Meanwhile, bunkhouses were built starting only in February 2014.

Likewise in Naval, the BFAR distributed boats to the fishermen who lost or had their boats damaged. The DSWD allegedly distributed papers indicating Php10,000 relief, but the people, according to the participants, received only Php1,000. The DA also did not go to the communities but only waited for the survivors to seek assistance from its office.

In Pinabacdao, the participants complained that the municipal DSWD did not release the Php14 million cash assistance allegedly unloaded to them by the regional DSWD. Even government employees, teachers and soldiers did not receive any relief assistance. The PCA gave out coconut seedlings and the DA fertilizers and corn seeds, but to only few people.

VIEWS FROM LGUs

No plan is a good plan?

The focus of Tacloban City's rehabilitation plan, according to its city administrator, is shelter. Temporary and permanent shelters are targeted to be constructed at the northern part of the city. Fifty permanent houses have been awarded by GMA Kapuso Foundation. The commitment of the TV network was to construct 400 housing units until December 2014. Habitat for Humanity and the NHA are also building permanent houses.

The LGU's biggest problem is the fact that people are still living in bunkhouses and tent cities. Tacloban is maintaining three bunkhouses, housing 1,700 families. The LGU targets to provide 14,000 permanent shelter units and channels its finances to housing. The problem however is the availability of land. The LGU is looking at the northern part of Tacloban City since it is the only part where there is still 'available' land.

In Tanauan, permanent relocation site developments for the displaced families have been started. This is a cooperative project of the Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council (HUDCC), NHA, Gawad Kalinga, and DPWH. Bgy. Pago comprises 2.4 hectares; Maribi site is 3 hectares; and Sacme, 3 hectares.

Tanauan has reportedly three strategies in its recovery and rehabilitation plan, namely disaster protection such as building a sea wall in the NDZ areas; reconstruction of the municipal building and housing development for informal settlers; and economic drivers such as building of slaughter houses.

Guiuan has a master rehabilitation plan which the UN Habitat helped in drafting. Guiuan is apparently designed to be an eco-town, and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat) along with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) made ecological profiling for the province's comprehensive land use planning, providing timetable and process.

Meanwhile, Pinabacdao LGU did not have a disaster plan before Typhoon Yolanda and does not have a rehabilitation plan yet, according to its Mayor. Likewise in Naval where the NGOs are the ones mostly doing rehabilitation work.

National Government's relief & rehabilitation effort




DBM Secretary to the OPARR Secretary reveals that of the amount, only Php38.7 billion had Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), or actually released.⁴⁸

The funds were released to various national government agencies, GOCCs and LGUs. The funding was grouped under the four main clusters of the Yolanda CRRP, namely infrastructure (Php22.5 billion), livelihood (Php11.2 billion), resettlement (Php2.4 billion), and social services (Php3 billion). The DBM also reported that various municipalities in Iloilo, Cebu and Leyte received a total of Php36.8 million to help in relief and rehabilitation of affected communities.⁴⁹

One year after, about 3,000 people still live in tents in Tacloban. Close to a million people are still living in inadequate shelters.⁵⁰ Public and community infrastructure such as schools, health centers and gymnasiums have yet to be rebuilt or repaired.⁵¹ Survivors have been struggling to find livelihood. For many fisherfolk, boats donated are small and not appropriate for rough seas. The main fishing grounds of fisherfolk in Tacloban and neighboring areas, Cancabato Bay, have not been cleared of debris.⁵²

Relief & Rehabilitation Clusters



Assistance Fund or PDAF, which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court), 2014 NDRRM Fund and national budget, and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program.⁴⁷ But a copy of the memo of the

The results of the IBON nationwide survey on institutional responses after Typhoon Yolanda in October 2014 with 1,414 respondents revealed that 65.3% of the respondents said that the national government's response to risks and damages caused by the typhoon was not enough, while only 19.5% said that it was sufficient. A significant 13.5% said they could not ascertain if the response was enough or not.⁵³

Rehabilitation and recovery

The decision to shift from relief and response to the rehabilitation and recovery phase was made on 4 July 2014 at the Inter-Cluster Coordination Meeting of the national government and the Humanitarian Country Team. The team was chaired by the DSWD, and co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the UNDP. This transition to the next phase usually takes place one year after the calamity occurs, but the UN decided the transition could take place four months earlier apparently due to the progress seen in Yolanda-affected areas.⁵⁴

The 10 relief and response clusters were transitioned to five rehabilitation and recovery clusters, namely resettlement, social services, infrastructure, livelihood, and support, which OPARR now leads.⁵⁵

But the decision was reached without the OCD nor NDRRMC having produced a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) on which a comprehensive rehabilitation plan could be based.⁵⁶ To avert further criticism regarding the delay in producing the CRRP and the release of rehabilitation funds, President Aquino announced on 18 July 2014 that he approved six local rehabilitation plans – for the areas of Tacloban City, Western Samar, Leyte, Eastern Samar, Cebu, and Iloilo.⁵⁷

Finally, on 1 August 2014, OPARR Secretary Panfilo Lacson submitted the CRRP, the master plan for post-Yolanda rehabilitation, to President Aquino for approval. It was signed and approved on 29 October 2014, with Php167.9 billion funding requirement for major rehabilitation projects.⁵⁸

The amount was raised to Php170.9 billion by the time of the Yolanda anniversary.⁵⁹ It remained small compared with the Php571 billion worth of estimated damages and losses and Php360.9 billion recovery and reconstruction needs. Still, according to OPARR, only about Php30.7 billion of the Php170.9 billion rehabilitation plan will come from government funds; the rest will be sourced from various grants and loans as well as the private sector.⁶⁰

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Absence of national government



In the IBON survey conducted in the entire Eastern Visayas, 59.4% of 1,092 respondents identified the LGUs as the first aiders, followed by the survivors' relatives (40.9%), local NGOs and foreign NGOs (24.5% each), and private individuals unrelated to them (11.4%). Only 10.1% felt the national government being there immediately after the disaster. (See Table 2)

Their relatives were there within one week after Typhoon Yolanda, according to 82.6% of the respondents, followed by community folk (78.3%) and friends (73.1%). The local military (46%) and the LGU (41.4%) were also there within the same period. Churchworkers and other religious groups (36.5%) and people's organizations (35.3%) were also there within one week after the typhoon. The national government was felt during the first week, according to only 19.1% of the respondents.

Beyond immediate relief and rescue, 42.5% respondents identified the LGU as continuously providing aid for the affected families, while 35.6% named their relatives. Foreign and local NGOs were also cited by 19.9% and 15.4% of the respondents, respectively. Significantly, 27.5% of the respondents said that nobody provided

continuous aid for them after Typhoon Yolanda. Others identified to have provided continuous aid were: private individuals (9%); churchworkers and other religious groups, 8.5%; friends, 5.8%; people's organizations, 5.7%; national government, 5.3%; foreign government, 4.5%; military and their personnel, 3.5%; foreign military and their personnel, 3.5%; and the survivors' community, 2.9 percent. Three percent simply did not answer. (See Table 3)

Asked what they can say about the aid provided, those who identified "friends" had the highest approval, with 66.7% of the respondents saying that aid (mostly basic family needs) from them was enough. Following closely are those who identified "military and their personnel" (mostly provided security according to the respondents) with 65.8 percent. Others with relatively high positive responses from those who identified them as continuously providing aid were: foreign military (57.9%); foreign NGOs (56.2%); foreign governments and their communities (each 53.1%). "National government" had 39.7% of the respondents saying that its continuous aid was enough, while people's organizations got 24.2%; local NGOs, 22.6%; LGU, 22%; and private individuals, 18.4 percent.

Table 2. Institutions that first aided the Yolanda survivors

Institutions	First aided the affected families (Multiple response)		How soon? (in percentage)				
	Frequency	Percentage	Within 1 week	Within 2 weeks	Within 1 month	More than 1 month	No answer
Total respondents	1,092	100.0					
Local government unit	649	59.4	41.4	31.3	8.6	13.3	5.4
Relatives	447	40.9	82.6	4.9	4.3	6.3	2.0
Local NGOs, foundation	268	24.5	22.0	20.5	12.3	38.1	7.1
Foreign NGOs, foundation	267	24.5	23.2	25.1	13.1	26.6	12.0
Churchworkers, religious groups	148	13.6	36.5	27.0	9.5	15.5	11.5
Friends	130	11.9	73.1	8.5	6.9	7.7	3.8
Private individuals	125	11.4	23.2	30.4	2.4	39.2	4.8
National government	110	10.1	19.1	29.1	8.2	36.4	7.3
People's organizations	85	7.8	35.3	17.6	2.4	23.5	21.2
Foreign governments	78	7.1	21.8	32.1	15.4	26.9	3.8
Community	69	6.3	78.3	4.3	4.3	7.2	5.8
Foreign military, military personnel	66	6.0	50.0	16.7	12.1	16.7	4.5
Military, military personnel	63	5.8	46.0	25.4	4.8	9.5	14.3
Media foundation	2	0.2	50.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0
No answer	22	2.0					
None	131	12.0					

Source: IBON Eastern Visayas Household Survey on the Impact of Typhoon Yolanda

LGUs as first responders?

Official disaster preparedness and response has been structured (and budgeted) in a way that the LGUs are at the forefront. But the LGUs of the areas most affected by Typhoon Yolanda were incapacitated with some government officials and employees being victims themselves. President Aquino declared a state of calamity so that the national government could step in to lead and coordinate relief efforts in affected areas.¹ But the national government faltered in its intervention; as early as 21 November 2013, the national government declared that management of relief efforts had been transferred back to the LGUs so that it could presumably concentrate on rehabilitation efforts.² Yet, the shift to rehabilitation was announced only in July 2014, and the plan was unveiled still a month later.

There were some reports of LGU officials both in and outside of affected areas helping in relief efforts. For instance, the provincial government of Samar gave initial aid to towns like Basey and Marabut because most of the relief efforts were concentrated in Tacloban City.³ The city council of Ormoc City authorized the Mayor to access local calamity funds for relief efforts.

The provincial government of Capiz distributed about Php 4.2 million worth of relief goods to typhoon-affected municipalities.⁴ Various LGUs from other parts of the country, such as Monkayo in Compostela Valley and Koronadal City in South Cotabato also sent aid and personnel to help in the relief efforts.^{5 6}

Apart from these, there is little news of LGUs initiating rehabilitation efforts. Most reports are centered on the Local Rehabilitation and Recovery Plans (LRRPs) of the six areas approved by President Aquino in July 2014.⁷

The role of INGOs

Private individuals and organizations were the top donors of emergency funding for the affected areas in November 2013, which amounted to around US\$190 million out of the total emergency funding of US\$845 million (which includes all contributions such as cash, in-kind, bilateral, and multilateral).⁸ A large chunk of this amount came from INGOs and their local affiliates. In accounting, INGOs are also included in the private sector database of the OPARR, which shows a total of Php12.4 billion worth of funds and donations.⁹

Table 3. Institutions that continuously aided the Yolanda survivors

Institutions	Continuously provided aid for the affected families (Multiple response)		What can you say about the aid provided? (in percentage)			
	Frequency	Percentage	Enough	Not enough	Don't know	No answer
Total respondents	1,092	100.0				
Local government unit	464	42.5	22.0	69.6	1.1	7.3
Relatives	389	35.6	38.3	58.9	0.5	2.3
Foreign NGOs, foundation	217	19.9	56.2	29.0	2.3	12.4
Local NGOs, foundation	168	15.4	22.6	63.1	3.0	11.3
Private individuals	98	9.0	18.4	65.3	1.0	15.3
Churchworkers, religious groups	93	8.5	49.5	32.3	3.2	15.1
Friends	63	5.8	66.7	28.6	1.6	3.2
People's organizations	62	5.7	24.2	37.1	4.8	33.9
National government	58	5.3	39.7	43.1	6.9	10.3
Foreign government	49	4.5	53.1	38.8	4.1	4.1
Military, military personnel	38	3.5	65.8	15.8	2.6	15.8
Foreign military, military personnel	38	3.5	57.9	31.6	2.6	7.9
Community	32	2.9	53.1	25.0	6.3	15.6
None	300	27.5				
No answer	34	3.1				

Source: IBON Eastern Visayas Household Survey on the Impact of Typhoon Yolanda

In terms of funding for rehabilitation, there are Php17.4 billion multilateral and bilateral grants as of September 2014. (See Table 4) Of which, JICA accounts for Php3.5 billion; UNICEF for Php2.1 billion; the EU for Php2.1 billion; United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for Php1.9 billion; FAO for Php1.4 billion; and UNDP for Php1 billion, among others. Private sector donations amount to Php12.4 billion, led by Save the Children with Php3.3 billion, PLAN International with Php2.4 billion, and Oxfam with Php1.6 billion. Others include: Active Citizenship Foundation (ACF) with Php868.5 million; Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) with Php680.4 million; Red Cross, Php621.1 million; and SM Foundation, Php292.5 million. Other big local corporations have also contributed to rehabilitation funds, such as Aboitiz, Ayala Land, Metrobank, Globe, etc.¹⁰

While INGOs have contributed in many ways to assisting communities devastated by Typhoon Yolanda, there were concerns that arose in how they provided

assistance. Among these are issues of appropriateness and relevance of assistance provided, coordination and partnerships with local partners such as NGOs, community organizations and LGUs, and the sustainability of the assistance given.


In providing humanitarian assistance, INGOs' understanding of local context and needs of communities is valuable in ensuring effectiveness of aid and extensive coverage of affected areas. While some INGOs made conscious effort to work with local NGO partners and consult with communities, there were still weaknesses in coordination and consultation that undermined recovery and development of some areas.

According to the study "Missed again:

Making Space for Partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan Response", more still needs to be done by INGOs to improve partnerships with local NGOs. It was noted that the Typhoon Yolanda disaster response was largely internationally led, coordinated and financed.

Also, INGOs along with UN agencies tended to prioritize direct delivery of human assistance as opposed to partnerships with local NGOs.¹¹ Though direct delivery was swift and at a large scale, better coordination and partnerships with local NGOs would have led to more effective, relevant and efficient

Private efforts



SURVIVORS SPEAK

LGU incapacity

In Tanauan, the LGU warned the communities especially those in the coastal areas and advised them to evacuate to the Tanauan Gym. But the LGU, according to the participants, did not properly warn the people about the nature of a storm surge. The participants said that had the LGU told them that there would be a “tsunami” then they would have scampered to safer grounds right away. The people would later learn that even the LGU had no idea that a storm surge could bring in rampaging waters.

There were no preparations for food, thus people ransacked stores after the devastating typhoon. Relief from the government came only four days later, but the rice distributed was wet and many of the canned goods were already expired.

The LGU provided medical relief and assistance right after the storm, while other municipalities gave food and water a week after Typhoon Yolanda.

In Tacloban City, the LGU transported people to the evacuation centers including the Tacloban Astrodome about two days before the typhoon made landfall. Porridge was served to the evacuees. The barangay officials of Bgy. 52 prepared food packs of bread, eggs and rice, which the people brought with them to the evacuation centers. Many of the residents of Bgy. 52 however evacuated to the San Fernando Elementary School, which was reached by water during the height of Typhoon Yolanda.

The participants recalled that they received rice, coffee, noodles, and canned food from the DSWD. Medicines for the sick and wounded were provided a week later.

The NAPSE farmers received food packs that contained expired food and wet rice. Each of their families received 25 kilos of rice. The DSWD distributed noodles and coffee and gave the farmers green card so they would receive assistance from other organizations. Until the research period, however, no relief has been provided.

In Guiuan, the LGU informed the people of the typhoon, and some people were already preparing a week before the typhoon. Others went to evacuation centers. However, many people did not listen to the LGU, because they were not aware of the term “storm surge”. The news, on the other hand, was so focused on the pork barrel scandal and not the super-typhoon, thus people thought it was just an ordinary typhoon. Had the LGU said “tsunami”, the participants said, people would have evacuated right away. Meanwhile, those who evacuated earlier went back to their houses because it was sunny before Typhoon Yolanda.

The LGU did not prepare many evacuation centers and did not identify evacuation sites. At the height of the typhoon, the people made their own decisions as to where to go and were unaware of the integrity of the structures. The gymnasium, assigned as an evacuation center, collapsed because there were too many evacuees. Two evacuees died there.

The people received three kilos of rice, one canned sardines, and noodles from the LGU two days after Typhoon Yolanda. Relief efforts by the DSWD and national government came two weeks later. The LGU provided temporary hospital set-up where the survivors could seek medical attention.

In Naval, the LGU made calls via radio advising people in the coastal areas to evacuate to the nearest evacuation centers. But the roofs of the schools used as evacuation centers were torn off, and people had to go back to their houses or had to look for sturdier shelters.

It took a month before Naval received relief goods. Also, according to the participants, distribution of relief goods from the LGU was “color-coded”, meaning, only those who voted for the incumbent officials got their share. The LGU of Bgy. Caray-caray distributed Php300 to survivors who had their houses totally damaged and rice to those with partially damaged houses. This was sourced from the LGU’s fund but was distributed only in January 2014.

In Pinabacdao, the LGU informed the people that there would be a typhoon but without mentioning the intensity and that the people had to be prepared. Some of them transferred to safer places while others simply stayed at home.

The people did not understand the warnings because they were given in English. The people were not able to prepare food when they evacuated. The LGU also did not prepare any.

The participants said that after the storm, which lasted four hours, they started looking for their roofs. There were piles of debris everywhere. They all cried when they saw their ricefield all flattened and their fruit trees and coconuts uprooted and destroyed. There were wounded people everywhere.

In the first three months, they bartered their root crops with relief goods from Tacloban City. After several months up to now it is still hard to find food to eat. There is not enough work with which to augment farm incomes.

There was no immediate relief from the government. The relief from the governor of Western Samar came after the relief of people’s organizations such as Gabriela and Bayan Muna in February 2014. There was also help from Balsa Mindanao, another initiative of people’s organizations led by Bayan, but the relief packs were not enough for the affected population.

Table 4. Summary of multilateral and bilateral grants assistance for Yolanda rehabilitation and recovery, As of 29 September 2014 (in million Php)

Funding Agency / Donor	Amount
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA; Japan)	3,483.0
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)	2,132.8
European Union (EU)	2,097.9
United States Agency for International Aid (USAID)	1,853.3
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	1,371.7
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	1,010.5
KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau or Reconstruction Credit Institute; Germany)	910.4
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	898.7
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA; Korea)	860.0
United Nations International Labor Organization (ILO)	466.6
United Arab Emirates (UAE)	430.0
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	367.3
Department for International Development (DFID; United Kingdom)	361.2
United Nations World Health Organization (WHO)	251.0
International Fund for Agricultural Development	174.2
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Cooperation”; GIZ)	172.9
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	165.8
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT; Australia)	150.9
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN HABITAT)	130.5
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	99.1
Swiss Humanitarian Aid	12.3
Total	17,400.0

Source: Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

assistance. Though limited in resources, capacity and reach, the strength of local NGOs is their knowledge of the local situation, culture and needs, as well as their relationship and integration with the affected communities.¹²

Some of the shortcomings in ensuring partnership between INGOs and local NGOs include how

the humanitarian assistance system was limited in accommodating local NGOs so they could better participate in so-called cluster coordination meetings. The cluster meetings were mainly held in the coordination hubs based in the cities. However, being in the field, problems with transportation, and limited capacity also made it difficult for local NGOs to attend cluster meetings.¹³ There were also limitations in providing translation at the meetings and ensuring local NGO partners were familiar with humanitarian assistance system. Unable to fully participate, some local NGO staff eventually stopped attending meetings.¹⁴

Another limitation of INGOs in response is the uneven distribution of relief goods and assistance. A response review by the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and Humanitarian Coalition (HC) point to how areas like Tacloban City were saturated with INGO/NGO support while others, especially remote communities, received little or none.¹⁵

Uneven distribution of relief has also occurred within communities disrupting the Filipino community culture of *bayanihan*. Due to their own resource limitations and targets, some INGOs prioritize distributing aid to those they consider the most vulnerable in the community. However, interviews conducted by the *Pamati Kita* Project (an IOM, Plan and World Vision International cooperative project) in disaster-hit areas show that this has created conflict and division among community members and has raised the issue that ensuring solidarity within affected communities is just as important as need. To avoid this, some communities suggested distributing relief to all even if it is limited. But some INGOs are unable to do so as a result of intense pressure to meet their committed targets.¹⁶

How INGOs also communicate and consult with affected communities also needs to be improved and can help in avoiding confusion while maintaining accountability and respect to the survivors. The DEC and HC response review explained how many of the communities visited would like organizations that held assessments or interviews with them to share their findings, such as



SURVIVORS SPEAK

Some help from NGOs

In Tanauan, the participants recalled the following as visible in responding to the disaster:

- Tzu Chi Foundation – UCT of Php8,000 to Php15,000, rice, foldable bed, blanket, one-time medical mission
- Oxfam with Green Mindanao – temporary shelter (skeletal foundation worth Php7,000), wash kit, hygiene kit
- Samaritan Purse – tarpaulin, rice
- Save the Children – voucher for kids
- ACF – boats for fishermen, sidecar/pedicab for pedicab drivers, vouchers

The participants cited the INGOs as the ones who gave immediate meaningful relief and assistance, especially Tzu Chi Foundation who provided assistance to families in both the “build zone” and the NDZ areas in Bgy. San Roque. Because of the UCT from Tzu Chi, the people were able to pay their loans and use the remaining amount to buy fishing gear. Livelihood assistance from some INGOs provided boats without the gear.

Tzu Chi gave UCT depending on the size of the family: Ph12,000 for families with two children; Ph15,000 for families with more than two children; and Ph8,000 for those without children. Aside from the UCT, Tzu Chi gave out blankets, rice, and noodles.

The participants also cited the shelter assistance from Oxfam and Green Mindanao but this was sidetracked by the LGU.

In Tacloban City, the following were visible during disaster response:

- Samaritan Purse – tent, tarpaulin
- Oxfam – hygiene kit, cash for work, boat
- ACF – boat
- Tzu Chi – cash for work of Php500 a day, rice, UCT of Php15,000, Php12,000 and Php8,000 (the people bought clothes for their children and household needs)
- Red Cross – hygiene kit
- Tulong Kabataan – clothes, rice, water
- Green Mindanao – shelter materials

The INGOs gave boats and fishing gear as well as sustainable livelihood assistance in the NDZ areas. However, they have stopped distributing relief in the NDZ areas.

Meanwhile, Tzu Chi Foundation’s UCT helped a lot, according to the participants. The cash for work of Php500 a day was given immediately at the end of each workday.

Bgys. 89, 87, 85, and 84 received assistance from Green Mindanao and Oxfam for the construction of their houses. The IOM meanwhile constructed houses for those in Bgy. 88 and NDZ areas.

In Guiuan, survivors recalled the following INGOs:

- Plan – cash for work at Php250 per day (4 hours for the women and 8 hours for the men)
- Oxfam – hygiene kit, thermal kit, kitchen utensils, blanket, straw mats, cash for work for Php260 within 15 days
- Red Cross – Php10,000 for 700 plus families for fisherfolk to purchase good lumber for fishing boats
- Japanese Good Neighbor – five kilos of Taiwan rice one month after Typhoon Yolanda, feeding program
- People in Need, IOM and Oxfam – cash for work where the daily wage is Php260 or Php250 within 15 days

The most sustained relief assistance was from the Red Cross, which gave each household in all barangays 25 kilos of rice, coffee, sugar, salt, and kitchen utensils. World Renew also gave relief goods a number of times.

In Naval, INGOs also gave relief assistance, but the LGU raffled this off regardless of the actual needs of the survivors.

- One barangay received shelter assistance (shelter materials, kitchen utensils) from the PDRF about three to six months after Typhoon Yolanda.
- Another barangay received tents from the Red Cross.
- The Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) also gave relief assistance but only to their members.

In Pinabacdao, only people’s organizations such as Balsa-Mindanao, Tabang-Eastern Visayas (Tabang-EV) and Bayan Muna gave out food packs of dried fish, mung beans, rice, canned goods, and noodles; farm tools; and clothes. The Citizens Disaster Response Center (CDRC) also provided seeds.

VIEWS FROM LGUs

Appreciating NGOs

Tacloban City started rehabilitation with the help of the INGOs. The city hall did not have resources to respond, but NGOs arrived, and that helped a lot. Most of the help from the NGOs was in terms of capability building and health. NGOs assistance was coordinated with the LGU because of the cluster approach, and it was the DSWD receiving the funds.

Tzu Chi Foundation was very instrumental as they helped in clearing debris for cash for work and paid the people Php500 for four hours work clearing debris. They also provided ten wheeler trucks. Despite the heavy devastation, the Tacloban LGU was able to clear the city through the help of NGOs.

In Tanauan, the LGU monitored the NGOs to avoid duplication. The NGOs addressed shelter, health, and rehabilitation. For the LGU, the issue is sustainability, as the NGOs do not monitor the situation of the beneficiaries after receiving assistance (e.g. boats).

Pinabacdao LGU has also noticed that not all NGOs are coordinating with the LGU. For those who did, the LGU sent with them provincial teams. The LGU is also not used to coordinating with NGOs, such as the German and Italian NGOs, due to language barrier.

Likewise in Guiuan, Oxfam coordinated only later when the LGU sought it. There were instances where INGOs simply bought the shelter materials and distributed these to the people. The INGOs did not go further to reach the interior barangays because of unpaved roads and lack of transportation.

NGOs' TAKE

INGOs and local NGOs

INGOs and local NGOs have a significant presence in typhoon Yolanda-hit areas, providing various levels of disaster relief and response. Among the INGOs giving assistance are Save The Children (STC), which promotes children's rights and provides relief and support to children in developing countries, and Oxfam International, an international confederation of 17 organizations working to find solutions to poverty and injustice. Another INGO is Action of Church Together (ACT) Alliance, an international alliance of churches and church-based organizations whose advocacy is the environment and humanitarian response.

Meanwhile, local NGOs have also worked alongside INGOs in providing DRR. Two of these are the Leyte Center for Development (LCDE), which is a disaster risk reduction and response NGO covering areas from Northern Samar to Southern Leyte, and the Biliran Environmental Awareness Movement or BEAM, a network of multireligious sectors.

A UN-led cluster coordination system was set up to organize the INGO and local NGO efforts and to ensure that there would be no duplication of assistance extended to communities. The UN OCHA served as the overall cluster coordinator. INGOs and local NGOs were assigned to various clusters based on their expertise and the type of assistance given. Some of these clusters were camp management and coordination; communications with communities; education; early recovery and livelihoods;

food and agriculture; health; nutrition; protection; shelter; and water, sanitation and hygiene.

Despite having a DRR system in place, there were still challenges faced by INGOs and NGOs in coordinating relief and response efforts. One such challenge was ensuring coordination among INGOs and NGOs in providing relief and assistance. According to LCDE, the trafficking of relief and assistance by the UN OCHA could be improved. There were areas saturated with INGOs/NGOs while other areas had little to no assistance.

Also because there is no binding agreement, even if an area has already been assigned to an NGO, UN OCHA still allowed other INGOs or relief organizations to enter. An example of this was when the IOM gave relief assistance to LCDE beneficiaries before LCDE could do so during the early recovery phase. This was problematic because based on the UN OCHA cluster coordination system, once the beneficiaries are given relief assistance, this cannot be duplicated. Likewise, LCDE as a local NGO with a track record of providing DRR to disaster-stricken communities has its own system of assistance provision and other NGOs coming in without coordination tend to disrupt the organized system put in place by LCDE in the communities it is serving.

STC also shared that there were some NGOs mainly from Asian countries such as Japan, Korea and Thailand that did not coordinate with UN OCHA or LGUs and did not attend the coordination meetings. These NGOs would enter areas already covered by other INGOs like

STC. As a result, STC had to look for another area to serve so as not to duplicate assistance.

ACT Alliance also faced challenges in coordinating with other NGOs in terms of their approach or type of assistance given. They give assistance through already established POs in the community, not to individuals, to ensure unity and rebuilding of the whole community. According to ACT Alliance, NGOs who enter the community with different approaches can disrupt this unity by for example, giving out cash grants to only a selected number of families. Some of the ACT Alliance-assisted communities discouraged these NGOs from doing so to prevent discord among community members.

Another challenge faced by INGOs and NGOs in providing DRR was coordinating with the LGUs, especially when faced with conflicting political interests and policies.

During the early recovery phase, ACT Alliance was tasked to build 400 housing units in Bgy. 100, San Roque in the northern part of Tacloban City. It prepared the papers for land development and identified families that should benefit, prioritizing the poorest. However, the INGO was told by the LGU that the LGU would choose the beneficiaries. Because ACT Alliance felt this process of selection was being influenced by politics, it eventually declined the project.

ACT Alliance again observed the influence of politics in relief distribution in one of the areas they were assigned to. The INGO conducted a rapid assessment of the barangays and identified those that did not yet receive assistance. When they showed the list of priority barangays to the Mayor, he questioned this and instead gave his own list of recommended barangays. However, when ACT consulted with their PO network, they found that the Mayor's list were those barangays that voted for him.

BEAM also had difficulties coordinating with the LGU in Biliran. According to BEAM, when they suggested activities to the LGU where they could work together, the LGU said they preferred a separation of church and state action in disaster relief and response.

On the part of STC, they first conduct meetings with the LGUs in the municipalities to determine potential beneficiaries and help identify the affected barangays. However, in order to avoid political issues, there are

times that the STC goes directly to the communities to decide on the selection of beneficiaries.

Oxfam International stated that the capacity of LGUs in terms of coordination, providing technical support and making fair decisions needed to be improved. In Palo, Leyte for example, the survivors staying at bunkhouses in Bgy. Candahug were told by the LGU to transfer to another relocation site in Bgy. Tacuranga. This was in preparation for the Pope's visit in January 2015. However, relocatees already staying at the Bgy. Tacuranga site were leaving because they were becoming ill, and the barangay was far from schools and health services.

Some INGOs and NGOs also see the importance of ensuring the sustainability of assistance extended by them. According to LCDE, though dole-out types of assistance during the early recovery phase are necessary, eventually more sustainable assistance should be provided such as provision of meaningful livelihood and agricultural projects that would establish and ensure food security to meet the long-term needs of the communities.

The INGOs and NGOs will eventually leave Yolanda-affected areas and their financial and material assistance will stop. Instead of giving cash assistance to individual families, LCDE believes that this should be given through organizations in the community, or at least as a counterpart. The organizations can then ensure that the assistance will benefit the whole community and will be sustained. INGOs and NGOs should also consider the long-term impacts of their assistance as opposed to just "disposing" of their relief goods.

LCDE and Oxfam observed that there is no comprehensive livelihood program being implemented by the government in the Yolanda-affected communities. This is important to avoid famine and increased criminality in the long run. The comprehensive livelihood programs should also primarily ensure the food security of the communities while cash crops should be secondary.

ACT Alliance also echoes this and feels that any assistance given, whether cash or skills training should be appropriate to the culture and needs of the affected communities. For example, ACT Alliance observed that the skills training given by BFAR to women in the community are hair cutting and massage. Instead, sustainable agriculture should be taught to the local people to address their long-term livelihood needs.

whether or not they were eligible for aid. There were several barangay FGDs that were assessed a number of times but did not hear from the organizations again.¹⁷

There were also concerns that the aid provided by some INGOs for Typhoon Yolanda has been channeled to programs and projects that are not sustainable and compatible to the needs of affected communities. For example, an excess of fiberglass fishing boats was distributed to affected fisherfolk, but there is not enough fish catch due to the typhoon. Fisherfolk have to go farther out to sea but the fiberglass boats are not suitable for deep sea fishing.¹⁸

Another concern is that the impartiality and neutrality of INGOs and the humanitarian sector overall can be diminished under the pressure of donor interests. Findings of the Humanitarian Response Index from 2007-2011 for example, showed that the political, economic and security agenda of donor governments are undermining the ability of humanitarian organizations to meet the needs of affected populations.

In 2013, more than US\$16.4 billion or 74.5% of total international humanitarian aid came from government donors. The top government aid donor was the US at US\$4.7 billion followed by EU institutions (US\$1.9 billion) and the United Kingdom (US\$1.8 billion). Although data for 2013 alone is not yet available, it is estimated that from 2009-2013, as much as US\$11.4 billion of donor funds was channeled through INGOs. This translates to an average of US\$2.3 billion per year that INGOs have received from mostly government and private donors. This figure could be higher considering that INGOs are also secondary recipients of funds from multilateral agencies.¹⁹

Concerns on donor impartiality and neutrality are further exacerbated by the weakness of donor accountability and transparency in terms of aid allocation. Donors tend to see accountability in terms of fiscal management and control of the partners they fund as opposed to being accountable to and truly helping affected populations.²⁰

Response by mining corporations

According to the US Chamber of Commerce Typhoon Haiyan-Corporate Aid Tracker, US\$59.1 million of business pledges have been announced in support of recovery efforts. It does not state however how much was actually received.

Members of the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines (COMP) also provided relief and rehabilitation aid to areas affected by Typhoon Yolanda.²¹ (See Table 5) The President of COMP and President and Chief Executive

Table 5. Mining corporations's relief efforts

Mining corporation	Relief efforts
Glencore Xstrata	US\$2 million
B2Gold	US\$1 million
Philex Mining Corporation (with MVP Group of Companies)	Php35 million
Atlas Consolidated Mining Corporation	Relief goods
Oceana Gold Philippines Inc.	US\$1 million (through UNICEF) Emergency response team
Nickel Asia Corporation	Medical service and supplies, generator sets
Apex Mining Co.	Unspecified
Asiaticus Management Corp.	Unspecified
Atro Mining	Unspecified
Freeport McMoran	Unspecified
Hinatuan Mining Corp.	Unspecified
Intex Development Corp.	Unspecified
TVI Resouce Development Philippines	Unspecified
Vale Exploration	Unspecified

Sources: Various new reports monitored by IBON

Officer (CEO) of Benguet Corporation, Benjamin Philip G. Romualdez, is the brother of Leyte Rep. Martin Romualdez, and cousin of Tacloban City Mayor Alfred Romualdez. Romualdez took a month leave of absence from Benguet Corporatin to personally oversee coordination and distribution of relief goods and support in his home province.²²

Philex Mining Corporation also sent a rescue team from Benguet to Leyte three days after the storm. This was part of the greater effort of the MVP Group of Companies which raised Php35 million for Yolanda victims through the TV5 telethon. Philex Chairman and MVP Group head Manuel V. Pangilinan also stated that the majority of the telethon proceeds would go to rehabilitation.²³

Atlas Consolidated Mining Corporation accepted and distributed relief goods to the northern towns of Cebu province affected by Typhoon Yolanda. It also provided rescue and relief aid in the municipalities of Daanbantayan and Medellin.²⁴

Oceana Gold Philippines Inc. provided an 11-man emergency response team to the Philippine Mine

Safety and Environment Association (PMSEA) for search and retrieval operations in Leyte and other areas. It also donated US\$10,000 to UNICEF as well as held a donation drive among its employees.²⁵

Other mining groups that donated cash and various supplies to the Yolanda relief agencies and foundation include COMP staff, Apex Mining Co., Asiaticus Management Corp., Atro Mining, Freeport McMoran, Intex Resources, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., MRL Gold, Platinum Group Metals, Philippine Mining Development Corp., TVI Resource Development Philippines, and Vale Exploration.²⁶

Nickel Asia Corporation (NAC) also helped in relief and rehabilitation efforts in Guiuan, Eastern Samar. It used its own airplanes to bring doctors, medicines and supplies. It also provided generator sets and medical teams to other areas.²⁷ Hinatuan Mining Corp. (HMC), a subsidiary of the NAC, on the other hand, was said to have taken advantage of the situation in typhoon-hit Guiuan, Eastern Samar. HMC was given authorization by the DENR to transport nickel ore stockpiles off the Manicani island in Guiuan, while at the same time giving relief assistance to Yolanda victims to win their favor. The loading of the ore took place right after Typhoon Yolanda hit, even though HMC's operation was suspended in 2001 for causing aquatic and soil erosion.

HMC was able to gain authorization from the DENR to haul and load ore stockpiles based on an endorsement from OPARR Sec. Lacson. He requested that NAC "haul and load ore stockpiles as part of the agency's rehabilitation and recovery efforts". OPARR's endorsement letter to the DENR states that this is "a mitigating measure against any possible adverse environmental effect that may worsen calamities".

The validity of the endorsement and authorization is in question because tests on Manicani's bodies of water by the Environmental Management Bureau turned out negative from the hazard posed by siltation.²⁸

International mining firms were also involved in relief and rehabilitation efforts. Glencore Xstrata, a Swedish international mining corporation that owns the Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining (PASAR) Corp. in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) donated US\$2 million to the relief effort.²⁹

B2Gold, a Vancouver-based gold producer that operate three mines in the Philippines, donated US\$1 million for rescue and relief efforts. B2Gold is a partner of Filminera Resources Corp. (FRC) which operates a gold project in Masbate and which is currently the largest operating gold mine in the country.³⁰

Corporations dividing areas among themselves

The leading role of private corporations in the reconstruction and recovery in Yolanda-affected areas has bolstered the thesis of how the current global economic system finds opportunities to profit and establish their interests amid so-called collective shocks such as wars and disasters.³¹ In a study of several events including Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the concept of "disaster capitalism" showed how disasters such as these create a blank sheet wherein capitalists were able to reconstruct cities and the economy according to their interests. For example, in New Orleans, public schools which were destroyed were never rebuilt but were replaced by private schools.³² This also happened to their public housing and health facilities.

OPARR Undersecretary Danilo Antonio stated that the private sector has already bankrolled Php11.8 billion worth of projects that include infrastructure, livelihood, resettlement, and social services.³³ OPARR also stated that there are local corporations that have committed to lead in the rehabilitation of areas damaged by Typhoon Yolanda and they are referred to as "development sponsors". They have divided among themselves 16 out of the 24 "development areas".³⁴ (See Table 6)

Some of these corporations are the Lopez Group of Companies; Ayala Corporation; Aboitiz Foundation; PLDT-Smart; SM Group of Companies; Metrobank; International Container Terminal Services Incorporated; Jollibee-Mang Inasal; and Robinsons Land Corporation.³⁵

There are also 10 "sectoral sponsors" that promised to support needs in education, health, housing, and livelihood. (See Table 7) Also, the trustees of a so-called multi-donor fund are ABS-CBN; GMA-7; PLDT-Smart; Globe Telecom; and Washington Sycip.

In the relief, reconstruction and recovery after Typhoon Yolanda, the Aquino government gave the corporation free rein in choosing areas that they wanted to sponsor. Interestingly, many of these areas are urbanized areas or with strategic locations for transportation and other investments. Some corporations including their foundations have chosen to sponsor one to several congressional districts, while some only chose to sponsor a part of a district. There are cases where there are several corporations sponsoring one area. In the lone district of Eastern Samar for example, Nickel Asia only chose to sponsor Guiuan, but the rest of the lone district is being sponsored by eight development partners.

Other areas with sponsors are areas where these corporations have already established their business presence or are looking into expanding business

Table 6. Development Sponsors

Aid	Province	District	Committed		
			As of 23 January 2014	As of 26 June 2014	As of 6 October 2014
1	Leyte	Tacloban 1	International Container Terminal Services Inc.	International Container Terminal Services Inc. PLDT-SMART Metrobank Foundation GT-Metro Foundation Injap Foundation Energy Development Corp.	International Container Terminal Services Inc. Bloomberg Cultural Foundation Inc.
2	Leyte	Tacloban 2	PLDT-Smart	PLDT-Smart Energy Development Corp.	PLDT-Smart Foundation
3	Leyte	Palo	Metrobank	Metrobank Nickel Asia Corporation	Metrobank Foundation GT-Metro Foundation Inc.
4	Leyte	Rest of 1st District	Injap Land Corporation	Injap Land Corporation Consuelo (Zobel Alger) Foundation Peregrine Development International (American)	INJAP Land Corporation
5	Leyte	2nd District	Energy Development Corp.	Energy Development Corp. Christian Aid	ABS-CBN Lingkod Kapamilya Foundation Inc. Ayala Foundation
6	Leyte	3rd District			
7	Leyte	Ormoc/ Kananga	Energy Development Corp. Aboitiz	Energy Development Corp. Aboitiz	Energy Development Corp.
8	Leyte	Rest of 4th District	Engineering Equipment Inc.	Engineering Equipment Inc.	Energy Development Corp. RCBC
9	Leyte	5th District			ABS-CBN Lingkod Kapamilya Foundation Inc. Ayala Foundation
10	Biliran	Lone District			
11	Eastern Samar	Guiuan/ Salcedo	Nickel Asia Corporation	Nickel Asia Corporation	Ayala Foundation Consuelo Foundation Nickel Asia Corporation
		Lawa-an		Christian Aid ABS-CBN Viscal	
12	Eastern Samar	Rest of Lone District		Aboitiz Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc. Ayala Foundation Globe PLDT-SMART	PLDT-Smart Foundation Ayala Foundation ABS-CBN Lingkod Kapamilya Foundation Inc. Viscal Foundation Aboitiz Metrobank Foundation GT-Metro Foundation Inc Assumption Alumnae Association
13	Samar	2nd District	ABS-CBN Sagip Kapamilya Foundation Inc.	ABS-CBN Sagip Kapamilya Foundation Inc. PLDT-SMART SKI JG Summit Holdings	ABS-CBN Lingkod Kapamilya Foundation Inc. Consuelo Foundation
14	Cebu	3rd and 5th Districts	Vical Group of the Metro Gaisano Group	Vical Group of the Metro Gaisano Group Ayala Land	VICAL Foundation
15	Cebu	4th District	Aboitiz / Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc.	Aboitiz / Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc.	Aboitiz
16	Negros Occidental	1st, 2nd & 3rd Districts	Ayala Corporation	Ayala Corporation	Ayala Foundation
17	Aklan	Lone District	Globe	Globe	Globe Telecom
18	Antique	Lone District			
19	Capiz	1st District	PLDT-SMART Metro Pacific Group	PLDT-SMART Metro Pacific Group	PLDT-Smart Foundation
20	Capiz	2nd District	PLDT-SMART	PLDT-SMART	PLDT-Smart Foundation
21	Iloilo	2nd and 3rd District			
22	Iloilo	4th District	JG Summit Holdings, Inc.	JG Summit Holdings, Inc.	JG Summit Holdings Inc
23	Iloilo	5th District	Ayala Land Corporation Phinma Group	Ayala Land Corporation Phinma Group	Ayala Land
24	Palawan	1st District	Secours Populaire Francais (French NGO)	Secours Populaire Francais (French NGO)	

Source: Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

Table 7. Sector Sponsors

Sector	Corporations	
Education	SM Foundation Inc. Tzu Chi Asian Terminals Incorporated (ATI) Save the Children	BDO Foundation CEMEX Plan
Health/ Nutrition	Jollibee Plan PLDT-SMART	BDO Cemex
Housing	SM Philippine Red Cross Energy Devt Corp (EDC) Plan ATI Cemex Habitat for Humanity	Gawad Kalinga Tzu Chi Assumption Cares BDO France-Philippines United Action LaFarge Cement
Livelihood	Magsaysay World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) PLDT-SMART Assumption Cares	Philippine Red Cross BDO Oxfam Cemex
Others	PLDT-SMART Tzu Chi BDO UP Planades Manila Water	Secours Populaire Francais PWC Cemex Meralco

Source: Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

opportunities. As early as December 2013, the Aquino government identified 16 areas which can be sponsored, and nine corporate sponsors immediately committed to be the government's development partners. As of October 2014, there are 24 areas with development partners.

The Lopez group (ABS-CBN Lingkod Kapamilya Foundation Inc. and Energy Development Corporation) and the Zamora group (Nickel Asia Corporation), which have extractive industries in Leyte and Samar, respectively, chose areas where they currently operate. It is important to note that their operations in mining and geothermal energy have histories of being opposed by communities because of these projects' environmental and social impacts.

In contrast, there are still 54 municipalities and cities without development partners. Interestingly, these areas are usually in more remote and interior parts. (See Table 8)

Local corporations have also formed philanthropic networks or organizations through which they contributed to Typhoon Yolanda relief and rehabilitation efforts. The PBSP (which has 250 member-companies and whose Visayas executive committee chair is Jose Antonio Y. Aboitiz) launched Project New Dawn on 18 June 2014 which focuses on continued relief efforts and long-term rehabilitation of four northern Cebu municipalities (Bantayan, Daanbantayan, Madrideojos, and Sante Fe).³⁶

PBSP has already identified Php180 million worth of critical infrastructure and livelihood service projects, and so far has raised half of these projects' total cost.³⁷ It also advocates for the need to lessen red tape so that corporations will have no problems implementing their projects.³⁸

Another group comprised of members of the private business sector involved in rehabilitation efforts is the PDRF. PDRF was created as a structural mechanism to "facilitate the large, coordinated and unified effort of the business community to handle the whole spectrum of disaster management". The president of the PDRF is Rene S. Meily, and it is co-chaired by Ayala Corporation chairman and CEO Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala and Manila Archbishop Luis Antonio Cardinal Tagle.³⁹

Agribusiness corporations are also partnering with national government agencies to fund rehabilitation projects such as intercropping, livelihood projects and distributing seeds. Agribusiness corporations such as East-West Seed Philippines (EWPH) and Bayer are donating hybrid seeds to Yolanda-affected farmers.^{40 41}

Table 8. Areas without development partner/s, As of 6 October 2014

Province	City / Municipality
Leyte	Calubian, Leyte, San Isidro, Tabango, Villaba, Abuyog, Mahaplag, Baybay City, Javier (Bugho)
Southern Leyte	Silago, Maasin, Anahawan, Libagon, Sogod
Biliran	Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Naval
Eastern Samar	Balangkayan, General McArthur, Hernani, Quinapondan, Llorente, Maydolong
Samar	Daram, Talalora, Villareal
Antique	Barbaza, Bugasong, Caluya, Culasi, Laua-an, Libertad, Pandan, Patnongon, San Remegio, Sebaste, Tibiao, Valderama
Iloilo	Alimodian, Badiangan, Bingawan, Cabatuan, Calinog, Janiuay, Lambunao, Maasin, Mina, New Lucena, Pototan, Zarraga
Dinagat Island	Loreto

Source: Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

An Php11-million partnership was also forged between Cargill Philippines and PBSP to rehabilitate coconut farming communities in Leyte, starting in Tabango, Leyte. This will then be replicated in other areas of Eastern Visayas.⁴² The implementation of the project will also be done with the PCA, the DA, Visayas State University-Villaba Campus, and the local government of Tabango, Leyte.⁴³

The project includes the following:

- Establishment of coconut nursery to propagate seedlings, supplying about 70,000 seedlings a year
- Rehabilitation of coconut farms
- Establishment of two 5,000-square meter demonstration farms to promote cash crop production as a source of income and food for farmers while they wait for the coconut trees to bear fruit

- 400 coconut farmers will receive training and be organized into farmers' association, and their leaders will be given management training.⁴⁴

The project is designed to eventually allow the development of an inclusive business model for Cargill Philippines that may involve the sourcing of coconut materials as well as other produce. Cargill is one of PBSP's newest members and has already donated US\$500,000 to Typhoon Yolanda survivors.⁴⁵

There are also other foreign corporations that have become "development sponsors" in Yolanda-affected areas, such as the Peregrine Development Corporation (American). The US Embassy and USAID have also partnered with foreign corporations launching recovery and rehabilitation projects.⁴⁶ Last October, Director

SURVIVORS SPEAK

The usual suspects

In Tanauan, the following private donors (aside from NGOs) are visible:

- UNICEF – educational assistance, solar light
- WASH – water purifier
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – tarpaulin
- New Leyte Edible Oil – Php2 million for barangay hall
- Pepsi – Pepsi products
- Wilkins
- M Lhuillier
- Sogod
- GMA Foundation
- ABS-CBN
- TV5
- RL (Lumeng) – a private trader that had its warehouses raided by hungry survivors right after Typhoon Yolanda eventually distributed for free all that was left in its warehouses, including eggs and pigs

The participants cited JICA and UNICEF being active in the reconstruction of schools.

In Tacloban City, the following private donors (aside from NGOs) are visible:

- USAID
- Catholic Relief Service (CRS), UNHCR – shelter assistance, assisted residents in getting legal

documents such as birth certificates, marriage license

- IOM – tarpaulin, phone sim cards, galvanized iron sheets, bunkhouses
- UNICEF – hygiene kit, soap, blanket
- ABS-CBN – slippers, noodles, clothes
- SM

According to the participants, the Koreans are visible in helping construct the schools, while the DPWH leads the repair of roads.

In Guiuan, the following donors are visible:

- UNICEF – children's shoes, bags, notebooks
- GMA – notebooks, bags, shoes for school children
- SM – rice, water, canned food
- Puregold – commercial rice, canned food, biscuits
- Cong. Manny Pacquiao – Php1,000 to each family living in tents and galvanized iron sheets used by the LGU to fix the terminal and public market

There are Chinese mining companies extracting chromite in the area who help in road repairs, according to the participants. However, there are roads that do not need fixing but are being destroyed then fixed again.

In Naval:

- Metrobank Foundation – cash donation coursed through the LGU, which the LGU used to purchase food relief (sardines, rice, noodles)
- GMA Foundation
- ABS-CBN

Gloria D. Steele of the US Embassy and Manila USAID Mission turned over two schools to the Tacloban National Agricultural School (TNAS).⁴⁷

The TNAS is part of the reconstruction and recovery projects under the USAID Rebuild project. Also under this project, the US government is working in partnership with Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble to reconstruct and restock one thousand *sari-sari* (convenience) stores. The storeowners will also be trained in basic store management and micro-credit.⁴⁸

Altogether, the US government has contributed almost US\$142.5 million in support to the Philippines for the Typhoon Yolanda recovery.⁴⁹

The role of media

In the recent disasters experienced by the Philippines, media tended to be more concerned with promoting itself to the public and getting the most airtime views. It also tended to focus attention on one place and forget reporting other less covered areas that equally needed attention and assistance.

The Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), an NGO focused on press freedom, in its analysis of content of media coverage for Typhoon Yolanda from print to broadcast showed how Philippine media failed to arm itself of the crucial information on the nature of the super typhoon and what a storm surge is. It said that Philippine media was not helpful in trying to tie up with the weather bureau, PAGASA, the NDRRMC and other key government agencies to get the public properly informed and forewarned of the impending impact of super typhoon Yolanda.

The CMFR noted in its analysis that some reporters risked their lives to deliver the news and to help the victims they encountered during the typhoon's onslaught, but the coverage on Typhoon Yolanda was not devoid of posturing, playing the hero and other kinds of grandstanding on the part of the media. Several reporters were indeed involved in rescue, retrieval and relief operations while they were on field, and the reportage of their respective networks put the companies in a good light. Likewise, major TV and broadcast networks devoted extensive coverage on the assistance they provided the survivors. The CMFR noted however that actual report could have been more meaningful if it had focused more on giving the context of the critical need for immediate rescue and relief operations.^{50 51}

Philippine media launched donation drives through their networks and relief drives through their foundations.

ABS-CBN Foundation through its *Sagip Kapamilya* launched its "*Tulong Na, Tabang Na*" campaign, and a telethon. GMA-7's Kapuso Foundation launched *Kapuso* telethon, and TV5's Alagang Kapatid Foundation launched "*Tulong Kapatid, Sulong Kapatid*" telethon to raise funds and collect food and clothes for the typhoon victims. The news programs reported on the rescue and relief operations of their respective networks. TV Patrol reported that ABS-CBN network had set up cell phone charging stations so residents in the affected areas so the people could contact their relatives. Meanwhile, the Philippine Daily Inquirer launched a relief drive to help the victims of Yolanda.^{52 53}

The coverage of their relief operations and search and rescue efforts helped media outfits gather huge donations from local and international donors and private individuals. With their foundations, major Philippine media outfits, ABS-CBN, GMA and TV5 have also taken the role of NGOs in providing relief and rehabilitation assistance including providing shelter, school buildings and health assistance, among others, to the survivors.

The extensive coverage of their own relief drives shifted the reportage from the responsibility of the government to respond in times of disasters to their own efforts. Also, it contributed to blurring the line between delivering the news and gathering more viewership and name recall for their corporate interests.

ABS-CBN for example is owned by the Lopezes who are among the major players in the energy and power sector, infrastructure and telecommunications, banking and finance, agribusiness, and automotives, among others. Its foundation *Sagip Kapamilya* partners with Lopez-owned Energy Development Corporation and First Balfour Corporation in the construction of schools in the Yolanda devastated areas. It targets construction of 149 classrooms in Leyte, Samar, Iloilo, and Palawan.⁵⁴ Donations in cash or in kind mobilized from ABS-CBN's "*Tulong Na, Tabang Na*" reached Php1.5 billion in 2013.⁵⁵



GMA, which is owned by the Gozon family, has under it the GMA Kapuso Foundation, which in partnership with the NHA provided 600 dwelling units for its shelter assistance to Yolanda survivors in Tacloban City and Palo in Leyte province. The Kapuso villages will also have classrooms, which GMA Kapuso Foundation and its partners will construct.⁵⁶ As of November 15, 2013, the GMA Kapuso Foundation collected Php85.3 million worth of cash and Php2 million worth of in-kind donations.⁵⁷

TV5, which is owned by Manny V. Pangilinan who is also into the mining, telecommunications, real estate, banking and finance, collected Php3.9 million in donations in 2013 for Yolanda survivors. It provided shelter kits for 50 evacuee families through PLDT-Smart Foundation.⁵⁸

According to the CMFR's study, conflict of interests in relation to the views on government response was also observed during the reportage of Typhoon Yolanda. The CMFR cited the example of how Korina Sanchez, a veteran news anchor of ABS-CBN, defended the government after Anderson Cooper of international media outfit CNN reporting from Tacloban City said he noticed that there was lack of search and rescue missions and feeding center and lack of organized relief and recovery as a whole.⁵⁹ Sanchez is the wife of DILG Secretary Manuel Roxas, who was supposed to be overseeing relief and recovery operations.

TV personality Kris Aquino of ABS-CBN, who is President Aquino's sister, also wielded her media influence to defend President Aquino when his leadership was challenged in news reports. She also joined relief operations as part of the ABS-CBN contingent in Tacloban.⁶⁰

President Aquino asked the media to give "greater accuracy in reports" after the international media highlighted disorganized relief and recovery operations. The government said that the media has a "role to uplift the spirits of the Filipino people – to find stories of resilience..." instead of focusing on missing and slow search and rescue and relief and recovery. After this request, media outfits featured more stories about the "very real and human face" and features that "move others to action".⁶¹

By people's organizations

There are individual stories of families, friends and community members initiating relief efforts both here and abroad. But there is no available aggregated data in terms of how much they donated and/or number of activities/missions they initiated.

In terms of people's organizations, there is BALSAs or *Bayanihan Alay sa Sambayanan*, an organized response of the Filipino mass movement to disasters and calamities. BALSAs are a network of progressive groups.⁶²

The following are relief and response efforts coordinated by BALSAs and partners:

- Nov 21-26 – BALSAs National Relief Caravan for Samar and Leyte brought 14,144 relief packs and mobilized 180 volunteers from Manila, Bicol and Samar. Conducted psychosocial intervention
- Dec 3-8 – "Caravan for the Environment, Human Rights and Justice" conducted relief, medical, and psychosocial mission as well as documented the damages wrought by Typhoon Yolanda in the province of Mindoro
- Dec 17-18 – BALSAs and Lingap Gabriela relief mission in Samar, Iloilo and Aklan
- Jan 17-21 – Fourth SOS (*Samahang Operasyong Sagip*) Medical Mission conducted in Carigara, Leyte and neighboring municipalities; the 33-person team was comprised of 4 doctors, 5 nurses, 6 senior behavioral science students, 2 social workers, 1 video documenter, and staff members from partner organizations⁶³
- Jan 23-26 – Second National Relief Caravan brought in 8,000 relief packs, 2,000 seed packs aboard 9 trucks while mobilizing 100 volunteers from various sectors
- BALSAs and other partner organizations have been sending relief goods through cargo planes provided by Air Asia and Philippine Airlines, as well as providing psychosocial services. Volunteer groups also helped to retrieve and identify bodies in Tacloban City.
- POs are also active in exposing the actual situation in the typhoon-affected areas, corruption, and inadequate and negligent response of the Aquino administration.

In Pinabacdao, for instance, the participants in the FGD can only recall help coming from BALSAs Mindanao, Tabang EV, ABS-CBN, and Bayan Muna partylist which gave out food packs of dried fish, mung beans, rice, canned goods and noodles, farm tools, and clothes. CDRC also provided seeds.

SURVIVORS SPEAK

Unanswered needs

A year after Typhoon Yolanda, the most basic needs of survivors remain unmet. In the rapid appraisal conducted by IBON, the participants were candidly asked about their disappointments as well as priority needs that would make them feel contented with official disaster response.

In Tanauan, people need water and electricity, sustainable livelihood and capital for livelihood support, housing, and schools for their children. They also demand not to be relocated to another place away from their main source of livelihood (i.e. fishing). They also want the government to build safe, sturdy and better evacuation center so that people would willingly evacuate when there are disasters and go back to their original residences when it is safe to go back.

The participants said they were made to believe that they would be provided with housing materials. Oxfam promised Php12,000 housing assistance, but this was “trafficked” by the LGU which extended only Php7,000. Even the imported canned goods, chocolates and other food relief they heard of did not come and instead were replaced with local canned sardines, the usual noodles, and rice.

They find the “sweat for equity” for shelter unfair, since some individuals who were not able to complete the required work hours but are close to the leaders or have close links with the LGU were prioritized over those who earned their work hours yet have no connections. One old woman was even sent back to the NDZ area in Bgy. San Roque to await the completion of permanent housing units in the GK village even if she had already completed her work hours. Meanwhile, one leader in the GK village who is close to the Mayor was able to get three housing units.

In Tacloban City, the participants said that relief distribution was tainted with politics. Relief goods were repacked and the contents were replaced with regular noodles, canned sardines and rice. People were made to fall in long lines but by the time they reached the table, there were no more relief packs while they saw sacks and sacks of relief goods being hoarded by barangay officials.

People in Tacloban City demand seed money for small businesses. The farmers want to have their own land and security of tenure, livelihood support, and shelter. They also need seedlings and capital support with which to pay for farm labor and farm tools.

In Guiuan, people need livelihood and jobs. They need shelter that they call their own. The Mayor said that land and shelter would be awarded to them, but the DSWD said that the government was still deciding whether it would make the people pay for the land and shelter.

Politics and favoritism influenced relief distribution. Some men were given boats even if they are not fishers, while some fishermen did not receive any. Some families received relief twice, while others did not receive relief at all. There were those not affected by the typhoon but also received relief. Some relief goods were even spoiled already.

In Naval, people complain of “color coding”, the local term for politicking in relief distribution, such as the provision of “cash for work” and food relief in evacuation centers, where recipients were identified based on their political allegiance. The participants said they received rice with worms and expired medicines, ate only once or twice a day yet heard of relief goods just being wasted because the LGU failed to distribute these right away.

In Pinabacdao, people need farm tools especially tractors and carabaos. They need irrigation system especially during summer, start-up capital for livelihood, seed capital for farming, seedlings, and inputs. In fishing, people need boats and fishing gears.

SURVIVORS SPEAK

Big help from friends

In Tanauan, the people who “looted” the stores shared with their neighbors the goods that they were able to get, such as assorted food stuff including milk for babies and children, diapers, slippers, shoes and clothes, bottled water, among others. In Tacloban City and Guiuan, in fact, “looting” was community-coordinated.

Relatives living in other towns and provinces not affected by the typhoon adopted their family

members who survived. The survivors went back after a while when relief started being distributed to affected areas.

In Guiuan, the community practiced *bayanihan* or labor pool to erect their houses again. In Naval, friends and neighbors of the survivors accommodated them until the time they managed to build back their houses. They also received assistance from their relatives overseas. In Pinabacdao, by joining their friends in the organization, People Surge, the survivors were able to gain attention to their plight and get needed assistance.

Endnotes

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Stuck in corruption and patronage politics



Government response is slow and glaringly inadequate because it has remained stuck in corruption and patronage politics. One such example of politicking in disaster response that made national news was the finger pointing and blame-game between Tacloban City Mayor Romualdez and the Aquino administration, particularly Mar Roxas and President Aquino.¹

Mayor Romualdez accused the administration of favoritism in relief and response efforts. He stated that he had requested additional help for security and to conduct search and rescue efforts but was refused.² In turn, President Aquino, to deflect criticisms of the administration's disaster response, pointed the finger at the LGUs (particularly Mayor Romualdez) and how they did not fulfill their roles as the "first responders" to the disaster.³

More recently, a word war once again erupted, this time between Mayor Romualdez and OPARR Secretary Panfilo Lacson, over slow rehabilitation efforts and lack of funds for Tacloban City.⁴

There are also reports that such politics at the national level is being reflected at the local level in the distribution of relief. According to a Reuters article, there is indication

of uneven aid distribution due to a political feud between Mayor Remedios Petilla and one of the local barangay captains, Annalisa Yu in Palo, Leyte. The Petilla clan is pro-Aquino administration while the Yu clan supports the Romualdez clan. There are accusations that Mayor Petilla left out the barangays of Yu in relief distribution.⁵

Aside from funds that were released at presidential discretion in December 2013, there was political bickering among national officials including President Aquino and questionable decisions of bureaucrats and local government officials. This resulted in the agonizingly slow extension of help to those who needed it most and hampered efforts of organizations that wanted to reach survivors in the earliest possible time.

Concerns about corruption in the bureaucracy have discouraged some donors to course relief donations to the government and instead gave them directly to organizations they trust. Yet, these were hampered by bureaucratic procedures as well. For example, 12 container vans of relief supplies from Belgium were stuck at the port of Cebu for five months because the cargo was supposed to be taxed as the consignee, Rotary International, was not accredited by the DSWD.

The sender and the consignee did not want to pay for the taxes and other attendant fees. The Belgian donors refused to course the donations through the government either so that the cargo could enter tax free.⁶

There is a thin line between inefficiency and questionable practices. Logistical problems have been cited as the reason for aid not reaching survivors on time but these may be the loopholes that allow unscrupulous practices or questionable schemes to be done.

Unaccounted for relief supplies were disclosed by the COA in its 2014 audit. The COA discovered that various supplies and equipment worth Php36.9 million with the DOH could not be accounted for, as regional offices confirmed that they have not received the supplies that were supposedly shipped to them. Cadaver bags (27,808 pieces) were also not distributed on time and resulted in the shortage of bags for retrieved bodies. The cadavers were exposed for a long time, which created additional hazards to survivors and disaster workers. In the DSWD Field Office VII, damaged goods and dented canned goods were excluded in the repacking but were not accounted for; nor were there records of disposal. Actual physical count of unpacked supplies did not match packed supplies and resulted in 1,000 sacks unaccounted for.

Anomalies in food donations not reaching their intended beneficiaries were also rampant. Food donations specifically meals ready to eat (MRE) packs by the British government have allegedly turned up on supermarket shelves in Metro Manila. DSWD officials vowed to investigate but the outcome of the investigation was never released. Local officials were also accused of keeping food aid for themselves instead of distributing them as testified by two foreign aid workers.⁷ DEC, an umbrella group representing 14 United Kingdom charities, have expressed concern about evidence that suggests that not all the £60 million of aid given by the United Kingdom has been reaching those most in need.⁸



SURVIVORS SPEAK **“Color-coded response”**

In Tanauan, participants recalled that barangays that did not run under the same political party as the incumbent’s were least prioritized in receiving assistance. In Tacloban, this was mostly felt when politicians chose their respective constituents and voters to be given relief and provided relief in the bunkhouses but not in NDZ areas. In Guiuan, barangay officials even apportioned for themselves the fine clothes from among the relief goods. In Naval, the politician’s face was printed on the plastic bags of relief goods. If the people were not of the same political color, they did not receive any assistance from the ruling families. In Pinabacdao, Mila Tan distributed rice only to those who voted for her.

SURVIVORS SPEAK **Opportunistic**

In Tacloban City, the women participants shared that there was livelihood opportunity offered by the International Emergency Development Aid (IEDA). In the beginning, the IEDA said that the women (25 of them) did not have to pay and that it would provide Php10,000 as a grant. But after IEDA coordinated with the DSWD, the women were informed that it was already a loan under the government’s poverty program Self-Employment Assistance Kaunlaran (SEA-K) of the DSWD. Every week the women had to give Php70 per group to open a bank account and Php200 per week as loan amortization.

The women have an organization called Bangon Organization and Bunkhouse Abukay Organization, which IEDA helped put up. But at present, it is the DSWD that is managing the project.



PO TALK

Victims twice

Farmers of Alang-Alang in Leyte complained that the DA sold to them the seeds for dispersal instead of distributing these for free. In Bgy. Sta. Cruz in Tanauan, the local PO noted irregularities in the distribution of assistance. The national government provided galvanized iron sheets for shelter assistance through the DSWD's Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) program, but not all of the GI sheets were distributed and reportedly went to corrupt officials. Likewise, there was supposed to be a set of 20 pieces of GI sheets provided by NGOs for the survivors in Bgy. Sta Cruz, but only 14 were distributed by the LGU. Even the last 25 kilos of rice the DSWD was supposed to provide the survivors were allegedly not distributed. The DSWD's program for cash for work was also tainted with patronage politics; only relatives of LGU officials and staff or people with connections with the LGU were given cash for work.

BISKAFFA complained about how Bgy. Bangon was listed as one of the coastal barangays even if it is far from the coast. Residents of Bgy. Bangon received Php20,000 voucher ahead of Bgy. Cabuynan even if Bgy. Cabuynan was in the top three most devastated barangays of Tanauan.

In Eastern Samar, COCO Care members complained that they were made to expect cash assistance of Php40 per coconut tree planted but this was not fulfilled by the PCA. The PO disclosed that apparently the funds used from the budget for coconut rehabilitation comprised only 5% of the allocated assistance. They also asked fertilizers from the PCA but there was no response from the PCA. There is apparently PCA scholarship, but PCA when asked said that there is no fund for the scholarship.

VIEWS FROM LGUS

Playing favorites

In Tacloban City, even the LGU complained about the promised rice from Taiwan coursed through the DSWD, which never came. Even the distribution of noodles was staggered and this was not done equally – other barangays received relief from the DSWD five times already while others received only twice. Goods were kept in the DSWD regional office and not distributed at once. The WFP gave one sack of rice to every Tacloban survivor, but the sacks were redirected to the DSWD office and repacked in DSWD sacks. Yet, in other municipalities, they still used the WFP sacks. The national government has a warehouse along the Maharlika Highway where relief goods are stockpiled until now.

In Pinabacdao, Mayor Quijano said that the national government provided Php179 million to the losing mayoral candidate for relief and rehabilitation assistance instead of directing the funds to the incumbent. He added that there was no proper consultation. When Pinabacdao LGU asked why they were not included, the national government told the Mayor that their municipal and barangay halls were not damaged.

But the farmers' agricultural crops were heavily damaged. Before Typhoon Yolanda, many farmers had already harvested their rice, but there were other farmers who had had standing crops of palay and these were damaged by Typhoon Yolanda, including coconut trees, bananas, rootcrops among others. It was the NGOs that came to help.

In the IBON nationwide survey on institutional response on Yolanda, 47.5% of the respondents said that they noticed that there was something wrong with the government's response after the typhoon (either the LGU or the national government, or both). Five out of 10 of these respondents said that the intended aid or relief goods did not reach the affected families (52.3%), while 44.9% said that there was no immediate rescue of victims. Four out of 10 respondents said that it took a long time before families were transferred to relocation sites, resettlement areas and evacuation centers; there was no immediate distribution of basic goods, i.e. water, food, clothing; there was discrimination among which families get to receive aid or relief goods; and there is still the threat from natural hazards. Three out of 10 respondents said that government response was influenced by politics.⁹

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Most militarized disaster response



There was concern regarding the overwhelming presence of both local and foreign military troops in Yolanda-affected areas. Though their presence was justified as needed for relief and rehabilitation efforts, concerned communities and organizations questioned the necessity of so many troops, the motives and to what extent they were truly conducting relief operations.

The day before Typhoon Yolanda made landfall, the national government stated that 4,500 AFP troops and additional personnel were on red alert at the Mactan Air Base in Eastern Visayas. Another 6,450 policemen in various units of the region were also on red alert. However, many of these pre-positioned personnel who were within the typhoon-affected areas became victims themselves.¹

The day after the typhoon struck and left the Philippine area of responsibility, 508 personnel from the PNP Special Action Force (SAF), and a 106-man army contingent from Catbalogan City were deployed. But it is unclear if they were conducting search and rescue of typhoon survivors.² The AFP stated that immediately after the typhoon their main priority was to re-establish communications.³

It was only after reports of survivors looting and ransacking in order to survive after days of hunger, as well as the overwhelming number of dead bodies on the streets that more troops were deployed. This was more for security purposes and road-clearing as opposed to conducting actual relief and response operations.⁴

The AFP reported that there were members of the New People's Army (NPA) involved in the looting, launching offensives and sabotaging relief operations. This was thus used to militarize the Yolanda-affected areas and increase their presence. But the AFP reports were proven to be false. It was also reported that the National Democratic Front (NDF) of Eastern Visayas wished to call for a ceasefire to facilitate aid to typhoon victims, but the AFP refused to reciprocate.⁵

By 16 November 2013, around 12,000 troops on the ground had been deployed by the AFP under the Central Command in addition to 3,400 external troops and follow-on forces in Eastern Visayas.⁶

Aside from the numerous local military forces, there was also a great number of foreign military forces in the typhoon-affected areas, particularly that of the US government.



The nuclear-carrying warship USS George Washington that carried 90 jet fighters, helicopters and 6,250 naval soldiers was accompanied by four guided missile cruisers and one supply ship and sailed to the Gulf of Leyte and docked in various parts of Leyte and Samar. Only days after Typhoon Yolanda, the US troops started an open-ended mission in Central Visayas with some 13,000 troops involved in the US military-directed *Oplan Damayan*. They took over Tacloban airport and gained access to Mactan airport and seaport.⁷

IBON survey respondents in fact said that they felt the foreign military more than the local military.⁸ Many have criticized the Aquino administration for allowing so many US military troops to enter Philippine territory, instead of civilian agencies, to conduct “humanitarian relief missions”.

The so-called humanitarian aid and efforts of the US military forces are questionable since many, especially

within the Asia region, are aware of the US defense strategy that features a ‘pivot’ toward the Asia-Pacific. This is done through increased military presence in the region, in which the Philippine plays a crucial role.

Despite people’s protests, the Aquino government agreed to a more widespread and permanent US military presence or “rotational basing” following a series of US-Philippines visits in 2012. The extensive involvement of the US government and its collaboration with the Philippine government during Typhoon Yolanda only proves that the US is serious about its defense strategy. The US is using militarized disaster response to prolong US military intervention in the Philippines.⁹

On 17 December 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to the Philippines and visited Tacloban City. He announced the allocation of US\$40 million in military

US military presence after Yolanda



SURVIVORS SPEAK

Militarized

In Tanauan, the Korean and Malaysian militaries were visible during disaster response. In Tacloban, according to the participants, the military provided security when prisoners broke out of prison during the disaster. Participants from Guiuan felt like there was war in Guiuan, since there was a large number of foreign militaries including the US Navy and American and local soldiers from Zamboanga. The military

simply cleared the roads and “secured” the place. In Pinabacdao, according to the participants, the police and the military simply observed relief-giving and monitored where the assistance was coming from, especially if it was coming from suspected NPA members. A relief volunteer in Carigara, Leyte was killed by suspected military elements on August 23, 2014.

PO TALK

Harassed

BALSA Mindanao was questioned by the LGU for going to remote areas and also not passing through the Mayor's office in La Paz town in Southern Leyte. The Mayor also questioned BALSAs choice of barangays for relief giving. According to the PO, on the other hand, it chose far-flung areas because these were not reached by relief-giving agencies.

In Las Navas town in Northern Samar, a large deployment of military in a school where a medical mission was being conducted frightened

and inhibited the people from availing of the PO's medical mission. In Mapanas, Northern Samar, there were only a few served by medical mission because the presence of soldiers intimidated the people. Incidentally, the place was also badly hit by Typhoon Glenda that struck Eastern Visayas several months later in 2014.

Tabang Eastern Visayas added that the supply of water was cut down in the areas where progressive POs were providing relief assistance.

assistance under the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to "improve the Philippines' maritime security and maritime domain awareness".¹⁰ There was also US\$25 million in humanitarian aid in addition to US\$60 million in disaster assistance already provided.¹¹

The US Embassy in Manila reported that, at its peak, US military presence included more than 13,400 troops, 66 aircraft and 12 naval vessels.¹²

During the weeks following typhoon Yolanda, more military forces from Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Brunei, Thailand and New Zealand joined the 'disaster response'. Thus typhoon Yolanda became the world's most militarized disaster response.¹³



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'Build Back Better'



On 21 November 2013, the NEDA started the process to produce the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda – Build Back Better (RAY) “to be the basis for immediate government interventions in the affected areas and to be a document to facilitate international donor assistance”. The document was presented to the international community in Manila on 18 December 2013.

The PDNA was presented to President Aquino only on 16 May 2014, amounting to Php104.6 billion. The President appointed the OPARR Secretary Panfilo Lacson who established five clusters of governors and mayors (later transitioned to four), and together they supported the formulation of the CRRP for the President’s approval. Lacson finally submitted the CRRP on 1 August 2014. President Aquino approved it on 29 October 2014, near the anniversary date of the disaster.¹

The CRRP’s funding requirement, amounting to Php170.9 billion (when unveiled), is way below RAY’s recovery and reconstruction needs of Php360.9 billion and comprises only 30% of the estimated total cost of damages.² It appears that the Aquino government has simply made the CRRP affordable to investors instead of addressing real needs. Only Php37.4 billion of CRRP’s funding

requirement is funded; the rest will have to be raised from investments. Per cluster, resettlement eats up 44% of the funding requirement, followed by infrastructure (21%), livelihood (19.7%), and social services (15.5%).

The CRRP relies on the private sector (including NGOs), like the RAY that has stipulated the following strategies

- expansion of the public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements for major investment programs;
- streamlining processes to accelerate the issuance of licenses to operate new businesses, especially those that help re-establish critical supply chains;
- facilitating bulk purchase arrangements from the private sector for goods that help meet the basic needs of affected communities; and
- fostering business-community links through “adopt-a-town” partnerships.³

The CRRP is simply a rehash of the Aquino government’s Philippine Development Plan (PDP) whose centerpiece is the PPP program. The CRRP, like the PDP, provides projects, programs and activities (PPAs) to meet the PDNA. The CRRP states that significant efforts shall come from the private sector for PPAs focused on four

key areas, namely education, health, housing, and livelihood. The entities can engage in the recovery efforts as donors, sector sponsors, and/or “development sponsors”.

The OPARR has divided the Yolanda-affected areas into 24 “areas of intervention and development” or AID. Each AID will be sponsored by one or more “development sponsors” who will be responsible for identifying project commitments for education, health, housing, and livelihood. They can also initiate or assist in the facilitation of rehabilitation projects in their “adopted” AID. Meanwhile, sector sponsors are not responsible for specific AID but mostly participate in rehabilitation efforts across several AIDs. Donors are not directly involved in projects but provide financial support.⁴

The Build Back Better framework is the backbone of the RAY and CRRP. The RAY outlined a plan to rehabilitate and recover the areas devastated by Typhoon Yolanda primarily through private sector investment. The NEDA claimed that because bulk of damages and losses were private in nature, the task of recovering them would also be private. The government will only be providing support hence the allocation of only a fraction of estimated needs as RAY’s cost. The PDNA estimated more needs in roads, agriculture, disaster-risk reduction and environmental management than the RAY.

The RAY and CRRP are based on a framework of privatized and corporate-led disaster response and reconstruction. This is because according to the government, RAY estimated that 90% of the total damages and losses caused by Typhoon Yolanda was to privately-owned assets and incomes. The privatization of reconstruction can be seen in how the government organized its efforts to respond: by forming the OPARR which merely acts as the coordinator of private assistance. Just before the first anniversary of Typhoon Yolanda, OPARR considered 20 private companies, 21 private foundations, 15 local NGOs, and 17 international agencies as its partners.

The RAY was updated a year after it was presented. The accomplishment of the updated RAY will be measured according to five areas: Livelihood and Business Support, Housing and Resettlement, Social Sectors, Infrastructure, and Oversight and Performance Monitoring. These outcomes are measured by indicators identified by the NEDA based on the PDP and CRRP results matrices guided by an overall policy framework of PPP, investor-driven growth and social protection.

For housing and resettlement, the government puts the responsibility to rebuild or repair on the house owner while it prioritizes clearing the areas near the coast. The government seeks to provide merely “sufficient support” as it believes that it is primarily the responsibility of each household to find suitable housing. Majority of its financing options is for the private sector, such as giving incentives to promote private sector construction, private sector contribution through corporate social responsibility (CSR)



funding, and donor contributions to develop community-based housing schemes. Likewise, the government wants to assess the strict implementation of the no-dwelling zone because of its concerns that the government will bear the responsibility of addressing massive involuntary resettlement and provision of

alternative livelihood to those who will be displaced.

For livelihood and business support, the RAY has been focusing on supporting banks and microfinance institutions and establishing businesses in the affected areas instead on how to bring about sustainable capital to small producers. It is focusing on providing banks and microfinance companies incentives such as bank guarantees, establishment of a disaster loan fund for lending institutions, and facilitating further credit flow in order for these companies to loan money to survivors. Second, it is looking into granting temporary tax holidays to businesses. The revised RAY maintains the low allocation for agriculture recovery despite the huge estimates of loss. In the coconut subsector, the government will support in the area of providing technological and market support for landlords-businessmen.

The infrastructure targets of RAY are confined to outputs consisting of public infrastructures. It will use existing mechanisms such as PPP and regular contracting mechanisms as provided for in the PDP to construct roads, bridges and other public infrastructure. First, there is an added focus on building resilient infrastructure and increasing the government's capacity to construct in a bigger scale. For utilities such as electricity and water supply, the government will provide the private sector additional financing needs. Second, the infrastructure targets include the implementation of the no-dwelling zone policy and the drawing up of CLUPs as the mechanism to identify other hazard zones.

By January 2015, 18 corporations were considered "development partners", which have committed to rehabilitate their respective AIDs, according to the OPARR. Some of these corporations are owned by only one group such as ABS-CBN Lingkod Kapamilya Foundation Inc. and Energy Development Corporation (Lopez); Ayala Land and Ayala Foundation; International Container Terminal Services Inc. (ICTSI) and Bloomberry Cultural Foundation Inc. (Razon); and RCBC and Yuchengco group of companies, etc.

These corporations are owned by the country's richest families: Gokongwei, Zobel-Ayala, Aboitiz, Pangilinan, Ty, Razon, Sia, Lopez, Zamora, Gaisano, Cojuangco, Ang, Tan, Sy, Yuchengco. These families have interests in property development and real estate with the exception of the Zamoras who are known for mining interests. Pangilinan's Metro Pacific Holdings, which is partly owned by Indonesian magnate Salim and has interests in water and power and is seeking to expand its interests in property development, adopted Tacloban City and Capiz. Razon's interest in Tacloban lies in it being the major transport hub of Eastern Visayas. This fits his interest in ports and storage as well as in resorts and casinos. Razon, who also chose to sponsor Tacloban, holds the Philippines subsidiary of Bloomberry, a giant gaming corporation, and has interests in developing resorts and casinos located near international seaports and on reclaimed land. The Razon Group also owns ICTSI, one of the largest shipping and storage companies in the country.⁵

The corporate-led framework of the CRRP is also highlighted by President Aquino's choice of appointee for the position of Executive Director of PARR. He appointed Danilo Antonio, chief operating officer of Eton Properties, the real estate holding of tycoon Lucio Tan, to assist Lacson in the implementation of private-initiated projects.

The CRRP must be complemented by rehabilitation and recovery plans at the provincial and city levels. The LGUs thus are enjoined to raise their own investments. Budget allocation, on the other hand, will have to be coordinated with the agencies involved. Upon the publication of the CRRP, the LGUs of the affected areas already had their respective LRRPs. The LGUs employed different strategies to implement these plans.

According to the CRRP, the Leyte Provincial DRRMC is tasked to oversee the implementation of its LRRP through a Rehabilitation and Recovery Team. The team has Governor Leopoldo Dominico Petilla as its chairman and is composed of cluster heads from different agencies. The overall secretariat is the Provincial Planning and Development Office (PPDO).

Meanwhile, Tacloban City LGU established the Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TRSDG), which is a multi-stakeholder group led by the City Government of Tacloban and UN Habitat, with key government agencies and stakeholders from the city as its members. The City Planning and Development Office and the City Human Resource Management and Development Office head the secretariat, which was formed to oversee the administrative, coordination, and other support functions of the TRSDG.

The TRSDG and UN Habitat organized planning workshops participated in by national government, humanitarian clusters, NGOs, private sector, etc. with support from the UNDP. Planners from Arcadis, a global consulting/engineering company and partner of UN Habitat, gave inputs on promoting sustainable shelter and urban development. Also, the Alliance for Safe and Sustainable Reconstruction (ASSURE) was hired to give key inputs in developing the plan.

The Provincial Government of Samar, on the other hand, established the Provincial Reconstruction Management Office (PRMO) by virtue of an Executive Order, which is tasked to oversee the implementation of the LRRP. It is headed by the PPDO and government officials from engineering, health, agriculture, tourism, education, trade and industry, and environment provincial offices.

In Eastern Samar likewise, the PDRRMC is overseeing the LRRP in coordination with municipal and barangay DRRM offices. A monitoring and evaluation team will be organized at the provincial level. In Biliran, the provincial government created a PDRRMC with the Governor as chairman. A multi-stakeholder DRR/climate change adaptation (CCA) technical working group was established to oversee implementation of the LRRP.

VIEWS FROM LGUs

Ruling party rules

Leyte Governor Petilla confirmed that donations from other countries were channeled directly to the national government while other funds for rehabilitation are included in the national budget and as savings from previous years. The funds of the DILG were “downloaded” to LGU-related projects. There had also been “quick funds” from the DOH, since the province has public hospitals, from the DepEd for damaged schools, and from the DSWD for fully damaged (Php30,000-40,000) and partially damaged (Php10,000) houses.

Water supply was fully restored three days after the typhoon. All towns were energized by 20 December 2013 and all barangays by April 2014. It was only in May 2014, however, that transportation normalized.

According to Governor Petilla, INGOs observed that recovery in Leyte was faster compared to recovery in Haiti. As early as January 2014, there were NGOs (food, medical, emergency) that were already leaving the country. Those involved in reconstruction and rebuilding (schools, shelters, health centers) remained. According to the Governor, people have been generally calm and back to work.

The Governor affirmed that fresh investments specifically in small businesses are coming in, especially to Tanauan and Palo. The Leyte LGU is also negotiating with interested investors in a 3,000-hectare banana plantation. Apparently, there is a processing plant in Baybay City with a capacity of 70 tons, but Leyte can supply only 2 tons. The LGU thus sources bananas from Mindanao. Apparently too, the OPARR facilitates private investments to the LGUs.

However, there seems to be inconsistency with what the city or provincial LGUs are saying. The City Administration of Tacloban actively participated in the formulation of the CRRP, but it has become frustrating, according to the office, because everything has remained simply a plan. Tacloban City started with its own money, building transitional shelters until others groups like Operation Compassion, Operation Blessing, CRS, Oxfam, and IOM followed.

The Tacloban City Mayor decided to let the city swim on its own. Even the commitments of the international communities were redirected. The Mayor explained that the INGOs started operations and were focused in Tacloban City but were redirected by their mother units, suspecting that the national government did not want these organizations dealing directly with Tacloban City. The World Bank meanwhile did an assessment of relief and rehabilitation work and realized that so much has been channeled to Tacloban City, yet nothing has happened until now.

On the contrary, Tanauan was made the pilot area for recovery and rehabilitation. Its plan was submitted to OPARR Secretary Lacson during his visit, and Lacson helped facilitate the initial development such as the Tanauan Plaza through Edgar InJap Sia (co-owner of the fastfood chain, Mang Inasal who recently expanded to property development), the reconstruction of the public market, and Gawad Kalinga permanent shelter.

On the other hand, the Mayor of Pinabacdao, when asked about RAY, said “RAY? Nobody told me about RAY”. The national government never called the LGU to be part of the meeting for rehabilitation. The OPARR indeed asked for proposals, but the LGU could not make one because the LGU lost its resources. The OPARR plan was presented only in July 2014, and it was already in reconstruction phase.

Not a novel concept

Build Back Better is being used by the Philippine government as a slogan for the reconstruction post-Yolanda, and essentially refers to the principles behind RAY. However, Build Back Better is a foreign aid mechanism that supports and facilitates corporate-led and investment-driven reconstruction.

This mechanism originated from the post-tsunami rehabilitation used by the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami and former US president Bill Clinton. It was created and widely used by international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the ADB, by developed countries, as well as the UN.⁶

Build Back Better was previously applied in other disaster-hit countries such as after the earthquake in Kashmir (Pakistan), Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, and more recently, in the massive earthquake in Haiti. In these countries, foreign corporations, INGOs and foreign governments were involved in the reconstruction of the economy, which had only benefited themselves.

Looking at the experience of Haiti, the Build Back Better framework created opportunities for big corporations to construct hotels and industrial parks. However, four years later, there were still not enough houses for survivors with many still sheltered in camps. Infrastructure projects under Build Back Better did not lead to livelihood opportunities for the survivors.

SOUNDS FAMILIAR

Haiti in the rubble

Haiti suffered a massive earthquake in January 2010. Barely 24 hours after the earthquake, right-wing think tank Heritage Foundation came up with a paper titled *Amidst the Suffering, Crisis in Haiti Offers Opportunities to the US*, laying down opportunities for the US to profit in Haiti through privatization and corporate-led reconstruction. Two months after the earthquake, companies attended the “Haiti Summit” in the US to discuss post-earthquake contracting possibilities.

Bill Clinton with the UN and the World Bank set up and spearheaded the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission one year after the earthquake to implement Build Back Better. US-based consultants created the Commission’s master plan, and its first activity was a US\$2-million housing expo which showcased the various models of corporations for post-earthquake construction. The earthquake destroyed 100,000 houses and more were damaged.

In the first year after the earthquake, the US government awarded more than 1,500 rehabilitation contracts worth US\$267 million. All went to US firms except 20 worth US\$4.3 million, which went to Haitian businesses. USAID awarded over US\$46 million to contractors for housing. Reconstruction contracts were in the main awarded to large international companies, most of which have bad records with previous reconstruction contracts such as AshBritt Environmental, CHF International. About

42.5% of contracts in the first five months were ‘no-bid’ contracts.⁷

By September 2013, nearly four years after the earthquake, only 7,500 new homes had been built and 27,000 repaired, very small number considering the billions of dollars that poured in. By January 2013, some 350,000 Haitians are still living in camps.⁸ Some 55,000 families have received one-time payments of about US\$500 to leave the camps. Some 10,000 people were evicted from the city and dumped on a wasteland.⁹

A huge chunk of foreign aid to Haiti went to the businesses of big corporations. A big portion of the USAID fund, or some US\$170.3 million went to the construction of a power plant and port for the industrial park, which was the centerpiece of US reconstruction efforts.¹⁰ Some US\$7.5 million from the World Bank’s private financing arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and US\$2 million from the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund went to the Oasis project, a luxury tourism complex.¹¹ Marriott International and telecom giant Digicel got US\$26.5 million ‘financial boost’ from the IFC.

These hotels and tourism facilities were among the several luxury hotels that were constructed as part of Build Back Better reconstruction program. IFC justified its financial arrangement with hotel corporations by saying that the construction will create jobs.¹² The IFC currently has about US\$78.5 million worth of investments in Haiti. In total, almost half of IFC investments have helped the construction of deluxe hotels in a rich suburb.¹³

‘No build zones’

The principle of ‘no build zones’ is not new either under the framework of ‘build back better’. In order to maintain the devastated areas clear, especially near the coast, the Aquino government declared no build zones, with the DENR delineating 40-meter no-build zones from the coasts, which cover about 100 kilometers of coastline in Samar and Leyte. The DPWH put up the signs that areas within 40 meters from the shoreline is a no build zone in February 2014. The Aquino government said that these zones were for the growing of mangroves and beach forests that would protect the areas against storms.¹⁴ An estimated 10.8 million people will be displaced by the policy.

Sec. Lacson however immediately proposed to change the term to “no dwelling zones”.¹⁵ This is obviously to allow tourism-related infrastructures to be built while the government prohibits survivors to go back to their dwelling places. Despite the lack of regional master plans, corporations have started recovery and reconstruction works according to their own corporate agenda, with Sec. Lacson coordinating their projects.

The ‘no build zone’ policy is integrated in the RAY as a platform for the implementation of its housing and resettlement and infrastructure goals. One of the goals of the RAY is the completion of revised comprehensive land use plans or CLUPs that will lay down areas for new housing, commercial and industrial use and hazard zones. This will be applied to housing and resettlement, infrastructure and even in livelihood and business targets. The constant reminder of building more resilient structures in safe areas echoes not only in the RAY but in the strategies of other countries that followed the model and implemented the ‘no build zone’ policy.

Many of RAY’s targets are actually framed around the outcomes of implementing a ‘no-build zone’ policy. The housing and resettlement targets, infrastructure targets and even the livelihood and social services targets rely on the clearing of ‘unsafe’ zones. Indicators that these targets have been met are: increased tourist arrivals for job generation; the improvement of tourist destination areas in terms of water supply; and overall regional economic growth targets. These are further based on the assumption that there will be increased commercial activities in ‘no build zones’.¹⁶

The housing and resettlement targets for example will be measured by the reduction of the percentage of families located in 'unsafe zones' and by the percentage increase of families resettled from 'unsafe zones' to safer areas. Yet, the government is planning to reconsider the 'no-build zone' policy in order to allow other establishments to be built in these so-called unsafe zones. The OPARR recommends the classification of coastal areas into "safe zones", "unsafe zones", or "controlled zones". Building in so-called controlled zones will be allowed as long the developers will establish "mitigating measures" such as mangroves, catch basins, or sea walls to protect against disasters.¹⁷

The policy has led to permanent displacement of survivors. Estimates peg the households to be displaced at around 252,688 fishing households (National Anti-Poverty Commission estimate) while the fisherfolk group Pamalakaya estimated that

70,000 families, mostly farmers and fisherfolk will be displaced in Panay island alone.¹⁸ About 13 LGUs in said provinces have already expressed that the policy "might constitute forced eviction, which is considered a gross violation of human rights."¹⁹

This policy has been widely implemented in coastal areas in the countries affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and the Maldives, the common theme was the designation of buffer zones in the coastal areas, which used to be inhabited by fisherfolk and households with fishery-based activities. In these countries, the common experience was also that there was no consultation that took place before the delineation of the coastal areas as no build zones, the prohibition of those who used to live in the coastal areas to rebuild their homes, the entry of property developers for tourism and other commercial infrastructures and the displacement of households from their sources of livelihood.²⁰

SOUNDS FAMILIAR

NDZ in India, Sri Lanka and Thailand

After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, according to the Central Government of India notification, there should be no buildings – both residential and non-residential within a 1,000-meter distance from the seashore. Barely two years after the tsunami, the present Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu announced a Tamil Nadu-Malaysian Government joint venture to construct residential buildings for the personnel belonging to multinational companies and foreign embassies in the so-called no build zone.

The State government of Tamil Nadu promoted eco-tourism and allowed the corporate and multinational sectors to construct buildings after evicting and relocating people traditionally living along the seashores in the name of protection from future tsunami disasters. Traditional rights of the fishers were violated as the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Revenue Administration Department of Government of Tamil Nadu has instructed 13 coastal districts to compulsorily relocate even those living within 500-meter distance from the seashore and take over the lands and buildings thus vacated.

The Tamil Nadu government has developed the mangrove-rich areas on Pichavaram in Cuddalore district for ecotourism. The development of the Nagapattinam port, which did not push through before the tsunami, also pushed through because of coastal regulation zone and forcible evictions. Other big projects in supposedly no build zones were the construction of International Tourism Convention Centre in Mahabalipuram and the construction of a compound wall of 1,000 kilometers from Chennai to Kanyakumari.²¹

In Chennai, India, about 2,000 tsunami-affected families previously residing in the coastal village of Thideer Nagar – many of whom are Dalits – were forcibly relocated to Okkium Thuraipakkam site without their consultation. The government told them that for the people to get housing assistance, all houses within the 200-meter high tide line have to be relocated. The destruction of the tsunami enabled commercial interests, which have long wanted to acquire the land occupied by fishing communities, to displace these communities. The World Bank funded the construction of temporary shelters in the relocation site located in the low-lying areas in the outskirts of the city. The displaced households had to find other means of livelihood.²²

In the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, the displaced households were housed in closely guarded barracks, which prevented them from returning to the sites of their previous homes. Many investors however were encouraged to develop the fishing village into an oceanfront "high-end boutique tourism destination", which will be a model to other 30 'no build zones' in South Asia. Government land was also opened to private buyers. It was the private sector, which made a blueprint of reconstruction from housing, hotels, and other infrastructure.²³

In Thailand, the government implemented the Designated Areas for Sustainable Tourism Administration (DASTA) programme in the tsunami-affected areas to usher in large-scale private investment along the coast. The government has projected mega development projects and exclusive tourism developments under the post-tsunami recovery programme.

Build back who?

Who is government rehabilitating? In a statement made three days after Typhoon Yolanda struck the Visayas, President Aquino was already citing the relief and response efforts by the private sector.²⁴ In the RAY, a whole section is devoted to the role of private sector in recovery and rehabilitation. The Aquino government further stresses that, "... government seeks to enable new modalities to encourage and facilitate the active involvement of the private sector in implementing RAY".²⁵ As previously mentioned, the RAY closely resembles the PDP, which is anchored on private sector role especially through the PPP.²⁶ And as Panfilo Lacson said as soon as he became OPARR Secretary, "... the private sector will figure prominently in rehabilitation efforts and their efforts will outlive the Aquino government".²⁷

On the contrary, the Aquino government has had bad attitude towards some NGOs and POs that have also done relief and rehabilitation efforts. There have many stories how the government and armed forces have stopped NGO and PO efforts especially if they are suspected of supporting the communist movement.

In January 2014, Anakpawis regional coordinator Lloyd Laoreno was tailed by five motorcycle-riding men who were suspected members of the military. While coordinating local leaders in Palo for a relief mission, Laoreno was followed from Tacloban City until Jaro, Leyte where he traveled to avoid potential danger.²⁸ On 18 November 2013, volunteers of Balsa-Mindanao were also harassed by elements of the PNP in Tolosa, Leyte. The PNP scolded the volunteers from Mindanao, questioning why they needed to deliver relief packages to people in the town's interior villages.²⁹

On 19 June 2014, the Panay Center for Disaster Response (PCDR) office, which provides relief aid to

affected communities in Northern Iloilo, Capiz, Antique, and Aklan, was ransacked by three unidentified men. Staff and volunteers of PCDR were handcuffed and their faces partially taped. The masked intruders took laptops, memory sticks, printed documents, hard drives, mobile phones, logbooks, and cameras. The NGO suspects that the men are members of the military, since they took items that would not normally be targeted in a mere robbery.³⁰

People Surge is a broad alliance of Yolanda survivors, organizations and individuals dedicated to helping typhoon victims and minimizing if not preventing the risks of future calamities. It is fighting for the rights of Yolanda survivors and seeking justice for the victims and in the light of the Aquino administration's negligence and incompetence in ensuring their safety and welfare.³¹

On 17 February 2014, People Surge went to the Office of the President (Malacañang) to present their petition signed by more than 17,000 people displaced by Typhoon Yolanda. The petition presents their demands, including the demand for Php40,000 in immediate cash relief to each survivor for house repairs and help with other financial difficulties. The members of People Surge were made to wait for three hours at the Malacañang. The group, led by the chairperson Sister Edita Eslopör, left when no officials came to speak with them. They left the petition with a clerk at the records office.^{32 33}

Eventually, President Aquino answered People Surge through the media, only stating that it would not be possible to meet their demand for the Php40,000 immediate cash relief. He did not respond to the other demands of the group.³⁴ He even criticized the survivors saying, "To those who are saying that we have been slow in responding... it seems to me that if they are capable of attending to their trip to Manila, perhaps they can also attend to their livelihood".³⁵

SURVIVORS SPEAK

Bad attitude, bad response

In Tanauan, NGOs and INGOs were prohibited by the governor to provide assistance to communities in the NDZs and that all the NGOs and INGOs were required to coordinate with the LGU. Relief to NDZ communities is being "controlled" by the LGU.

In Guiuan, the participants observed that the INGOS did not trust the LGU and did not want to pass or coordinate with the LGU. This was true especially with the Americans who saw that their relief was being replaced with other items. The IOM for instance knew that their relief was being stored at the LGU and said that it had no choice but to keep quiet otherwise they might not be allowed to enter communities and provide relief. On the other hand, World Renew American volunteers made a survey on the needs of

the people, but the municipal LGU allegedly did not want to approve of INGO's choice of beneficiaries and insisted the relief assistance be given to the LGU's list of beneficiaries. In the end, no relief assistance reached the intended beneficiaries.

The UNICEF was also supposed to have provided Php40,000 to all families in Bgy 6. The UNICEF coursed the cash assistance through the DSWD, but the DSWD provided assistance only to 4Ps members and gave only Php4,000 a month for six months.

In Biliran, there was a tendency for certain relief assistance to be trafficked and prevented from going to the intended beneficiaries. The participants also observed that the LGU treated the People Surge and other POs differently. The LGU suspect them of being subversives. They are tagged or regarded as rebels, making it hard for the POs to move freely and make demands for relief and justice.

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Build back worse

The problem with ‘build back better’ is that the root causes of vulnerability to disasters are not being addressed. In fact, there are indications that the CRRP is even bound to exacerbate the country’s lack of adaptive capacity including a resilient economy.

Poorer than poor

Eastern Visayas was the second poorest region after the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 2012. The region’s poverty incidence was 37.4% among families and 45.2% among the population, considerably higher than the national incidence of 19.7% among families and 25.2% among the population. The region has consistently ranked one of the poorest regions since 2006, falling from fifth poorest region to second poorest in 2012.¹ If poverty estimates by IBON would be used (Php68 a day), Eastern Visayas would register 3.4 million poor people. (See Table 9)

The average household income in 2012 was Php166,735, the fifth lowest nationwide and 29.4% lower than the national average. Average expenditures amounted to Php131,927, which was 31.5% lower than the national average.²

Also, based on the 2011 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) of the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), families in the Eastern Visayas had the highest incidence of hunger. About 16.2% of total families surveyed said they experienced hunger compared to the national percentage of 6.3 percent. Of the poor families surveyed, 24.7% experienced hunger, while 8.5% of non-poor families experienced hunger.³

Poor social outcomes

A significant number of children 0-5 years old had some form of malnutrition: 25.7% were underweight, 41.7% were stunting (failing to gain sufficient height for their age), and 7.8% were wasting (failing to achieve sufficient weight for their height).⁴ (See Table 10)

Based on the 2011 Family Health Survey, Eastern Visayas also had the highest infant mortality rate (IMR) with 40 deaths per 1,000 live births, and under five mortality rate (U5MR) with 53 deaths per 1,000 live births. This is almost double the national IMR of 22 deaths per 1,000 live births and U5MR of 30 deaths per 1,000 live births.⁵ Maternal mortality was 79 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2011.⁶ (See Table 10)

Table 9. Poverty Indicators

Indicators	Eastern Visayas	Philippines
Poverty incidence (2012; in %)		
Poverty incidence among families	37.4	19.7
Poverty incidence among the population	45.2	25.2
Income and expenditure (2012; in Php)		
Average household income	165,735.03	234,612.06
Average household expenditure	131,926.83	192,537.66
Hunger incidence (2011; in %)		
Hunger incidence among families	16.2	6.3
Hunger incidence among poor families	24.7	14.5
Hunger incidence among non-poor families	8.5	2.8

Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistical Coordination Board 2012 Official Poverty Statistics, Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office 2012 Family Income and Expenditure Survey and 2011 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey

In terms of education, net enrollment rate for the school year 2010-2011 was 91.52%, higher than the national rate of 89.89 percent.⁷ Yet, the cohort survival rate for both public and private elementary schools for the same school year was 73.61%, lower than the national rate of 75.39 percent. Secondary school cohort survival was 73.13% while the national rate was 79.43 percent.⁸ In 2012, 210,000 or 13.4% of children 5-17 years old in the region were not attending school.⁹ (See Table 10)

In addition, a big number of destroyed infrastructures are schools which until a year later remained unrepaired. In the IBON survey conducted in Eastern Visayas, five out of 10 respondents said that there are structures which were destroyed and have not been rebuilt. Seven out of 10 of these respondents identified schools as needing repairs.¹⁰

Ravaged agrarian, extractive economy

In the past few years, the economy of Eastern Visayas had mostly remained stagnant. There was a slight increase in the gross regional domestic product (GRDP) of 2.1% in 2011 from 2010, which however fell by 6.4% in 2012.¹¹ This was attributed to the six-month production halt at the PASAR due to a fire. The region bounced back by 5.7% when PASAR production resumed.

Average annual growth rate from 2011 to 2013 was only 0.4 percent. Meanwhile, it contributed an annual average of 2.4% to the national gross domestic product

Table 10. Social Outcomes

Indicators	Eastern Visayas	Philippines
Malnutrition (2011; in %)		
Underweight	25.7	20.2
Stunting	41.7	33.6
Wasting	7.8	7.3
Mortality (2011; in %) ^a		
Infant mortality rate	9.4	8.6
Under five mortality rate	1.4	1.1
Maternal mortality rate	79.4	67.2
Education (in %) ^b		
Net enrollment rate	91.5	89.9
Cohort survival rate - Elementary	73.6	75.4
Cohort survival rate - Secondary	73.1	79.4
Children 5-17 not attending school	13.4	11.8

a - mortality rates are as per 1,000 live births, except for maternal mortality rate that is per 100,000 live births.

b - as of school year 2010-2011, except for children 5-17 not attending school that is as of 2012.

Sources: Food and Nutrition Research Institute, Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office 2011 Family Health Survey, Department of Health 2011 Field Health Service Information System, Department of Education, Philippine Statistics Authority-Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics 2013 Yearbook of Labor Statistics

(GDP) from 2010 to 2013.¹² The industry sector was the biggest contributor to the GRDP in 2010 and 2011 due mainly to significant growth in mining and quarrying. The sector decreased by 18.8% in 2012 due to, as mentioned above, the PASAR shutdown, but came back by 14.1% in 2013, contributing 41.1% to the GRDP. The services sector was another significant contributor, registering positive growth from 2010 to 2013 due to increased private sector investment. The sector grew by 7.3% in 2012, accounting for 39.3% of the GRDP, but slightly declined to 38.9% in 2013. The agriculture sector, on the other hand, exhibited increasingly negative growth rate: 0.8% in 2011, 3.0% in 2012, and 6.6% in 2013. The sector's contribution to the GRDP fell from 22.6% in 2012 to 20.0% in 2013.¹³ (See Table 11)

Yet, Eastern Visayas is mainly an agricultural region. Latest available data from the Census of Agriculture indicates that in 2002, the agricultural land area of Eastern Visayas was 723,048 hectares (which may have increased in the last 12 years), comprising more than 31% of total land area. Coconut and palay were the major crops produced, accounting for 368,322 hectares and 228,256 hectares of area harvested, respectively in 2002.¹⁴

Based on data in 2013 from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), the area planted to coconut has

Table 11. Regional Accounts of the Philippines, 2010-2013 (at constant 2000 prices; in million Php)

Region and Sector	2010	2011	2012	2013
Philippines	5,701,539	5,910,201	6,312,174	6,765,459
Eastern Visayas	150,799	153,901	144,030	152,194
<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>33,899</i>	<i>33,630</i>	<i>32,607</i>	<i>30,457</i>
<i>Industry</i>	<i>66,345</i>	<i>67,457</i>	<i>54,761</i>	<i>62,497</i>
<i>Services</i>	<i>50,555</i>	<i>52,814</i>	<i>56,662</i>	<i>59,240</i>

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistical Coordination Board 2010-2012 and 2011-2013 Gross Regional Domestic Product

increased to 419,640 hectares, while area harvested to rice increased to 282,153 hectares. In 2012, 1.8 million MT of coconut was produced, accounting for 11.2% of the country's total volume of production. Rice production was 994,972 MT or 5.5% of the country's total production. Eastern Visayas is the third largest producer of coconut and the eighth largest producer of rice in the country.¹⁵

Fisheries and aquaculture is also an important part of the regional agro-economy, accounting for 23.7% of the agricultural gross value added (GVA) and 5.4% of the GRDP in 2012. The regional fisheries sector produced about 200,417 MT or 4% of total fisheries production.¹⁶

The main sources of livelihood in Eastern Visayas are in agriculture, fisheries, and the service sector. The region had a labor force population of about 1.9 million and a participation rate of 63.5% in 2012. (See Table 12) Of the region's 1.8 million total employed, about 787,000 or 44.4% were employed in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fisheries. Meanwhile, 810,000 or 45.7% were employed in services, and 173,000 or 9.8% in industry. (See Table 13) Estimates also show that around 92% of the families in Eastern Visayas are earning from agriculture; 52% of the families are directly participating in agriculture. Of which, 51% are tenants.

Also in 2012, official underemployment rate was 25% and unemployment rate was at 5.2 percent.

Unpaid family workers accounted for 13.3% of the region's employed. (See Table 14) Meanwhile, working children in the region numbered 189,000, of which 111,000 or 58.7% worked in the agriculture sector. Of these working children, 97,000 were attending school with a school attendance rate of 51.3 percent.¹⁷ (See Table 15)

The region is the worst performer in the otherwise fake land reform program, the CARP. In 2013, only 635

Table 12. Eastern Visayas Labor Force Indicators, 2012 (population in thousands; rate in %)

Population 15 years old and over	2,942
Labor force	1,868
Employed	1,771
Underemployed	442
Unemployed	98
Not in the labor force	2,844
Participation rate	63.5
Employment rate	94.8
Underemployment rate	25.0
Unemployment rate	5.2

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office 2012 Labor Force Survey

hectares was 'distributed', only 6% of target and the least in the country. In total, only 429,374 hectares was 'distributed', the second worst performance (only 64% of target) in the country.

Region 8 has the largest land remaining on leasehold (226,659 hectares), the worst poverty incidence (77%) among so-called agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs), and lowest number of paid or fully paid farmers (farmers who have amortized for the land awarded to them).

According to the survey conducted by IBON in Eastern Visayas, more than half of the respondents still rely on agriculture: 36% are primarily into farming, while 23% are fisherfolk. Among the farmer respondents, 53.4% are tenants and only 35.9% own the land they are cultivating. Most of them harvested coconuts, root crops, various vegetables and palay. Of those who are into fishing, more than half use fishnets and fishing lines. Only one-third of fishing households use motorized boats and another one-third rely on small non-motorized boats with oars. One out of five respondents is a laborer (or engage in *pasuhol*, local term for short-term contracted labor). Others get by with small businesses (11.2%), and as employees (government employees, 2.5%; private sector employees, 1.5%). Others rely on pensions and support from relatives.¹⁸

While most families tried to find other sources of income, opportunities remained few during the survey period. Only 17.1% had other sources of income, of which most were still resorting to short-time labor. With limited opportunities, 8 out of 10 respondents said their families earned less than Php5,000 on average every month. This is followed distantly by 15% of the respondents saying that they earned Php5,000-9,999 on average.¹⁹

The region has been hosting large-scale mining operations that have destroyed the environment and put

Table 13. Total Employed Persons in Eastern Visayas By Industry Group, 2012 (in thousands)

Total employed persons	1,771
Agriculture	787
<i>Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry</i>	632
<i>Fishing</i>	155
Industry	173
<i>Mining and quarrying</i>	5
<i>Manufacturing</i>	83
<i>Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply</i>	4
<i>Water supply; Sewearge, waste managemnet and remediation activities</i>	2
<i>Construction</i>	79
Services	810
<i>Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles</i>	308
<i>Transportation and storage</i>	96
<i>Accommodation and food services activities</i>	42
<i>Information and communication</i>	10
<i>Financial and insurance activities</i>	11
<i>Real estate activities</i>	2
<i>Professional, scientific and technical activities</i>	3
<i>Administrative and support service activities</i>	13
<i>Public administration and defense; Compulsory social security</i>	114
<i>Education</i>	59
<i>Human health and social work activities</i>	18
<i>Arts, entertainment and recreation</i>	9
<i>Other service activities</i>	99
<i>Activities of households as employers; Undifferentiated goods and service-producing activities of households for own use</i>	26
<i>Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies</i>	-

Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding off.
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office 2012 Labor Force Survey

the affected communities in greater peril even before Typhoon Yolanda. Chinese corporations such as Nicua Mining Corp. and Peng Cheng Metallic Resources Inc. mine magnetite, nickel and chromite. Small fisherfolk and other families who depend on the seas and lakes for livelihood have been economically displaced. Nickel Asia, the largest nickel mining company in the Philippines and owned by the Zamora Group and Japanese corporations, has been mining in Guiuan for years now. (See Map 2)

Table 14. Total Employed Persons in Eastern Visayas By Class of Worker, 2012 (in thousands)

Total employed persons	1,771
Wage and salary workers	863
Own account workers	670
<i>Self-employed</i>	617
<i>Employer</i>	53
Unpaid family workers	236

Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding off.
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office 2012 Labor Force Survey

Table 15. Working children in Eastern Visayas, 2012 (in thousands)

Population 5-17 years old	1,562
Working children 5-17 years old	189
Currently attending school	97
<i>Employed by industry group</i>	
Agriculture	111
Industry	10
Service	66

Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding off.
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office 2012 Labor Force Survey


Mining in the region has become more prominent after Typhoon Yolanda. Corporations with mining interests such as the Pangilinan Group and Nickel Asia have been at the frontline of “rehabilitation and reconstruction” while continuing the devastation of Eastern Visayas.

Ravaged to the ground

There was a notable decrease in both rice and corn production in Eastern Visayas after Typhoon Yolanda. Rice production region-wide registered a negative 1.6% growth rate from first semester of 2013 to first semester of 2014. There was only slight growth in rice production in Eastern and Northern Samar, while negative growth was registered in the region’s remaining provinces. Western Samar had the worst negative growth at -8.8%, followed by Southern Leyte with -3.4 percent.²⁰ (See Table 16)

In terms of corn production, Eastern Visayas had a negative growth rate of -5.2 percent. Eastern Samar had positive growth of 10.2%, while Northern Samar had 5.8% growth. This was in contrast to negative growth rates in the rest of the region. Western Samar again plunged by negative 32.8%, followed by Southern Leyte at negative 7.1%.²¹ (See Table 16)

Map 2. Existing mining activities in Eastern Visayas



Source: Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources

3. Alberta Resources Devt. Corp
4. Daprosa C. Perez
5. Luvimin Cebu Mining Corp. and TVI Resources Devt. (Phils)
6. Explosive Consultation and Application (ECA) Phils, Inc.
7. Explosive Consultation and Application (ECA) Phils, Inc.
8. Fastem Construction Incorporated
9. Strong Built (Mining) Development Corp.
10. Vincent Tan Tions
11. Cambayas Miining Corp.
12. Jorge P. Tan Jr
13. Edgar L. Lim
14. Mt. Sinai Exploration Mining and Development Corporation

Approved Industrial Sand and Gravel Permits

1. Philip Ray N. Bonife
2. Lemuel Molina
3. Sixto N. Chu
4. Bach Concrete Aggregates Co. Inc.
5. Manuel T. Salazar
6. Ernesto U. Dacay Jr.
7. Jerry M. Lanoy
8. Familia Homes, Inc.
9. Rodolfo L. Servacio
10. Cleto Tagura
11. Nelson R. Chan
12. Tereso B. Primer
13. Jerry M. Lanoy
14. Bernardo O. Sanchez
15. LRM Construction
16. Masada Resources and Mining Corporation
17. Romeo C. Teoco
18. Eastern Rock Enterprises
19. Romeo N. Villeza
20. Rainier D. Mancera
21. Clarita C. Madelero
22. Rogelio F. Villahermosa
23. Ma. Selena R. Salas
24. Rodolfo L. Servacio
25. Francis Lloyd T. Chua
26. Federico C. Paltad
27. Marisse S. Serafica
28. Zelda V. Ogario
29. Conrada R. Villahermosa
30. Luz G. Ortega
31. Lourdes P. Chua
32. Golden Rock Marketing
33. Myles Anthony Siao
34. Romeo N. Villeza
35. Danilo M. Pascual
36. Manuel A. Chua
37. Rodolfo M. Maat
38. Ma. Nancy S. Mostacesa
39. Adelfa A. Lagat
40. Roger L. Tinay
41. Celedonia S. Catingub
42. Lorenzo M. Baltonado Jr.
43. Herminia A. Primer

**Permittee / Tenement holder
Approved Exploration Permits (iron, magnetite, nickel, and other associated mineral deposits)**

1. Mt. Mogan Resources and Development Corporation
2. Mt. Mogan Resources and Development Corporation
3. Xing Fu Fa Mining Corp. (Assignment from CVMR Resources (Phils.).

Approved Mineral Processing Permits (limestone, sand and gravel, and other associated minerals)

1. Pheschem Industrial Corporation
2. Kenith Builders Development Inc.
3. MAC Builders

Existing Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (copper, gold, chromite, cobalt, dolomite, iron, limestone, magnetite, manganese, nickel, rock phosphate, and other associated deposits)

1. Hinatuan Mining Corp.
2. Cosco Capital Inc (changed name from Alcorn Gold Resources Corp)

Table 16. Palay and corn production in Eastern Visayas, First Semester 2013-2014 (in metric tons)

Crop and Region and Province	First Sem 2013	First Sem 2014
Palay production		
Eastern Visayas	531,728	523,113
Biliran	32,219	32,111
Eastern Samar	32,131	32,428
Leyte	290,189	288,616
Northern Samar	56,420	56,912
Southern Leyte	53,839	51,991
Western Samar	66,930	61,055
Corn production		
Eastern Visayas	44,161	41,868
Biliran	409	408
Eastern Samar	255	281
Leyte	29,850	29,185
Northern Samar	6,834	7,227
Southern Leyte	723	672
Western Samar	6,090	4,095

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority-Bureau of Agricultural Statistics Statistical Database

The coconut subsector has been the most devastated, with 34 million trees felled. Eastern Visayas is the second highest region in terms of coconut production. In 2013, coconut production in the region fell 8.3% from 2012 to 2013 but the impact of the typhoon will be felt more in the 2014 production, which has yet to be released by the government. Manufacturing dependent on coconuts such as coconut oil production was also affected. Coconut oil exports from January to November 2014 was down by around 25% from the same period last year.

Months after Typhoon Yolanda struck, many coconut farmers in Eastern Visayas have yet to receive support from the Philippine government. Even the clearing of felled coconut trees was not done. Coconut farmers say that clearing the farms of coconut debris is urgent because of threats of pest infestation to trees that are still standing. It will also take longer to make farmers viable because of overgrowth. They had to rush clearing the farms before the felled coconut trees rot. But they were demanded by landlords to ask for permission before the tenants could clear the land.²²

There was uneven support from the government in terms of seedlings dispersal. The national government distributed coconut seedlings only to some farmers. The PCA itself reported that out of a target of 1.8 million coconut seedlings to be distributed, only 745,674 have been distributed so far. Those who have been given

seeds said that they have not received support to tide over their families between planting and fruit bearing, which would take a minimum of six years. Some farmers complained that the only intervention they got from PCA after the typhoon was two packets of *pinakbet* seeds (referring to vegetables used in the *pinakbet* dish such as okra, string beans, eggplant, bitter melon, and squash).²³

Farmers have to find various means to cope. There were some farmers who were able to sell vegetables harvested from their farms, which brought in a smaller income, while waiting for the coconut seedlings from the national government to grow and mature. Some farmers made use of the lumber from the damaged coconut trees to earn about Php70 (US\$1.60) per piece. Others left their farming life to participate in alternative livelihood programs being offered by aid groups.²⁴

Many tenants and small coconut farmers have become more indebted because of lack of support from the government. In Bgy. Tacuranga, Leyte, small coconut farmers face interest rates as high as 120% from loan sharks (usurers), because they have not received any financial help from the government.²⁵

Small coconut farmers and tenants are in deeper poverty more than ever. Food crops such as bananas, palay, corn and peanuts, which were then ready for harvesting were wiped out. This resulted in greater poverty and hunger especially among women and children. Food prices increased, which resulted in more hunger as farmers did not have money.²⁶

In terms of fisheries, there is no data available for volume of production in commercial and marine municipal fisheries in Eastern Visayas for 2012 to 2014. Only inland municipal fisheries volume of production is available. Inland municipal fish production declined by 2.3% in the first quarter of 2014 compared to the same period in 2013. There were also declines in crustacean (-33.3%) and mollusks (7.1%) production region-wide.²⁷



Leyte province had the worst decline in inland municipal fish production at negative 71.4%, followed by Western Samar at (14%).²⁸ (See Table 17)

There is decreased fishery production after Typhoon Yolanda. There is so much debris in the waters that natural corals and their artificial reefs have been destroyed.²⁹ The Tacloban Urban Fisherfolk Association said that before Typhoon Yolanda, they could catch at least five kilos on a good day. But at present, a good catch would only yield five pieces of fish. There has also been stiffer competition among the fisherfolk of 43 coastal barangays in Tacloban City. Before the typhoon, the city agricultural office only had 200 plus registered fishers, but the registry grew to 10,000 after Typhoon Yolanda.³⁰ This has been observed as a response to the distribution of boats to fisherfolk by humanitarian organizations. Yet the yield has substantially declined.

Poorer than ever

The destruction wrought by Typhoon Yolanda has led to the increased poverty of already impoverished areas. As a result of loss of livelihood and homes, and damages incurred in agricultural and fisheries, typhoon survivors are struggling and find themselves mired in poverty.

According to NEDA based on data from APIS, the increased poverty incidence among Filipino individuals and families is attributed to the rapid rise in food prices, particularly rice, and the effects of Typhoon Yolanda during the first semester of 2014.

From 24.6% during the first half of 2013, poverty incidence among Filipino individuals increased 1.2 percentage points to 25.8% in the first half of 2014. In terms of poverty incidence among Filipino families, this rose by 1.1 percentage points from 18.8% in first semester 2013 to 20.0% during the same period of 2014.

Meanwhile, 10 out of 17 regions experienced double-digit increases in their poverty thresholds due to higher food prices. Among these, the highest increase in poverty threshold was in Eastern Visayas with 14.2%,

which NEDA stated could possibly be due to Typhoon Yolanda. Overall poverty thresholds rose to 9.4% in the first semester of 2014. Leyte was not included among the sample households for income and poverty estimates since no survey has been conducted there since Typhoon Yolanda.

Table 17. Inland municipal fisheries volume of production in Eastern Visayas, First Quarter 2013-2014 (in metric tons)

Specie and Region and Province	First Quarter 2013	First Quarter 2014
Fish		
Eastern Visayas	116.7	114.0
Biliran	0.1	0.1
Eastern Samar	14.8	13.5
Leyte	0.7	0.2
Northern Samar	91.2	91.7
Southern Leyte	-	-
Western Samar	10.0	8.6
Crustaceans		
Eastern Visayas	23.7	15.8
Biliran	-	-
Eastern Samar	8.5	4.6
Leyte	3.6	0.2
Northern Samar	10.4	9.9
Southern Leyte	0.5	0.5
Western Samar	0.6	0.7
Molluscs		
Eastern Visayas	11.2	10.4
Biliran	-	-
Eastern Samar	0.4	0.0
Leyte	-	-
Northern Samar	9.3	8.8
Southern Leyte	0.5	0.5
Western Samar	1.0	1.0

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority-Bureau of Agricultural Statistics Statistical Database

Endnotes

- 1 *2012 Official Full Year Poverty Statistics*, Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistical Coordination Board (PSA-NSCB), December 2013.
- 2 *2012 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES)*, Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office (PSA-NSO).
- 3 *2011 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS)*, Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office (PSA-NSO).
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- 6 *2011 Field Health Service Information System (FHSIS)*, Department of Health (DOH),
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- 13 "Statement of NEDA VIII on the 2013 Performance of Eastern Visayas Regional Economy", National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), accessed at <http://nro8.neda.gov.ph/statement-of-neda-viii-on-the-2013-performance-of-eastern-visayas-regional-economy>.
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People's response

There were concerted efforts by various people's organizations to bring not only relief to affected areas but also capacity-building to affected communities. Many of these are community to community efforts in coordination with People Surge, the alliance of Typhoon Yolanda victims, survivors, organizations and individuals who joined together in the common goal of helping the typhoon victims and minimizing if not preventing the risk from similar calamities. These organizations formed under Balsa have extended relief, health and medical services, capacity-building, and solidarity with the survivors.

There has been active participation from volunteer health workers, professionals, medical and allied students to provide relief and medical missions to survivors under the *Samahang Operasyon Sagip* (SOS). SOS was able to serve 89 communities with 13,139 families in Eastern Visayas.¹

Peasant groups under the *Operasyon Sagip Kanayunan* (Operation Rescue the Countryside), which include Rural Missionaries of the Philippines (RMP), *Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas* (KMP or Peasant Movement

of the Philippines), *Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya ng Pilipinas* (PAMALAKAYA or National Federation of Small Fisherfolks Organization in the Philippines), National Federation of Women Farmers (AMIHAN), and *Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura* (UMA or Agricultural Workers Union), and the *Sentro ng Repormang Agraryo* (SENTRA or Center for Agrarian Reform) held relief operations in Western Samar to farming communities. They delivered food supplies and other basic necessities during the first mission, and organic vegetable seeds and water pump in the succeeding missions.

Labor groups under their relief arm, Task Force Obrero, also provided relief assistance to 2,411 families in communities of Isabel, Leyte; Mambusao in Capiz; and Calinog and Capaz in Iloilo. Workers' groups and labor unions in Tacloban, Ormoc City, Maasin and Simangan, Leyte were also beneficiaries of the relief mission. Local organizations were also beneficiaries of solar-powered generators, solar chargers, battery-powered LED lamps, and tents to be used by the community.²



Nearly a year after Typhoon Yolanda, people's aspirations still revolve around the satisfaction of basic needs, which implies the failure of current government efforts to deliver much-needed intervention in times of calamities. In the IBON survey in Eastern Visayas, the respondents said that among the people's aspirations that need to be prioritized, enough food supply comes first (91.7% of total respondents). This is followed by sustainable livelihood with 89.7%; health services, 88.3%; strong, safe dwelling unit, 84.8%; education, 84.7%; clean, safe drinking water, 83.3%; electricity, 68.7%; consultation and participation in rehabilitation efforts, 60%; and reconstruction of infrastructure, 50.7 percent.³

SURVIVORS SPEAK

Relying on themselves

What have the survivors done? In their opinion, what should have been the better response?

In Tanauan, according to the participants, they all helped clean up the debris from Yolanda devastation. They have attended seminars on how to start all over again so they can avail of livelihood assistance. They have existing fishermen's association and fish vendors' association, which help members make livelihoods and put up small funds for trainings for alternative livelihood sources.

Meanwhile, somebody has been assigned to regularly monitor the weather even if there is no community training yet on disaster coping mechanisms. For the participants, the NGOs and other organizations are more preferred than government, and their assistance should be directly given to the communities and not coordinated anymore with the government so there will be no politics involved.

Likewise in Tacloban City, according to the participants, relief assistance from NGOs should be channeled directly to the people and not pass through barangay officials or the mayors and the DSWD. Government, based on their experience, would just play favorites in relief giving.

The NAPSE farmers on the other hand helped each other in clearing their farms. They also maintain a two-hectare communal farm and they divide the returns among themselves. They take turns in keeping watch over their community especially after the strafing incident. It was the partylist Bayan Muna which helped

have their organization registered and assisted them in the resolution of their land dispute case.

For the farmers, in order to be better prepared for disasters, the problem that should be resolved is land ownership. According to the farmers, their vulnerabilities to disasters stem from their lack of access to their production resources. The government should redistribute land and provide capital and inputs support to help them rise above poverty.

In Guiuan, the participants believed that there should be trainings on disaster preparedness and response. They also see the urgency of constructing sturdy evacuation centers. Warnings should be in Tagalog or language understood by the people. There should be no favoritism and politicking in disaster response. Likewise in Biliran, participants said that there should be no more politicking. Livelihood and shelter assistance should be prioritized.

In Pinabacdao, aside from *bayanihan*, the community implemented *balik-pagsasaka* (return to farm). They borrowed capital for farming. The People Surge went to Pinabacdao to help them forward their demands to the LGU. They asked the Pinabacdao LGU to extend assistance to the farmers and provide cash for work to help them get by, because the cash for work was forwarded to the DSWD but was not deposited in the bank and not given to the farmers and citizens.

They are strengthening their organization in Pinabacdao and continuing with their *bayanihan* to prepare themselves for other disasters. Joining People Surge and the various mass actions were effective in getting their demands from an otherwise apathetic government, according to the participants.

PO TALK

A year after

Coconut farmers in Eastern Visayas have not recovered yet from the devastation wrought by Typhoon Yolanda. Coconut trees were destroyed, and worse, traders bought whatever was left of the coconut products at very low prices. Farmers also lost their farm tools, animals such as carabaos, fishing tools, among others, which they had saved up for years and were gone in just a few hours.

The government's response under the PCA was not enough. In Pastrana for instance, coconut farmers requested for 2,000 sacks of coconut seedlings to start again, but the government provided only 600 sacks. Only the coconut farmers with lands benefited from the Php3,000 incentive provided by the PCA for every hectare of coconut farms replanted with coconut seedlings.

In Tacloban City, farmers are slowly recovering with planting of vegetables for both food and income supplement, but traders take advantage by buying low at Php2 per kilo of string beans for instance. On the other hand, prices of basic commodities spiked so high that farmers can no longer afford to buy these. Rice is being sold at Php2,500 per cavan. To get by, some farmers resorted to bartering their produce of rootcrops and vegetables for rice and other necessities in the bunkhouses in Tacloban City.

The Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap or Kadamay, the association of urban poor communities in Tacloban City, said most of the urban poor in the city used to live along coastal areas in the NDZs. Urban poor communities usually source income from fishing and stevedoring in piers and in public wet markets. Some are doing carpentry for others, while others work part-time as tricycle or jeepney drivers whenever the owners or actual drivers take a rest.

In Tanauan, particularly in Bgy. Sta Cruz, the first two weeks after Typhoon Yolanda up to the second month, the people were all dependent on

relief including water, as there was nothing left for the survivors to live on. The people ate whatever was provided even the rice that was submerged in floodwaters. The survivors fished in the rivers even if there were still dead bodies in them. Part of the people's catch was for consumption and whatever was left was sold in the market.

Lately, JICA together with the local organization in Bgy. Sta Cruz implemented the soft-bone *bangus* (milkfish) and oysters processing for export. JICA is helping them in the reconstruction of fish pens and oyster farms. Oxfam on the other hand is proposing to take care of the fingerlings and feeds.

In Bgy. Cabuynan, majority (80%) are fishers and two zones of the barangay are affected by the NDZ policy. After Typhoon Yolanda, only the government employees (10% of Cabuynan's workforce) were able to get back to work. Even if most have been provided with boats, there is less fish to catch. Making fishing activities illegal by the NDZ policy also aggravates their plight.

Social services have not yet gone back to normal. Some of the classes are still being held in tents. The barangay health center was repaired by Save the Children, but the facilities remain wanting. People go to the public hospital in Palo for hospitalization.

Prices have increased. A ganta (a Filipino dry measure equivalent to 2.2 kilos) of rice costs Php110 and the people complain they cannot afford to buy nutritious food for their children. Some NGOs provided vegetables seeds and people planted these so they could have free vegetables from their backyards.

In Guiuan, Mercedes and Salcedo in Eastern Samar, almost 90% of coconut farmers who are members of Coco Care are economically paralyzed. The coconut seedlings provided by the government were over matured and died two weeks after they were distributed to the coconut farmers. Farmers have shifted to vegetable farming and cash for work or construction, while others rely on relief from NGOs.

PO TALK

Changing government

In affected areas where there is hardly any assistance from the national government, LGUs or NGOs, the POs facilitated the entry of their network of organizations to provide relief of food and medicines, including livelihood and shelter assistance.

Tabang Eastern Visayas served as facilitator of the delivery of assistance to survivors for other groups like Balsa Mindanao; SOS, which gave assistance on health and medical mission, food, seeds, tools of production including pump boats for fishermen; Center for Trade Union Human Rights (CTUHR), which provided one big pump boat, and work carabaos; Sagip Kanayunan, Rotary (Cebu) from the UK, which gave kitchen utensils, foot-powered tricycles, water, and food; Caraga Care; RMP, which gave out work carabaos, rice mill, food for work, cash for work, and clothes; the Redemptorist brothers who gave out farm implements and pump boats; and also a group of Filipino-American volunteers.

Tabang Eastern Visayas also facilitated party list groups that extended assistance. These are Anakpawis, Kabataan, Bayan Muna, and Gabriela Women's Party. Tabang also facilitated lawyers from the public attorney's office.

After Typhoon Yolanda, Sagupa and the Eastern Visayas chapter of farmers under KMP allied with People Surge. It focused on organizing farmers among Yolanda survivors and campaigning for mass production to revive lost livelihoods. Sagupa also facilitated relief and rehabilitation from network of organizations and NGOs so that relief of food, seedlings of vegetables and palay, tools such as tractors, and shelter support such as GI sheets, plywood, etc. could reach areas not reached by relief giving organizations.

The social practice of collective work (*bayanihan*) has helped rebuild the community resilience. The role of Tabang has been to promote collective work. It believes that nature of relief and rehabilitation assistance should contribute towards strengthening the unity of the communities. The communities on the other hand appreciate the importance of organization. The fisherfolk for instance who were assisted by Tabang in establishing their mussels mariculture are practicing collective or communal work. They divide among themselves the tasks of production, harvesting and marketing.

As for the farmers, collective work in agricultural production is important. Sagupa promotes the establishment of communal gardens. It facilitates trainings from NGOs and organizes the communities towards the campaign for genuine agrarian reform and sufficient and sustainable livelihood.

Kadamay, on the other hand, always investigates the urgent issues affecting the communities, including the problem of demolitions. The organization also ensures the education of its members by continuous discussions of the situation.

In Tanauan, in Bgy. Sta Cruz, the community does not have a plan or program, but the people are willing to invest their labor to start anything as sustainable source of livelihood and income. The members of the Sta. Cruz Talaba and Fishpen Association were not provided with daily wage for the construction of fish pens and oyster farms with the JICA, but they are willing to contribute as long as the organization assisting is serious about its objectives.

Relief and rehabilitation should be targeted to the vulnerable, according to the POs. Assistance should be designed in such a way that it prepares people to be resilient and sustainable. Government should encourage people's participation and work together for their welfare.

Meanwhile, problems in warehousing and transport of goods for relief assistance should be resolved and that assistance being provided should be holistic. The government is always slow in this regard; it must be quick enough in extending emergency relief and assistance. As regards coconut production, diversification must be encouraged over monocropping.

For the urban poor, there should be good and informed preparation for impending hazards. There should be genuine development and progress, and the people should be given back their lost livelihoods instead of being driven away from their sources of income in the coastal areas. Ambulant food vendors should not be driven out of the public market.

The farmers will only recover if genuine agrarian reform is implemented. The government should have given equal priority to agriculture because of the immensity of the damage to crops, which is the main source of livelihood for the millions of farmers affected by Typhoon Yolanda.

Farming communities have increased vulnerabilities especially those relying only on coconut farming. The slow response by government adds to their hardships, and worse the government implements the wrong policies like distributing hybrid seeds. People are demanding the government to make concrete measures and readiness for natural hazards by being able to provide quick and safe evacuation of communities.

According to the POs, politics should never influence development priorities and implementation of programs especially during times of disasters. Programs implemented should be according to the needs of the people. There should be transparency, but most of all, there should be community consultation and participation.

People Surge, which includes various organizations and volunteers from religious organizations and church workers, academe, workers, peasants, urban and rural poor, professionals, lawyers, small entrepreneurs and concerned government employees, has put forward their demands as victims of Typhoon Yolanda.⁴ These were presented to President Aquino in February 2014. Their immediate demands are:

1. Provide Php40,000 immediate financial relief to every affected family. This is based on the framework that relief distribution has been insufficient and rehabilitation plan is uncertain. This amount only covers for at least two months of decent living for a family of six in Eastern Visayas prior to the typhoon.
2. Scrap the 'no-build zone' policy that enforces outright land grabbing, effective demolition and eviction of the victims from their homes and livelihood. Provide them with free and adequate housing, sufficient supply of clean water, and electricity.
3. Sustain the distribution of relief assistance of food and water to the victims both in the urban and rural communities until such time that their economic lives are relatively stable and recovered.
4. Provide financial subsidy or monetary relief to the affected families in farming and fishing communities especially to those whose subsistence and livelihoods primarily depend on agriculture.
5. Impose price controls on basic commodities and moratorium on oil, power and water rate hikes.
6. Facilitate a speedy restoration and access to vital public utilities such as water, power, transportation and communication installations in severely affected areas. Provide alternatives such as solar panels and the like as deemed necessary.
7. Immediately pull out local and foreign military forces and suspend all counter-insurgency programs in typhoon-struck urban and rural areas. The continuing presence of these military forces causes anxiety and economic sabotage and thus intensifies hunger and poverty especially in remote areas where farmers are constrained from tending their farms for fear of military harassments. Re-channel the budget allocation for defense to a pro-people relief and rehabilitation program instead.
8. Provide immediate employment and livelihood for the affected families to arrest the deepening hunger and poverty among them.
9. Hold public consultations in crafting the rehabilitation and reconstruction plan and ensure that the victims, not the big businesses and landlords, are at the core of this plan. Ensure transparency and accountability during implementation.

To commemorate the first year of Typhoon Yolanda, around 25,000 people gathered in Tacloban to reiterate their demand for justice over the Aquino government's negligence to address their needs.⁵ Fully aware that the government plan in rehabilitation and recovery extends to several years with the private sector taking the lead, People Surge also demands medium-term measures to address public services and facilities that extend free services to survivors. These are:

1. Provide adequate assistance and speed up the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector to ensure food security and restore the livelihood of affected families.
2. Hasten the repair and reconstruction of public hospitals and ensure free access especially to indigents and victims.
3. Hasten the repair and reconstruction of schools, provide adequate educational assistance to basic education and ensure free matriculation for public higher educational institutions.
4. Provide adequate assistance to the surviving families for the loss of lives, property and livelihood.
5. Implement a one-year tax moratorium (such as business, income, and real property tax) that aims to benefit local businesses and small entrepreneurs in severely affected areas.
6. Allocate additional funds to LGUs in Yolanda-stricken areas that would serve as special calamity funds to facilitate the prompt delivery of basic social services. Ensure transparency and accountability in its implementation.

Lastly, because People Surge recognizes the historical and structural roots of the country's vulnerability to natural hazards, People Surge demands the rollback of destructive policies that led to damages and loss in a scale such as Typhoon Yolanda. These long-term demands are:

1. Review all government policies that are destructive to people's lives and the environment such as mining policies and related anti-people policies. Revisit the laws on disaster risk preparedness and response.
2. Implement genuine agrarian reform under the auspices of a national industrialization program as a key solution to mass poverty and its consequent people's vulnerability to disasters and climate change impacts.
3. Hold the Aquino government criminally liable for its negligence in ensuring the safety and welfare of its people. Hold the Aquino government responsible for its ineptness and incompetence in the rescue, relief and rehabilitation efforts.

Endnotes

- 1 *Samahang Operasyong Sagip Newsletter*, Issues 1-3, November 2013, December 2013 and January 2014.
- 2 “Labor groups provide relief assistance to Yolanda victims”, Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), 7 January 2014, accessed at <http://ctuhr.org/labor-groups-provide-relief-assistance-to-yolanda-victims>.
- 3 Eastern Visayas Household Survey on the Impact of Typhoon Yolanda, *op. cit.*
- 4 People Surge, accessed at [http://www.peoplesurge.org/sites/peoplesurge/files/downloads/People%20Surge%20\(Cocept%20Paper%20-%20Final\)_long%20ver.docx](http://www.peoplesurge.org/sites/peoplesurge/files/downloads/People%20Surge%20(Cocept%20Paper%20-%20Final)_long%20ver.docx).
- 5 Salamat, Marya, “Tens of thousands of survivors gather in Tacloban to demand justice”, *Bulatlat.com*, 11 November 2014, accessed at <http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/11/11/tens-of-thousands-of-survivors-gather-at-tacloban-to-demand-justice/#sthash.0QtMgFKC.dpuf>.



Conclusion

A country's exposure to natural hazards does not alone make it vulnerable to disasters, according to the United Nations. It is when the hazard is combined with poor adaptive capacity, i.e. human vulnerability or sensitivity, the lack of preventive measures and human activities that have harmed the natural environment, that disaster takes place. The Philippines ranks 3rd in disaster risks in the list of 173 countries, next only to small countries such as Vanuatu and Tonga. The Philippines' high disaster vulnerability is clearly a function of chronic poverty and economic underdevelopment as well as policies that cater to elite and foreign plunder of natural resources and reduce government responsibilities.¹

Typhoon Yolanda brought to fore the country's poor adaptive capacity. This was manifested clearly by the Aquino government's lack of preparations to reduce the risks and by its post-calamity negligence as well as opportunism. The disaster brought out deep-seated faults in economics and governance as well as highlighted the role of systemic corruption, patronage politics and dependence on foreign powers in reducing the country's overall adaptive capacity.

It is not as though the Philippine government is not aware of the country's exposure to natural hazards and

extreme climate conditions. The Philippine archipelago is composed of 7,100 islands, mostly low-lying areas, making it susceptible to sea level rise. It has the longest coastline in the world, making it susceptible to storm surges. Its mountainous topography and steep slopes, on the other hand, sits on a complex fault system that runs all throughout the archipelago, making it prone to landslides and mudslides.

The country is greatly influenced by monsoons, which bring significant rainfall in the case of the Southwest monsoon or cooler and drier weather in the case of the Northeast monsoon. It is also prone to the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), the irregular cycle of warming and cooling of the sea surface temperatures of the Pacific Ocean along Ecuador, Peru and Chile, which contributes to periodic drought and extreme sea levels and subsequent flooding across the southwest Pacific, including the Philippine archipelago. Lastly, around 19 typhoons enter the Philippine area of responsibility in a typical year, usually 6 to 9 of which make landfall. These typhoons are usually associated with high winds, storm surges and extreme rainfall.

These challenges are permanent features of the Philippines and its geographic region. They are not

new to the Philippines, and the Aquino government is also not unaware how anthropogenic climate change has significantly altered these climate challenges to result in climate extremes and surprises. The country has experienced the worst catastrophes due to the increasing frequency of super-typhoons in the last four decades, which scientists are tracing to climate change.

Yet, the Aquino government failed to think and apply hard lessons. It failed to strengthen the country's adaptive capacity, unfortunately because its mindset has been solely focused on private business and in running the government like a business. The Aquino government has faltered in all phases of response – from disaster preparedness, search and rescue, relief, rehabilitation, to reconstruction, including accounting of relief goods and funds, because of its privatization policy and reliance on the private sector.

The presence of the national government was not felt in the most critical hours after Typhoon Yolanda hit. Immediately it relied on the private sector to do search and rescue, still it could not mobilize its own transportation and communication facilities to deliver relief, since these had already been privatized. The deficiency of the government's infrastructure-centered PPP projects came to fore as the Aquino government sorely lacked food and water relief mechanisms as well as sturdy evacuation centers. It was even incapable of burying the dead.

Relief was as scarce as original resources were, and relief operations stopped even if survivors were still scrambling to find food. Ironically still, the Aquino government sent military troops to stop the survivors from 'looting'.

What was further revealed was that at the height of crisis situations, the government's response would be stuck in or continue to be dictated by corruption and patronage politics. Corruption and politicking in disaster response, including release of discretionary funds to serve political ends or the non-release of relief goods and funds, sadly characterized what transpired even a year after Typhoon Yolanda. National and local officials engaged in blame game in the middle of relief operations, while the much-needed relief packs were rotting in government warehouses or were being sold in commercial establishments. Official relief goods were reportedly not reaching disaster areas, not only because government response was focused on Tacloban City but also due to patronage politics where provinces of the administration's allies were being prioritized.

The Aquino administration also sought to tax donations that were not going through the government, especially after it became obvious that much of the aid coming in was

being coursed through humanitarian organizations, civic groups and private institutions instead of the government.

Typhoon Yolanda set a record on disaster response as being the most militarized. The US has increasingly used a militarized disaster response to justify prolonged US military intervention, like what it did in Haiti during the earthquake in 2010. The Aquino government, on the other hand, had used the scenario where the US was airlifting survivors and flying in and out of the areas as justification for the framework agreement with the US for increased rotational presence.

The role of the media in disaster coverage also showed conflicting interests in reportage, whether as a media outfit with social responsibilities, a charity and humanitarian organization, or as a corporation with vested interests. What became obvious with Typhoon Yolanda was that in addition to the confused roles of media, the media also acted as government's propaganda machinery that seemingly downplayed official negligence and accountability.

In the end, irony of ironies, Yolanda-affected areas have suddenly become an investors' dream. In a more-business-than-usual approach, the Philippine government has adopted a framework that purportedly rebuilds disaster-stricken countries but in the way that prioritizes corporate interests. Coastal areas are to be developed for other commercial interests such as high-end tourism rather than fisheries, mining and property development rather than agriculture. With a 'no-build zone' policy that has been proven to have disregarded the plight of survivors in Haiti, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, Thailand, Maldives, Pakistan, Central American countries and even in New Orleans in the US, the Philippine government has chosen to uphold corporate interests in reconstruction and recovery.

'Build back better' does not address existing social and human sensitivity as root causes of vulnerability, in the case of Eastern Visayas, the prevailing backward conditions of its agrarian economy prior to Yolanda. The region is mired in feudal structures of ownership and production that have chronically impoverished its population. The government's policies of resource plunder, such as liberalized mining, have only served to exacerbate the erosion of the natural economy on which the majority of the people depend for life and livelihood. It is not the focus of rehabilitation efforts to solve these basic problems that have been there beforehand and have weakened the country's adaptive capacity. On the contrary, there are indications that the rehabilitation plan is even bound to exacerbate the country's lack of adaptive capacity including a resilient economy.

Survivors have taken on the advocacy to demand the provision of basic needs even after more than a year, make the Aquino government accountable for the vast damage, to expose and oppose the corporate-led rehabilitation plan, and push for policies that put an end to natural resources plunder and exploitative production structures. If there were one bright spot in the middle of this devastating social storm, it would be how the Yolanda survivors have organized themselves

to rebuild and increase their capacities for disaster preparedness, disaster risk reduction, people-centered responses, and community development. One crucial element in this organization is the recognition that only by striking at the roots of disaster vulnerability shall efforts towards disaster management become truly meaningful. Under the current circumstances, however, without a doubt this will have to be spearheaded by the people's movement.

Endnotes

1 *Birdtalk Yearend 2013: Deepening Crisis and Disillusionment, op. cit.*

Annexes

Annex 1. Key informants

Name	Office / Organization Represented	Date	Position
<i>International and Local Non-Government Organizations</i>			
Diana Ragub	Communication with Communities of International Organization for Migration	19 September 2014	Coordinator
Gustavo Cavero	Save the Children	26 September 2014	Program Manager for Food Security and Livelihoods
Kaiser Rejve	OXFAM	1 October 2014	Programme Manager for Tacloban & Eastern Leyte Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) Response and Recovery Programme
Jazmin A. Jerusalem	Leyte Center for Development	2 October 2014	Executive Director
Andrew Martin	United Nations Office for the Act Alliance	3 October 2014	Deputy Head of Office
Joselito Sosmeña		3 October 2014	Field Coordinator, Tacloban Field Office
Fr. Arnold Cordeta	Biliran Environmental Action Movement	22 October 2014	Spokesperson
<i>Local Government Units</i>			
Ramil M. Vierras	Barangay Kaboynan, Tanauan, Leyte	15 September 2014	Barangay Captain
Noel Martinez	Barangay 52, Tacloban City	17 September 2014	Barangay Captain
Jerome Fabre	Municipal Planning and Development Office, Tanauan, Leyte	18 September 2014	Clerk
Ildebrando Bernadas	Tacloban City	19 September 2014	Assistant City Administrator
Susan Parilla	Naval, Biliran	22 September 2014	Municipal Mayor
Marina Tolibas	Tanauan, Leyte	23 September 2014	Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer
Rosemarie Bedinas	Pinabacdao, Western Samar	24 September 2014	Municipal Vice Mayor
Nelson Badulid	Pinabacdao, Western Samar	24 September 2014	Municipal Agriculturist
Imelda Fabelani	Pinabacdao, Western Samar	24 September 2014	Municipal Planning and Development Officer
Zaldy Pacaira	Pinabacdao, Western Samar	24 September 2014	Municipal Engineer
Dr. Mario Quijano	Pinabacdao, Western Samar	25 September 2014	Municipal Mayor
Dr. Gloria E. Fabrigas, MD MPH	Tacloban City	25 September 2014	City Social Welfare Development Officer
Fritzie D. Odron	Giporlos, Eastern Samar	28 September 2014	Municipal Vice Mayor
Maria Nenita Ecleo	Guiuan, Eastern Samar	29 September 2014	Municipal Planning and Development Officer
Dominico Petilla	Leyte	3 October 2014	Provincial Governor
<i>People's Organizations</i>			
Efren Caneda	Sta. Cruz Talaba and Fishpen Association	15 September 2014	Association President
Ramil M. Vierras	Bislig-Kaboynan Farmers and Fishermen's Association	15 September 2014	Association President
Jose Padron	COCO Care	28 September 2014	Executive Director
Bert Ada	Tabang Eastern Visayas	2 October 2014	Executive Director
Joel Reyes Abaño	Kadamay Tacloban	2 October 2014	Spokesperson
Nestor Lebico, Sr.	SAGUPA Eastern Visayas	2 October 2014	Secretary General

Annex 2. Profile of participants in focus group discussions

Date	Location	Sex	Range of Age	Sources of livelihood	Barangay / Shelter type
13 September 2014	Tanauan, Leyte	Female - 11; Male - 8	26-62	Fishing Fish vending Informal employment (laundry washer, pedicab driver)	Bgy. San Roque (no build zone area) Gawad Kalinga Village in Bgy. Pago (formerly residing in Bgy. San Roque)
17 September 2014	Tacloban City	Female - 5; Male - 3	30-65	Fishing Informal employment	Bgy. 52 (no build zone area) IPI bunkhouse (formerly residing in Bgys 71 and 88) Abucay bunkhouse (formerly residing in Bgys 37 and 88)
21 September 2014	Naval, Biliran	Female - 12; Male - 2	25-70	Farming Informal employment (laundry washer, tricycle driver laborer, food vending) Churchworker Government employee	Bgy. Pablo Bgy. Bigaa Bgy. Caray-caray Bgy. Antipolo Naval Proper
24 September 2014	Pinabacdao, Western Samar	Female - 4; Male - 10	43-55	Farming Fish vending Informal employment (laborer) Small neighborhood retail store	Bgy Nabog Bgy Paras-anun Bgy, Mambug
28 September 2014	Guiuan, Eastern Samar	Female - 2; Male - 15	24-65	Fishing	Bgy. 6 (no build zone area) Salug (bunkhouse) Eastern Samar State University (tent city)
30 September 2014	Tacloban City	Female - 4; Male - 6	24-69	Farming	Bgy. 97 (Cabalawan)

Annex 3. Nationwide Household Survey on Institutional Response After the Typhoon Yolanda

	Frequency	Percentage
Respondents' Profile		
<i>Age</i>		
18-21 years old	137	9.7
22-35 years old	401	28.4
36-56 years old	613	43.4
57 years old and above	247	17.5
No answer	16	1.1
Total	1,414	100.0
<i>Sex</i>		
Female	820	58.0
Male	511	36.1
No answer	83	5.9
Total	1,414	100.0
<i>Sector</i>		
Worker	304	21.5
Farmer	183	12.9
Employee	79	5.6
Professional	43	3.0
Businessman/woman	77	5.4
Student	83	5.9
Housewife/husband	493	34.9
Unemployed	95	6.7
Others	54	3.8
No answer	3	0.2
Total	1,414	100.0
In your opinion, is the national government's response to disaster risks and damage caused by the typhoon Yolanda enough?		
Yes	276	19.5
No	923	65.3
Don't know	191	13.5
No answer	24	1.7
Total	1,414	100.0
Did you notice anything wrong with regard to the government's response after the typhoon Yolanda?		
Yes	671	47.5
No	495	35.0
Don't know	232	16.4
No answer	16	1.1
Total	1,414	100.0

Annex 4. Eastern Visayas Household Survey on the impact of Typhoon Yolanda

	Frequency	Percentage
Respondents' Profile		
<i>Age</i>		
18-21 years old	74	6.8
22-35 years old	225	20.6
36-56 years old	490	44.9
57 years old and above	285	26.1
No answer	18	1.6
Total	1,092	100.0
<i>Sex</i>		
Female	694	63.6
Male	330	30.2
No answer	68	6.2
Total	1,092	100.0
<i>Sector</i>		
Worker	115	10.5
Farmer	322	29.5
Fisherfolk	175	16.0
Employee	28	2.6
Professional	9	0.8
Businessman/woman	82	7.5
Student	30	2.7
Housewife/husband	254	23.3
Unemployed	63	5.8
Others	10	0.9
No answer	4	0.4
Total	1,092	100.0
What is your family's primary source of income?		
Farming	395	36.2
Fishing	251	23.0
Labor	235	21.5
Own business	122	11.2
Employment-government	27	2.5
Employment-private	16	1.5
Others	8	0.7
Pensioner	4	0.4
Support from relatives	4	0.4
None	27	2.5
No answer	11	1.0
Total	1,092	100.0

